Patna High Court
The State Of Bihar vs Ambika Roy And Anr. on 26 May, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ82
Author: B.N. Agrawal
Bench: Binodanand Singh, B.N. Agrawal
JUDGMENT B.N. Agrawal, J.
1. The present case has been registered on the basis of a reference made to this Court under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by the learned District and Sessions Judge under his memo No. 208 dated the 10th of September, 1986, after holding a preliminary enquiry and writing a concise reasoned order of reference dated 21-8-1986 as Postulated under. Rule 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts (Patna High Court) Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), framed under the provisions of the Act.
2. The necessary facts leading to this, reference, in short, are that one Mukhi Ahir had instituted a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 119 of 1966 against Ambika Roy, hearing of which was going on in the court of the learned 2nd Additional Munsif. On 8-4-1983, the said Ambika Rai (hereinafter referred to as 'the party-contemner') filed a petition in the court of the learned District Judge giving rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 35 of 1983 for transferring the aforesaid title suit from the court of the learned 2nd Additional Munsif to any other court of competent jurisdiction stating therein that the learned Munsif had allowed the plaintiff to examine even those witnesses whose names were not mentioned in the list of witnesses whereas he did not permit the defendant Ambika Rai to examine witnesses beyond the list of witnesses and thereby made discrimination between the defendant and the plaintiff in giving opportunity of leading evidence. It was further mentioned in the transfer petition that the learned Munsif had declared in open court that the defendant was bound to fail. It was also stated that the learned Munsif was on visiting terms with the plaintiff. The said transfer petition was duly signed by the party-contemner as well as his lawyer.
One Akhileshwar Singh, Advocate, Siwan civil Court, aged about 30 years (hereinafter referred to as 'the lawyer-contemner') had sworn an affidavit and filed the same in the aforesaid transfer application stating therein that he had been working as a lawyer in the aforesaid title suit on behalf of the party-contemner meaning thereby the defendant. In his affidavit, he had stated that he had personal knowledge of the allegations made against the learned Munsif in the transfer application and the same were true. He had also stated in the affidavit that in his presence the learned Munsif had declared in open court that the defendant will lose the case.
3. In the said transfer application a rejoinder was filed denying all the allegations and in support of the rejoinder, an affidavit duly sworn was filed. Upon perusal of the transfer application, rejoinder thereto and both the affidavits, referred to above, the learned District Judge by his order dated 12-5-1983 called for a report from the learned Munsif with regard to the allegations made in the transfer application against him who submitted a report denying all the allegations. It was said in the report that the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff were allowed to be examined outside the list subject to payment of cost of Rs. 20/- to the defendant, the defendant received the amount of cost and cross-examined the aforesaid witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff. So far the defendant is concerned, it was reported that he was also allowed to examine the witnesses outside the original list of witnesses submitted in the suit. It was stated in the report that on 14-3-1983 a prayer made on behalf of the defendant to recall DW 2 was rejected, which order was confirmed by this Court in a civil revision whereafter only the transfer application was filed. The learned Munsif had stated that he had never uttered anything in the court room against the defendants and it was false to say that he was on visiting terms with the plaintiff.
On 14-9-1983 before the learned District Judge, one Shri Shree Kant Singh, a very senior counsel of Siwan Bar, made statement in court that he was senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant in the suit and the learned Munsif had not uttered a word that the defendant would lose the case. The learned District Judge having found that serious allegations had been made against the court concerned, ordered that he would hold an enquiry and summoned Shri Bindhyachal Mishir, a senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and the said Shri Shree Kant Singh besides the Bench Clerk of the Court of the learned Munsif, who were examined on 30th of September, 1983 as court witnesses. The said Shri Bindhyachal Mishir, who was examined as court witness No. 1, stated that he was appearing as senior counsel on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit in question. He has further stated that at no point of time the learned Munsif declared in court that the defendant would lose the case. He has also stated that the learned Munsif had not made any discrimination in giving opportunity to the parties to examine their witnesses. Court witness No. 2 was the said Shri Shree Kant Singh who has also made similar statement in the case. Court witness No. 3 was Shri Akhileshwar Singh, an Advocate of Siwan Court, who was working in the suit on behalf of the defendant. He has stated that the statement made by him in the affidavit that the learned Munsif had declared in court that the defendant will lose the case was not correct. He has further stated that he made the statement in the affidavit bona fide because his client told him that in his presence the learned Munsif had declared in open court that the defendant would lose the case. Court witness No. 4 is Bench Clerk of the Court of the learned Munsif who has stated that never the learned Munsif had declared in court that the defendant would lose the case.
4. The learned District Judge by his order dated 22-10-1983, in view of the aforesaid evidence, having found the allegations in the transfer petition baseless and false, rejected the transfer application. By the same very order, he directed for issuing a show-cause notice against the party-contemner as to why the matter be not reported to this Court for initiating a proceeding for contempt of court against him. Pursuant to the service of notice the party-contemner filed his show-cause stating therein, inter alia, that he made allegations in the transfer application to the effect that the Presiding Officer had declared in open Court that the defendant would lose the case because he was so informed by his counsel. The learned District Judge after hearing the party-contemner, having been satisfied that it is a fit case for referring the matter to this Court, by his order dated 21-8-1986 referred the matter to this Court for initiating a contempt proceeding against the party-contemner for committing contempt of court of the court of the learned Munsif and under a letter of reference, referred to above, he sent the matter to this Court.
5. On receipt of the reference from the learned District Judge, it appears that the matter was first placed in the administrative side of the Court and subsequently in the judicial side. On 7-9-1987, a Division Bench of this Court after applying its mind took cognizance and passed an order to issue notice to the party-contemner to show cause as to why a contempt proceeding be not started against him. The party-contemner was directed to remain present in court in person on the date fixed, i.e., 15-10-1987.
Pursuant to the service of notice, the party-contemner filed a show cause stating therein that he had signed the transfer application bona fide believing his counsel Shri Akhileshwar Singh who told the party-contemner that in his presence the learned Munsif had declared in open court that the defendant would lose the case. As such, on 8-8-1988, another Bench of this Court directed to issue show cause notice to the said lawyer-contemner as well who was also required to remain present in court on the date fixed, that is, on 2-9-1988. Upon the receipt of notice the lawyer-contemner entered appearance and filed his show cause before this Court stating therein that he had started practice in the year 1979. According to him, he did not sign the transfer application, which was signed by one Shri Kapil Deo Sharma, Advocate. He has stated that he had never informed the party-contemner that the learned Munsif had declared in open court that the defendant would lose the case. He has further stated that he made the statement in the affidavit bona fide as the party-contemner told him that in his presence the learned Munsif had declared in court that the defendant would lose the case.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the contemners submitted that the proceeding for contempt has not been initiated as yet though the alleged contempt was committed on 8-4-1983 and now no proceeding can be initiated as under Section 20 of the Act such a proceeding can be initiated within a period of one year only from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Learned counsel has alternatively contended that the proceeding for contempt initiated by this Court on 7-9-1987 was beyond the period of limitation, as such, the same is liable to be dropped. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand, contended that the proceeding for contempt shall be deemed to have been initiated on 22-10-1983 when the learned District Judge directed for issuing notice to the party-contemner to show cause as to why the matter be not reported to this Court for taking action against him under the provisions of the Act and the said order having been passed well within time from the date of the alleged contempt, i.e., on 8-4-1983, the proceeding cannot be said to be barred by limitation. It was further contended that in any view of the matter the proceeding for contempt should be deemed to have been initiated at least by this Court on 7-9-1987. Thus, upon the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, questions arise for consideration by this Court, viz.--
(1) Whether order dated 7-9-1987 passed by this Court would amount to initiating a proceeding for contempt and, if so, whether the proceeding was initiated within the period prescribed under law?
(2) Whether a proceeding for contempt would be deemed to have been initiated on 22-10-1983 when the learned District Judge directed the party-contemner to show cause as to why the matter be not reported to this Court for taking action against him under the provisions of the Act?
7. In relation to question No. 1, I may usefully quote the order dated 7-9-1987 passed by a Division Bench of this Court, which runs thus:
"Heard Mr. Lala Kailash Behari, the learned counsel appearing for the State and perused the record.
Let a notice be issued to the opposite party to show cause as to why a contempt proceeding should not be started against him.
Show cause, if any, must be filed on 15-10-1987 and the opposite party, the alleged contemner should also remain present in person in court on that date".
8. The contempt in the present case said to have been committed is a criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act by which the acts of the party-contemner amount to scandalising and lowering down the authority of the court of the learned Munsif. Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to take cognizance of criminal contempt. Section 15(2) of the Act lays down that in the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action upon a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate General. So far contempt of courts subordinate to the High Court is concerned, action cannot be taken by this Court suo motu. Section 17 of the Act prescribes procedure after taking cognizance under Section 15 of the Act and lays down that notice of every proceeding under Section 15 of the Act shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise. Rule 7(iii) of the Contempt of Courts (Patna High Court) Rules lays down that the person charged shall, unless otherwise ordered, appear in person before the Court as directed on the date fixed for hearing of the proceeding, and shall continue to remain present during the hearing till the proceeding is finally disposed of by the order of the Court. (P-8). Section 20 of the Act lays down that no court shall initiate a proceeding for contempt after the expiry of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. For better appreciation, I may usefully quote the relevant portions of Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Act and Rule 7 of the Rules, which run thus:
Section 15 -- "Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases -- (1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by --
(a) the Advocate General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, (or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such law offices as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf or any other person, with the consent, in writing of such Law Officer.) (2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf".
Section 17 -- "Procedure after cognizance -- (1) Notice of every proceeding under Section 15 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise."
Section 20 -- "Limitation for actions for contempt -- No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
Rule 7 -- "(1) The notice to the person charged shall be issued in Form 1. When action is instituted on a petition, a copy of the petition along with annexures and affidavits shall be served upon the person charged.
(ii) The person charged may file his reply/ show cause duly supported by an affidavit or affidavits.
(iii) The person charged shall, unless otherwise ordered? Appear in person before the Court as directed on the date fixed for hearing of the proceeding, and shall continue to remain present during the hearing till the proceeding is finally disposed of by the order of the Court."
9. From a bare perusal of Section 15(2) of the Act, it would appear that cognizance would be deemed to have been taken of criminal contempt, if any action is taken by this Court on a reference made to it. It has not been defined anywhere in the Act as to what is the meaning of expressions 'take action' which would necessarily mean cognizance. So far the expression 'cognizance' is concerned, the same has been used in different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). A question has arisen times without number as to what was the meaning of expression cognizance within the meaning of the Code and the controversy has been set at rest by the apex court in its decision in the case of Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, AIR 1964 SC 1541 : (1964 (2) Cri LJ 468), wherein their Lordships have laid down that application of mind by a Magistrate for proceeding under various provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code would amount to taking cognizance and observed:
"It is well settled now that when on a petition of complaint being filed before him a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under the various provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint."
10. In the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, C.J. of the Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 2255 : (1975 Cri LJ 1), their Lordships were dealing with the question of maintainability of appeal under Section 19 of the Act and considering whether an appeal was maintainable against an order initiating a proceeding for contempt and while deciding the said question, their Lordships observed thus:
"The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminous a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court."
From the aforesaid observations of the apex court, it would be clear that initiation of contempt proceeding would mean assumption of jurisdiction to proceed for contempt.
11. In the case of Purushotam Das Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon, (1978 Cri LJ 772) : AIR 1978 SC 1014, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering a case where also an appeal was preferred under Section 19 of the Act against an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court directing to issue notice to the con-temner to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of court of the High Court and the Court decided that the order initiating a contempt proceeding will not be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. While deciding that question the Court has taken into consideration the provisions of the Act and laid down the law that contempt proceeding is initiated by issuance of notice to a contemner. The observation of the Court reads thus:
"The proceeding is initiated under Section 17 by issuance of a notice."
12. In the case of Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad, AIR 1980 Guj 194, a Division Bench was dealing with a case where a petition was filed for taking action under the provisions of the Act within a period of one year from the date of commission of the alleged contempt but the order was passed for issuing notice to the contemner after the expiry of one year. In those circumstances, their Lordships held that no action can be taken against the contemner. The Court laid down the law that action would be deemed to have been taken by the court under the provisions of the Act on the day when the Court applied its mind to the facts disclosing the act of contempt. The observation runs as follows:
"The conclusion which we record, therefore, is that no contempt proceedings can be initiated by a court after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt. Action under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 can be taken if the court has applied its mind and initiated proceedings by passing some order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged act of contempt. If an application for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is filed within a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt, but the court has passed no order thereon before the expiry of one year from the said date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the court is barred because the court did not apply its mind to the complaint or information within a period of one year. It is this application of mind by the Court which amounts to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971."
13. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Jamuna Das Gangadas and Co., (1984 Cri LJ 605), a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court was considering a case where an application was filed for taking action under the provisions of the Act before the expiry of the statutory period but the order for issuing notice to the contemner was passed after its expiry. In those circumstances, a learned single Judge of the High Court ultimately dropped the contempt proceeding as the same was initiated beyond the statutory period and the order was upheld by the Division Bench. In that case, their Lordships have held that initiation of a proceeding means assumption of jurisdiction to proceed for contempt. Their Lordships have further approved the earlier decision of the same very court which had laid down that a proceeding for contempt can only be initiated against a contemner when the court orders for issuance of notice. The observation of the Court reads thus :
"It is thus clear that the initiation means assumption of jurisdiction to proceed for contempt."
"It is also clear from State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad, 1978 Raj LW 186, that the proceedings can only be initiated against the contemner, when the Court orders for issuance of notice. In that case, contempt was committed on April 1, 1974 and July 15, 1974. Proceedings for contempt were initiated on September 25, 1975 by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Sharma, J., as he then was, held that the proceedings for contempt were initiated against the contemners beyond the period of one year from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been committed. In that view of the matter, the proceedings for contempt were held to be time-barred and, therefore, notices were discharged."
14. In the case of Gulab Singh v. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das, AIR 1975 All 366, a Division Bench of that Court had dropped the contempt proceeding on the ground that the proceeding for contempt was initiated by ordering issuance of notice to the contemner which order was passed after expiry of the statutory period. It was held that the proceeding was initiated beyond the period of limitation; as such, the same was dropped. The Court observed thus :
"It was only on 9-8-1974 that the proceedings were initiated by issuing notice to the respondent. That was after more than one year of the date of the alleged contempt."
15. In the case of Advocate General, A. P. Hyderabad v. A. V. Koteswara Rao, (1984 Cri LJ 1171), in which the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering the case where petition initiating contempt proceeding was filed well within time, but notice in the admission matter was issued after the expiry of statutory period of one year and in those circumstances ultimately, the contempt proceeding was dropped as the same was initiated by issuance of notice in the admission matter beyond the statutory period of limitation.
16. On a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it would be clear that a contempt proceeding will be deemed to have been initiated on the day when a court has passed an order for issuing notice against a contemner and thereby applying its mind. It has been submitted that in the present case, specifically in the order dated 7-9-1987 this Court while issuing notice has directed the contemner to show cause as to why a contempt proceeding be not started against him. On the basis of this observation, it has been submitted that in the present case, contempt proceeding is yet to be initiated. In the case of Purushotam Das Goel, (1978 Cri LJ 772) (supra), notice was directed to be issued to the contemner to show cause as to why he be not proceeded against for committing contempt of court and the apex court in that case laid down that the same would amount to initiating a proceeding for contempt. In my view, there can be no distinction between the expressions 'proceeded against for committing contempt' and 'starting a contempt proceeding'. Both stand on the same footing. In both the cases, there is application of mind with a view to take action against a contemner for committing contempt of court. Therefore, the language used in the order of the present case cannot show that by the said very order the proceeding was not initiated.
17. Moreover, Section 17(1) of the Act lays down that notice of every proceeding under Section 15 of the Act shall be served personally upon the person charged and Rule 7(iii) of the Rules lays down that the person charged shall be directed to appear in person before the court on the date fixed unless otherwise ordered. In the present case, from the orders dated 7-9-1987 and 8-8-1988, it would appear that the contemners were directed to appear in person on the date fixed. Further the expression 'person charged' used in Section 17(1) of the Act and Rule 7(iii) of the Rules goes to show that the proceeding was initiated by giving a direction to issue notice. These, in my view, will be additional reasons for holding that by order dated 7-9-1987 the contempt proceeding was initiated by this Court. This being the position, I have no hesitation in holding that the contempt proceeding in the present case was initiated on 7-9-1987.
18. Now I proceed to consider the second point involved in this case, that is, as to whether the contempt proceeding will be deemed to have been initiated on 20-10-1983 when the learned District Judge under the purported exercise of powers under Rule 15(2) of the Rules directed for issuing notice to the party-contemner for showing cause as to why the matter be not reported to this Court for punishing him for contempt of the court of the learned Munsif. So far this point is concerned, in the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, under Section 15(2) of the Act a proceeding for contempt can be initiated by High Court alone and by not a District Judge. The expression 'Court' within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act would obviously mean a court which is empowered to initiate a contempt proceeding within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act. If it is held that the expression 'Court' used in Section 20 of the Act would mean any Court not necessarily a court empowered to take cognizance, in that event, the provisions of Section 15 of the Act would come in conflict with the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, as Section 15 of the Act empowers only a High Court and the Supreme Court to take cognizance of criminal contempt. A District Judge is not empowered to take cognizance under Section 15(2) of the Act in relation to contempt of a court subordinate to a High Court, as such, any steps taken by him under Rule 15(ii) of the Rules by issuing notice to a contemner for showing cause as to why the matter be not reported to this Court cannot amount to initiation of a proceeding for contempt within the meaning of Section 15(2) read with Section 20 of the Act. The view which I have taken finds support from an observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Baradakanta Mishra 1975 Cri LJ 1 wherein it has been observed that a Court meaning thereby a High Court upon receipt of reference may decline to initiate a proceeding for contempt which means that until a High Court applies its mind on a reference made to it under Section 15(2) of the Act, a contempt proceeding is not initiated and this being the position a proceeding taken under Rule 15(ii) of the Rules for making a reference to a High Court cannot amount to initiation of a proceeding for contempt. I may usefully quote the observation of the Court which runs thus :
"Where the Court rejects a motion or reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt."
19. In the case of the State of Maharashtra v. J. V. Patil ((1976) 78 Bombay Law Reporter, 116) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was considering a case where reference was made by a subordinate court under Section 15(2) of the Act. The reference in that case was made by a subordinate court within the statutory period and upon receipt of the reference the matter was placed first in the administrative side of the Court before the learned Administrative Judge of the High Court, who within the statutory period passed an administrative order for placing the reference before the Court in its judicial side. Prior to the date when a Division Bench of the High Court had applied its mind by giving a direction to issue notice to the contemner and thereby initiating a proceeding for contempt, statutory period of one year had already expired. Their Lordship laid down the law that the contempt proceeding will be deemed to have been initiated on the day when the Division Bench of the High Court applied its mind. In their Lordships' opinion neither the date when the reference was made by the subordinate court under Section 15(2) of the Act nor the date of the administrative order of the learned Judge of the High Court can be said to be the date of initiation of the contempt proceeding.
20. In the case of the State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad (1978 Rajasthan Law Weekly, 186) the learned Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court from the administrative side referred the matter to the Government Advocate for his opinion in relation to initiation of a contempt proceeding within the statutory period of limitation. A question had arisen as to whether the same would amount to initiation of a proceeding for contempt or not and it was laid down that it would not amount to initiation of a contempt proceeding.
21. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has placed reliance upon a Full Bench judgment of Punjab and Harayana High Court in the case of Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh (1984 Cr LJ 301) wherein the then learned Chief Justice of that Court Mr. Justice S. S. Sandhawalia speaking for the Court observed and laid down that in a case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a reference made by it the proceeding must be deemed to have been initiated from the date when such reference is made. I find myself in respectful disagreement with the law laid down in the aforesaid case for the reasons stated hereinafter. Firstly, if it is so held, in that event, while interpreting Section 15(2) of the Act a Court will be required to read something more which is not there is the said statute. Under Section 15(2) of the Act only High Court can take cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate Court. If it is held that reference made by a District Judge under Section 15(2) of the Act would amount to initiation of a proceeding for contempt, it would confer power under Section 15(2) of the Act upon a District Judge to take cognizance. The language of Section 15(2) of the Act is unamiguous. It is well settled that when there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, a plain and literal meaning has to be given to the same and a Court while interpreting a statute cannot be allowed to add words thereto. Secondly, in my view, the learned Chief Justice in that case was not justified in distinguishing the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Baradakanta Mishra (supra) according to which a contempt proceeding, as stated above, is initiated only after receipt of reference by the High Court when it has applied its mind and prior to that the proceeding cannot be said to have been initiated. Thirdly, in the aforesaid Full Bench judgment, the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Purushottam Das Goel (supra) has not been taken into consideration which lays down that the proceeding for contempt is initiated when an order for issuance of notice is passed by a High Court. This case also supports the contention that prior to the date of passing of order by a High Court directing to issue notice to a contemner on which date the High Court shall be deemed to have applied its mind, the contempt proceeding cannot be said to have been initiated meaning thereby that steps taken by a District Judge under Rule 15(ii) of the Rules for making a reference to this Court cannot amount to initiation of a proceeding for contempt. For these reasons, I am of the view that the case of Manjit Singh and others (supra) can be of no avail to the State.
Thus, I am clearly of the view that the learned District Judge in the present case cannot be said to have initiated a proceeding for contempt of court by giving a direction in his order dated 20-10-1983 to issue notice to the party-contemner to show cause as to why the matter be not reported to this Court for taking action against him for committing contempt of Court.
22. From the foregoing discussions, it becomes clear that the contempt proceeding would be deemed to have been initiated in the case in hand on 7-9-1987, whereas the alleged contempt is said to have been committed on 8-4-1983 which makes the initiation null and void, the same having been initiated many years after the expiry of statutory period of limitation. In this view of the matter, I do not think that any action can be taken against the contemners for committing contempt of court and the contempt proceeding is liable to be dropped.
In the result, the reference is rejected and the rule of contempt issued against both the contemners is hereby discharged.
Binodanand Singh, J.
23. I agree.