Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
P. Srinivasulu vs Registrar (Adminstration), High Court ... on 16 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(2)ALD759, 2000(2)ALT522
Author: P. Venkatarama Reddi
Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi
ORDER P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
1. The petitioner who was a Munsif Magistrate (present designation being Junior Civil Judge) prays for issuance of the writ to quash the order of the High Court in Roc.No.367/91/B.Spl.(SC), dated 20-2-1995. Disciplinary enquiry was initiated against the petitioner by the High Court into various charges of misconduct and judicial impropriety against the petitioner. Based on the report of the Enquiry Officer viz., II Additional District Judge, Guntur, the High Court passed the impugned order imposing the punishment of withholding the promotion for five years, The suspension was revoked by the same order and the petitioner was put back to duty. The EO held that the charge No. 1 and additional charge No.2 were proved to the extent that the Charged Officer disposed of several criminal cases pertaining to the Courts of which he was placed incharge despite the warning issued by the District Judge in his communication dated 15-5-1991 marked as Ex.P49. Charge No.2(i) and charge No.3(iv) and additional charge Nos.3, 4 and 6 were also held to have been proved. The said charges are reproduced below:
"Charge No .1" That you P. Srinivasulu while working as 1st Additional District Munsif, Narasaraopet despite of issuance of warning to you by the then District Judge, Guntur in Dis.No.4912, dated 21-5-1992 you have disposed of CC Nos.151 to 160 of 1991, 162 and 163 of 1991 on the file of the 2nd Additional District Munsif Court, Narasaraopet during summer vacation from 20-5-1991 to 2-6-1991 as incharge of II Additional District Munsif, Narasaraopet and you have not stated the reasons in the judgment as to under what circumstances you have imposed lesser punishments and fines imposed by you are not uniform and thereby you have committed misconduct and dereliction in discharge of your duties.
Additional Charge No.2: Violating the orders issued by the then District Judge, Guntur in Dis.No.4912, dated 21-5-1991 that 'you shall not repeat such lapses (i.e. disposing of a criminal cases of other Courts without holding full additional charge) thereafter'.
Charge No.2(i) That on perusal of record in CrI.MP No.1116 of 1991 on the file of the Munsif Magistrate Court, Chilakaluripet and the sworn statement of Sri Sk. Basha, Head Clerk, Munsif Magistrate Court, Chilakaluripet which was recorded by the District Judge, Guntur that you Srinivasulu, 1st Additional District Munsif, Narasaraopet and incharge Magistrate of Munsif Magistrate Court, Chilakaluripet granted bail in CrI.MP No.1116 of 1991 on the file of the Munsif Magistrate, Chilakaluripet as incharge Magistrate of Chilakaluripet on 30-6-1991 to the 2nd accused who is an Industrialist and a man with material means, go to strongly suggest that the entire affair of surrendering A2 and obtaining bail orders was made evidently with some prearranged plan or on some understanding on his surrender in a crime which was registered for an offence under Section 302, IPC without giving an opportunity to 'the concerned police would only expose that you have passed such an order dishonestly and on account of the corrupt practice indulged by you and that your observation in the said Crl.MP as if the APP of Assistant Sessions Court, Narasaraopet appeared and argued on behalf of the SHO, Chilakaluripet was false and incorrect in view of the Statement of Sri Sk. Basha, Head Clerk, Munsif Magistrate Court, Chilakaluripet and thereby you have grossly abused and misused your Office of Magistrate post.
Charge No.3(iv) : That on verification of the report dated 12-9-1991 of the then District Judge, Guntur that in Cr. No. 150 of 1991 Phirangipuram Police Station wherein the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Guntur by his order dated 27-6-1991 in Cr.No.2472 of 1991 refused to grant anticipatory bail to the accused on the ground that he has alleged to have inflicted injuries twice with an iron rod on the head of the de facto complainant and that during the absence of Additional District Munsif, Sattenapalli you have granted bail as incharge Magistrate to the sole accused on 8-8-1991 in Crl.MP No.2710 of 1991 though the APP made an endorsement on the bail application opposing the same on the ground that it is triable by Sessions Court, and that investigation is not yet completed. Similarly, in Cr. No.31 of 1991 of Phirangipuram Police Station wherein the II Additional District Judge, Guntur by his order dated 27-6-1991 dismissed the Crl.MP No.2468 of 1991 in respect of 3 accused and as not pressed in respect of A9, A16 and A17 and granted bail to A8 and A10 to A16. Subsequently, A1 approached High Court and filed Crl.MP No.1027 of 1991 for anticipatory bail and it was dismissed. Subsequently, Al surrendered on 8-8-1991 before the 1st Additional District Munsif Magistrate, Narasaraopet who was placed incharge Additional District Munsif Magistrate, Sattenapalli and filed bail application Crl.MP No.27I8 of 1991. The APP endorsed on the application opposing the petition on the ground that offence is triable by the Sessions Court and that the accused is aggressive in nature and that investigation is not yet completed and that despite it you have granted bail to Al and thereby you have committed misconduct and gross negligence and dereliction in discharge of your duties.
Additional Charge: No:(3): Granting of bails to the accused involved in the offences exclusively triably by Courts of Sessions and where you have no power to try the offences;
Additional Charge No:(4) Accepting the service of notices on unconcerned persons and passing of orders without hearing the prosecution and without affording an opportunity to the prosecution to address arguments;
Additional Charge No: (6) Granting bail to an accused person who is involved in an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life by passing orders in several petitions filed by the accused persons, on one and the same day and in quick succession i.e., petition filed under Section 91 of Cr.PC to cause production of the records in other crime; petition filed to permit the petitioner's Counsel to go through the records; petition filed to surrender the accused and petition filed for grant of bail and accepting the sureties on sufficient certificates and passing of orders in all the above petitions in utter disregard and violation of Rules and procedure and acted in utter disregard of judicial norms for extraneous and extra-judicial considerations leading to an inference of corruption.
2. At this stage, it may be pointed out that what was stated by the Enquiry Officer in the concluding part of the report as regards the proof of additional charge No.3 is contrary to his own findings. His findings in para 15 would unequivocally indicate that the petitioner was absolved of this general charge. He accepted the contention that notwithstanding the fact that the case is exclusively triable by a Court of Session, the Magistrate has got jurisdiction to grant bail. The EO however dealt with specific cases in which bail was granted in the cases mentioned under charges 2(i) and 3(iv) and drew an inference that the CO went out of the way in granting bails apparently for extraneous considerations. So also, the statement of EO in the concluding para that additional charge Nos.4 and 6 were proved is not an accurate statement inasmuch as apart from the two instances of granting bails (forming part of charge Nos.2(i) and 3(iv), in no other instance, the petitioner was found guilty of the irregular grant of bails for extraneous reasons or passing orders without giving adequate opportunity to the prosecution. On the other hand, the findings/observations in Paragraph 15 (towards the end) would indicate that the petitioner was absolved of that charge No.6. Thus, there is no independent finding vis-a-vis charge No.6 and even charge No.4 except while dealing with the aforementioned charges 2(i) and 3(iv).
3. The High Court was evidently misled by the concluding para of the EO and committed the same mistake as EO in observing that additional charge Nos.3, 4 and 6 were also proved. The High Court observed:
"The High Court .... . agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the charges proved against him, rejects the contentions of the charged Officer and holds that the said charges are proved.
In view of the gravity of the charges viz., 1, 2 and 3 which are partly proved, additional charge No.2, partly proved and additional charges 3,4 and 6 which are fully proved, against the Charged Officer, the High Court hereby imposes upon the charged Officer...... the punishment of withholding of promotion for five years".
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the bail orders passed by the petitioner were judicial orders and even according to the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner had an undoubted power to grant bail. It is pointed that the petitioner had given valid and sound reasons for granting bail to the surrendered accused in the two instances pointed out by the EO. As far as first charge and additional charge No.2 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no evidence that the petitioner received the proceedings of the District Judge in Ex.P49 and that in any case, there is no bar against the disposal of cases as an incharge Magistrate. It is then submitted that the findings of the EO which were accepted by the High Court especially with regard to charges 2(i) and 3(iv) are based on assumptions and surmises and the finding cannot be sustained at all.
5. The extreme contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the orders passed in exercise of judicial powers cannot be the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings unless there is material to hold that the Judicial Officer received illegal gratification or favoured a party for personal reasons, cannot be accepted. It is too late in the day to say that judicial orders passed by the members of Subordinate Judiciary are immune from the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court unless positive evidence of corruption and nepotism is forthcoming. Rarely, if not seldom, there could be direct evidence of receipt of illegal gratification or the Officer succumbing to the influence of some outside agency. Sometimes, the facts speak for themselves. Sometimes, it is a matter of reasonable inference to be drawn having regard to the manner in which the case was disposed of. Utter negligence in the performance of duties, not bestowing elementary care in preparing the judgment or an order blatantly overlooking the normal procedure or a basic provision of law which he or she may be reasonably supposed to be aware of, will also invite disciplinary action in appropriate cases.
6. The Supreme Court in VR. Katrai v. State of Karnataka, , spelt out the test of inference to be drawn from an overall picture presented by the particular judicial order. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court while absolving the petitioner from the charge on the ground that there was scope to think that the assessment of compensation was the result of a mistake rather than illmotive, laid down as follows:
"Fixation of valuation was a Judicial Act of the appellant. We would like to make a special mention of the position that even if the assessment of valuation is modified or affirmed in appeal as a part of the judicial process, the conduct of the Judicial Officer drawable from an overall picture of the matter would yet be available to be looked into. In appropriate cases, it may be open to draw inference even from Judicial Acts."
7. In Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, , the Supreme Court held that the Government could take disciplinary action against a statutory functionary in respect of his Acts and omissions which cast a reflection upon his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty as a member of the service. The Supreme Court illustrated the instances in which the disciplinary action can be taken against a judicial functionary.
"Certainly, therefore, the Officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge..... It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an Officer.... Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases:
(i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii) If there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) If he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant;
(iv) If he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) If he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi) If he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago 'though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great'.
The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive".
8. Their Lordships however handed down a note of caution in the following words:
"However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated".
9. Having reviewed the various decisions on this aspect, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Parvatha Rao, J. and K.S. Shrivastav, J. in K. Someswara Kumar v. High Court of A.P., , observed:
"the three cases of A.N. Saxena, , and K.K. Dhawan, 1993 (2) SCC 565 and Upendra Singh, , related to Officers of Income Tax Department exercising quasi-judicial powers. The principles laid down in these cases apply a fortiori and with greater vigour to Judicial Officers exercising judicial powers".
In Paragraph 20, the learned Judges said:
"The law is thus clearly laid down by the Apex Court as regards the circumstances under which judicial functioning of Judicial Officers attracts disciplinary scrutiny and punitive action. The resultant position is that the conduct of a Judicial Officer in exercise of his judicial functions can be the subject matter of disciplinary action. We also have to observe that as Judicial Officers exercise sovereign judicial power of the State and they hold an Office of trust, judicial probity is of utmost importance and it is on this bed rock that public confidence rests".
Then, in Paragraph 21, it was observed:
"It follows therefore that disciplinary action taken against the appellant cannot be assailed if from an overall picture of the matter it is found that he acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of statutory powers of if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party - it is not necessary that he should have been actuated by corrupt motive".
10. Someswara Kumar's case (supra) is a case in which punitive action taken against a Judicial Officer in connection with his disposals on judicial side was upheld by this Court.
11. In Special Deputy Collector (LA) v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao, , it was observed:
"If feats of imagination are allowed the sway, the LAO/Collector would overstep judicial decisions/quasi-judicial orders and would land in misconduct amenable to disciplinary law".
In a recent judgment in Z.B. Nagarkar v. Union of India, 1999 SCC (L&S) 1299, the Supreme Court clarified that negligence in exercise of quasi-judicial power in order to constitute misconduct should not be "mere carelessness, inadvertence or omission, but culpable negligence". It was further observed that initiation of disciplinary proceedings cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite and there must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the quasi-Judicial Officer. A wrong interpretation of law which cannot be said to be deliberate or mala fide, does not constitute misconduct.
12. Ultimately, as observed by the Supreme Court, it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. It will be necessary to draw a distinction between unintentional error of judgment or bona fide exercise of judicial discretion and wanton, deliberate and brazenly negligent exercise of such powers. If there is scope for reasonable doubt that it is a case of bona fide error, the benefit of that doubt should no doubt go to the charged Officer. If there is no direct evidence, the question can be approached from the stand point of preponderance of probabilities and the reasonable inference that could be drawn from the proved facts. Mere suspicion, however, cannot be a ground to condemn a Judicial Officer or any other public servant.
13. Now we will advert to the findings on the charges held to have been proved and consider whether the petitioner can be punished on the basis of the findings recorded. The charge No.1 to the extent it is held to have been proved and additional charge No.2 go together. The District Judge, Guntur (examined as PW7) having noticed that the petitioner was disposing of criminal cases while he was kept incharge during the temporary absence of regular Magistrate, issued a memo on 15-5-1991 warning him not to repeat such lapses i.e., disposing of criminal cases of other Courts without holding full additional charge. The contention of the petitioner that memo was not received, was rightly disbelieved by the Enquiry Officer. The EO discussed this aspect in detail in Para 12. The evidence of PW5 - Jr. Assistant was relied upon by the EO. The EO inferred that though the initial to the petitioner was not found on Ex.P49, the petitioner ought to have been aware of the communication received from the District Judge. In fact, Ex.P49 reveals that the comments of the petitioner were called for before issuing that memo. Despite the receipt of that memo from the District Judge, the petitioner disposed of a batch of 12 cases on 30-5-1991 pertaining to the Court of which he was kept incharge. In these cases, the accused were charged of offence under Section 379 IPC for the theft of electrical energy. Charges were framed, trial was started and closed on the same day. The accused pleaded guilty and they were sentenced to pay a fine ranging between Rs.50/- to Rs.100/-. Thus, every thing was done at a great speed. Of course, the EO exonerated the petitioner of the latter part of charge No.1 as he felt that discretion exercised by the petitioner in imposing the fines, though paltry they are, cannot be faulted. The charge that the petitioner did not pay heed to the instructions and warning of District Judge for whatever reason it be, is amply proved, it is not the case of the petitioner that the D.J.'s orders were illegal and therefore not binding on him. If the D.J. had issued instructions contrary to the law or established procedure, the petitioner should have represented the matter to the High Court rather than being too anxious to dispose of as many cases as possible during the period he was kept incharge of another Court of Magistrate for a few days. Atleast, it is an Act of indiscipline which cannot go unnoticed.
14. Coming to charge No.2(i), certain factors which are brought out in the enquiry report are worth noticing. According to the evidence of PW1 who was the Head Clerk in Magistrate's Court at Chilakaluripet, on 30-5-1991, certain advocates practicing at Chilakaluripet came to him and stated that accused No.2 in Crime No.162 of 1991 (who was absconding) would surrender before the Magistrate and requested him to go over to Narasaraopet with the record in the bail petition. The petitioner was incharge Magistrate on that day. By the time he went to the Chambers of Magistrate at about 4.00 p.m., the advocate for the accused was already in the Chambers and the advocate presented the bail application and put forward his arguments. The petitioner took out the records in Cr. No.162 of 1991 already obtained from the Police Station from his box. After hearing the arguments, the petitioner called the Steno-Typist and dictated the order in the Chambers itself granting bail on certain conditions. PW1 further stated that the Public Prosecutor from the concerned Court or any other Court was not there when the bail petition was argued. Though the bail petition was argued in the Chambers and order was dictated in the Chambers, in the docket proceedings, a noting was made to make it appear that the order was pronounced in the open Court. For coming to this conclusion, the learned Enquiry Officer gave detailed reasons after referring to the evidence of PW1 and critically examining the evidence of DW1, Steno Typist. In the bail application, notice was given to the Additional Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge as the regular Additional Public Prosecutor pertaining to the concerned Court was not available. Though the Public Prosecutor was not present and his arguments were not heard, in the order Ex.P3, it is stated that the Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the bail application on the ground that the Magistrate had no competence to grant bail. As already noted, PW1 categorically stated that the Public Prosecutor was not present. Moreover, in the preamble of the order, the name of the Public Prosecutor is not mentioned which reinforces the version of PW1 that Public Prosecutor was not present.
15. Thus, the bail application was disposed of on the same day on which A2 -the absconding accused surrendered himself. The CO allowed the notice to be served on an unconcerned Public prosecutor, heard the arguments in the chamber and passed an order on the same day releasing the accused on bail even without giving sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to get instructions in the matter. The solvency certificates (Exs.P4 and P5) furnished by the sureties were accepted without demur though they were signed by the Village Assistant only and they were not countersigned by the MRO. It was noticed that the petitioner was normally insisting on the solvency certificates being counter-signed by the Mandal Revenue Officer. But, in this particular case, he deployed a different standard. A2 was a rich person running a brick industry. From all these circumstances, an inference was drawn by the learned EO that the petitioner was obviously prompted by some extraneous considerations in granting bail to A2 in post-haste that too in a case in which the offence under Section 302, IPC was registered. Added to that, a wrong picture was given as if Public Prosecutor was heard and order was pronounced in open Court whereas the order was dictated in the chambers.
16. Even if we ignore the last consideration i.e., the accused being a rich industrialist, the other factors stare at the petitioner. The inference drawn by the EO cannot be said to be without basis nor is it hit by rule of perversity of finding. It is trite to say that this Court in exercise of judicial review power under Article 226 cannot re-appraise the evidence nor go into the question of adequacy or even reliability of evidence. If there is some legal evidence on which findings can be based, the High Court cannot interfere with these findings under Article 226.
17. Coming to charge No.3(iv), there is yet another wrong statement in the concluding part of the enquiry report which we must point out. In Paras 15 and 16, the EO held that charge No.3(iv) was established. But charge No.3(iv) is in two parts. The first part of the charge pertains to grant of bail on 8-8-1991 in Crl.MP No.2710 of 1991 (Cr. No.15 of 1991). The other one is grant of bail in Crl.MP No.2718 of 1991 (Cr. No.3l of 1991) on the same day. Though the propriety or otherwise of grant of bails in both the cases almost stand on the same footing, no Finding was recorded by the EO with regard to Cri.MP No.2710 of 1991 (Cr. No.15 of 1991) which is the subject matter of earlier part of charge No.3(iv). The finding is only in regard to Crl.MP No.2718 of 1991 (Cr. No.31 of 1991). The High Court while dealing with the matter on administrative side committed the same mistake as the EO and repeated in the impugned order what the EO stated in the concluding part of the enquiry report, as if the entire charge No.3(iv) was proved.
18. Coming to second part of charge held proved i.e., in regard to Cr. No.3I of 1991, the petitioner granted bail on 8-8-1991 when he was incharge Magistrate of Sattenapalle Court. The accused No.1 who was charged for offences triable by Court of Session viz., Sections 147, 148, 436 and 379, IPC and who was refused anticipatory bail by the Court of Session sometime earlier, surrendered himself on 22-6-1991 and sought bail. The Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the bail application on the ground that the offence was triable by Court of Session, that the accused was aggressive in nature and the investigation was not yet completed. Earlier, anticipatory bail petition was rejected by the Sessions Court. The accused moved for regular bail on 8-8-1991 which was granted subject to certain conditions. This is what the EO commented in Para 15 of Enquiry report:
"As the case related to the Court of Additional Munsif Magistrate, Sattenapalli, the delinquent Officer could have allowed the matter to be considered by the regular Magistrate instead of granting bail on the very same day during the temporary absence of the Additional Munsif Magistrate, Sattenapalti. This circumstance of granting bail to A1 in Ex.P66 on the same day with the knowledge of refusal of anticipatory bail by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge on 9-6-1991 clearly goes to suggest that this granting of bail to A1 in Cr. No.31 of 1991 was hastened by the delinquent Officer and it leads to a suggestion and inference that such accepting the surrender on the same day of granting of bail on the same day inspite of refusal of anticipatory bail by the II Additional District Judge in a case which was exclusively triable by Court of Session clearly go to show that it was for extraneous consideration leading to an inference of corruption."
19. The only point which seems to have been put against the petitioner is that he should have been slow in granting bail to the accused whose anticipatory bail petition was rejected by the superior Court. Whether this only reason is sufficient to sustain the charge and gives rise to the inference of corrupt motives sought to be drawn by the EO is one aspect. Secondly the contention of the petitioner that regular bail petition is different from the anticipatory bail petition, was not met by the EO nor did he refer to the reasons given in the bail order, to see whether there was any intrinsic evidence of favouring the accused.
20. The above findings or observations to contrary to the observations made by the Enquiry Officer in Paragraph 15 itself to the effect that: (1) That the incharge Magistrate can attend to urgent bail applications; (2) It is not unusual for the accused to surrender and seeking and obtaining bail on the same day; (3) The Magistrate has got jurisdiction to grant bail even in the cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session.
21. The only reason therefore which survives is that the bail was granted despite the fact that anticipatory bail petition was rejected by the Sessions Judge. The petitioner should have been slow in granting bail to the accused whose anticipatory bail petition was rejected by the superior Court. By any reasonable standard, the only reason assigned for imputing motives to the petitioner in disposing of the bail application of Al in Cr. No.31 of 1991 cannot be said to be a relevant reason especially when the bail petition under Section 437 was being taken up nearly six weeks after the bail petition under Section 438 was rejected. Moreover, there was no consideration of the reasons given by the petitioner in his order (Ex.P66). One of the points focused by the petitioner in Ex.P66 order was that there was a complaint and counter complaint that the police did not take any steps to arrest the accused all these days despite the rejection of anticipatory bail and the accused being a public servant, was not likely to abscond. These reasons given by the petitioner were not tested by the EO. True, the CO did not advert to the objection of the Public Prosecutor. But, whether on that account, an inference of motivated or reckless disposal of bail application could be drawn, has not been considered by the EO.
22. The upshot of the above discussion is, the reasoning in support of the finding recorded under charge No.3(iv), is contrary to the observations made by the EO while discussing the charge in Para 15. Secondly, the only reason given, by itself, cannot form a reasonable basis for sustaining the charge. Thirdly, there was non consideration of other relevant aspects viz., the reasons given in the bail order (Ex.P66) and the omission of the Charged Officer to advert to the objections of the Public Prosecutor. With all these infirmities, the conclusion with regard to 2nd part of charge No.3(iv) cannot be sustained. As already noticed, the High Court merely agreed with the enquiry report. There was no other reasoning. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court as disciplinary authority should take a fresh look at charge No.3(iv) insofar as Cr. No.31 of 1991 is concerned and record its finding on a consideration of the relevant aspects. The High Court should also reconsider the question of punishment in the light of two factors: (i) additional charges 3, 4 and 6 though not proved (except in relation to charge No.2(i)) were erroneously held to have been proved in the concluding para of the enquiry report and (ii) the finding reached on a de novo consideration of second part of charge No.3(iv). If, on such re-consideration, the High Court feels that the punishment of withholding promotion for five years is excessive, the petitioner's case for promotion as Subordinate Judge should be considered at the appropriate point of time at which he became eligible for being considered promotion and in the event of the petitioner being found fit for promotion, he should be given the benefit of notional promotion with proforma fixation of pay and seniority in the cadre of Sub-Judge/Senior Civil Judge. The impugned order of the High Court is quashed and the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.