Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Rallis India Ltd. And Ors. vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 20 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998CRILJ3593, 1998(3)WLC373, 1997WLC(RAJ)UC682, 1998(1)WLN305
ORDER Amaresh Ku. Singh, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutors and perused the record of the case.
2. It appears that Shri Gajraj Singh. Insecticide Inspector and Agriculture Officer submitted a complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara against M/s. Kotri Charbhujanath Kraya Vikraya Sahkari Samiti Ltd. and Ors. and alleged therein the commission of offence punishable Under Section 29(1)(ka) of the Insecticides Act, 1968. On the basis of that complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 22nd February '95 took cognizance of the offence Under Section 29(1)(ka) of the Insecticides Act and directed the issue of summons against the persons named as accused persons in the complaint. A perusal of the order dated 22nd February '95 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate shows that he has not given any reasons for coming to the conclusion that there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused persons.
3. By this petition Under Section 482, Cr.P.C., the petitioners have prayed that the proceedings which were initiated against them by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara be quashed.
4. During arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners did not press the petition so far as M/s. Rallis India Limited (petitioner No. 1) is concerned. He has however, pressed the petition on behalf of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 6. The main ground taken in this petition is that there was no sufficient ground to proceed against the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 as there is nothing to show that they were concerned with the production and distribution of the insecticides or they were in any manner resposible for the alleged offence.
5. The learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned order dated 22nd February, 1995 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. His Submission is that it was not necessary for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to give reasons for taking cognizance of the offence or for issuing process against the petitioners. It is further submitted by him that so far as M/s. Rallis India Limited is concerned, there is sufficient evidence to show that the misbranded insecticide was manufactured by this firm. As regards the sufficient grounds to proceed against the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6, the learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 all of them were Directors of M/s. Rallis India Limited and therefore, it should be presumed that they were Incharge of the affairs of the company for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 and in any case it may be presumed that the alleged offence was committed with their consent or connivance or on account of their neglect as contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the Insecticides Act and therefore, it cannot be said that there was no sufficient ground to proceed against them.
6. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. So far as the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 are concerned, no such rule of law has been brought to my notice which may justify the inference that every Director of the company must be presumed to be the person Incharge of or the person responsible to the company for the conduct of the business within the meaning of Section 33 of the Insecticides Act. Section 33 of the Insecticides Act reads :-
33. Offences by companies- (1) Whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of, or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of, the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment under this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section,-
(a) "company" means anybody corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals: and
(b) "director" in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.
7. A bare perusal of Section 33 of the Act shows that this second does not make it mandatory that the Directors. Managers, Secretaries and other officers of the company shall be presumed to be persons incharge of the company or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company within the meaning of this section. In fact. Section 33 clearly provides that no person shall be deemed to be responsible for the offences committed by the company unless it is proved that he was incharge or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company at the time the offence was committed. In the absence of any rule of law making it mandatory on the part of the Court to presume that all the Directors, Managers, Secretaries and other officers of a company are responsible for the offence committed by the company, the question whether a person is or is not liable for the offence committed by the company must be regarded as a question of fact, and therefore, the presumptions have to be drawn in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 114 of the Evidence Act after taking in to consideration all relevant facts having a bearing on the question.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a recent judgment delivered by a single Bench of this Court in Bharat Insecticides v. State of Rajasthan 1997 (1) WLC 657. In that case, Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. L. Tibrewal after taking into consideration the provisions of the Insecticides Act and several rulings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners including the Directors of the manufacturing company.
9. In the instant case, the Insecticide Inspector does not appear to have conducted any inquiry to find out who were the persons responsible for the conduct of business of the company or who was the person incharge of the company, for the purpose of Section 33 of the Insecticides Act, at the time of alleged offence was committed. The complaint does not contain any facts which may justify the conclusion that the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 are the persons, who would be regarded as persons incharge of the company or persons responsible for the conduct of business of the company Under Section 33 of the Insecticides Act. The documents, which were filed with the complaint do not show that the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 are responsible Under Section 33 of the Act for the offence committed by M/s. Rallis India Limited. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has also not given any reasons to show how he came to the conclusion that the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 were the persons against whom he could issue the rule of process Under Section 204, Cr.P.C.
10. In view of the above mentioned facts, it must be held that there was no sufficient ground to proceed against the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 and therefore, the issue of process against the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 by the impugned order was impermissible and therefore, the initiation of proceedings against the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 by issuing summons against them amounts to abuse of the process of the Court.
11. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order dated 22nd February, 1995 deserves to be quashed and set aside so far as the issue of process against the non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 is concerned and to that extent is hereby quashed and set aside. The petition has not been pressed on behalf of the petitioner No. 1 namely M/s. Rallis India Limited and therefore, so far as the petitioner No. 1 is concerned, the petition is rejected.
12. For the removal of doubts, it is made clear that nothing shall preclude the insecticide Inspector from conducting further inquiry to find out who is/are the persons responsible Under Section 33 of the Act for the offences committed by the company and nothing will preclude the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate from issuing process Under Section 319, Cr.P.C. against any person, who is shown to be responsible for the offences committed by the petitioner No. 1, if circumstances justifies such a course.
13. The petition is disposed of accordingly.