Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Bakaram Jangaiah And Others vs Gunde Laxmamma (Died) By Lrs. on 24 July, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(3)ALD381, 1999(3)ALT375, 1999 A I H C 2848, (1999) 3 ANDHLD 381, (1999) 3 ANDH LT 375, (1999) 2 ANDHWR 253
Author: V. Bhaskara Rao
Bench: V. Bhaskara Rao
ORDER
1. The Order of the Joint Collector. Ranga Reddy District in File No.B4/l 1802/88, dated 4.4.1989, copy of which was served on the Counsel for the Revision Petitioners on 15.4.1989, affirming the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Maheswaram in File No.A1/8477/ 71 and A1/M1/83, dated 2.1.1987 directing eviction of the revision petitioners from the land bearing Sy.Nos.236 and 237 admeasuring about 30 acres situated at Sri Nagar village of Maheswaram Mandal under Section 32 of Andhra Pradesh (Telangatia Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short "the Act") is assailed in this Revision Petition.
2. The facts giving rise to this revision petition- in brief are that :
3. The land originally belonged to one Amanagul Venkata Narayana Rao. Late Bakaram Rajaiah, father of the revision petitioners was the protected tenant thereof. His name was recorded in the final record of tenancy as protected tenant while that of A. Venkata Narayana Rao as land holder. Late Bakaram Rajaiah was in possession and enjoyment of the disputed land. On 6.2.1952, he entered into an agreement of sale with the land holder A. Venkata Narayana Rao and eversince that day, he has been cultivating the same by paying the land revenue to the Government and after bis death, the revision petitioners arc in possession and enjoyment. While so, A. Venkata Narayana Rao entered into an agreemen of sale dated 6.2.1358 Fasli with the respondent No, 1 Gunde Lakshmamina in respect of the disputed land as well as some other land for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- (O.S.). A registered sale deed was also executed by him on 13.6.1950 in favour of the respondent No. 1. Thereafter her name was mutated in the revenue records as land holder and the name of fiakaram Rajaiah has been shown as protected tenant. On the death of Bakaram Rajaiah, the names of the revision petitioners have been entered as his successors. The respondent got a legal notice issued on 14.11.1967 to Bakaram Rajaiah terminating his tenancy on the ground that he committed default in payment of rents. The tenant gave a reply disputing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and himself. It is further stated that any purchase by the respondent is void in view of the provisions of the Act. She then filed a petition undef Section 32(2) of the Act seeking recovery of possession. The revision petitioners filed a counter resisting the petition. Following a judgment of this Court in Mohd. Ikramuddin v. Mohd. ismaii - 1972(2) An.WR 35, the Mandal Revenue Officer allowed the petition holding that the revision petitioners have committed willful default in payment of rent for tbree years and directed eviction after the appeal time i.e., 60 days from the date of the judgment.
4. Aggrieved by the above Order, the revision petitioners filed an appeal under Section 90 of the Act to the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District raising as many as 14 grounds, The learned Joint Collector considered the contentions of both parties and affirmed the Order of the Mandal Revenue Officer dated 2.1.1987 and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the revision petitioners are before this Court challenging the Order of the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, who confirmed the findings of the Manda! Revenue Officer, Maheswaram.
5. Sri A.Pulla Reddy, learned Counsel for the revision petitioners strenuously contended that the registered sale deed executed by the land holder, A. Venkata Narayana Rao in favour of the respondent on 13.6.1950 is hit by Section 47 of the Act and the above sale is void as held by this Court in a catena of decisions viz.. lachmamnm v. K,China Venkata Reddy and Another - 1972 (1) APLJ 46 (NRC) Vahanna and Others v. Satnbit Gond (died) Per LRs. Keshav and Others - 1985 (3) (HC) APLJ 32, K.Raji Reddy (died) and Others v. K.Susheela Bai and Others - 1986 (1) ALT 44, Subham Reddy v. Konneti Mullappa and Others -1987(2) ALT 11, Maddi Seeta Devi v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Moinabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and Others - 1990(1) APLJ 219. He further contended that the agreement dated 6.2.1358 Fasli is not true, but assuming that it is Iriie, it cannot have any effect as the same was not validated under proviso to Section 47 of the Act which is incorporated by 1954 amendment. In the same context, he pointed out that the sale dated 13.6.1950 is not validated under Section 50-B of the Act. He therefore argued that no title, right or interest has been conveyed to the respondent by A, Venkata Narayaita Rao and consequential mutation of her name in the revenue records does not have any effect whatsoever. Adverting to the case of the revision petitioners, he contended that not only the name of Bakaram Rajaiah, father of the revision petitioners is recorded in the final tenancy record but the revision petitioners have been recognised as successors of Bakaram Rajaiah and hence they have a preferential right to purchase the land and Bakaram Rajaiah has accordingly purchased the same under sale deed dated 6.2.1952 and hence they were no longer under an obligation to pay rents (o the land-holder and that the laud holder never demanded any rent from them and therefore they have perfected their title to the disputed land by adverse possession. It is also pointed out that the judgment cited supra (1) which is relied upon by both the Mandal Revenue Officer and the Joint Collector has been overruled by a Division Bench of this Court in Ameena Bee v. Raghavaiah - 1987 (1) ALT 612 and this fact was not noticed by them. He alternatively contended that no opportunity to deposit rent within 90 days is given and that is another irregularity which was not considered by both the authorities. He finally called in aid a judgment of I Addl. Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District in O.S.No.15 of 1989, dated 26.11.1996 and argued that the Civil Court has recorded a finding that the sale deed dated 13.6.1950 set up by the respondent is hit by Section 47 of the Tenancy Act and the transaction thereunder is void ab initio. He thus argued that viewing from any angle, the respondent is not entitled to seek eviction of the revision petitioners under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act and hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
6. On the other hand Sri S.L. Chennakesava Rao, learned counsel for respondents strenuously contended that the genuineness of sale deed dated 13.6.1950 in favour of the respondent cannot be doubted for a moment, for the simple reason that such a transaction is referred to in the sale deed dated 6.2.1952 which is relied upon by the revision petitioners. Adverting to the main defect of want of sanction under Section 47 of the Act, he argued that Section 47(2) envisages disposal of applications for such sanction in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed and Section 2(i)(p) defines 'prescribed' to mean as prescribed by rules made under this Act; Whereas the relevant rules were framed by Notification No.32, dated 14.7.1950 and they were published in the Gazeite on 29.7.1950. He therefore argued that any permission under Section 47 was not contemplated before 29.7.1950, but the sale deed is dated 13.6.1950 and hence it does not suffer from any such defect.
7. Sri Chennakesava Rao, learned Counsel pointed out that a piece of land in Sy.No.236 was acquired for a public purpose and that the compensation was shared by the respondent to an extent of 40%, while the balance was paid lo the protected tenant. He further contended that the revision petitioners had knowledge of the above sale deed since there is recital of the same in their title deed and hence they should have taken steps to avoid the same as required by Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and now they cannot take any such step as it is barred by limitation prescribed by Article 59 of Limitation Act. In the same context, he also argued that a tenant has no locus standi lo challenge the owner's title as per Section 116 of the Evidence Act. He then argued that as the protected tenant does not recognise the respondent as owner, (here is no question of opportunity to deposit rents being given and admittedly there was default for more than three years and hence the eviction order is sustainable.
8. In reply to the above contentions, Sri A. Pulla Reddy, learned Counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the sale dated 13.6.1950 is void ab initio and hence there is no need to seek cancellation of such a document and he relied upon the Judgment in Nut an Kumar v. II Add!.District Judge, Banda (Full Bench) -. He added that the protected tenant was not a party to the document in question and hence there is no need to seek its cancellation as held in Maddu Tatha and Others v. V.Nagamani -1995 (1) ALD 484. He placed strong reliance on the judgment in Kotaiah v. The Property Association of the Baptist Churches (Pvt) Ltd., , and contended that Section 116 of the Evidence Act has no application to the facts of this case in as much as the protected tenant never accepted the respondent as landlord. Adverting to Section 47(2) of the Act, he replied that simply because rules are not framed, it cannot be said that Section 47 is kept in abeyance and such an inference cannot be drawn in the absence of a provision under the Act or rules to that effect. He finally argued that in Venkat Rao v. State of Bombay , several judgments of this Court have been overruled and the correct law has been laid down and this revision petition will have to be decided on the ratio of Venkat Rao v. Stale of Bombay (supra 11 cited) and Kotaiah v. The Properly Association of the Baptist Churches (Pvt) Lid., (supra 10 cited).
9. I have applied my earnest consideration to all the above contentions of both the learned Counsel. Having regard to the above contentions and the pleadings of both sides and findings recorded by the two authorities below, the following points emerge for consideration :
(1) Whether the respondent Guticfe Lakshmamma has acquired valid title?
(2) Whether Late Bakaram Rajaiah purchased the interest of landlord under unregistered sale deed dated 6.2.1952, as contemplated by Sections 38 and 38-A of the Act, if not, what is the effect of the above sale deed ?
(3) Whether the protected tenant Late Bakaram Rajaiah or his sons, revision petitioners have committed willful default, in payment of rent to the respondent Gunde Lakshmamma.
(4) Whether the impugned eviction order as confirmed by the learned Joint Collector is sustainable in law ?
Point No. 1 :--
10. It is not in dispute that Late Bakaram Rajaiah was protected tenant of the subject land. Not only his name was entered in the final record of tenancy as protected tenant, but a futile attempt was made by the landlord at some point of time lo have relinquishment of his rights as per the lower Court record. It appears that the then Tahsildar rejected the same on the ground that there was no provision for relinquishtnent of tenancy rights at that point of time. Be it noted that Clause (a) to sub-Section (1) to Section 19 of the Act was introduced by amending Act 3 of 1954 and it came into force on 4.2.1954. It is only then that a provision is made in the Act enabling a protected tenant to surrender his rights. " In those circumstances, the Tahsildar appears to have rejected the surrender as borne out by the record of the Mandal Revenue Officer. It is thus evident that Late Bakaram Rajctiah continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the subject land as protected tenant. This factor has to be borne in mind while considering this point whether the respondent Gunde Lakshmamma has acquired valid title.
11. The case of the respondent is that she entered into an agreement of sale Ex.Al, dated 6th day 1358 Fasli (equivalent to 6.2.1948) and thereafter she took sale deed dated 13.6.1950 Ex.A2 from the original owner A, Venkata Narayana Rao. On behalf of protected tenant it was contended in the lower Court that Ex.Al is not a genuine document. I do not think that it is necessary to go into the genuineness or otherwise of this document for the simple reason that it culminated into a regular sale deed dated 13.6.1950 (Ex.2). Sri Pulla Reddy, learned Counsel ("or the revision petitioners contended that though the above transaction should have been validated in the first instance under the provisions of the Amendment Act 3 of 1954, the same has not been done. It is not the case of the respondents that steps were taken for regularisation of the above transaction. That remedy was available for a limited period and nothing was done within that period. The learned Counsel attacked the validity of the sale deed dated 13.6.1950 Ex.A2 on two grounds.
12. It is firstly argued that there being a protected tenant, who had a right to purchase the land and unless he declined to purchase the same on being offered to him, the land-holder could not have sold it to the respondents. It is not the case of the respondents that this land was offered to the protected tenant and that he declined to purchase the same.
13. I perused Section 38-D of the Act. It provides for a right to purchase the landholder's interest in the land held by the protected tenant. The language used is 'protected tenant shall be entitled to purchase1. On a careful reading of Section 38-D of the Act, I find force in the above contention of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners. A reading of the petition filed by the respondent before the Mandal Revenue Officer would disclose that she did not set up any case that the above land was offered to the protected tenant and that the protected tenant declined to exercise the option to purchase the landholder's interest under Section 38-D of the Act. This Court considered this very situation in the judgment cited supra (3) and held:
"It is mandatory under Section 38-D of the Act for the landholder, to give notice in writing of his intention to sell the lands and offer to sell them to the respondents and admittedly no such offer was made. Section 38-A further provides that only if the protected tenants on receipt of the intimation, if they do not express their readiness in writing to purchase the same within six months from the date of receipt of such notice, then and then only the landholder has a statutory right to alienate the lands to others.
In the instant case in view of the fact that admittedly no such notice had been given, the sale itself is in violation of Section 38-D. The object of Section 38-D is to confer on the protected tenant the titulory right with ownership in the agricultural lands. So the agreements and sale-deeds are opposed to public policy to defeat the provisions of Section 38-D and they are void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. So, any alienation made in contravention of Section 38-D shall have to be declared to be null and void".
That is the first contention regarding the validity of (he sale deed and it is merited.
14. The other ground is that previous sanction under Section 47 of the Act has not been obtained. He relied on judgments cited supra 2 to 6 in support of that contention.
15. On the other hand, Sri Chenna Kesava Rao contended that the Rules in this regard were framed under notification No.32 dated 14.7.1950 and they were published in the Gazette on 29.7.1950 and since Section 47(2) contemplated disposal of applications in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed and whereas the procedure has been prescribed by Rules on 14.7.1950, which is subsequent to the sale deed in question and hence, the question of seeking sanction under Section 47 did not arise on 13.6.1950. It is further contended that Section 47 has been deleted from the statute subsequently and hence the rigour of the law did not apply subsequently. He relied on a judgment of this Court in G.V.K. Rama Rao v. Bakelite Hylam Employees Cooperative House Building Society, Hyderabad- 1997(4) ALD 294.
16. I carefully considered the above contentions. Before taking up two-fold contention of Sri Chenna Kesava Rao, it is necessary to peruse the case law cited by Sri Pulla Reddy.
17. In lachmamma v. K.Chinna Venkata Reddy (supra 2 cited), it is held :
"that a plain reading of Section 50-B would clearly indicate that it is prospective in operation and not retrospective. Mere deletion of Section 47 or introduction of Section 50-B docs not by itself validate all the transfers which were invalid: such invalid transfers do not become legally-enforceable unless a seal of approbation is put by the Tahsildar by granting a certificate validating the sale."
In Ushanna 's case (supra), it is held:
"Though Section 47 was deleted, the invalid transfers which had taken place from 1950 to 1969 could be validated with the aid of proceedings under Section 50-B and thereby the invalidity could be cured. Section 50-B was introduced with a definite purpose 'fo save the invalid transactions that have taken place between June 10, 1950 to March 18, 1969 aYid the time was extended finally upto March 31, 1972. If the transferee or alienee did not avail himself of this opportunity of getting his alienation and possession validated under Section 50-B, he should suffer the consequences since the transfer and delivery of possession in his favour remained invalid and unlawful." After March 31, 1972, there is no possibility of validating all the invalid transactions that took place preceding that date. Therefore there is no indefeasible title or right created in favour of the alienees before December 1, 1963 in which date 1959 Regulation came to be applied to the Telangana region and by operation of Section 3 of the Regulation, the sales are void, the contract of sale and the unauthorised and illegal possession of the land are null and void and the protection of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act is not available."
In K. Raji Reddy's case (supra), it is held, "Section 47 was deleted from 1969 and consequence of such deletion is that the requirement of permission for alienation is lifted. Subsequent to 1969 the alienation may be made without the necessity of permission from the Tahsildar. The Legislature took stock of the difficulties of the persons who entered into transactions without permission of Tahsildar and to obviate the impasse due to; absence of permission of Section 47, Section 50-B was introduced validating the transactions, provided an application is made and the Tahsildar after due enquiry issues a sale certificate. Section 50-B is extended from lime to time upto 1972 the validation of sales by recourse to Section 50-B cannot be made.
In the instant case, admittedly, no permission for alienation is obtained and no steps for validation under Section 50-B were taken. In the absence of permission for alienation under Section 47 the gift could have been validated if proper application is made and the requisite certificate is issued under Section 50-B. In the absence of permission under Section 47 and in the absence of sale certificate envisaged under Section 50-B the infirmity of an invalid transaction subsists and continues. In view of deletion of Section 50-B from 1972 there is no possibility of getting over the invalidity and hence the gift deed is void and unenforceable."
In Subham Reddy's case (supra), it is held, "The suit for mere injunction is not maintainable. In this case, no suit for specific performance has been filed by the respondents. Though they are in possession pursuant to the agreement of sale, but since no prior permission under Section 47 of the Act has been obtained, their possession is unlawful. Under those circumstances, the doctrine of part performance is not available."
18. In Maddi Seeta Devi's (supra), it is held:
"Failure to obtain permission from Tahsildar under Section 47 renders a transaction void. Therefore, the sale-deed dated 8-10-1964 by which the third respondent and his two brothers sold the property in favour of Pochamma being void, the same land Pochamma could not convey by a subsequent sale-deed no rights flow under a void transaction."
19. It is abundantly clear from the above case law that Section 47 of the Tenancy Act is held to be a mandatory provision and failure to obtain sanction thereunder renders the transaction void. All the above judgments were rendered by different learned Judges and all of them have taken consistent view in this regard.
20. I shall now consider two-fold contention of Sri Chenna Kesava Rao. It is true that the relevant rules viz., rules regarding transfer of agricultural lands under Section 47 of the Act were framed under Notification No.32 dated 14-7-1950 and published in the Official Gazette on 29-7-1950. Section 2(1)(p) defines the term 'prescribed' to mean as prescribed by Rules made under this Act. As Section 47(2) provides for disposal of applications for such previous sanction in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed, it must be taken that it is under these rules that the said applications have to be disposed of. It is also irue that there was failure on the part of the rule making authority to frame the above rules immediately after the Act was brought into force, 'fhc question is whether failure to frame rules would render the Act or any provisions of the Act inoperative or otiose. Sri Chenna Kesava Kao, learned Counsel could not show any provision either in the General Clauses Act or interpretation of statutes in this regard. In my considered view such a failure would not affect the operation of the law in any manner so long as Section 47 of the Act remains on the statute book and it is deemed to be in force and effective. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the above contention of Sri Chenna Kesava Rao. It is then argued that Section 47 of the Act lias been deleted from the Act with effect from 18-3-1969 and hence it has lost its rigour, lie relied on a judgment of this Court in G.V.K. Rama Rao 's case (supra). On the other hand Sri Pulla Reddy contended that the above judgment which is rendered following a Full Bench judgment of this Court in K. Parvathamma v. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Board of Revenue), Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and others, , does not lay down correct law inasmuch as there arc two kinds of sales namely, (i) private sales and (ii) Court auction sales and that the ratio in the above case is applicable only to latter cases, but this being a case of private sale, it cannot be applied.
20. In this context it has to be seen that when the proceedings in this case commenced before the concerned Tahsildar in file No.C/2/6122/68 on 31-8-1968, this document Ex.A2 was pressed into service on 31-8-1968 while Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was on the statute book. It is also on record lhat the respondent got her name mutated in the revenue records on the basis of this very document way-back in 1964. So, the objection of want of sanction under Section 47 has to be traced to 31-8-1968, if not to 1964.
22. In K. Parvathamma's case (supra), the Full Bench held:
".... The provisions of Section 47 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 requiring prior sanction of the Tahsildar for effecting an alienation or a transfer are equally applicable to transfers by operation of law - when properties are sold in auction by a Civil Court as well as by the revenue officials under the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act. In the case of private alienations the ruie is well settled that prior sanction should be obtained before the registration of the document, that is, at the stage when the title to the property passes to the purchaser. Likewise, in the case of involuntary sales, sanction should be obtained before the sale is confirmed, thai is, the stage at which there is a transfer of property by operation of law."
23. Following the above ratio, this Court held in G.V.K. Rama Rao's case (supra) that the rigour of Section 47 lias been lost subsequent to deletion of Section 47 of the Act. It is rightly pointed out by Sri Pulla Reddy, learned Counsel that the Full Bench was considering a case of auction sale and the question was whether sanction is required at the stage of auction or at the stage of confirmation of sale. Since Section 47 of the Act was deleted before the confirmation of sale, it is pointed out that there was no need to obtain permission under Section 47. Distinguishing the Full Bench decision on the above lines Sri Pulla Reddy contended that this being a private sale, deletion of Section 47 did not have any effect whatsoever and that the transaction in this case is hit by Section 47 and it is void ab initio. On a careful consideration of the Full Bench decision and the contentions of Sri Pulla Reddy, \ hold that the distinction between private sales and Court auction sales is noticeable and this Court missed to notice such a distinction in G.V.K. Rama Rao 's case (supra) and the same is fit to be ignored.
24. Returning to the case on hand, the correct legal position appears to be that previous sanction under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act is essential and the sale-deed Ex.A2 is hit by Section 47 inasmuch as the Tenancy Act was brought into force on 10-6-1950 whereas Ex.A2 was executed on 13-6-1950.
25. Thus, I hold that no valid title is conveyed to the respondent Gunde Lakshmamma through Ex.A2, It is noteworthy that Section 50(B) of the Act provided for validation of all transactions which are otherwise invalid either for want of sanction under Section 47 or for want of registration or stamp-duty. Time for validation of the transaction was extended from time to time till 31-3-1972. Both the parties have stated that no such validation under Section 50(B) of the Act was sought for in this case. In these circumstances, it has to be held that (he sale-deed daled 13-6-1950 Ex.A2 is void. Moreover, this question was also considered by the learned 1 Addl. Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District in OS No.15 of 1989. The judgment in that case was rendered on 26-11-1996. A copy of (he judgment is filed as additional evidence and marked as Ex.CI in CMP No.2919 of 1997. It has been held by that Court that the transaction under Ex.A2 is a void transaction. Hence, respondent Gunde Lakshmanuna has not acquired valid title thereunder. Point No.l is answered accordingly.
26. Point No.2: Late Bakaram Rajaiah, the protected (etiant got an unregistered sale-deed dated 6-2-1952 executed in his favour for a consideration of Rs.750/-. He resisted the claim of the respondent for arrears of rent and also for recovery of possession on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent on the basis of this document. Taking the aid of Section 38 of the Act Sri Pulla Reddy contended that a protected tenant is entitled to purchase landholder's interest and accordingly late Bakaram Rajaiah has purchased the same under Ex.B2 dated 6-2-1952. I perused Ex.B2 and considered the contentions of Sri Pulla Reddy. Ex.B2 shows that the document in favour of Gunde Lakshmanuna namely Ex.A2 has been recited (herein and it is stated that Tahsildar has issued orders as in Kx.Bl stating that the landlord cannot sell the land without the consent of the tenant and that the tenant has got the very fist right to purchase but not others. From a conjoint , reading of Exs.B1 and B2, it appears that the landlord relented after executing Ex.A2 in favour of respondent and decided to sell his interest in (he land to the protected tenant. Accordingly, it is recited in Ex.B2 lhat he will get the matter seltled with Gunde Lakshmamma and it is his responsibility. It is, therefore, apparent that the protected tenant and the landlord came to an understanding as to the price for the interest of the landlord. Hence, there appear to be good ground for applying the provisions of Section 38 and 38(A) of the Act to (his case. It is, however, noteworthy that even if there is agreement between the landlord and protecled tenant on the reasonable price, the matter should be placed before the concerned Tahsildar and a certificate should be obtained by late Bakaram Rajaiah. Notwithstanding the fact that a certificate as contemplated by Section 38 or 38(A) has not been obtained, he enjoyed possession over the (and during his life time. It is asserted that he has been paying land revenue to the Government and such fact is not disputed. Evidently he was under an impression that he was full owner of the above land and he has been asserting his rights as such and therefore he has paid land revenue to the Government. There is no record to show that any olher person has paid land revenue for this land.
27. It is a well known fact that parlies in Telangana area used to enter into transactions through unregistered sale-deed and it has also been age-old practice in this area to honour such sale-deeds. It is for this reason that the Legislature thought it fit to introduce Section 50(B) of the Act (o enable such parties to validate such sales and umpteen cases came to light in (his area. This Court, therefore, takes judicial notice of these transactions. I am of the view that even if Section 38 or 38(A) of the Act have not been strictly complied with, the transaction under Ex.B2 has to be treated as one covered by the above provisions. It was affected as long back as 46 years and the parties have honoured the transaction and therefore, the original landlord. A. Venkata Narayana Rao never demanded any rent from the protected tenant. The revision petitioners have stepped into the shoes of protected tenant on his death and they are entitled for the same rights as late Rakaram Rajaiah, Point No.2 is answered accordingly. ..
28. Point No. 3: In view of my finding on point No.1, the respondent is not a lawful owner or landlord of the land as she did not get valid title from the previous landlord. Therefore, the protected tenant or his sons were under no obligation to pay any rent to her. The question of wilful default in payment of rent to respondent-Gunde Lakshmamma does not arise in these circumstances. As already held above the protected tenant purchased the interest of the landlord as long back as 46 years under Ex.B2 dated 6-2-1952 and they have been asserting bonafide rights of full ownership. 1 therefore hold that the revision petitioners have not committed any wilful default in payment of rent. Point No.3 is answered accordingly.
29. Point No. 4: In view of my findings on point Nos. 1, 2 and 3, it has to be held that the impugned eviction order is bad in law.
30. Another ground is raised by Sri Pullet Reddy that an opportunity should have been given to protected tenant to deposit the rent and that has not been done. It is true that Section 28(1) provides for an opportunity being given to the protected tenant to deposit the rent within a specified time. Assuming that the revision petitioners continued to be protected tenants, it is not known as to why such an opportunity was not given to them to deposit rents. In any case, the impugned eviction order cannot be sustained for all the reasons given above. Point No.4 is answered accordingly.
31. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned eviction order in file No.B4/11802/88 on the file of the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District dated 4-4-1939 confirming the order of Mandal Revenue Officer, Maheswaram in file No.Al/8477/71 and A1/M1/83, dated 2-1-1987 is set aside.
32. On behalf of the revision petitioners it is stated thai paper possession was delivered to the respondent during the course of pendency of this revision petition. If that is so, respondents 2 to 6, who have come on record as legal representatives of respondent No.1 Gunde Lakshmamma, are not entitled to any rights and hence they have to be summarily evicted and the revision petitioners will have to be put in possession of the subject land. The Mandal Revenue Officer is, therefore, directed to evict the respondents 2 to 6 and restore possession to the revision petitioners. There will be no order as to costs.