Madras High Court
P. Jayarama Pillai vs Union Bank Of India Rep. By Its Branch ... on 14 September, 1990
Equivalent citations: (1991)2MLJ43
ORDER Srinivasan, J.
1. There is no merit in this revision petition. The short facts are these: The respondents filed a suit for recovery of money due on an equitable mortgage. A decree was passed on 3.12.1981. Though as per the judgment a preliminary decree under the provisions of Order 34, C.P.C., was passed, the decree actually drafted by the Court was only for payment of money. It read only as money decree and the necessary provision which should be included in a decree under Order 34 were not found therein. The decree-holders filed an application for passing §f a final decree in 1986 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the application to pass a final decree. Seeing that there was no decree in accordance with Order 34, C.P.C., the application was not passed.
2. Thereafter the Court suo motu amended the decree and brought it in consonance with the judgment. Thus a proper decree under Order 34 was passed. That was done only on 11.7.1986. The decree-holders filed I.A. No. 509 of 1988 for passing a final decree in accordance with the preliminary decree.
3. The petitioner herein contested the same on the ground that he did not have any notice before the decree was amended by the Court, and he was not in any way bound by the amendment. The further contention of the petitioner was that the application for passing final decree was clearly barred by limitation. The contentions of the petitioner were overruled and the court below granted the reliefs prayed for by the decree-holders.
4. In this revision petition, learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that inasmuch as there was no notice to the petitioner before the decree was amended, the petitioner is not bound by the amendment carried out to the decree. It is also contended that the application is very much out of time and the period till which the amendment proceedings were pending cannot be taken into account by the decree-holders.
5. Thirdly it is argued that at any rate the decree-holder should have filed an application for condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and it is for the Court to consider the same before directing passing of the final decree.
6. I do not accept any of the contentions put forward by learned Counsel for the petitioner. For an amendment under Section 152, C.P.C., which is for rectification of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders etc., there is no necessity for giving notice to the parties. In"this case, the amendment was carried out by the Court on its own motion. It was clearly an accidental error in drafting the decree. When the judgment is based on an equitable mortgage granting the prayer of the plaintiff, the Court ought to have drafted the decree in the form provided under Order 34, C.P.C. But, unfortunately, the decree was drafted in the form of a money decree. The Court, on realising the mistake, rectified the error and drafted a proper decree. Hence no grievance can be made there of by the petitioner herein.
7. The decree-holders could not have applied for passing of a final decree before the decree was rectified. In this case the rectification of the error took place only on 11.7.1986 and within two years therefrom the decree-holders had applied for passing of a final decree. Hence the application is very much within the time prescribed by law.
8. It is well-known that no party can suffer because of a mistake committed by a Court. In this case, the mistake committed by the Court in drafting the decree was rectified only in July, 1986 and the decree-holders cannot suffer because of that mistake and lose their right to apply for final decree before the mistake was rectified.
9. There is no necessity for the decree-holder to file any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as there is no delay at all in filing the application for passing final decree. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in T. Appukuttan v. Gopala Pillai . In that case an appeal was filed against unamended portion of a decree after the amendment of decree. For the purpose of calculating the limitation for the appeal against the decree it was held that the limitation, started from the date of original decree even with respect to the amended portion. That judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.
10. The court below has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Sivan Pillai v. Anbayyan (1976) 1 M.L.J. 385. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the court below has made a mistake in relying upon the said judgment and according to her, that judgment would not apply to the facts of the present case. In that case a decree passed in a mortgage suit did not fix the outer limit for the payment of amount as required by Order 34, C.P.C. The Court held that the mistake was that of the Court and the party should not suffer on account of the said mistake committed by the Court. Therefore, the court held that the application filed beyond period of three years for the passing of the final decree in accordance with Order 34, C.P.C, was not barred by limitation. The court below is right in relying on the same. In this case as the Court had not drafted the decree properly and the proper decree was drafted only in July, 1986, it cannot be said that the right to get a final decree on the basis of a preliminary decree was already lost to the decree-holders even in 1984.
11. In the circumstances, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed with costs.