Kerala High Court
Pakran vs Kunhiraman Nambiar on 20 January, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(1)KLT824
Author: Pius C. Kuriakose
Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan, Pius C. Kuriakose
ORDER Pius C. Kuriakose, J.
1. The present owner of the building, 2nd petitioner before the Rent Control Court and the other legal heirs of his father, 1st petitioner before the Rent Control Court are the revision petitioners. The parties will be referred to as landlord and tenant or by their ranks before the Rent Control Court. The schedule building is one of the two rooms in the ground floor of a double storeyed building situated on the principal junction of Perambra, a small town in Malabar. The petitioners sought eviction before the Rent Control Court invoking the grounds of arrears of rent (Section 11(2)), user of building in a manner as to reduce its value and utility (Section 11(4)(ii)), the tenant putting up or acquiring possession of other buildings (11(4)(iii)), cessation of occupation (Section 11(4)(a)) and additional accommodation (Section 11(8)) of the Rent Control Act.
2. The Rent Control Court did not grant relief to the petitioners on any of the grounds. That Court even held the rent control petition to be not maintainable in law due to the reason that the gift deed relied on by the 2nd petitioner, the de facto claimant for the ground under Section 11(8) contained a reservation clause under which the 1st petitioner himself was entitled to collect the rent. In appeal by the petitioners, the finding of the Rent Control Court regarding the maintainability of the rent control petition was set aside. But all other findings were confirmed. After disposal of the appeal, the 1st petitioner passed away and hence the junction of revision petitioners 2 to 7 to this revision.
3. Heard Shri K.P. Sudheer, learned counsel for the revision petitioners and Shri R.K. Muraleedharan, learned counsel for the respondent. Lower Court records are available for our perusal.
4. The ground of cessation of occupation was not pressed by the petitioners before the Rent Control Court. The ground of arrears of rent was turned down for want of statutory notice. No arguments were addressed before us regarding that ground and also regarding the ground under Section 11(4)(ii). It was fairly conceded before us by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that the grounds which seriously survived are only the grounds under Section 11(4)(iii) and 11(8) of Act 2 of 1965.
5. The landlord's pleadings regarding the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) were that the respondent has other shop rooms and sites for erection of shops in Perambra Bazaar; he has one shop room in Alankar buildings; he has acquired another shop room and site for erection of shop rooms at a distance 100 yards from a three-road junction; the other shop rooms in his possession are sufficient for his requirements; that evidence regarding the shop rooms possessed by the respondent will be furnished later. These averments were answered by the respondent contending that he does not have any other shop room in Perambra Bazaar; the fact that he has sites convenient for putting up shop rooms is irrelevant; he does not have possession of any room in Alankar buildings and does not own any building at all.
6. The landlord's pleadings regarding the ground under Section 11(8) roughly were that the 2nd petitioner conducts business in textiles by name Super Fabrics in the room adjacent to the schedule room; he has an "essential need" to evict the respondent so as to enable him to expand his textile business. The respondent answered these pleadings by contending that the 2nd petitioner is already conducting textile business in the room just on the north of the schedule room; that the two rooms are separated by a concrete wall; that it will be impossible to make use of both these rooms simultaneously; the claim is an experimental one; the petition is the immediate result of strained relationship between the parties on account of a police complaint filed against the landlord by the tenant; the same is without bona fides. He also contended that the income from the schedule room is the main source of livelihood and suitable shop room with equal facilities is not available in the locality.
7. The eviden6e before the Rent Control Court consisted of the oral testimony of PW. 1, the 2nd petitioner and documents Ext. A1 to A7 on the side of the petitioners and the testimony of RW1 and documents Ext. B1 to B4 on the side of the tenant, apart from court exhibits, Ext.C1 and C2 commission reports and Ext.C3 plan. The Rent Control Court found in the context of the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) that the room pointed out by the petitioners in Alankar buildings was legally in the possession of the tenant's brother. On the basis of Ext. C2 Commissioner's report obtained at the instance of the tenant the Court found that the tenant was in possession of another two storeyed building where in he was conducting watch repairing business in a fairly large scale. The court took the view that the watch repairing building was not liable to be taken into account for the purpose of Section 11(4)(iii) since that building was occupied for the said purpose even prior to the commencement of this lease. The Court noticed on evidence that the tenant had started construction of a multi storeyed commercial building on a commercial plot belonging to him and that the construction work had been stopped. According to the court what was required was completion of construction or actual possession of other buildings. The Court found on the basis of Ext.A5 tax assessment register that the tenant was the owner and in legal possession of another room, an arappura muri, described by the authorities below as a plank shop, a shop room made of wooden planks. Ext.C2 revealed that the said plank shop had by then been removed. The Court took the view that a plank shop can never be sufficient for the conduct of a substantial business like textiles. The Appellate Authority without entering on much discussions confirmed the findings of the Rent Control Court regarding the ground under Section 11(4)(iii). Both the authorities below were very much impressed by the statement of the tenant as RW.1 that he will vacate the building once he is able to complete the construction of the three storeyed commercial building, the construction of which was under way.
8. Regarding the ground under Section 11(8), the Rent Control Court took the view that the pleadings from the side of the petitioners are insufficient and that the evidence is not convincing. According to that Court, a landlord invoking the ground under Section 11(8) shall prove three ingredients, viz., (1) the building presently occupied by the landlord is insufficient and is causing much inconvenience to him; (2) the landlord has no other way than to evict the tenant for getting the required additional accommodation; and (3) that he has the potentiality and resources to expand the business. After formulating three ingredients as above, the Rent Control Court found that the landlord failed to prove the three ingredients. The landlord was blamed for not giving details regarding the stock position and also for the failure to take out a commission to show that he experienced paucity of space. Extracting two sentences from the testimony of PW1, re-extracted below, (There is no bar for expansion of trade in the room presently in my possession and the room just above that room already in my possession. The same is being done even now), (translation ours) the court went to the extent of holding that the moment the landlord conceded so, his claim under Section 11(8) failed. The Rent Control Court which enunciated three essential ingredients regarding the ground under Section 11 (8) however did not consider the question of hardship/advantage under the first proviso to Section 11(10). The Appellate Authority which concurred with the findings of the Rent Control Court also blame the petitioners for insufficiency in pleadings. The landlord's case in evidence that the first floor room is suitable only for use as a store room and not for display of goods is not accepted by that authority for want of pleadings. The Appellate Authority decides the question of comparative hardship and advantage in favour of the tenant specifically referred to the watch repairing business and stating that the said building is not suitable for textile business.
9. Shri K.P. Sudheer, learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the concurrent nature of the findings entered by the authorities below will not justify us in refraining ourselves from making a reappraisal of the evidence. According to the counsel, our powers under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act will enable us to make a de novo reappraisal of the evidence in appropriate cases. The approach of the authorities, counsel submitted, in the context of the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) was quite pendantic and unrealistic. He submitted that the tenant who was given compliments for having voluntarily disclosed the details regarding the watch repairing building is not so honest a man as the authorities below seem to think. It was submitted that the defence to the case under Section 11(4)(iii) was one of total denial. The abrupt removal of a plank shop which was just five years old and the sudden stoppage of the construction of a three storeyed commercial building on the reason that the local authority withdrew the permission, a reason not founded on evidence, speaks volumes for the tenant's so-called fairness, counsel submitted. So also, the tenant's stand that he is ready and willing to surrender the schedule room once he completes the construction of the building, appreciated very much very by the authorities below as demonstrative of his fairness, according to counsel, has now been established to be an unfair and since the tenant had already disposed of the plot where construction was going on, even prior to the hearing of the rent control appeal. Regarding the ground Section 11(8) also counsel submitted that both the authorities below misread the pleadings as well as evidence. According to counsel, no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the tenant due to the insufficiency of the landlord's pleadings and this aspect will be clear when the tenant's pleadings and the tenant's evidence are looked into. Counsel also submitted that the tenant had stopped the textile business in the schedule building and in its place has commenced jewellery business, an event which supports the landlord's case that the jewellery business in Alankar buildings conducted in the name of the tenant's brother actually belonged to the tenant himself. According to the counsel, the evidence regarding the watch repairing building will show that the said business accounts for the tenant's main source of income. Counsel concluded by submitting that both the authorities below were under the notion that the rent control statute is intended to promote the welfare of the tenant alone, a notion contrary to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court.
10. Opposing the submissions of Shri Sudheer very stiffly, Shri R.K. Muraleedharan submitted that we do not have power to set aside the factual findings concurrently entered by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority which are the only two courts of fact under the scheme of the statute. Even our power to have a reappraisal of the evidence, according to counsel, is narrow. Regarding the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) counsel submitted that the simple question was whether the tenant is possessed of or whether the tenant has put up another building reasonably sufficient for the tenant to shift his present business. On the evidence on record this question had to be answered in the negative and there is no scope for interference. Regarding the ground under Section 11(8) counsel submitted that in order to appreciate whether the trader genuinely needs additional accommodation, it is essential to examine the records pertaining to the volume of business presently and during the previous years. The best evidence in this connection, according to counsel, was the report of an advocate Commissioner on the basis of a local inspection and such a report was wanting in this case. Counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority's finding regarding comparative hardship was unassailable.
11. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 is wider than the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 CPC and many other statutory revisional jurisdictions. We are aware that on factual matters courts of facts, particularly the trial Court occupies a salutory position since that court has the advantage of seeing the witnesses and recording their evidence. Nevertheless we are not at all hesitant to say that in our present revisional jurisdiction we will be justified in interfering if we notice that there has been a wrong application of settled legal principles or that there has been misreading of the pleading and evidence resulting in prejudice to either of the parties. Having read through the order passed by the Rent Control Court, we are convinced that in the present case there will be justification for reappraising not only the pleadings but also the evidence.
12. The tenant had contended that the rent control petition is not maintainable due to the reason that the gift deed relied on by the de facto claimant contains a reservation clause to the effect that his father will be entitled to collect rent during his lifetime. The Rent Control Court even after noticing that the father is also one of the petitioners held that the petition is not maintainable in law since the father did not come forward to adduce evidence. The Appellate Authority certainly set aside this finding holding that the reasons stated by the Rent Control Court are absolutely wrong. We feel that the formulation of a non-issue as the first issue, the serious consideration given to that issue and the patently wrong finding ultimately entered on that issue clearly demonstrates a basically faulty approach from the side of the Rent Control Court, an approach which has also tainted the other findings of that Court.
13. Let us now consider whether the authorities below were justified in denying eviction on the ground mentioned under Section 11(4)(iii). Section 11(4)(iii) deals with tenants who are often more landlord-like than landlords. The legislative intendment behind that ground is not difficult to gather. In these times of acute accommodation shortage, the law wants to ensure that tenants who are having more buildings in their possession than what is reasonably necessary for them shall surrender the extra buildings for other needy tenants, if not for a needy landlord. Statutory provisions like Section 11(4)(iii) will have to be construed in a realistic and meaningful manner and not in a pedantic or narrow manner. The authorities below are certainly right in their view that the ground under Section 11 (4)(iii) will be made out only when it is shown that the tenant has possession of a building either at the time of commencement of the lease itself or through subsequent acquisition or by putting up a building and the same is reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village. We also agree that acquisition of plots however ideal they may be for construction will not constitute a ground under Section 11(4)(iii). We further agree that mere commencement of construction of a building is not sufficient. Accordingly we concur with the findings of the authorities below regarding the building where watch repairing businesses conducted, Ext.A3 and A4 plots where construction of storeyed buildings was started but discontinued and even regarding the room in Alankar buildings where going by documents it is the tenant's brother who is in possession.
14. However, the building which is the subject-matter of Ext.A5 assessment register stands on a different footing. The said building was put up by the tenant subsequent to the commencement of the present lease and according to him five years prior to his examination. Ext.A5 pertains to the period 1987 to 1992. At the time when the advocate Commissioner visited the properties for preparing Ext.C2 Report, ie., on 29.9.90, some one and a half years after the rent control proceedings started, Ext.A5 building was not in existence. Ext. C2 commission was taken out by the tenant inter alia to obtain a negative report regarding the existence of buildings on the plot where Ext.A5 building stood. The landlord's version is that the building was removed after the rent control proceedings started and there is controversy between the parties regarding the time of removal. Ext. A5 does not enable us to have an idea of the size of the building which was an arappura peedika- a shop room made of wooden planks. Admittedly, upon permission from the tenant, his brother was doing pan shop business in that building. The annual rental value shown is Rs. 540/-. The plank shop should have been of a reasonable size but probably smaller than that of the schedule room. The Rent Control Court ignored Ext.A5 building for the purpose of Section 11(4)(iii) stating that a plank shop cannot be used for the conduct of any substantial business. The rent control statute does not classify buildings as those fit for conduct of substantial business and otherwise. At the most the statute classifies the buildings as residential and non-residential. We are not prepared to accept the Rent Control Court's view that a plank shop can never be suitable for the conduct of substantial business in the nature of business in textile goods. It is common sight in our towns, particularly in bus stand, boat jetty and railway station areas that small time trade in readymade garments and even textiles go on well even in bunk shops. Ext. A5 building which is an arappura peedika certainly was a superior version of a bunk shop. We cannot ignore that building on the reason that the building no longer exists since such a view will enable ingenious tenants to bypass the statutory provisions. The view of Chandrasekhara Menon, J. in Narayanan Nair v. Pachumma, (1980 KLT 430), was approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Ramachandran v. Parukutty Amma, (1993 (2) KLT 43). According to us, the principles laid down in Ramachandran (supra) applies to the present situation also. The important question is whether the plank shop in question was reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirements in Perambra town. When the landlord makes out for the purpose of Section 11 (4)(iii) that the tenant is or has been in possession at the relevant time of another building, it is for the tenant to plead and prove or prove that the building pointed out by the landlord is not reasonably sufficient for his requirements. The tenant's version that the plank shop has to be removed on account of decay and deterioration and that the removal took place prior to the commencement of the rent control petition does not inspire us. His brother was conducting a pan shop therein. Whether that building was reasonably sufficient even if not fully sufficient for the conduct of his textile business is an aspect which was capable of better evidence than his own ipse dixit. It was his burden to adduce such evidence and to show that the plank shop building was not at all sufficient even reasonably for the shifting of his business. He not only did not adduce such evidence but would very cleverly obliterate even the signs of such evidence and would commence the construction of a three storeyed building on its site. According to us, these circumstances justify drawal of adverse inferences against the tenant. We therefore, conclude that an order under Section (4)(iii) is liable to be passed against the tenant with reference to Exts. P5 building. We notice that the tenant had been extremely enthusiastic in defending the landlord's case under Section (4)(iii). He took out a commission and got a report regarding Alankar buildings, the watch repairing company building and even regarding the plots where he started construction of commercial buildings. He in fact wins compliments from the Rent Control Court in expressing willingness to surrender the building as and when he is able to complete the construction of the new buildings which were being constructed. Even the Appellate Authority takes due note of this seemingly fair stand while confirming the Rent Control Court's order. In this Court the landlord filed I.A. 2407 of 2003 seeking reception of additional evidence (Annexures 1 to 5) to which the tenant filed counter-affidavit annexing two documents, Exts. R1(a) and R1(b). Annexure 1 dt. 3.8.1993 reveals that at least one year before the rent control appeal was heard, the tenant had disposed of the plot upon which he was carrying on construction of storeyed building. Yet he withheld that information from the Appellate Authority and was successful in sustaining the negative orders passed by the Rent Control Court obviously also on the reason of what the authorities describe as his fair concession. We have given our observations on the annexures produced in connection with I.A. 2407/2003 elsewhere. Suffice it to say that the conduct of the tenant when it came to say defending landlord's case under Section 11(4)(iii) was not that fair as the authorities below thought.
15. We shall now deal with the ground under Section 11(8). We fail to understand how the rent control court could formulate the three aspects mentioned by it as though they are statutory ingredients to be established by a landlord for obtaining eviction order under Section 11(8). Neither the statute nor any binding judicial precedent so far as our research goes would justify the formulation of any such statutory ingredients. What is required under Section 11(8) from the landlord's side is to show that he needs the scheduled buildings by way of additional accommodation for his personal use. A Division Bench of this Court in Arjunan v. Eranu (1991 (2) KLT 279) has ruled that the need of additional accommodation for personal use is not confined to the need of the landlord alone but is wide enough to include use by the members of the landlord's family. Section 11(8) certainly is qualified by Section 11(10) and thus it becomes necessary also to show that the landlord's requirement is bona fide. It is now trite that the standards to decide bona fides of a claim under Section 11(3) and that of a requirement for additional accommodation coming under Section 11(8) are different, the former being more rigorous than the latter. The learned Judges who decided Arjunan (supra) virtually approved of the view of Subramonian Poti, J. (as he then was) in Lekshmana Naikan v. Gopalakrishna Pillai, 1981 KLT 167, wherein his Lordship held that in cases coming under Section 11 (3) the question is not whether the landlord will be able to manage without the additional accommodation and the question is only whether the landlord is setting up an excuse to obtain eviction and went to the extent of holding that additional accommodation cannot be denied even if the requirement amounted to a luxury. Even for claims under Section 11(3) bona fide requirement means nothing more than reasonable requirement from the view point of a person placed in circumstances similar to that of the given landlord. Resisting the landlord's claim the tenant attributes two oblique motives to the landlord, The first one is that the landlord wants to relet the building for a higher rent. The aid motive does not impress us since the landlord's right to have reasonable increase is recognized notwithstanding continuance of the tenancy since Issue Ninan v. State of Kerala, (1995 (2) KLT 848), and reiterated through two subsequent Division Bench decisions of this Court including our own decision in Aboobacker v. Vasu, (2003 (3) KLT 1029). The second oblique motive or provocation attributed by the tenant is the strained relationship between the parties due to the filing of a petition before the local police by the tenant against the landlord who created what is described as unruly scene in the schedule room. The aid motive has not been established in evidence and in any event we are of the view that such strained relationship by itself will not be fatal to a claim which is otherwise bona fide.
16. We find that to a certain extent the decision of the authorities below in the context of the ground under Section 11(8) turned on alleged insufficiency of pleadings. We have already extracted the relevant pleadings in this case. Having read the pleadings and the evidence which the parties adduced, we are of the view that no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the tenant due to the insufficiency of pleadings from the side of the landlord and the authorities below were not justified in turning down the claim for additional accommodation on the reason of insufficiency of pleadings.
17. Ext. C2 commission report reveals that the petition schedule room has a carpet area of roughly 100 sq. feet only while the adjacent room where the landlord is conducting textile shop is only slightly bigger. The landlord has stated in his evidence that the room in his possession is not sufficient for the conduct of his textile business. He stated that he has lots of stock and has no sufficient space to display the same. He stated that presently he is constrained to keep his goods on the table and even on the floor. Regarding the wall which separates the two rooms, he maintained that the same is not made of concrete and that either by fixing a door on that wall and even without unifying the two rooms he will be able to expand his present business. It is a very detailed oral evidence which was given by PW.1 regarding the need for additional accommodation. What the Rent Control Court did was to extract just three sentences therefrom and conclude that his statement that there is no embargo for him in expanding his business by making use of the ground floor room and the first floor room already in his possession is fatal to the claim under Section 11 (8). The Rent Control Court's method of appreciation of evidence which unfortunately was approved by the Appellate Authority is highly improper. Appreciating the evidence as a whole, the emerging facts are that the landlord has a room which is only slightly bigger than the schedule room in the ground floor and that he has a room in the first floor which is used by him as a store room. The landlord wants to have a more spacious show-cum-sales room in the ground floor itself while retaining the existing storage facility in the first floor. The controversy between the parties as to whether the separating wall between the two ground floor rooms is made of RCC or of laterite stones should not have disturbed the minds of the authorities below in view of the landlord's evidence that it would be possible for him to have the business simultaneously done in the two adjacent rooms even without demolishing the wall or by opening a door on the same. The authorities should have seen that it was an area which should have been left to the landlord and his technical advisors to be taken care of by them at a post eviction stage. Mostly in cases under Section 11 (8), the tenanted building and the building where the landlord is already conducting his business will be adjacent portions of a larger building as in the present case. In such a case where it is conceded by the tenant that the landlord's business in his room is on the increase, courts will ordinarily be justified in holding that the landlord has established the bona fides expected of him under the first proviso to Section 11(10).
18. We are not prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the tenant that in all cases under Section 11(8) where expansion of an on going business is projected the landlord should adduce evidence in the form of a Commissioner's report regarding paucity of space and other evidence regarding volume of business transacted during the current year and the previous year. In a few cases under Section 11(8), the Commissioner's report and evidence can be of assistance. But we have also noticed that in many cases under Section 11 (8), the Commissioner's evidence turn out to be artificial evidence since paucity of space is an aspect which is capable of stage management also. We would have been inclined to accept the argument regarding non-production of evidence regarding the present volume of business and volume of business during previous years, had it not been for the tenant's own admission that the landlord's business is on the increase and also in view of the obvious position that even if the schedule building is also obtained, what the landlord is going to have for his textile show room will be only around 250 sq. feet. Importantly, the tenant does not have a case that the landlord has no funds to do business in a larger scale. The quarrel between the parties is only as to who is richer. Regarding the potentialities of textile business in the town and that too in the building situated on a vantage point also there is no quarrel. The authorities below have rejected the claim also because the landlord has a first floor room and used by him for storage purposes. The authorities are right in their observation that now-a-days textile shops are being conducted from the first floor rooms also. But in small towns like Perambra and having regard to customer habits, our view is that from the point of view of retail trade in textile goods a ground floor room will be more ideal. Interestingly the Rent Control Court while dealing with the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) held that the first floor portion of the two storeyed building where watch repairing business is conducted is not suitable for shifting of the tenant's textile business. The authorities should have remembered that a landlord who has a choice will always choose or prefer the ground floor room to a first floor room when it comes to conduct of retail business. We are therefore of the view that the landlord's claim for additional accommodation of personal use was true and was not liable to be rejected as not bona fide.
19. The only surviving question is whether the hardship which will be sustained by the tenant will outweigh the advantages which the landlord will gain. The Appellate Authority alone considered this aspect but in a cursory and casual manner. What the Rent Control Court is expected to do while considering the question of comparative advantage and hardship is to weigh the landlord's advantages and the tenant's hardships on the two scales of the balance. Unlike under the second proviso to Section 11(3), on the question of comparative advantages and hardships as envisaged by the first proviso to Section 11(10), both the landlord and the tenant have the burden to adduce evidence. It can be said that the landlord has the burden to adduce evidence regarding the advantages which he will gain while the tenant has the burden to establish the hardships which he will suffer. Having sifted the evidence adduced in this case, we are of the view that the advantages which the landlord will gain will outweigh the hardship, if any, which the tenant may suffer. The landlord's version that he does not have any other business remains unchallenged. The tenant concedes that the landlord's business is on the improve. The landlord's proposed show room will be some 70% larger than the present show room and he can hopefully look forward to much more business profits, the primary advantage for which anybody conducts business. On the side of the tenant he has stated that the income which he derives from the textile business accounts for his main source and that his life will come to stalemate if he is ordered to be evicted. But evaluating his evidence it will have to be held that the tenant's above version is exaggeration. Evidence shows that his watch repairing business is also conducted in a fairly large scale, engaging four employees including a trainee. He had agricultural lands, yielding plantation crops in the name of his son, wife and himself. The counsel for the tenant was unable to dispute the assertion from the opposite side that the tenant has closed down his textile shop and is presently conducting jewellery business in the schedule room. Scrutiny of the tenant's testimony reveals that he has not given evidence to the effect that no other suitable building are available in the locality for him to shift his textile business or jewellery business for that matter. To a considerable extent the hardship which a tenant suffers on account of eviction will be mitigated if not completely effaced if the tenant is able to obtain an alternate accommodation on lease or by other modes. We would also like to mention that while the comparative financial position of the landlord and the tenant does not have any direct relevance regarding a tenant's eligibility for the protection of the second proviso to Section 11(3), the same will have considerable relevance while the court considers the question under the first proviso to Section 11(10). Thus, the financial position of the tenant including his capacity to acquire plots suitable for erection of buildings and the capacity to put up buildings can and should be taken into account by the Rent Control Court while assessing the hardships from the tenant's point of view. Having seen Annexures 1 to 5 and R1(a) and R1(b) produced by the parties in the context of LA. No. 2407 of 2003, we also feel that the tenant in this case will be capable of acquiring an alternate premises for lease or by purchase/purchase and construction. In fact, those documents-the prices paid and received - even suggest that the argument of the landlord that the tenant deals in real estate business also is not without force.
The result of the above discussions is that the revision stands allowed, the orders of the authorities below are set aside and eviction is ordered against the respondent-tenant under Sections 11(4)(iii) and 11(8). The respondent is however given time till 30.6.2004 to vacate the premises on condition that he will file an affidavit before the executing court within one month from today unconditionally undertaking to surrender the premises peacefully by 30.6.2004 and undertaking further to discharge the entire arrears of rent and to pay rent which falls due subsequently. The parties will suffer their costs throughout.