Madras High Court
J.Kanagasundaram vs Panayakurichi Panchayat on 17 October, 2012
Author: S.Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED:17/10/2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR WP (MD) No.7826 of 2007 1.J.Kanagasundaram 2.Muruganantham 3.K.Ravi 4.R.Seeni @ Seenivasan ... Petitioners vs 1.Panayakurichi Panchayat, rep. By its President, Panayakurichi, Trichirappalli. 2.The Commissioner, Thiruverambur Panchayat Union, Thiruverambur Panchayat Union Office, Trichy. 3.The District Collector, Trichy. 4.The Superintending Engineer, PWD Trichirappalli. 5.The Executive Engineer, PWD R.C.Division, Trichy. ... Respondents (R5 impleaded as per order dated 30.10.2007 in M.P. No.3 of 2007) Writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for an issuance of a writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents to shift the cremation ground now newly constructed in S.F.No.82/1B, measuring 40 cents in Panayakuruchi, in Trichy District to S.No.62/2 in Panayakuruchi, in Trichy District. !For Petitioners... Mr.V.K.Vijayaraghavan ^For Respondents... Mr.K.Hema Karthikeyan for R1 Mr.K.Balasubramanian for R2 Mr.S.Kumar AGP for R3 to R5 :ORDER
The petitioners, residents of Panayakuruchi Village, Trichy District, have sought for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to shift the newly constructed crematorium in S.No.82/1B measuring 40 cents in Panayakuruchi Village, Trichy District to S.No.62/2, in the said place.
2. On the averments made in the supporting affidavit, Mr.M.Sivakumar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the land comprised in S.No.82/1B, in Panayakuruchi Village, is a PWD vaikal poramboke. In the said village, the above said lands in S.No.62/2 have been set apart for cremation. He further submitted that when lands have already been earmarked for Mayanam purpose, construction of a new crematorium was wholly unwarranted. According to him, the villagers were not consulted. Public opinion was not obtained. There is no permission from the Public Works Department and that therefore, the construction of the crematorium in S.No.82/1B, in Panayakuruchi village has been done arbitrarily. Inviting the attention of this Court to Rule 7 of the Tamil Nadu Village Panchayats (Provision for Burial and Burning grounds) Rules 1999, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the construction of a burial ground in S.No.82/1B, is within the prohibited distance of 90 metres of a dwelling place or source of drinking water supply and therefore, it is contrary to statutory provisions. He further submitted that near the new crematorium, there are agricultural lands and residential houses. According to him, the location of the burial ground, would affect the health and hygiene of the villagers. He also submitted that the location would cause disturbance to the peace and tranquility in the village and for the abovesaid reasons, prayed for a mandamus, as stated supra.
3. The Block Development Officer (Panchayats), Thiruverambur Panchayat Union, the second respondent herein, in his counter affidavit has stated that the original crematorium was situated adjacent to National Highways
- 45 (Trichy-Chennai road) and that the land on which the burial ground was in existence, has been acquired by the National Highways Authority, for laying a four laning of NH-45. He further submitted that the existing burial ground in S.No.62/2 belongs to Christian Community. There was a need to construct a new crematorium. Before the construction of the crematorium, (cremation shed), it has been properly informed to the villagers by 'Thandora' and that the Panayakuruchi village panchayat has also passed a resolution to that effect. The construction of the new crematorium was done as per the scheme "Anaithu Grama Anna Marumalarchi Thittam", introduced by the State Government. A special grama sabha meeting was conducted to announce to the public that the village has been selected under the above AGAMT scheme for 2007-2008, to select several works, including the construction of a cremation shed at S.No.82/1B.
4. The Block Development Officer (Panchayats) Thiruverambur, the second respondent herein, has further submitted that as per the revenue records, the land in S.No.62/2 has been shown as an existing burial ground, which has been purchased, generations back and used only by the Christians and it is not a poramboke land. In the above said circumstances, the Block Development Officer (Panchayats), Thiruverambur has denied the contentions that the land in S.No.62/2 has been set apart for, Mayanam purposes for general public.
5. The Block Development Officer, has further submitted that crematorium from S.No.82/1B cannot be shifted to S.No.62/2, as the latter place is being used exclusively by the Christians. He also submitted that the petitioners, who are aware of the resolution, and which has been given effect to by constructing a crematorium under AGAMT scheme cannot, have suppressed the facts and that they cannot now seek for a mandamus to shift the crematorium from S.No.82/1B to S.No.62/2 in Panayakuruchi Village. According to him, the land in S.No.62/2 has been classified as PWD Vaikal Poramboke.
6. The second respondent has also stated that a suit in O.S.No.1026 of 2007 has been filed by one Mr.Amenudhin on the file of the learned District Munsif, Trichy, and that the interim injunction sought for, in I.A.No.672 of 2007, restraining the respondents to put up any construction, has been dismissed. The construction has already been completed. For the aforesaid reasons, she has prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.
7. The Executive Engineer (PWD), WRO, River Conservancy Division, Trichy, the fifth respondent herein, in his counter affidavit has stated that the land comprised in S.No.82/1B, belongs to Public Works Department. He has stated that PWD has not granted permission for construction of any crematorium in S.No.82/1B. He has also stated that the village panchayat has not informed the Public Works Department, River Conservancy Division, Trichy, regarding the proposed construction or the construction made later on. However, at paragraph No.8 of the counter affidavit, the Executive Engineer, PWD, WRO, Trichy, has stated that he is ready to obey any orders to be passed in this writ petition.
8. Record of proceedings shows that on 02.04.2008, in M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2007, this Court, has passed the following orders:
"The scope of this writ petition is narrowed down to the following aspects, the details of which should be reported to this Court. * Out of the lands in two survey numbers, which is sought to be charged by the petitioners.
* The status of the lands in question.
* Whether any construction has been made in the said lands?
2.After hearing the arguments on the either side, it appears that if the information as regards the present position and also the availability of alternative place if any in that village, is ascertained, then, it may facilitate amicable settlement of the issue.
3.Therefore, this Court directs the District collector, Trichirappalli, to inspect the place and identify the status of both the survey numbers and the position as on today, besides finding out whether any alternative place is available in that area. The said inspection should be done in the presence of all the parties to the proceedings including the petitioners, the panchayat President, the Commissioner of Panchayat Union, the Superintending Engineer and the Executive Engineer, Public Works department, R.C.Division, Trichirappalli. Further, a detailed report is to be filed by the District Collector within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Post this matter after three weeks for filing counter."
9. Pursuant to the abovesaid order, the District Collector, Trichy, has filed a reply affidavit along with an inspection report, dated 06.05.2008. In his counter affidavit, the District Collector, Trichy, the third respondent herein, has stated that the place in S.No.82/1B and the lands in S.No.82/1B and 62/2, respectively, in Panayakuruchi Village were inspected by him on 06.05.2008, along with the petitioners, the President Village Panchayat Panayakuruchi, the Commissioner, Panchayat Union, Thiruverambur, the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Tiruchirappalli, the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, River Conservancy Division, Tiruchirappalli. In his report, he has also stated that as per the revenue records, land in S.No.82/1B, measuring an extent of 0.16.0 hectares has been classified, as Public Works Department Vaikal Poramboke. The land in S.No.62/2 measuring 0.14.5 Hectares, has been classified as Mayanam and Vaikkal, as per the revenue records and that the said place is being exclusively, used only by the Christians, as their cemetery. In respect of land in S.No.82/1B, measuring 0.16.0, a cremation shed, cement road, compound wall, hand pump and barbed wire fencing, on the three sides of the cremation ground have been put up by the President, Village Panchayat, Panayakuruchi village under the AGAMT 2007-2008. According to him, the Cremation ground to an extent of 0.10 cents, is a vacant place. The District Collector, Trichy, has further stated that the Dalit christians have been using the land in S.No.62/2, as their cemetery. According to him, the cremation site, which was hitherto used by the Panayakuruchi villagers, other than the Christians has been acquired by National Highways Authority of India, for four laning, NH-45. Therefore, the proposal for a cremation ground, for the use of the villagers of Panayakuruchi was taken up under the "Anaithu Grama Anna Marumalarchi Thittam", in S.No.82/1B, on the land classified as PWD poramboke. According to him, the construction work was completed in September 2007 itself.
10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the materials available on record.
11. Pleadings disclose that initially, the villagers have been using the burial ground, in Panayakuruchi Village and that the said place has been taken over by the National Highways Authority of India, for widening, National Highways - 45, for four laning. As per the revenue records, the land in Survey No.62/2 measuring 0.14.5 hectares, has been classified as Mayanam and Vaikal poramboke and that the same, is being exclusively used by Christians, as their cemetery. Inasmuch as the land, hitherto, used by the villagers, other than Christians, has been taken over by National Highways Authority of India, a necessity in the village has arisen for making a provision by the Department. There is no dispute that as per the revenue records, land in S.No.82/1B measuring 0.16.0 Hectares has been classified as Public works Department Vaikal Poramboke. When the Government have introduced, a scheme named "Anaithu Grama Anna Marumalarchi Thittam", a special grama saba meeting has been conducted to bring it to the notice of the villagers that the said village has been chosen under the abovesaid scheme, for the year 2007-2008, for undertaking developmental activities, for the villagers, including the construction of a crematorium in S.No.82/1B. As per the version of the Block Development Officer, Panchayats, Thiruverambur, the second respondent herein, before proceeding with the construction, 'Thandora' has been made in the village and that the panchayat council has also passed a resolution to that effect. The petitioners claiming themselves to be the owners of the lands adjacent to the new crematorium, in their supporting affidavit to the writ petition, have not stated anything about the "Thandora" effected in the village and the resolution passed by the council.
12. Material on record discloses that there was a requirement of a new crematorium, for the use of villagers, other than Christians and in such circumstances, the panchayat have chosen the land in S.No.82/1B in the said village, as the place suitable for burial ground. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the permission of PWD, particularly River Conservancy Division, Trichy, has not been obtained, which it is admitted by the Public Works Department, it is evident from the counter affidavit filed by the Executive Engineer, Public Works department, Trichy, the said authority has categorically submitted that there is no objection to obey the orders to be made in this writ petition. The Public Works Department has not taken up the issue with the District administration, at any point of time. They have not objected to the construction of the cremation shed at any point of time. Even though the land belongs to PWD department, they impliedly have conceded to the requirement for forming a new burial ground. On the basis of the decision of the council, action has been taken under "Anaithu Grama Anna Marumalarchi Thittam" to construct a crematorium in S.No.82/1B measuring 40 cents of land.
13. As regards the contention that the location of the new burial ground, is adjacent to agricultural lands and residential houses, and that the same has affected the health and hygiene of the villagers, no materials have been produced before this Court to substantiate the same. The averments made in the supporting affidavit, is a generalised statement. Going through the material on record in entirety, this Court is not able to arrive at any prime facie conclusion that the petitioners are personally aggrieved over the construction of a new crematorium in S.No.82/1B. Nowhere in the affidavit, the petitioners have pleaded that there is an infringement of any constitutional, statutory, legal or customary right recognised by law, insofar as the petitioners, are concerned.
14. A writ of mandamus would lie only, if a person who approaches this Court, under Article 226 of the constitution of India, on the averments pleaded and evidence substantiated, prove that there was a subsisting right and the statutory authorities, who have a corresponding duty, have failed to discharge the same. Reference can be made to the following decisions:
14.1.. In the decision reported in (1996) 9 SCC 309 (State of U.P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors.) in paragraph 10, the Apex Court held as follows:
10. ...Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and the said right was subsisting on the date of the petition....
15. In the decision reported in (2004) 2 SCC 150 (Union of India v. S.B. Vohra) the Supreme Court held that 'for issuing a writ of mandamus in favour of a person, the person claiming, must establish his legal right in himself. Then only a writ of mandamus could be issued against a person, who has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so.
16. In the decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC 280 (Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain) in paragraphs 11 and 12 the Supreme Court held thus,
11. The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.:
Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed.
Note 192.-Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty.
Note 196.-Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject always to the well- settled principles which have been established by the courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned-an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Note 206.- ... The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action.
12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College and Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar this Court observed as follows in para 15 of the Reports (SCC): (Sipahi Singh case, SCC pp. 152-53)
15. ... There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance.... In the instant case, it has not been shown by Respondent 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on Respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that Respondent 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same.
Therefore, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities...."
17. Reading of the rule relied on by the petitioners, makes it clear that, no person shall bury or burn or cause to be buried or burnt any corpse in any place, within 90 metres of the dwelling place or a source of drinking water supply other than the place licensed, as a burial and burning ground. In the case on hand, the land in S.No.82/1B in Panayakuruchi village, has been chosen for the purpose of providing a burial ground to the villagers, other than Christians, in Panayakuruchi village, and that therefore, the contentions of the petitioners regarding distant factor cannot be countenanced. The place has been chosen and licensed, as a crematorium, by the village panchayat and after the financial sanction accorded by the District Collector, Trichirappalli, under "Anaithu Grama Anna Marumalarchi Thittam", construction has been completed in September 2007. The statutory provision, is to the effect that only if the village panchayat is satisfied that the location of a burial ground in S.No.82/1B in Panayakuruchi Village, would cause disturbance to peace and tranquility, to the villagers and health of persons, in the neighbourhood thereof, the same requires to be shifted and in the case on hand, no materials have been placed to substantiate the same, to arrive at a conclusion, but, on the contrary, the village panchayat, itself has chosen the said place, for making a provision, for a burial ground for the villagers, other than the christians.
18. Yet another contention raised in this writ petition is that the location of the burial ground in S.No.82/1B in Panayakuruchi Village would cause disturbance to peace and tranquility, in the village. The said contention is baseless. On the contra, it is evident from the report of the District Collector, Tiruchirappalli that the land, which has been used for burial, had been taken over by the National Highways Authority of India for widening NH-45, four laning road and that a new cremation ground for the people of the Panayakuruchi Village had been taken up in S.No.82/1B and completed in September 2007. Absolutely, no materials have been placed before this Court to substantiate infringement of any personal right of the petitioners. When the petitioners have not proved infringement of any personal right, to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is of the view that the writ petition is purely vexatious.
19. The petitioners, who have not stated anything about the "Thandora" made in the village, before the decision was taken by the village panchayat, they have suppressed the information to this Court. The petitioners have approached this Court, with unclean hands. Suppression of the abovesaid fact is apparent on the fact of record. The averments made in the counter affidavit have not been refuted. On the aspect of suppression of material facts, this court deems it fit to consider the following decisions:
19.1. In T.Ramamoorthy v. The Secretary, Sri Ramakrishna Vidyalaya High School, etc. & Others reported in 1998 Writ. LR 641, at Paragraph 6, held as follows:
"....This principle that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, things must be done in that way and not otherwise and that the other method of performance is necessarily precluded, is not only well settled, but squarely applies to this case also in construing the scope of the power as also its exercise by the management under Section 22 of the Act."
19.2. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, [(2004) 4 SCC 268], the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 12, held as follows:
"12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner."
19.3. In Captain Sube Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(2004) 6 SCC 440], the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 29, held as follows:
"29. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, a Constitution Bench of this Court reaffirmed the general rule that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself.
19.4. The Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements reported in 2005 (1) CTC 223, at Paragraph 27, held as follows:
"27. Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to severe consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.
19.5. In Pandit D Aher v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2007 (1) SCC 437, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 19, held as follows:
"It is now well settled that a judicial review would lie even if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If statutory authority uses its power in a manner not provided for in the statute or passes an order without application of mind, judicial review would be maintainable. Even an error of fact for sufficient reasons may attract the principles of judicial review."
20. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.
21. In Moody v. Cox [(1917) 2 Ch. 71: (1916-17) All ER Rep 548 (CA)], it was held: (All ER pp. 555 I-556 D) It is contended that the fact that Moody has given those bribes prevents him from getting any relief in a court of equity. The first consequence of his having offered the bribes is that the vendors could have rescinded the contract. But they were not bound to do so. They had the right to say "no, we are well satisfied with the contract; it is a very good one for us; we affirm it". The proposition put forward by counsel for the defendants is: "It does not matter that the contract has been affirmed; you still can claim no relief of any equitable character in regard to that contract because you gave a bribe in respect of it. If there is a mistake in the contract, you cannot rectify it, if you desire to rescind the contract, you cannot rescind it, for that is equitable relief." With some doubt they said: "We do not think you can get an injunction to have the contract performed, though the other side have affirmed it, because an injunction may be an equitable remedy." When one asks on what principle this is supposed to be based, one receives in answer the maxim that anyone coming to equity must come with clean hands. I think the expression "clean hands" is used more often in the textbooks than it is in the judgments, though it is occasionally used in the judgments, but I was very much surprised to hear that when a contract, obtained by the giving of a bribe, had been affirmed by the person who had a primary right to affirm it, not being an illegal contract, the courts of equity could be so scrupulous that they would refuse any relief not connected at all with the bribe. I was glad to find that it was not the case, because I think it is quite clear that the passage in Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea [(1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318: 2 Bos & P 270], which has been referred to, shows that equity will not apply the principle about clean hands unless the depravity, the dirt in question on the hand, has an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for. In this case the bribe has no immediate relation to rectification, if rectification were asked, or to rescission in connection with a matter not in any way connected with the bribe. Therefore that point, which was argued with great strenuousness by counsel for the defendant, Hatt, appears to me to fail, and we have to consider the merits of the case.
22. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16, pp. 874-76, the law is stated in the following terms:
"1303. He who seeks equity must do equity.-In granting relief peculiar to its own jurisdiction a court of equity acts upon the rule that he who seeks equity must do equity. By this it is not meant that the court can impose arbitrary conditions upon a plaintiff simply because he stands in that position on the record. The rule means that a man who comes to seek the aid of a court of equity to enforce a claim must be prepared to submit in such proceedings to any directions which the known principles of a court of equity may make it proper to give; he must do justice as to the matters in respect of which the assistance of equity is asked. In a court of law it is otherwise: when the plaintiff is found to be entitled to judgment, the law must take its course; no terms can be imposed.
* * * 1305. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.-A court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the subject- matter of the litigation has been improper. This was formerly expressed by the maxim 'he who has committed iniquity shall not have equity', and relief was refused where auntitled folder transaction was based on the plaintiff's fraud or misrepresentation, or where the plaintiff sought to enforce a security improperly obtained, or where he claimed a remedy for a breach of trust which he had himself procured and whereby he had obtained money. Later it was said that the plaintiff in equity must come with perfect propriety of conduct, or with clean hands. In application of the principle a person will not be allowed to assert his title to property which he has dealt with so as to defeat his creditors or evade tax, for he may not maintain an action by setting up his own fraudulent design.
The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at depravity in a general way; the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief sought, and the conduct complained of must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense. Thus, fraud on the part of a minor deprives him of his right to equitable relief notwithstanding his disability. Where the transaction is itself unlawful it is not necessary to have recourse to this principle. In equity, just as at law, no suit lies in general in respect of an illegal transaction, but this is on the ground of its illegality, not by reason of the plaintiff's demerits."
23. Considering the facts in entirety, this Court is inclined to impose costs on the petitioners quantifying the same at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) to be paid by the petitioners, to the District Collector within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, the District Collector, Tiruchirappalli, shall take appropriate proceedings for realisation, under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act.
24. With the aforesaid directions, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.
RR To
1.Panayakurichi Panchayat, rep. By its President, Panayakurichi, Trichirappalli.
2.The Commissioner, Thiruverambur Panchayat Union, Thiruverambur Panchayat Union Office, Trichy.
3.The District Collector, Trichy.
4.The Superintending Engineer, PWD Trichirappalli.
5.The Executive Engineer, PWD R.C.Division, Trichy.