Delhi District Court
Varun Gupta vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 26 February, 2020
IN THE COURT OF MR. NAVEEN KUMAR KASHYAP,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-04, CENTRAL DISTRICT
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
Unique ID No.: DLCT01-007043-2019
CA Number :258/2019
1. Varun Gupta
S/o Mr. Rajender Kumar
R/o H.No. N-104, Prem Nagar-II,
Kirari Village, Nangloi
New Delhi
2. Mr. Rajender Kumar Gupta
S/o Late Madan Lal
3. Mr. Vijay Kumar Gupta
S/o Late Madan Lal
4. Mrs. Usha Gupta
W/o Mr. Rajender Kumar Gupta
5. Mrs. Meena Gupta
W/o Mr. Vijay Kumar Gupta
All r/o 2983-84, Saraj Ganj
Bahadurgarh Road,
Delhi-110006 .........................Appellants
Versus
1. State of NCT of Delhi
Through its Counsel
2. Jyoti @ Priyanka
D/o Mr. Naresh Kumar
W/o Mr. Varun
R/o 2088, Gali Ashok
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Bahadurgarh Road,
Sadar Bazar
Delhi-110006 ........................Respondent.
JUDGMENT
1. This judgment shall dispose of the above said criminal appeal arising out of impugned order dated 25/04/2019 passed by the Learned MM Ms. Sonam Singh Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby she inter-alia allowed the application of Jyoti @ Priyanka, respondent no.2 and thereby as an interim measure, the present five appellants (who are original respondent in the Trial Court) were prohibited from committing any act of domestic violence.
2. I have already heard the arguments of Learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent No.2 / original complainant. I have also perused the record, including the trial court record.
3. In nutshell, it is submitted in the present appeal, as also argued by the Learned Counsel for appellants that the impugned order in question suffers from non application of mind and is not based on material on record. That impugned order in question is passed without appreciating the facts that present respondent no.2 has been living CA No. 258/2019 Varun Gupta & ors vs the State & Anr Page no. 2 of 9 separately from the present appellants since 01/06/2015. It is further alleged that even the date of filing of the petition u/s 12 of the Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, present respondent no.2 was residing in her parental home as reflected from the memo of parties annexed with the original petition in question. It is further submitted that present respondent no.2 has not placed on record any recent complaint of alleged domestic violence. It is further submitted that after her separation no incident of violence was mentioned in the petition nor any material in support thereof was placed on record. It is further stated that respondent no.2 is no more residing in shared household and is not having domestic relation with the appellants. It is further stated that while residing at her parental house since 01/06/2015, she has filed a criminal case in CAW Cell and even a FIR No. 101/2016 is already registered long back. Thus, it is further argued great injustice and hardship would be caused to the appellants if order in question is not set aside as she may misuse the same to settle her personal scores with the appellants. As such, it is prayed that order dated 25/04/2019 to the extent under challenged i.e. prohibiting the appellants / original respondents from committing any act of domestic violence upon the respondent no.2 in the present petition be set aside. CA No. 258/2019 Varun Gupta & ors vs the State & Anr Page no. 3 of 9
4. On the other hand, reply dated 24/10/2019 was filed by the respondent no.2. In nutshell, it is submitted in such reply as also argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the order in question was rightly passed by the learned Trial Court. It is further submitted that during the period respondent no.2 remained her matrimonial home, she was subjected with cruelty and domestic violence by the appellants. It is further argued that it is wrong to state that she had not resided in the shared household or has not been having domestic relation with the appellants. Further it is claimed that appellants are not allowing respondent no.2 to enter her matrimonial home.
5. I have heard both the sides and gone through the record including the Trial Court Record. Further I have gone through the case laws relied by the parties.
6. Clause (f) of section 2 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act deals with definition of domestic relationship and for the purpose of ready reference, the same is reproduced below:
"domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family"
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7. On a bare reading of the same, it is clear that such definition covers not only persons living together at present but also who have lived together (in past) together in a shared household, as it is specifically mentioned in 2(f) of the Act that the person who have at any point of time lived together in a shared household as husband and wife. In the present case, there is no dispute that present appellant no.1 is husband of present respondent no.2. Further, it is the admitted position that earlier they were living together. At best, the case of even the appellant is the respondent no.2 left such matrimonial house since 01/06/2015. But same does not make any difference, in view of such definition. As such, prima facie, it is held that there is "domestic relationship" between the parties.
8. Further, clause (g) of section 2 r/w section 3 defines "Domestic Violence". On a bare reading of the present complaint read with domestic incident report filed by the protection officer, as also held by the learned Trial Court, prima facie, it is on record that domestic violence took place.
But having observed so, it is also a matter of record that a prima facie, it is not a dispute that present respondent no.2 is no more living with the appellant no.1 and instead she is residing with her parents.
In fact, even in the reply filed in the present appeal, respondent CA No. 258/2019 Varun Gupta & ors vs the State & Anr Page no. 5 of 9 no.2 smartly did not deny that at present she is no more living with the appellants.
9. In this back ground, we come to section 18 of the Act in question. Such section 18 provides:
"The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from--(a) committing any act of domestic violence;(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is achild, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;(f) causing violence to the dependents, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order"
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10. Thus, on a bare reading of such section 18 it can be seen that the Magistrate may pass an order on being, prima facie, satisfy that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place. Thus, it is not that only the situation that domestic violence threat existing at present is covered. Such definition covers even the situation where the domestic violence has already taken place (in past). In the present case, it is already noted above that, prima facie, incidents of domestic violence are reported even in the report filed by the protection officer.
Present complaint was filed in November, 2015. A domestic violence incidence in domestic incident report (DIR) dated 16/12/2015 pointed out domestic violence around the month of March, 2015 to August, 2015. Thus, this court do not find merits in the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that domestic violence were reported way back in past. Further just because the case is pending in the court and such application is not decided earlier, same in any case cannot be a ground to agitate that in the meanwhile, no fresh incident of domestic violence has taken place. Further, the courts must keep in mind the purpose of enacting such act and interpretation given by the Hon'ble Higher Courts, which is more effective protection to the rights of women guaranteed under the constitution against violence of any kind. In any CA No. 258/2019 Varun Gupta & ors vs the State & Anr Page no. 7 of 9 csae, it is not that past event, are not covered in section 18.
11. It is settled law that no detail reasoning is required at this initial stage. But having said so, it may also be observed that it would have been better if the learned Trial Court had discussed some details regarding the domestic violence in impugned order in question. It may further be noted that Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court from time to time have held that order of Trial Court is not vitiated or bad in law if no detail reasoning is given. But in any case, it is not the situation that there is bar in discussing in some detail, in orders like the impugned order in question. It may further be noted that any order passed by the Trial Court, is meant for not only for parties in question but also for the purpose of appellant court. Therefore, there is no harm in giving some specific details / reasoning in such orders and same is desired as noted above.
In any case, having observed so, this appellant court has gone through the complaint in the DIR. The same mention domestic violence incidence in para 4 (i) to (iv) apart from a hand written note at the end of the report. It points out insult by all the present appellants for not bringing dowry etc. and use of filthy language, it also points out name calling, humiliating by all the respondents. Further there are allegations CA No. 258/2019 Varun Gupta & ors vs the State & Anr Page no. 8 of 9 of sexual offence as well as economic violence in the form of forced sexual intercourse and not providing money for maintaining the present respondent no.2 by appellant no.1. In view of the same and the provision of law discussed above, this court do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order passed. Further in any case, it cannot be said that such order is not based on the material on record. As such, no interference is required in the same. Present appeal is dismissed accordingly.
12. Nothing mentioned herein shall tantamount to an expression on the merits of the case. The above said appeal is disposed of accordingly. TCR be sent back along with this copy of this judgment. This appellant court file be consigned to Record Room as per rules.
Announced in the open (NAVEEN KUMAR KASHYAP)
Court on 26/02/2020 ASJ-04/Central/Appellant
Court/DELHI/26/02/2020
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