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[Cites 6, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Ritesh Joseph vs M/S David Shoes Corner on 17 August, 2016

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                        In the Court of Ms. Namrita Aggarwal 
                    CCJ Cum Additional Rent Controller­1 (Central)
                                Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.

Case No. E­ 104/15
Unique I.D. No. 02401C0245902015
In the matter of :­

Ritesh Joseph 
S/o Sh. Raj Kumar Joseph 
Grandson of late Sh. L. Joseph 
R/o 3347, Christian Colony, 
Karol Bagh, New Delhi­110005.                                                      ...........Petitioner
                                                                   Versus
M/s David Shoes Corner,
Properietor Vijay David
C/o 3347, Christian Colony, 
Karol Bagh, New Delhi­110005.


Also at:­
Vijay David
S/o late Sh. H. David,
R/o D­83, DDA Flats, 
Paschim Vihar, New Delhi.                                                         ......... Respondent



Page 1 of  12                                                                                  E. No.  104/15
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                                                                    ORDER

16.08.2016

1.  Vide this order, I shall dispose off the application moved by respondents for grant of leave to defend the eviction petition filed by the petitioner u/s 14(1)(e) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [in short, 'the Act'].

2. An eviction petition has  been filed by the  petitioner Ritesh Joseph   against   the   respondent   M/s   David   Shoes   Corner   for vacation   of   the   tenanted   premises,   i.e.,   commercial   two   shops measuring   6.8'   x  8'   forming   part   of  property   No.  3347,   Christian Colony, Karol Bagh, New Delhi­110005, as shown in colour red in the   site   plan   annexed   alongwith   the   petition   on   the   ground   of bonafide   requirement   under   Section   14   (1)   (e)   of   the   DRC   Act. (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

3. The  case  of the  petitioner  is  that  the petitioner  Sh. Ritesh Joseph, grandson of late Sh. L. Joseph, is the lawful owner of the tenanted premises by virtue of probate granted by Hon'ble court on 04.08.1987.   That   the   respondent   has   been   attorned   and   has admitted the petitioner to be the owner.

4. That   the   tenanted   premises   is   bonafidely   required   by   the Page 2 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 3 petitioner for himself and his family members dependent upon him as petitioner No. 1 is not having any commercial property. That the petitioner   alongwith   his   wife   and   father   want   to   start   study   / coaching / tuition centre from the tenanted premises as the wife of the petitioner is unemployed and father of the petitioner is retired. That all of them are unemployed for the source of their livelihood. That the wife of the petitioner is graduate (B.Ed.) and unemployed. The petitioner wants to start business and to settle his wife and father in the tenanted premises. 

  On the above stated grounds, prayer is made for eviction of the respondents from the tenanted premises. It is further submitted that earlier also petitioner's late grand father had filed an eviction petition in the year 1978 which was dismissed on 19.11.1985 by the then Ld. Rent Controller Ah. J M Malik.

5. Summons were served upon the respondent who appeared and filed the leave to defend application stating that the petitioner is neither the owner nor the landlord of the tenanted premises, hence the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. It is further submitted by the respondent that the property of the petitioner is comprising of ground  and  first floor.  On the  ground  floor,  there  are  two shops which are under the tenancy of the respondent and besides that there are two more shops behind the shops under the occupation Page 3 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 4 of   the   respondent   which   are   lying   vacant   and   surplus   with   the petitioner. That on the first floor as well there are two shops on the front side and two shops on the back side and all the four shops are   lying   vacant   and   are   surplus   with   the   petitioner.   It   is  further averred that in this way there are six shops in the property which are   lying   vacant   and   surplus   with   the   petitioner.   The   rest   of   the portion of the property is being used by the petitioner for residential purposes. It is further submitted that the petitioners wants to sell out the property after getting it vacated from the respondent. 

6. Reply to the application for leave to defend has been filed by the petitioner wherein the petitioner has denied all the averments made by the respondent in his leave to defend application stating that   the   petitioner   is   the   absolute   legal   owner   of   the   tenanted premises. It is denied by the petitioner that there are other shops in the   premises   other   than   the   said   two   shops   being   used   by   the respondent. It is further stated that the entire property other than the   said   two   shops   in   question   is   being   used   for   residential purposes only. It has been specifically denied that the petitioner is having six shops which are lying vacant and are surplus with him.

 

7. Rejoinder has been filed wherein the respondent has denied all the averments made by petitioner in her reply to the leave to Page 4 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 5 defend application and re­averred what was averred by him in his leave to defend application. 

8. I   have   heard   the   arguments   and   have   gone   through   the documents.

9. Proviso (e) to Section 14(1) is a special provision which has been   enacted   by   the   legislature   for   the   class   of   landlords   who require the premises genuinely and their requirement is bonafide and they do not have any suitable accommodation.  The essential ingredients for attracting the proviso (e) of the Section 14(1) are :

a) The said premises are bonafide required by the landlord either for  himself or for his family member.
b) The   landlord   or   the   family   member   has   no   other   reasonable   suitable accommodation.

These   twin   thresholds   are   to   be   satisfied   conjunctively   in order to attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) and the absence of even one of the said ingredients clearly makes the said provision inapplicable.

10. The   satisfaction   of   the   two   requirements   of   bonafide   need and   no   reasonably   suitable   accommodation   has   been   time   and again emphasized by the Supreme Court of India in several cases Page 5 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 6 and more recently in the case Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:

"The   Legislature   in   enacting   the   provision   has taken   ample   care   to   avoid   any   arbitrary   or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not   a   mere   whim   or   a   fanciful   desire   by   him; further, such requirement must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or   whimsical   desire.    The   legislative   intent   is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord   has   no   other   reasonably   suitable residential   accommodation   of   his   own   in   his occupation   in   the   city   or   town   concerned.     This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation.     Similar   statutory   provision   is made in sub­section (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act Page 6 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 7 in   respect   of   accommodation   let   for   residential purposes.     Thus,   the   legislative   mandate   being clear and unambiguous, the Court is duty­bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also   whether   any   other   reasonably   suitable non­residential   accommodation   in   his occupation   in   the   city/town   is   available.  The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a   tenant   which   does   not   show   that   the court/authority   has   applied   its   mind   to   these statutory   requirements   cannot   be   sustained   and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order   in   appeal/second   appeal/revision. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to   be   a   question   of   fact.    But   in   recording   a finding   on   the   question   the   court   has   to   bear   in mind   that   statutory   mandate   incorporated   in Section 12(1)(f).  If it is found that the court has not   applied   the   statutory   provisions   to   the evidence   on   record   in   its   proper   perspective then   the   finding   regarding   bonafide requirement would cease to be a mere finding Page 7 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 8 of   fact,   for   such   erroneous   finding   illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment." 

11. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in   good   faith   and   genuine   i.e.   without   fraud   or   deceit". Requirement   is   not   a   mere   desire.     The   degree   of   intensity contemplated   by   "requires"   is   much   more   higher   than   in   mere desire.  The phrase "required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation.  A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with  mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek   ejectment   of   the   tenant.     Looked   at   from   this   angle,   any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord   and   its   bonafides   would   be   capable   of   successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court.   In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a   practical   approach   instructed   by   the   realities   of   life.     It   is   no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner,   he   should   live   or   to   prescribe   for   him   a   residential standard of their own.

Page 8 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 9

12. The meaning of "bonafide" in the context appears to be in two folds. (a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one.   (b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant on higher rent.

OWNERSHIP   AS   WELL   AS   LANDLORD­TENANT RELATIONSHIP

13. In the present case, the ownership of the petitioner over the premises   in   question   as   well   as   existence   of   landlord­tenant relationship has been disputed by the respondent but he has failed to   state   that   if   the   petitioner   is   not   the   owner   /   landlord   of   the premises then who else is the owner / landlord of the premises in question. The petitioner on the other hand has filed the grant of letter of administration under the Indian Succession Act by virtue of which  after  the  death  of  grand  father  of the  petitioner,  petitioner was declared to be the absolute owner of the property in question. The respondent being the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of the petitioner over the premises in question on vague grounds. Thus, the ownership of the petitioner over the premises in question as well as landlord­tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondent for the purpose of DRC Act stands duly established.

Page 9 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 10

BONAFIDE   REQUIREMENT   AS   WELL   AS   AVAILABILITY   OF ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION

14. It  is   averred   by   the   petitioner   that   the   tenanted   premises   is bonafidely   required   by   him  for   himself   and   his   family   members dependent   upon   him   as   petitioner   No.   1   is   not   having   any commercial   property.   That   the   petitioner   alongwith   his   wife   and father   wants   to   start   study   /   coaching   /   tuition   centre   from   the tenanted premises as the wife of the petitioner as well as petitioner are unemployed and father of the petitioner is retired. That all of them are unemployed for the source of their livelihood. That the wife   of   the   petitioner   is   graduate   (B.Ed.)   and   unemployed.   The petitioner wants to start business and to settle his wife and father in the tenanted premises. The respondent has not disputed the status of the wife and father of the petitioner.  It  is not the case of the respondent that either the wife or the father of the petitioner are engaged   in   some   other   profession   or   carrying   on   any   other business. The only contention made by the respondent is that there are two other shops on the ground floor as well as four shops on the first floor of the property in question which are lying vacant and which   can   be   used   by   the   petitioner   for   the   alleged   bonafide requirement. Per contra, it is submitted by the petitioner that the entire property except the two shops under the occupation of the Page 10 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 11 respondent is being used as residential premises by the petitioner. In order to prove the same the petitioner has filed the site plan of the property in question clearly showing that except the two shops under   the   occupation   of   the   respondent,   there   is   no   other   shop which can be used for commercial purposes and rest of the portion of the property in question is being used for residential purposes by the petitioner. Respondent on the other hand has failed to file even a single document, photograph or any site plan to contradict the site plan filed by the petitioner or to prove that there is any other shop   /   portion   except   two   shops   under   the   occupation   of   the respondent   which   can   be   used   by   the   petitioner   for   commercial purposes. Hence, this contention of the respondent seems to be a mere bald averment without any substance. The site plan filed by the petitioner stands proved in absence of any counter site plan filed by the respondent. Thus, the bonafide requirement as well as non­availability   of   alternate   suitable   commercial   accommodation with the petitioner stands duly proved. 

15. Thus,   from   the   discussion   made   above,   respondent   has failed   to   raise   any   triable   issue,   which   requires   evidence   to   be proved. The petitioner, on the other hand, has clearly established his bonafide requirement regarding tenanted premises. Hence, the application for leave to defend filed by respondent is ordered to be Page 11 of  12                                                    E. No.  104/15 12 dismissed.   Consequently,   eviction   order   is   liable   to   be   passed against the respondent under Section 25 B (4) of the Act.  In view of   above,   petitioner   is   held   entitled   for   recovery   of   the   tenanted premises, i.e., commercial two shops measuring 6.8' x 8' forming part   of   property   No.   3347,   Christian   Colony,   Karol   Bagh,   New Delhi­110005, as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the petition. However, the petitioner would not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises   before   expiration   of   six   months   from   today   in   view   of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act.

Announced in open Court                      (Namrita Aggarwal)
      th
on 17  Day of August, 2016               CCJ cum ARC­1 (Central)
[This order contains 12 pages.]           Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.




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