Allahabad High Court
Jwala Prasad Maurya vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. ... on 26 September, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R. Court No. - 27 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 6781 of 2022 Applicant :- Jwala Prasad Maurya Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home, Lko. And Others Counsel for Applicant :- Saurabh Yadava,Poonam Maurya Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I,J.
1. Heard Sri Saurabh Yadava, learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant inter alia praying for following relief:-
(i) Quash the impugned order dated 28.02.2022 passed by the Additional Session Judge Fast Track Court (ADJ FTC 1), Ambedkar Nagar in Criminal Revision No.53/2018, CNR No.UPAN010032102018 "Jwala Prasad Maurya Versus Kasha Prasad Tivari HCP Thana Maharua, District Ambedkar Nagar.
(ii) Quash the impugned order dated 23.06.2018 passed by Civil Judge (J.D.)/Judicial Magistrate, Ambedkar Nagar in the matter of charge sheet no. NIL/2015 dated 30.10.2015 in "State Vs. Jwala Prasad Maurya" in respect of Criminal Case No.239/2018 arising out of NCR No.19/2013, U/s 323, 504 I.P.C., dated 09.03.2013, Police Station Mahrua, District Ambedkar Nagar.
(iii) Quash the impugned charge sheet no. NIL/2015 dated 30.10.2015 in "State Vs. Jwala Prasad Maurya" in respect of Criminal Case No.239/2018 arising out of NCR No.19/2013, U/s 323, 504 I.P.C. dated 09.03.2013, Police Station Mahrua, District Ambedkar Nagar.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that an NCR No.19/2013 came to be registered against the present applicant on 09.03.2013 under Section 323 and 504 I.P.C. only. The matter was investigated vide order dated 05.04.2013 by means of an application filed by the opposite party no.2 under Section 155 (2) Cr.P.C. The charge sheet was submitted in the court on 30.10.2015, therefore, his submission is that the learned trial court was incompetent to take cognizance of the offence after lapse of period of limitation provided under 468 Cr.P.C. specially when the complaint / charge sheet came to be filed after a lapse of three years, three months and twenty days and thereafter cognizance of the case was taken after a lapse of five years, three months and fourteen days. His further submission is that while passing impugned order, learned trial court did so in utter violation of provision contained under Sections 467, 468, 469 Cr.P.C. which are part of Chapter XXXVI. Learned trial court could not have taken cognizance of the matter as the same was barred by limitation. He, thus, submits that such order, which has been passed in flagrant violation of statutory bar, is nothing but a gross abuse of process of this Court, which deserves to be quashed.
4. Per contra learned A.G.A. has controverted the aforesaid submissions and has also submitted that in the fact of this case, the impugned order rightly came to be passed by placing reliance on the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Bharat Damodar Kale & another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh1.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the applicant at length, learned A.G.A. for the State and upon perusal of record, it requires to be clarified at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the fact that the alleged incident, in respect of which, an NCR bearing no.19/2013, Police Station Mahrua, District Ambedkar Nagar came to be registered at the behest of opposite party no.3 on 09.03.2013. This is also not in dispute that thereafter the opposite party no.3 moved an application dated 05.04.2013 seeking permission of investigation of this case under Section 155 (2) Cr.P.C. which came to be allowed and the matter was investigated by the Investigating Officer. Thereafter, a charge sheet came to be filed which was actually prepared on 30.10.2015 and the same was forwarded to C.O., Bheeti on 15.06.2016 and charge sheet no.19/2013 was submitted to the court of Civil Judge (J.D.) / Judicial Magistrate-First Class, Ambedkar Nagar on 29.06.2016 i.e. after a period of three years, three months and twenty days from the date of occurrence.
6. At this stage, it deserves to be mentioned that the learned trial court consciously took cognizance of this case vide its order dated 23.06.2018 and since the charge sheet was filed under Section 323 and 504 I.P.C. only, accordingly, the same was directed to be registered as a complaint case keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 2(d) Cr.P.C.
7. The questions which fell for consideration by the Constitution Bench in the case of Sarah Mathew vs. The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases and others2 are as follows :-
"3.1.(i) Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of the prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence?
3.2.(ii) Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale (which is followed in Japani Sahoo) lays down the correct law?"
10. The term 'cognizance' in the context of the provisions of the Code and the earlier decisions in the case of Jamuna Singh Vs. Bhadai Shah6, R.R.Chari Vs. State of U.P.7, Gopal Das Sindhi Vs. State of Assam8, and Chief Enforcement Officer Vs. Videocon International Ltd.9, was discussed and it was observed that 'taking cognizance' is entirely an act of the Magistrate and that the same may be delayed because of several reasons including systematic reasons. The conflicting view points as to whether the date of taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for computing limitation was considered and it was observed as follows:-
"34. Thus, a Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have been committed. This is the special connotation acquired by the term "cognizance" and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI. It bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate. Taking cognizance may be delayed because of several reasons. It may be delayed because of systemic reasons. It may be delayed because of the Magistrate's personal reasons.
35. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the judgment of this Court in Sharadchandra Dongre. It is urged on the basis of this judgment that by condoning the delay, the court takes away a valuable right which accrues to the accused. Hence, the accused has a right to be heard when an application for condonation of delay under Section 473 CrPC is presented before the court. Keeping this argument in mind, let us examine both the view points i.e. whether the date of taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for computing limitation. If the date on which complaint is filed is taken to be material, then if the complaint is filed within the period of limitation, there is no question of it being time-barred. If it is filed after the period of limitation, the complainant can make an application for condonation of delay under Section 473 CrPC. The court will have to issue notice to the accused and after hearing the accused and the complainant decide whether to condone the delay or not. If the date of taking cognizance is considered to be relevant then, if the court takes cognizance within the period of limitation, there is no question of the complaint being time barred. If the Court takes cognizance after the period of limitation then, the question is how will Section 473 CrPC work. The complainant will be interested in having the delay condoned. If the delay is caused by the Magistrate by not taking cognizance in time, it is absurd to expect the complainant to make an application for condonation of delay. The complainant surely cannot explain that delay. Then in such a situation, the question is whether the Magistrate has to issue notice to the accused, explain to the accused the reason why delay was caused and then hear the accused and decide whether to condone the delay or not. This would also mean that the Magistrate can decide whether to condone delay or not, caused by him. Such a situation will be anomalous and such a procedure is not known to law...
xxx
37. We are inclined to take this view also because there has to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of limitation relating to criminal offences. If, as stated by this Court, taking cognizance is application of mind by the Magistrate to the suspected offence, the subjective element comes in. Whether a Magistrate has taken cognizance or not will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. A diligent complainant or the prosecuting agency which promptly files the complaint or initiates prosecution would be severely prejudiced if it is held that the relevant point for computing limitation would be the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The complainant or the prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation period because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent complainant out of the court in this manner. Besides it must be noted that the complainant approaches the court for redressal of his grievance. He wants action to be taken against the perpetrators of crime. The courts functioning under the criminal justice system are created for this purpose. It would be unreasonable to take a view that delay caused by the court in taking cognizance of a case would deny justice to a diligent complainant. Such an interpretation of Section 468 CrPC would be unsustainable and would render it unconstitutional. It is well settled that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra)."
(emphasis supplied)
8. Referring to the legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt' and actus curiae neminem gravabit', it was observed as follows :-
"39. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion, light can be drawn from legal maxims. Legal maxims are referred to in Bharat Kale, Japani Sahoo and Vanka Radhamanohari. The object of the criminal law is to punish perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well- known legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', which means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt'. Chapter XXXVI CrPC which provides limitation period for certain types of offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465 IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious social consequences. The provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay.Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means that the act of court shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition to state that the court's inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying mind to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the interplay of these three legal maxims. The provisions of this Chapter, however, are not interpreted solely on the basis of these maxims. They only serve as guiding principles."
(emphasis supplied)
9. The question as to what would be the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 was answered by the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Sarah Mathew (supra), as follows:-
"51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC."
(emphasis supplied)
10. It would also be relevant to refer to the decisions in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale Vs. State of A.P.3, and also in the case of Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty4, which were held to have laid down the correct law in the aforementioned decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Sarah Mathew (supra).
11. The observations made in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale, (supra) that the limitation prescribed under Chapter XXXVI of the Code is only for filing of the complaint or initiation of prosecution and not for taking cognizance, are quoted hereinbelow :-
"10. On facts of this case and based on the arguments advanced before us, we consider it appropriate to decide the question whether the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Code apply to the delay in instituting the prosecution or to the delay in taking cognizance. As noted above, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the limitation prescribed under the above Chapter applies to taking of cognizance by the court concerned, therefore even if a complaint is filed within the period of limitation mentioned in the said Chapter of the Code, if the cognizance is not taken within the period of limitation the same gets barred by limitation. This argument seems to be inspired by the chapter-heading of Chapter XXXVI of the Code which reads thus: "Limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences". It is primarily based on the above language of the heading of the Chapter, the argument is addressed on behalf of the appellants that the limitation prescribed by the said Chapter applies to taking of cognizance and not filing of complaint or initiation of the prosecution. We cannot accept such argument because a cumulative reading of various provisions of the said Chapter clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed therein is only for the filing of the complaint or initiation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance. It of course prohibits the court from taking cognizance of an offence where the complaint is filed before the court after the expiry of the period mentioned in the said Chapter. This is clear from Section 469 of the Code found in the said Chapter which specifically says that the period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence either from the date of the offence or from the date when the offence is detected. Section 470 indicates that while computing the period of limitation, time taken during which the case was being diligently prosecuted in another court or in appeal or in revision against the offender should be excluded. The said section also provides in the Explanation that in computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority should be excluded. Similarly, the period during which the court was closed will also have to be excluded. All these provisions indicate that the court taking cognizance can take cognizance of an offence the complaint of which is filed before it within the period of limitation prescribed and if need be after excluding such time which is legally excludable. This in our opinion clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the period of limitation, but for taking cognizance of an offence in regard to which a complaint is filed or prosecution is initiated beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Code. Apart from the statutory indication of this view of ours, we find support for this view from the fact that taking of cognizance is an act of the court over which the prosecuting agency or the complainant has no control. Therefore, a complaint filed within the period of limitation under the Code cannot be made infructuous by an act of court. The legal phrase "actus curiae neminem gravabit" which means an act of the court shall prejudice no man, or by a delay on the part of the court neither party should suffer, also supports the view that the legislature could not have intended to put a period of limitation on the act of the court of taking cognizance of an offence so as to defeat the case of the complainant..."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The aforementioned view in the case of Bharat Kale (supra) was affirmed and followed in the case of Japani Sahoo (supra) and it was held that the date relevant for computation of period of limitation under Section 468 is the date when the complaint is filed or criminal proceedings are initiated and not the date when the Court/Magistrate takes cognizance or issues process. Applying the doctrine of "actus curiae neminem gravabit", it was held that taking a contrary view would lead to injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law. The observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows :-
"47. We are in agreement with the law laid down in Bharat Damodar. In our judgment, the High Court of Bombay was also right in taking into account certain circumstances, such as, filing of complaint by the complainant on the last date of limitation, non availability of Magistrate, or he being busy with other work, paucity of time on the part of the Magistrate/court in applying mind to the allegations levelled in the complaint, postponement of issuance of process by ordering investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 or Section 202 of the Code, no control of complainant or prosecuting agency on taking cognizance or issuing process, etc. To us, two things, namely, (1) filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings; and (2) taking cognizance or issuing process are totally different, distinct and independent.
48. So far as complainant is concerned, as soon as he files a complaint in a competent court of law, he has done everything which is required to be done by him at that stage. Thereafter, it is for the Magistrate to consider the matter, to apply his mind and to take an appropriate decision of taking cognizance, issuing process or any other action which the law contemplates. The complainant has no control over those proceedings.
49. Because of several reasons (some of them have been referred to in the aforesaid decisions, which are merely illustrative cases and not exhaustive in nature), it may not be possible for the court or the Magistrate to issue process or take cognizance. But a complainant cannot be penalized for such delay on the part of the court nor can he be non-suited because of failure or omission by the Magistrate in taking appropriate action under the Code. No criminal proceeding can be abruptly terminated when a complainant approaches the court well within the time prescribed by law. In such cases, the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of court shall prejudice none) would indeed apply. (Vide Alexander Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte.) One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that an act of court does no harm to suitors.
50. The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the period provided by law and once he takes such action, it would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had not taken an action within the period of limitation. Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law.
51. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera legis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
52. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings."
(emphasis supplied)
13. Learned counsel for the applicant though not disputing the law laid down in the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements on the question of limitation has tried to carve out a distinction by pointing out that in the case at hand the proceedings have been initiated with the lodging of an FIR and not by way of a criminal complaint. The aforesaid contention cannot be accepted for the reason that the view taken in the Constitution Bench decision is that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.PC. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution. The expression 'institution of prosecution' would be wide enough to include within its ambit institution of prosecution - either by filing of a complaint or by lodging of an FIR.
14. The 'institution of prosecution' under the Code can be by giving of information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154, or by lodging a written complaint before the Magistrate. In this regard reference may be had to the decision in the case of Darshan Singh Saini Vs. Sohan Singh and another5, wherein following the law laid down in the case of Sarah Mathew, and noticing the fact that the complainant after repeatedly visiting the police station to lodge his complaint, when the police did not interfere, lodged a written complaint before the Magistrate, within the period of limitation under Section 468, it was held that the bar under the said section would not apply on the basis of cognizance having been taken on a date beyond the prescribed period. The observations made in the judgment, in this regard are as follows :-
"4. It is also apparent from the pleadings of this case, that according to the respondent, the police did not interfere, when the respondent repeatedly visited the police station, to lodge his complaint. It is therefore, that the respondent-Sohan Singh lodged a written complaint on 24-01-2008, before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh.
5. The appellant-Darshan Singh Saini, approached the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when he was summoned by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh through an order dated 06-02-2009. A perusal of the order dated 06-02-2009 reveals, that the appellant was summoned under Sections 341 and 506, read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860.
6. The High Court, by the impugned order dated 08-04-2010, while partly accepting the prayer of the appellant, quashed the proceedings initiated against the appellant under Sections 341 and 506 of the Penal Code, but arrived at the conclusion, that there was reasonable ground to proceed against the appellant under Section 323 of the Penal Code.
7. It was the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not acceptable in law, on account of the fact, that cognizance in the matter could not have been taken against the appellant, on account of the period of limitation depicted under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this behalf, it was the pointed contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that whilst the instant incident was of 15-01-2008, cognizance thereof was taken on 06.02.2009. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was premised on the fact, that though the complaint had been made on 24-01-2008, cognizance thereof was taken beyond a period of limitation of one year(on 06-02-2009).
8. We have considered the aforesaid contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is apparent from the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, that he is calculating limitation by extending the same to the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nalagarh, on 06.02.2009. The instant contention is wholly misconceived on account of the legal position declared by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, wherein in para 51, this Court has held as under : (SCC p.102) "51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC."
9. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that keeping in mind the allegations levelled against the appellant by the respondent, the date of limitation had to be determined with reference to the date of incident and the date when the complaint was filed by the respondent. Since the complaint was filed by the respondent on 24-01-2008, with reference to an incident of 15.01.2008, we are of the view, that Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not stand in the way of the respondent, in prosecuting the complaint filed by him."
15. Reference may also be had to the case of Johnson Alexander Vs. State by C.B.I.6 where the proceedings were held to be vitiated, in view of the bar under Section 468 for the reason that there was no application by the prosecution explaining the delay from the date of the alleged occurrence till the date of filing the complaint and registering the FIR.
16. The aforementioned authorities in the case of Darshan Singh Saini (supra) and Johnson Alexander (supra), would go to show that 'institution of prosecution' would refer to the date of filing of the complaint or registering of the FIR, and in a case where the same is within the period of limitation, proceedings cannot be held to be barred by Section 468 merely for the reason that the order of cognizance or issuance of process is made on a subsequent date.
17. Thus, the view taken in the judgments in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale (supra), Japani Sahoo (supra) and Sarah Mathew (supra) to the effect that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code the relevant date is the date of 'institution of prosecution' and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is primarily for the reason that so far as the complainant/informant is concerned, as soon as he files a complaint, he has done everything which is required to be done by him and thereafter he has no control over the proceedings or the delay in taking cognizance which may be for reasons which are systemic or otherwise cannot be a ground to non-suit a diligent complainant. The aforesaid reason, would also be applicable where the case is instituted with the lodging of an FIR by the informant/complainant diligently and within the period of limitation. In this situation also the complainant/informant cannot be non-suited for any subsequent delay in taking cognizance, issuing process or any other action contemplated under law, for which the informant/complainant has no control.
18. Recently Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni7 has held as under :-
Therefore, the enunciations and declaration of law by the Constitution Bench do not admit of any doubt that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The High Court has made a fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e., 04.12.2012 is decisive of the matter, while ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by the appellant on 10.07.2012, well within the period of limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of commission of offence i.e., 04.10.2009.
19. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that the date of alleged incident mentioned in the N.C.R. bearing No.19/2013 is 09.03.2013 at 17:30 Hours. The said N.C.R. was lodged on the same day i.e. on 09.03.2013 itself. Therefore, in the aforesaid view of the matter, this Court does not find any substance in the argument of learned counsel for the applicant that since the charge sheet came to be filed after a lapse of five years, three months and fourteen days from the date of registration of NCR and the same was barred by limitation and no cognizance on the basis thereof could have been taken.
20. As referred above, the charge sheet under Sections 323 and 504 I.P.C. was submitted by the Investigating Officer upon conclusion of investigation after collecting the credible evidence, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly taken cognizance of this case and directed the same to be treated as a complaint case keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 2(d) Cr.P.C.
21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any illegality, impropriety and incorrectness in the proceedings under challenge. There is no abuse of court's process either.
22. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lacks merit, which deserves to dismissed and the same is hereby, dismissed, accordingly.
Order Date :- 26.9.2022 A.Dewal [Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I,J]