Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Dheeraj Kumar Ojha on 19 March, 2021
Author: Dinesh Kumar Singh
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH ?Court No. - 16 1. Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 485 of 2020 Revisionist :- State of U.P. Opposite Party :- Dheeraj Kumar Ojha Counsel for Revisionist :- G.A. 2. Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 486 of 2020 Revisionist :- State of U.P. Opposite Party :- Dheeraj Kumar Ojha Counsel for Revisionist :- G.A. 3. Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 487 of 2020 Revisionist :- State of U.P. Opposite Party :- Dheeraj Kumar Ojha Counsel for Revisionist :- G.A. 4.Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION DEFECTIVE No. - 539 of 2020 Revisionist :- State of U.P. Opposite Party :- Dheeraj Kumar Ojha Counsel for Revisionist :- G.A. 5. Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 484 of 2020 Revisionist :- State of U.P. Opposite Party :- Ram Shiromani Shukla & Anr. Counsel for Revisionist :- G.A. Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh,J.
Re :- Condonation Applications
1. Heard Sri Kuldeep Pati Tripathi, Additional Advocate General and Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State-revisionist.
2. The reasons stated in the affidavits filed in support of the applications for condonation of delay are sufficient and have explained the delay satisfactorily for hearing these revisions, particularly, in view of the orders passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in suo motu Writ Petition No.3 of 2020 on 23.03.2020 and 06.05.2020.
3. Accordingly, the applications are allowed.
4. The delay in filing the revisions is hereby condoned.
Order on Revisions
1. Heard Sri Kuldeep Pati Tripathi, Additional Advocate General and Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State-revisionist and perused the record.
2. Since these revisions under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. have been filed against the common order dated 10.01.2020, passed by Special Judge, M.P. M.L.A./Additional Session Judge, Court No.5, Pratapgarh in Case No.2372 of 2018 (State Vs. Dheeraj Kumar Ojha & others), arising out of Case Crime No.462 of 2010, under Sections 353, 352, 342, 186, 504 I.P.C.; Case No.2375 of 2018 (State Vs. Dheeraj Kumar Ojha & others), Case Crime No.329 of 2005, under Sections 147, 341, 376, 353 I.P.C. & 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act; Case No.410 of 2017 (State Vs. Dheeraj Kumar Ojha & others), arising out of Case Crime No.164 of 2011, under Sections 143, 352, 353, 506 I.P.C. & 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, Police Station Kotwali Nagar, District Pratapgarh; Case No.420 of 2006 (State Vs. Dheeraj Kumar Ojha & others), arising out of Case Crime No.145 of 2006, under Sections 153, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. & 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, Police Station Raniganj, District Pratapgarh; Case No.517 of 2018 (State Vs. Ramshiromani Shukla), arising out of Case Crime No.20 of 2017, under Sections 143, 149, 153, 181, 341 I.P.C. & 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, Police Station Fatanpur, District Pratapgarh, therefore, the same are being decided with a common order.
3. Vide aforesaid orders passed by the learned Special Judge, M.P.M.L.A./Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.5, Pratapgarh, the applications moved by the Prosecutor under Sections 321 Cr.P.C. for withdrawal from prosecution in the aforesaid cases have been rejected.
4. The facts of the case (in Criminal Revision 485 of 2020) are that a written compliant was given by District Welfare Officer, Pratapgarh on 31.07.2010 stating that on the said date she was sitting in her office and doing the official work; at about 11.30 a.m. unsocial elements seized her office and started putting undue pressure for doing illegal work. It was stated that the complainant was the member of schedule tribe/caste and she tried to speak to those people but they misbehaved with her. They entered inside the office of the said official and used indecent language and misbehaved with her. They did not allow her to come out from her office and they continued to seize her office for one and half hours which affected the government and public work. It was also stated that the aforesaid incident was reported on 01.08.2010 in the newspaper "Amar Ujala" with photographs.
5. The facts of the case (in Criminal Revision No.486 of 2020) are that an FIR was registered on 20.06.2005 on the written complaint of Sub Inspector Daya Shankar Singh who was Incharge of Kotwali Nagar. As per the allegation in the FIR, on 20.06.2005 Sub Inspector Daya Shankar Singh along with other police team was on patrol duty on a jeep. The several workers of Bhartiya Janta Mukti Morcha including Dheeraj Ojha, District President and other 20 named persons along with 50 unknown persons had blocked Sadar Road, Pratapgarh from 12.00 o'clock to 01.00 p.m. by putting wooden log on National Highway, as a result thereof no vehicles could ply to the city from Chilbila side nor the vehicles could go from city to Chilbila side. The passengers and commuters faced scorching sunlight and, it caused great inconvenience to the people in general. The police team tried to convince them but they did not budge. The jam created by these people could be opened only after Sub Divisional Magistrate and Circle Officer came there and made them understand.
6. The facts of the case (in Criminal Revision No.487 of 2020) are that on 25.03.2011 the police team in the leadership of SHO, A.K. Ojha was on patrol duty. The police team also reached the District Court in respect of a case at around 11.00 A.M. SHO A.K. Ojha along with 2-3 Constables reached at canteen situated at the District Court premises. Sri Dheeraj Kumar Ojha with his friends Nitendra Chadha, Abhishek Mishra, Lalit Tiwari, Vijay Mishra, Achutyanand Pandey and 5-6 unknown persons met him and started abusing the SHO. Dheeraj Kumar Ojha said that it was the same SHO who locked them on 24.03.2011. Dheeraj Kumar Ojha and his friends became aggressive to assault the police team, however, the situation, on intervention of some Advocates, could be defused. These people threatened the police team.
7. The facts of the case (in Criminal Revision No.539 of 2020) are that an inquiry conducted with regard to news regarding "scuffle between S.D.M. and workers of Bhartiya Janta Mukti Morcha during burning effigy" published in the newspaper "Danik Jagran" at page no.3 on 26.07.2006, wherein it was found that on 25.07.2006 at about 10.25 A.M. in the leadership of Dheeraj Ojha, President of Bhartiya Janta Mukti Morcha, Sanjay Mishra, Sarvendra Dubey, Pawan Kumar, Dheeraj Singh, Ashish Singh, Vinay and 50-60 workers all of sudden entered into court premises at Raniganj and started raising slogans regarding their demand and also tried to burn effigy of Chief Minister, Uttar Pradesh illegally, then S.D.M. Raniganj along with assisting employees tried to make them understand to not make demonstration, but in the leadership of Dheeraj Ojha, his supporters started abusing and burnt the effigy of Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in illegal manner and also misbehaved with S.D.M., as a result of which public at large suffered great inconvenience.
8. The prosecution case (in Criminal Revision No.484 of 2020) is that on 01.02.2017 the Incharge Police Station Fatanpur, District Pratapgarh was on patrol duty in government jeep along with his team. He received an information that some people were reaching the National Highway for making demonstration when the dead body of martyr Vijay Shukla s/o Teerathraj Shukla was reaching with the military order. When the team reached at Fatanpur National Highway then, it was found that candidate Ram Shiromani Shukla along with his supporters and Dheeraj Ojha had jammed the National Highway in violation of Model Code of Conduct, as a result thereof the commuters had faced grave difficulty. Ram Shiromani Shukla and Dheeraj Ojha sat on protest on the National Highway in illegal manner and started raising slogans. On getting information regarding the incident, other police teams also reached there. The police teams tried to make them understand, but these people kept the National Highway blocked for 1-1/2 to 2 hours which resulted the disruption of traffic and those people had violated Section 144 Cr.P.C.
9. In four cases the complainants are the police officials and in one case it is the District Welfare Officer. In all the aforesaid cases, the State Government had taken a decision vide order dated 14.11.2018 to allow the Public Prosecutor to make applications for withdrawal from prosecution.
10. In pursuance of the aforesaid decision, the Public Prosecutor had moved applications for withdrawal from prosecution. In the applications filed under Section 321 Cr.P.C. the Public Prosecutor had stated that he had applied his independent mind, after perusing the case diary, on the facts evidence and other material of the case and he was of the opinion that the decision taken by the Government for withdrawal from prosecution was valid, legal and justified. It was also said that the Public Prosecutor was in total agreement with decision taken by the Government. The evidence collected against the accused was very weak and, the success of the prosecution was doubtful. In the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to withdraw from prosecution, therefore, the applications were filed in the interest of justice and public interest.
11. The Special Judge in its order vide impugned orders has rejected the applications on the ground that the Public Prosecutor did not state that how the evidence collected by the Investigating Agency was weak quality. The Public Prosecutor had stated that he was in complete agreement with the decision taken by the Government to withdraw from the prosecution which would show that the Public Prosecutor had not applied his independent mind and decision to move applications under Section 321 Cr.P.C. had been taken by him only in compliance of the decision taken by the Government to allow him to move the applications. In view thereof, since there was no independent application of mind by the Public Prosecutor, the learned Judge had dismissed the applications.
12. Mr. Dheeraj Ojha had filed an application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. No.618 of 2020 before this Court for quashing of the order dated 10.01.2020 in Case Crime No.517 of 2018. This Court disposed of the said 482 petition allowing him to move discharge application under Section 254(2) Cr.P.C. through Advocate and the trial court was directed to pass an order on the discharge application in accordance with law. The learned trial court vide order dated 09.02.2021 has discharged the said accused Dheeraj Ojha on the ground that there is lack of sufficient evidence against him. The Court has also taken note of the fact that the prosecution had presented an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. in which it was mentioned that the evidence compiled by Investigating Agency was inferior quality. Thus, the trial court itself was of the view that there was insufficient evidence to allow the prosecution against Dheeraj Ojha.
13. The question which requires to be answered in these revisions is "whether the Public Prosecutor while moving the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. is required to mention in details, his analysis and reasoning for reaching to the conclusion that the evidence collected by the prosecution is weak and the success of the prosecution appear to be remote or doubtful or it would be suffice for him to say that he has perused the case diary, material and evidence collected by the prosecution and in his view, it would be in the interest of justice and in public interest to withdraw the prosecution".
14. In the present case, the trial court has said that the Public Prosecutor has not given his reasoning for coming to the conclusion that how the evidence was weak and, therefore, learned trial court has concluded that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his independent mind in moving the applications under Section 321 Cr.P.C. for withdrawal of prosecution.
15. Section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, "Cr.P.C.") provides for withdrawal from prosecution with the power to the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw criminal case under Section 321 Cr.P.C.
16. The scope of Section 321 Cr.P.C., ambit of power and manner in which it has to be exercised by the Public Prosecutor have been dealt with in several decisions by the Supreme Court. Only a few decisions rendered by the Supreme Court would be apt to quote here to throw light on the scope of Section 321 Cr.P.C. and ambit and manner of exercise of the power by the Public Prosecutor under the aforesaid section. Ultimate authority to allow withdrawal from prosecution vests with the Court and the guiding consideration must always be interest of administration of justice when deciding the question whether prosecution should be allowed to be withdrawn or not.
17. In Bansi Lal Versus Chandan Lal and others (1976) 1 SCC 421, the Supreme Court has held in para-5 which, on reproduction, reads as under:-
"5...........Therefore when the Additional Sessions Judge made the impugned order, there was no material before him to warrant the conclusion that sufficient evidence would not be forthcoming to sustain the charges or that there was any reliable subsequent information falsifying the prosecution case or any other circumstance justifying withdrawal of the case against the respondents. Consenting to the withdrawal of the case on the view that the attitude displayed by the prosecution made it "futile" to refuse permission does not certainly serve the administration of justice. If the material before the Additional Sessions Judge was considered sufficient to enable him to frame the charges against the respondents, it is not possible to say that there was no evidence in support of the Prosecution case. The application for stay of the proceeding made before the committing Magistrate cannot also be said to falsify the prosecution case. If the prosecuting agency brings before the court sufficient material to indicate that the prosecution was based on false evidence, the court would be justified in consenting to the withdrawal of the prosecution, but on the record of the case, as it is, we do not find any such justification......."
18. In Balwant Singh and others Versus State of Bihar (1977) 4 SCC 448, the Supreme Court, while considering the role of the Public Prosecutor while moving an application for withdrawal from prosecution, has dealt upon the consideration which must weigh for moving such an application. The Public Prosecutor must keep in mind the administration of justice inasmuch as he is discharging the statutory responsibility and while discharging the statutory responsibility the only factor, which should be considered, is administration of justice and nothing else. Relevant portion of paragraph-2 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"2. .....................The statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal squarely vests on the public prosecutor. It is non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away in favour of those who may be above him on the administrative side. The Criminal Procedure Code is the only matter of the public prosecutor and he has to guide himself with reference to Criminal Procedure Code only. So guided, the consideration which must weigh with him is, whether the broader cause of public justice will be advanced or retarded by the withdrawal or continuance of the prosecution. As we have already explained, public justice may be a much wider conception than the justice in a particular case. Here, the Public Prosecutor is ordered to move for withdrawal......."
19. In Sheonandan Paswan Versus State of Bihar and others (1983) 1 SCC 438, the Supreme Court has held that before an application is moved under Section 321 Cr.P.C., the Public Prosecutor needs to apply his mind to the facts of the case independently, without being influenced by outside factors. Relevant paragraphs, on reproduction, read as under:-
"85. In our opinion, the object of Section 321 Cr.P.C. appears to be to reserve power to the Executive Government to withdraw any criminal case on larger grounds of public policy such as inexpediency of prosecutions for reasons of State; broader public interest like maintenance of law and order; maintenance of public peace and harmony, social, economic and political; changed social and political situation; avoidance of destabilization of a stable government and the like. And such powers have been, in our opinion, rightly reserved for the Government; for, who but the Government is in the know of such conditions and situations prevailing in a State or in the country? The Court is not in a position to know such situations."
134. The statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal squarely rests upon the Public Prosecutor. It is non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away. The court's duty in dealing with the application under Section 321 is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent un-influenced by irrelevant and extraneous or oblique considerations as the court has a special duty in this regard inasmuch as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from prosecution. The court's duty is to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous to the interest of justice."
20. The Supreme Court has also dealt with in a catena of decisions the manner in which an application for withdrawal from prosecution moved by the Public Prosecutor needs to be considered by the Court.
21. In State of Punjab Versus Union of India and others (1986) 4 SCC 335, the Supreme Court has held that while granting permission to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution, the Court needs to be satisfied itself that the Public Prosecutor has properly exercised statutory function and has not attempted to interfere with the normal course of justice for ulterior purposes. The administration of criminal justice should be the touchstone on which the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. needs to be decided. Relevant portion of paragraph-1, on reproduction, reads as under:-
"1. ............ The ultimate guiding consideration while granting a permission to withdraw from the prosecution must always be the interest of administration of justice and that is the touchstone on which the question must be determined whether the prosecution should be allowed to withdraw. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution of a case not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but also in order to further the broad ends of public justice, and such broad ends of public justice may well include appropriate social, economic and political purposes."
22. Similar views have been reiterated in Sheonandan Paswan Versus State of Bihar and others (1987) 1 SCC 288 by the Supreme Court. Paragraph-73, on reproduction, reads as under:-
"73. Section 321 gives the Public Prosecutor the power for withdrawal of any case at any stage before judgment is pronounced. This presupposes the fact that the entire evidence may have been adduced in the case, before the application is made. When an application under Section 32I Cr.P.C. is made, it is not necessary for the court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. To contend that the court when it exercises its limited power of giving consent under Section 32I has to assess the evidence and find out whether the case would end in acquittal or conviction, would be to rewrite Section 321 Cr.P.C. and would be to concede to the court a power which the scheme of Section 321 does not contemplate. The acquittal or discharge order under Section 321 are not the same as the normal final orders in criminal cases. The conclusion will not be backed by a detailed discussion of the evidence in the case of acquittal or absence of prima facie case or groundlessness in the case of discharge. All that the court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. The court, after considering these facets of the case, will have to see whether the application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given. In this case, on a reading of the application for withdrawal, the order of consent and the other attendant circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the application for withdrawal and the order giving consent were proper and strictly within the confines of Section 321 Cr.P.C."
23. In S.K. Shukla and others Versus State of U.P. and others (2006) 1 SCC 314, the Supreme Court has held that the Public Prosecutor cannot work like a post box. He needs to act objectively being an officer of the Court and it is always open to the Court to reject the prayer if it is not guided in the interest of administration of justice. Relevant portion of paragraph-32, on reproduction, reads as under:-
"32. .....The Public Prosecutor cannot act like a postbox or act on the dictates of the State Government. He has to act objectively as he is also an officer of the court. At the same time the court is also not bound by that. The courts are also free to assess whether a prima face case is made or not. The court, if satisfied, can also reject the prayer."
24. In Vijaykumar Baldev Mishra alias Sharma Versus State of Maharashtra (2007) 12 SCC 687 the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"12. Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 provides for withdrawal from prosecution at the instance of the public prosecutor or Assistant public prosecutor. Indisputably therefor the consent of the Court is necessary. Application of mind on the part of the Court, therefore, is necessary in regard to the grounds for withdrawal from the prosecution in respect of any one or more of the offences for which the appellant is tried. The provisions of TADA could be attracted only in the event of one or the other of the four 'things' specified in Nalini (supra) is found applicable and not otherwise. The Review Committee made recommendations upon consideration of all relevant facts. It came to its opinion upon considering the materials on record. Its recommendations were based also upon the legality of the charges under TADA in the fact situation obtaining in each case. It came to the conclusion that in committing the purported offence, the appellant inter alia had no intention to strike terror in people or any section of the people and in fact the murder has been committed only in view of group rivalry and because the parties intended to take revenge, the provisions of the TADA should not have been invoked.
13. The Public Prosecutor in terms of the statutory scheme laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure plays an important role. He is supposed to be an independent person. While filing such an application, the public prosecutor also is required to apply his own mind and the effect thereof on the society in the event such permission is granted."
25. In Rahul Agarwal Versus Rakesh Jain and another (2005) 2 SCC 377, the Supreme Court has held that while considering an application moved under Section 321 Cr.P.C., the Court should consider all relevant circumstances and find out whether the withdrawal from prosecution advances the cause of justice. The withdrawal can be permitted only when the case is likely to end in an acquittal and continuance of the case would only cause severe harassment to the accused. Relevant para-10 is extracted hereunder:-
"10. From these decisions as well as other decisions on the same question, the law is very clear that the withdrawal of prosecution can be allowed only in the interest of justice. Even if the Government directs the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution and an application is filed to that effect, the court must consider all relevant circumstances and find out whether the withdrawal of prosecution would advance the cause of justice. If the case is likely to end in an acquittal and the continuance of the case is only causing severe harassment to the accused, the court may permit withdrawal of the prosecution. If the withdrawal of prosecution is likely to bury the dispute and bring about harmony between the parties and it would be in the best interest of justice, the court may allow the withdrawal of prosecution. The discretion under Section 321, Code of Criminal Procedure is to be carefully exercised by the court having due regard to all the relevant facts and shall not be exercised to stifle the prosecution which is being done at the instance of the aggrieved parties or the State for redressing their grievance. Every crime is an offence against the society and if the accused committed an offence, society demands that he should be punished. Punishing the person who perpetrated the crime is an essential requirement for the maintenance of law and order and peace in the society. Therefore, the withdrawal of the prosecution shall be permitted only when valid reasons are made out for the same."
26. This Court vide judgment and order dated 12th December, 2013 passed in writ petition bearing Writ Petition No. 4683 (M/B) of 2013 ''Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri and others Versus Union of India' while dealing the scope, power and ambit under Section 321 Cr.P.C. has held in paras-116 and 117 which, on reproduction, read as under :-
"116. In view of above, the Public Prosecutor is the final authority to apply mind and take a decision whether an application for withdrawal of a criminal case is to be moved or not. For that, option is open to him to receive necessary instructions or information from the Government to make up mind on the basis of material made available. The Public Prosecutor cannot act like post box or at the dictate of the State Government. He has to act objectively as he is also an officer of the court. It is also open for the appropriate Government to issue appropriate instruction to him but he has to act objectively with regard to the withdrawal of cases. But the instruction sent by the government shall not be binding and it is the Public Prosecutor who has to take a decision independently without any political favour or party pressure or like concerns. The sole object of the Public Prosecutor is the interest of administration of justice. Power conferred on Public Prosecutor to take independent decision for the interest of administration of justice is not negotiable and cannot be bartered away in favour of those who may be above him on administrative side. He is stood to be guided by letter and spirit of Code of Criminal Procedure only and not otherwise. Neither the Public Prosecutor nor the Magistrate can surrender their discretion while exercising power at their end.
117. Similarly, the Court has duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the executive by resort of the provisions contained in Section 321 Cr.P.C. The court has to record a finding that the application moved by Public Prosecutor is in the interest of administration of justice and there is no abuse or misuse of power by the Public Prosecutor or the Government. In case an application is allowed, it must be recorded by the Court that the application has been moved in good faith to secure the ends of justice and not in political or vested interest. The court has final say in the matter and the decision should be free and fair with independent exercise of mind in the interest of public policy and justice. It must ensure that the application is not moved to thwart or stifle the process of law or suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given."
27. In the present case from the reading of the applications, it appears that the Public Prosecutor had filed applications under Section 321 Cr.P.C. in good faith, after careful consideration of the material placed before him. The Public Prosecutor has stated in the application that he has considered the evidence collected by the prosecuting agency which appears to be weak and the success of the prosecution is not bright. He has further stated that the application has been moved in good faith, in the interest of justice as well as in public interest. The cases in which the applications have been made have political overtones. All the cases have been registered in relation to the political activities of the accused. The nature of offences are trivial in nature. The prosecution has remained pending for quite some time before the court. In view thereof the Government has taken a decision to withdraw from prosecution and has given consent to the Public Prosecutor, after considering the material as stated above, to move the applications.
28. The Court is to consider whether the withdrawal from prosecution would further cause of justice or not and whether it would be in public interest to allow the withdrawal from prosecution. The application should show that the Public Prosecutor has applied his independent mind on the basis of the material placed before him including the evidence collected by the prosecution. It is not required for him to give detail reasoning in the application regarding analysis of every evidence. If, in his considered opinion, the chances of prosecution success appears to be weak and the withdrawal would further the cause of justice and, it would be in public interest, it cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor has not applied his mind. In one of the cases the Court has itself discharged the accused after considering the evidence on the ground that the evidence collected against the accused Dheeraj Ojha was not sufficient to continue with the prosecution. Therefore, the finding of the trial court that the learned Public Prosecutor has not applied its mind but has been guided by the State Government to withdraw prosecution does not appear to be correct. The applications show that the Public Prosecutor has applied his independent mind to the facts, material and evidence placed before him and, therefore, this Court is of the view that the impugned orders passed by the learned trial court are not correct and in accordance with law and, therefore, the same are hereby set aside.
29. These revisions are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside.
Order Date :- 19.3.2021 Anand Sri./-