Jharkhand High Court
Raju Thakur vs The State Of Jharkhand on 26 April, 2024
Author: Sanjay Prasad
Bench: Sanjay Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Revision No. 482 of 2021
....
Raju Thakur ...... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Manorama Devi ...... Opp. Parties
-----
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
-----
For the Petitioner : Mr. Shravan Kumar, Advocate
For the State : Mrs. Amrita Kumari, A. P. P.
For the O. P. No. 2 : None.
......
JUDGEMENT
C.A.V. on 03/01/2024 Pronounced on 26/04/2024 ....
The present Criminal Revision No. 482 of 2021 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the judgment dated 26.03.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2019 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur whereby learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur has allowed Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2019 filed by the Opposite Party No. 2 by setting aside the judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.06.2019 passed by Ms. Darshana, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in connection with C/1 Case No. 760 of 2015, although the opposite party no. 2, Manorama Devi had been convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act in connection with C/1 Case No. 760 of 2015 corresponding to T. R. No. 198 of 2019 by Ms. Darshana, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur vide judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.06.2019 and had been sentenced to undergo S. I. for a period of three (3) months and had further directed to pay a -1- sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner under Section 357 (3) of the Cr. P. C.
2. The complainant's case, in brief, is that the complainant and the accused and her husband were known to each other since long and the accused along with her husband had taken friendly loan of Rs. 2, 30,000/- from the complainant for the purpose of treatment of her daughter-in-law and also promised to return the same within one year. It is also alleged that when the accused failed to repay the debt amount within stipulated time, the complainant started demanding his money and after several request being made by the complainant, the accused had issued one cheque no. 858433 dated 25.1.2015 worth Rs. 2,30,000/- in favour of the complainant with an assurance that the same will be encashed on its presentation before the court. The complainant presented the said cheque to his Bank for encashment but the same was returned unpaid showing the reason "insufficient fund" in the account of the accused-Opposite Party No. 2 vide cheque return memo dated 10.02.2015. Thereafter, the complainant sent a legal notice to the Opposite Party No. 2 through registered post with A.D. but in spite of receipt of the legal notice, the accused- Opposite Party No. 2 failed to repay the cheque amount to the complainant. Hence, the present case has been filed by complainant against accused person.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP for the State.
4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgment dated 26.03.2021 passed by the learned Appellate Court below is illegal and not sustainable in law. It is -2- submitted that the complainant -petitioner had given friendly loan of Rs. 2,30,000/- to the opposite party no. 2 for treatment of her daughter in-law and she had promised to return the same within a period of one year and on request, the accused-opposite party no. 2 had issued Cheque No. 858433 dated 25.01.2015 of Rs. 2,30,000/- in the name of the petitioner. However, when the said cheque was presented for encashment, then, it had returned vide Memo dated 10.02.2015 and thereafter the complainant had sent legal note by Registered Post, but the opposite party no. 2 has failed to repay the cheque amount to the complainant. It is submitted that the complainant had examined herself as C.W.-1 in this case and he has fully supported his case for advancing friendly loan of Rs. 2,30,000/- by him to the opposite party no.2 and even though opposite party no. 2 had issued cheque of Rs. 2,30,000/- on 25.01.2015 in favour of the petitioner in discharge of her legal liability. It is submitted that the documents marked as Ext.-1, Ext.- 2, Ext.-3 and Ext.-4 and 4/1 respectively fully supported the case of the complainant -petitioner, which were the cheque, return memo, legal notice dated 18.02.2015, post receipt dated 18.02.2025 etc. It is submitted that evidence of D.W.-1 Manorama Devi, D.W.-2, Indu Devi, D.W.-3, Priya Sharma and D.W.-4, Nutan Devi are not reliable. It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court below has committed grave illegality by observing that the petitioner has no financial capacity to advance loan of Rs. 2,30,000/- to the opposite party no. 2. It is submitted that the petitioner is the holder of the cheque and presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act stands in his favour. It is submitted that a legal duty is cast upon the opposite party no. 2 to discharge her debt for the loan taken by her and thus, the learned -3- Appellate Court below has committed illegality by acquitting the opposite party no. 2. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court i.e. learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur has rightly convicted the opposite party no. 2 for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and has sentenced to undergo S. I. for a period of three (3) months and has further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner under Section 357 (3) of the Cr. P. C. Thus, the impugned judgment dated 26.03.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2019 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur may be set aside and the Criminal Revision Application may be allowed by directing the opposite party no. 2 to undergo S. I. for a period of three (3) months and to pay compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lac Fifty Thousand Only) to the petitioner.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that learned Trial Court has wrongly convicted the opposite party no. 2 for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act and has sentenced to undergo imprisonment of S. I. for a period of three (3) months and has further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner is shrewd money lender and has implicated several ladies including opposite party no. 2 to issue blank cheque in his favour. It is submitted that D.W.-1 Manorama Devi, D.W.-2, Indu Devi, D.W.-3, Priya Sharma and D.W.-4, Nutan Devi have fully -4- supported the case of the opposite party no. 2. It is submitted that D.W.-1 Manorama Devi i.e. Opposite Party No. 2 was the accused, who had stated that she had taken loan of Rs. 20,000/-/Rs. 30,000/- and had issued cheque, but it was converted into cheque amount of Rs. 2,30,000/- by the complainant- petitioner. It is submitted that even some criminal cases are pending against the petitioner, which have also been filed by the victim ladies against him. It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court below has rightly observed that the petitioner has no paying capacity to advance family loan to the extent of Rs. 2,30,000/-. Thus, no illegality has been committed by the learned Appellate Court below and hence, this Criminal Revision Application is devoid of merit and as such, this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed.
6. Perused the Lower Court Records and considered the submission of both the sides.
7. None appeared on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2, although notice was issued upon her.
8. It transpires that Complaint Case bearing C/1 Case No. 760 of 2015 had been filed by the complainant-petitioner in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur on 07.04.2015 against the opposite party no. 2 for initiating for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act that the opposite party no. 2 along with her husband had approached the complainant-petitioner in the 2nd week of December, 2013 and had requested for friendly loan of Rs. 2,30,000/- for treatment of her daughter in-law Mrs. Kanchan Singh and the complainant- petitioner is said to have pay a sum of Rs. 2,30,000/- in cash to the opposite party no. 2 on 15.12.2013. It is also stated that the said amount was not returned for a long period and on request, the -5- opposite party no. 2 had issued a cheque no. 858433 dated 25.01.2015 for a sum of Rs. 2,30,000/- in the name of petitioner, which was presented before the Bank on 09.02.2015, but the said cheque was dishonoured and it was returned vide Memo dated 10.02.2015. It transpires that the learned Court below has taken cognizance against the opposite party no.2 under Section 138 of the N. I. Act on 16.05.2015. It transpires that the instances of acquisition was explained by the opposite party no. 2 under Section 138 of the N. I. Act on 05.10.2016 and to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
9. It transpires that the complainant-petitioner, Raju Thakur got examined himself as C.W.-1 to prove its case.
10. It transpires that the following documents have been marked exhibit on behalf of the complainant-petitioner, which are as follows:-
(i) Exhibit-1 is Cheque having no. 858433 dated 25.01.2015 of Rs. 2,30,000/-.
(ii) Exhibit-2 is Cheque return memo dated 10.02.2015,,
(iii) Exhibit-3 is Legal Notice dated 18.02.2015,
(iv) Exhibit-4 & 4/1 is Postal receipt dated 18.02.2015 and A. D having signature of Manorama Devi showing dated 21.02.2015
11. It transpires that the statement of the opposite party no. 2 had been recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P. C. by the learned Court below on 13.12.2017 in which the opposite party no. 2 denied the circumstances put forth against her.
12. It transpires that the opposite party no. 2, in support of her case, got examined four witnesses, which are as follows:-
(i) D.W.-1 Manorama Devi, -6-
(ii) D.W.-2, Indu Devi,
(iii) D.W.-3, Priya Sharma and
(iv) D.W.-4, Nutan Devi
13. However, no any documents have been marked as the Exhibits as defence on behalf of the opposite party no. 2.
14. Thereafter Ms. Darshana, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur vide judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.06.2019 had convicted the opposite party no. 2, Manorama Devi for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act in connection with C/1 Case No. 760 of 2015 corresponding to T. R. No. 198 of 2019 and had been sentenced her to undergo S. I. for a period of three (3) months and has further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner under Section 357 (3) of the Cr. P. C. Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court has allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2019 filed on behalf of the opposite party no. 2, by setting aside the judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.06.2019 passed by Ms. Darshana, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur and hence, this Criminal Revision Application has been filed by the complainant-petitioner.
15. From securitizing the Solemn Affirmation of C.W.-1 i.e. the complainant-petitioner, which was filed on affidavit in English, it would appear that he has filed even Solemn Affirmation in English stating about the case as made out in the complaint, although, the Court questions were put to him, but it is evident that learned Court below has committed grave illegality by taking Solemn Affirmation of the petitioner on an affidavit instead of examining him in the Court as required under the provisions of -7- Section 200 of the Cr. P. Act and the action of Sri Arvind Kachchap, Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Jamshedpur amounts to contrary to law as is mandatory for the Court to examine the complainant on oath and substances of such examination shall be reduced to writing in light of the provisions of Section 200 of the Cr. P. C.
16. It transpires from the evidence of C.W.-1, Raju Thakur i.e. the petitioner himself that he has tried to support his case by stating that he had handed over Rs. 2,30,000/- in cash to the opposite party no. 2 on 15.12.2013 as a friendly loan for treatment of her daughter in-law Mrs. Kanchan Singh and on payment of money the opposite party no. 2 had issued cheque no. 858433 dated 25.01.2015 for a sum of Rs. 2,30,000/- in the name of petitioner, which was dishonoured on 09.02.2015 and returned vide cheque return memo dated 10.02.2015 and thereafter he has sent legal notice on 18.02.2015 vide Ext.-3 and had sent registered post and acknowledgement had been marked as Exhibit-4 & 4/1 respectively.
17. However, during cross-examination, he admitted that he himself for instituting the case on Manorama Devi i.e. the opposite party no. 2 and on Priya Sharma and also on Nutan Devi. He further admitted during cross-examination that Nutan Devi had also instituted G. R. Case No. 1927 of 2017 against him, which is pending in the Court of Sri Arvind Kachhap, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class. He further stated that he had also instituted a case upon the Nutan Devi in Parsudih P. S. because he had got a cheuqe of Nutan Devi for a sum of Rs. 85,000/- and it was not returned by her. He also admitted that he has got three saloon and he is engaged in sale and purchase of land and he is doing business of -8- land purchase and he has shown ignorance that Manorama Devi and Puja Sharma are the witnesses in the said G. R. Case No. 1927 of 2017 instituted by Nutan Devi, but he has been granted bail in that case. He also stated that Manorama Devi had only signed in his presence, but the cheque was filled by her. He further admitted that Puja Sharma had issued a cheque of Rs. 3,80,000/- to him and he had handed over friendly loan to Rs. 7,00,000/- to her. He further admitted that his daily income is Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 2000/- and his monthly expenses is around Rs. 18,000/- per month. However, he denied for taking blank cheque from the people and for investing the money on lending by taking interest. He admitted for arrived in the Court on 07.04.2015 for filing an affidavit and for putting signature on affidavit in presence of her clerk.
18. Thus, securitizing the evidence of C.W.-1, Raju Thakur, i.e. the petitioner himself, it is evident that he is involved in the business of money lending and for taking blank cheque from the people and had obtained blank cheques from the opposite party no.2, Manorama Devi, but has also Priya Sharma, Nutan Devi. As per his own case, he has given friendly loan of Rs. 2,30,000/- to the opposite party no.2, Manorama Devi and friendly loan of Rs. 3,80,000/- to Priya Sharma and has also obtained cheque from Nutan Devi, which is kept in his house. Thus CW-1, Raju Thakur appears to be the Moneylender and has obtained blank cheques from the several ladies including opposite party no. 2.
19. So far as the defence evidence is concerned, D.W.-1, Manorama Devi is the opposite party no. 2 in this case herself, and has stated during her evidence that the petitioner used to give money on interest to several ladies namely Nutan Devi, Priya -9- Sharma, Savita Devi, Vanmalai Tudu and several other ladies including the opposite party no. 2 and he used to take blank cheque in their respective signatures on the assurance that whenever they will pay the money, then he will return the cheque. She has further stated that she has taken only Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant and for which the complainant had obtained a blank cheque with her signature in lieu of the same and the cheque was misused by the complainant by instituting the false case against her. She has further stated that she has returned the said Rs. 20,000/- with interest to the complainant-petitioner and the complainant has assured her to return the said cheque, but it was not returned to her. She has also stated that the complainant- petitioner had instituted several cases under the provisions of N. I. Act against the ladies namely Nutan Devi, Priya Sharma, Savita Devi and Vanmali Tudu and other ladies.
During her cross-examination, she has stated that her husband is a Telco Employee and she is home maker. However, she has admitted for taking loan of Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant -Raju Thakur and in lieu of the same, she had handed over the cheque with her signature and she had denied her signature on the acknowledge card i.e. Ext. -4 and 4/1. She also stated that notice was not served upon her. She also stated that she has returned Rs. 30,000/- to the petitioner, but she has got no documentary proof. She has further stated that Nutan Devi had also instituted a criminal case against Raju Thakur in which she is a witness. She further stated that she has handed over blank cheque, but asserted that the complainant has instituted a false case for taking Rs. 2,30,000/- against her, although she has taken only Rs. 20,000/- as loan.
-10-20. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of D.W.-1, Manorama Devi, it is evident that the petitioner is involved in moneylending and used to give money on interest and in lieu of the same, he used to take blank cheque from the ladies and the opposite party no. 2 had taken names of some of the ladies Nutan Devi, Priya Sharma, Savita Devi and Vanmali Tudu and other ladies.
21. D.W.-2 is Indu Devi and she stated that the complainant used to give money on interest to several women of her muhulla and used to obtained blank cheques with her signature in lieu of the same with the assurance that upon returning the money, he will return the said cheque. She further stated that opposite party no.2 had taken friendly loan of Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant and in lieu of the same, the complainant had obtained a blank cheque with the signature of the opposite party no. 2, which was misused by him by filing this case. She further stated that opposite party no. 2 had returned the said Rs. 20,000/- to the complainant with interest, but her cheque was not returned on the ground that the same is missing in his house. She also stated that the complainant had instituted several cases through different person upon the women of her muhulla and opposite party no.2 had already returned the amount to the opposite party no. 2.
During cross-examination, she stated that monetary transaction was done during her presence and they used to give cheque to the complainant and even a Card was prepared for money transaction and Rs. 1,500/- was deposited weekly and Rs. 30,000/- was obtained in lieu of Rs. 20,000/-. She has further stated that the Card was kept by the Raju Ji i.e. the complainant- petitioner and they simply used to handover the money to him.
-11-Even after returning the money, cheque was not returned to her by assuring that cheque will be returned within 4-5 days. She has further stated that after receiving notice, they had gone to the complainant and enquire for institution of the case against them even after returning the amount. She further admitted that Nutan Devi had instituted the case upon the complainant- Raju Thakur and she is witness in that case.
22. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of D.W.-2, Indu Devi, it is evident that she has fully supported the case of DW-1, Manorama Devi and has stated that the petitioner used to take blank cheque from the ladies/woman of her muhulla in lieu of small loan to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- and for which, he used to charge interest @ Rs. 1,500/- weekly and even a Card was prepared by him.
Thus, D.W.-2, Indu Devi has fully supported the case of D.W.-1, Manorama Devi.
23. D.W.-3 is Priya Sharma and she also stated the same fact as stated by D.W.-1, Manorama Devi and D.W.-2, Indu Devi and as such, the same is not being repeated here. However, she has stated that opposite party no. 2, Manorama Devi had taken only Rs. 20,000/- from the petitioner- complainant and which was returned with interest by her. She stated that the petitioner- complainant had instituted several cases against women of her muhulla under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
During her cross-examination, she further stated that there was transaction of Rs. 20,000/- only during her presence and even opposite party no.2, Manorama Devi had returned @ Rs. 1,500/- every week in total twenty weeks, although she has no receiving of the same. She further stated that the complainant had given loan to -12- Nutan Devi, Manorama Devi, Priya Sharma and Indu Devi respectively.
24. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of D.W.-3, Priya Sharma, it is evident that she has fully supported the case of D.W.-1, Manorama Devi i.e. opposite party no. 2 and also supported evidence of D.W.-2, Indu Devi that the petitioner is a Moneylender and opposite party hand taken loan of Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant-petitioner and has returned the same @ Rs. 1,500/- per week in total twenty weeks by paying total Rs. 30,000/- to the complainant-petitioner.
25. D.W.-4 is Nutan Devi and she also stated the same fact as stated by D.W.-1, Manorama Devi, D.W.-2, Indu Devi and D.W.-3, Priya Sharma respectively and as such, the same is not being repeated here and she has also supported the case of O. P. No. 2.
However, during her cross-examination, she further stated that she has also instituted a case against the complainant and she was present at the time of monetary transaction between the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2, Manorama Devi. She further stated that Manorama Devi had handed over the blank cheque with her signature to the petitioner. She further stated that the complainant had paid money to twenty women and he had cheated all the women. She further stated that the petitioner had instituted the case Priya Sharma, Manorama Devi i.e. the opposite party no.2, Bindu Jha and she had also instituted a case against the complainant-petitioner.
26. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of D.W.-4, Nutan Devi, it is evident that she has fully supported the case of D.W.-1, Manorama Devi i.e. opposite party no. 2. It is also evident that she has also corroborated the evidence of D.W.-1, Manorama Devi, -13- D.W.-2, Indu Devi and D.W.-3, Priya Sharma respectively.
27. It further transpires that although there is own admission of opposite party no.2 for handing over the blank cheque to her signature to the complainant-petitioner, but she has fairly stated and admitted for taking loan of Rs. 20,000/- and which was returned in twenty weeks by paying Rs. 1,500/- per week by the opposite party no.2 to the petitioner total amounting to Rs. 30,000/-. However, the petitioner was not satisfied and his greed has further been increased.
28. It further transpires from the own evidence of CW-1 i.e. the complainant during his cross-examination that he has given loan to Nutan Devi, Priya Sharma, Manorama Devi, Indu Devi and Vanmali Tudu. He has further instituted a case upon Manorama Devi i.e. the opposite party no. 2 and Nutan Devi i.e. D.W.-4 and Priya Sharma i.e. the D.W.-3 and he has further instituted a case against one Bindu Jha.
29. It is evident that the opposite party no.2 is a lady and may not have understood the consequences of handing over a blank cheque while taking loan of Rs. 20,000/-, but it is also his own statement of the complainant-petitioner that he had given friendly loan of Rs. 2,30,000/- to the opposite party no.2, Rs. 3,80,000/- to Priya Sharma and Rs. 7,00,000/-friendly loan to other ladies.
Thus, the financial capacity of the petitioner has to be seen.
30. The petitioner has not filed any Income Tax Return showing advancement of sum of Rs. 2,30,000/- loan amount to the opposite party no. 2 or even Rs. 3,80,000/- to Priya Sharma and also loan advanced to Nutan Devi and some other ladies.
31. Presumption under Section 138 of the N. I. Act is -14- rebuttable in nature and even if blank cheque has been given by the opposite party no. 2 in the name of the petitioner, then the said presumption can be rebutted from the circumstances and the evidence adduced during trial.
32. It transpires that the evidence of D.W.-1, Manorma Devi is fully supported by D.W.-2, Indu Devi, D.W.-3, Priya Sharma and D.W.-4, Nutan Devi respectively during trial and even D.W.-2, Indu Devi, D.W.-3, Priya Sharma and D.W.-4, Nutan Devi were also victimised by the petitioner by instituting the cases against them. They have clearly stated that the opposite party no. 2 had returned Rs. 30,000/- for loan of Rs. 20,000/- and the petitioner had obtained a blank cheque from the opposite party no. 2.
33. It has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat Versus Dattatraya G. Hegde reported in 2008 (1) Supreme 306, at para-22, 23, 25, 26 and 29 as follows:-
" Para-22:-. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence the accused is required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
Para-23:- An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on records. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different. Para-25:- Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt -15- of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is preponderance of probabilities . Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.
Para-26:- A statutory presumption has an evidentiary value. The question as to whether the presumption whether stood rebutted or not, must, therefore, be determined keeping in view the other evidences on record. For the said purpose, stepping into the witness box by the appellant is not imperative. In a case of this nature, where the chances of false implication cannot be ruled out, the background fact and the conduct of the parties together with their legal requirements are required to be taken into consideration.
Para-29:- Disputes and differences between him and R.G. Bhat stood established by admission of the respondent himself. Similar industry was being run by R.G. Bhat although he was acting as the constituted attorney of the appellant. According to the appellant, R.G. Bhat had cheated him. The counterfoil showed that not more than Rs. 20,000/- had ever been withdrawn from that bank at a time. The courts were required to draw an inference as to the probability of the complainants advancing a sum of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on mere asking and that too without keeping any documentary proof. Even there was no witness. The purported story that the appellant would himself come forward to return the amount by a cheque knowing fully well that he did not have any sufficient funds is difficult to believe."
34. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme court that presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a rebuttable presumption and onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The Supreme Court has further held that the accused can also raise probable defence regarding the financial capacity of the -16- complainant.
35. It has been held in the judgment rendered in the case of Sanjay Mishra Versus Kanishka Kapoor @ Nikki reported in 2009 (0) Cr. L. J. 3777 by the Bombay High Court, at para- 11, 12, 13 and 15 as follows:-
" Para-11:- The Apex Court also reiterated well established legal position that for rebutting the presumption under section 139 of the said Act, it is not necessary in every case for the accused to step into the witness box. The Apex Court held that the standard of proof on the part of the accused and that of prosecution in a criminal case is different. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the standard of proof so as to prove a defence is "preponderance of probability".
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn even by reference to circumstances. In paragraph 44 the Apex Court observed thus:
". The presumption of innocence is a human right (See Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI.) Rights Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human provides: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
Although India is not bound by the aforementioned Convention and as such it may not be necessary like the countries forming European countries to bring common law into land with the Convention, a balancing of the accused's rights and the interest of the society is required to be taken into consideration. In India, however, subject to the statutory interdicts, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For the aforementioned purpose the nature of the offence, seriousness as also gravity thereof may be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of presumption as contemplated under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments -17- Act, the same may not lead to injustice or mistaken conviction. ..." (Emphasis added) In paragraph 45 the Apex Court held thus:
"45.We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is essential to the economic life of a developing country like India. This, however, shall not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not say how presumption drawn should be held to have rebutted. Other important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely, presumption of innocence as human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by section 139 should be delicately balanced. Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on record and having regard to legal principles governing the same."
(Emphasis added) The Apex Court held that presumption of innocence forms part of human rights and therefore the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by section 139 has to be delicately balanced. Para-12:- Now turning back to the facts of the present case, assuming that the presumption under section 139 of the said Act regarding existence of debt or liability is not rebutted, in order to attract section 138, the debt or liability has to be a "legally recoverable" debt or liability. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Krishna Bhat (supra) there is no presumption under section 139 of the said Act that the debt is a legally recoverable debt. In the case of Goa Plast (P) Ltd.Vs. Chico Ursula D'Souza [(2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 235] the Apex Court reiterated that a debt or liability subject matter of section 138 means a legally enforceable debt or liability.
-18-Para-13:- In the present case, there is a categorical admission that the amount allegedly advanced by the applicant was entirely a cash amount and that the amount was "unaccounted". He admitted not only that the same was not disclosed in the Income Tax Return at the relevant time but till recording of evidence in the year it was not disclosed in the Income Tax Return. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that liability to repay unaccounted cash amount is a legally enforceable liability within the meaning of explanation to section 138 of the said Act. The alleged debt cannot be said to be a legally recoverable debt. Para-15:- The Apex Court has held that the laws relating to the said Act are required to be interpreted in the light of the object intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviation from general law. The Apex Court expressed that the object of section 138 of the said Act was to ensure that commercial and mercantile activities are conducted in smooth and healthy manner. The explanation to section 138 of the said Act clearly provides that a debt or other liability referred to in section means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. The alleged liability to repay an unaccounted cash amount admittedly not disclosed in the Income Tax Return cannot be a legally recoverable liability. If such liability is held to be a legally recoverable debt, it will render the explanation to section 138 of the said Act nugatory. It will defeat the very object of section 138 of the Act of ensuring that the commercial and mercantile activities are conducted in a healthy manner. The provision of section amount. A cheque 138 cannot be resorted to for recovery of an unaccounted issued in discharge of alleged liability of repaying "unaccounted" cash amount cannot be said to be a cheque issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability within the meaning of explanation of section 138 of the said Act. Such an effort to misuse the provision of section 138 of the said Act has to be discouraged."
-19-36. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of John K. Abraham v. Simon C. Abraham, reported in 2014 (1) East C.C. 366 : (2014) 2 SCC 236, at Para 8, 9 and 12 as under:-
"Para 8:- Keeping the above factors in mind, when we examine the judgment impugned in this appeal, we find that the High Court committed a serious illegality in reversing the judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. While reversing the judgment of the trial court, what weighed with the learned Judge of the High Court was that in the Section 313 CrPC questioning, it was not the case of the appellant that a blank signed cheque was handed over to his son and that even in the cross-examination it was not suggested to PW 1 that a blank cheque was issued. The High Court was also persuaded by the fact that the appellant failed to send any reply to the lawyer's notice, issued by the respondent. Based on the above conclusions, the High Court held that the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be easily drawn and that the appellant failed to rebut the said presumption. On that single factor, the learned Judge of the High Court reversed the judgment of the trial Judge and convicted the appellant.
Para 9:- It has to be stated that in order to draw the presumption under Section 118 read along with Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the burden was heavily upon the complainant to have shown that he had the required funds for having advanced the money to the accused; that the issuance of the cheque in support of the said payment advanced was true and that the accused was bound to make the payment as had been agreed while issuing the cheque in favour of the complainant.
Para 10:- Keeping the said statutory requirements in mind, when we examine the facts as admitted by the respondent complainant, as rightly concluded by the learned trial Judge, the respondent was not even aware of the date when substantial amount of Rs 1,50,000 was -20- advanced by him to the appellant, that he was not sure as to who wrote the cheque, that he was not even aware when exactly and where exactly the transaction took place for which the cheque came to be issued by the appellant. Apart from the said serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, he further admitted as PW 1 by stating once in the course of the cross-examination that the cheque was in the handwriting of the accused and the very next moment taking a diametrically opposite stand that it is not in the handwriting of the accused and that it was written by the complainant himself, by further reiterating that the amount in words was written by him.
37. It has been held in the case of Lekh Raj Sharma Versus Yash Pal Gupta passed in Crl. L. P. No. 567 of 2014 vide judgment dated 30.06.2015 by Delhi High Court that cheque amount is not legally enforceable debt at para-21, 22 and 27 as follows:-
" Para-21:- The finding that, as the amount of loan disbursed to the respondent was not shown in the balance sheet and ITR, the appellant could not be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, is also erroneous. In this regard, reference may be placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in:
i) Deelip Apte vs. Nilesh P. Salgaonkar & Anr., 2006 (6) BomCR 653, wherein the Court observed:
"The learned J.M.F.C. has also held against the complainant the fact that the complainant had not shown the amount advanced by him in his income tax returns. I do not think that every person who gives friendly loans does in all cases show such loans in their income tax returns more so if they are payable on demand after short time. The learned acquitting J.M.F.C. entirely lost sight of the several presumptions which the law has enacted in favour of the complainant." (Emphasis Supplied)
ii) Mr. Krishna P. Morajkar vs. Mr. Joe Ferrao, 2013 CRIJ (NOC) 572 Bombay (Decided on 19.07.2013), wherein the Court observed:
"The underlined observations do not disclose as to where can one -21- find a prohibition on recovering amounts not disclosed in income tax returns. With utmost humility, I have to state that I have not come across any provision of Income Tax Act, which makes an amount not shown in the income tax returns unrecoverable. The entire scheme of the Income Tax Act is for ensuring that all amounts are accounted for. If some amounts are not accounted for, the person would be visited with the penalty or at times even prosecution under the Income Tax Act, but it does not mean that the borrower can refuse to pay the amount which he has borrowed simply, because there is some infraction of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Infraction of provisions of Income Tax Act would be a matter between the revenue and the defaulter and advantage thereof cannot be taken by the borrower. In my humble view, to say that an amount not disclosed in the income tax returns becomes irrecoverable would itself defeat the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Apart from the purpose of this Act, which has been outlined by the learned Single Judge in Shri Deelip Apte (supra) as well as in Sanjay Mishra (supra), it ought to be seen that the moment a person seeks to recover through a cheque an amount advanced in cash it gets amounted for in the system and the revenue authorities can keep a track of that and if necessary tax the person. To brand an amount which is not shown in Income Tax Act as unaccounted money would be too farfetched and, therefore, I am in respectful disagreement with the observations in Sanjay Mishra (supra), which in fact amounts to reading an additional requirement in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and legislating that such amounts becomes irrecoverable. At the cost of repetition, for saying that an amount not disclosed in income tax returns cannot be legally recoverable liability, some provisions of law to that effect would have to be shown. Such provision was not noticed by me and even the learned Counsel for the respondent could not show any -22- such provision to me." (Emphasis Supplied) Para-22:- Similarly, in the present case, the loan given by the petitioner was a friendly loan for the business of the accused-
respondent, in the background that they had known each other for about 40 years. It was payable in a short period of time. Thus, I do not find any merit in the submission of the respondent that since the name of the accused-respondent has not been shown in the balance sheet, or the amount had not been disclosed in the ITR, it stands established that the loan was not disbursed by the appellant.
Para-27:- The accused is obliged to set up a probable defence. The defence cannot be only a "possible" defence. It cannot be premised on the mere ipse dixit of the accused. There should be some credible material or circumstance available on record which should lead the Court to conclude that the defence/explanation for issuance of the dishonoured cheque is a probable one. For the reasons aforesaid, in my view, the findings and conclusions drawn by the learned MM on facts is palpably wrong, and it is also based on an erroneous view of the law."
38. It has been held in the case of Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418 at paragraph nos. 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, 25, 25.05, 28 and 29 as follows:-
"Para-13:- This Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35] had occasion to consider Section 118(a) of the Act. This Court held that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable and defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. In para 12, the following has been laid down: (SCC pp. 50-51) "12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was -23- illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon his failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non- existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, shall act upon the plea that it did not exist."
Para-14:- S.B. Sinha, J. in M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala [M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 39 :
(2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 30] had considered Sections 118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act, 1881. It was held that presumptions both under Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable in nature. Explaining the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" referring to an earlier judgment, the following was held in para 28: (SCC p. 49) "28. What would be the effect of the expressions "may presume", "shall presume" and "conclusive proof" has been considered by this Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta [Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1] , in the following terms: (SCC pp. 30-31, para
52) '52. ... It is true that the legislature used two different phraseologies "shall be presumed" and "may be presumed" in Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and furthermore although provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as regards the right to mines and minerals said to be vested in the Government vis-à-vis the absence thereof in relation to the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words "shall presume" would be conclusive. The meaning of the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" have been explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression "shall presume" cannot be held to be synonymous with "conclusive proof"."
Para-16:- This Court in M.S. Narayana Menon case [M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 39 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 30] held -24- that what is needed is to raise a probable defence, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence and even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon. Dealing with standard of proof, the following was observed in para 32: (SCC p. 51) "32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies."
Para-17:- In Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde [Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 166] , this Court held that an accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. The following was laid down in para 32: (SCC p. 62) "32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different."
Para-22:- Elaborating further, this Court in Rangappa case [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184] held that Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus and the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses on the defendant- accused and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. In paras 27 and 28, the following was laid down: (Rangappa case [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 :
(2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184] , SCC pp. 453-54) "27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation.
However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.
28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused -25- has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of "preponderance of probabilities". Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own."
Para-25:- We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:
Para-25.5:- It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.
Para-28:- There is one more aspect of the matter which also needs to be noticed. In the complaint filed by the complainant as well as in examination-in-chief the complainant has not mentioned as to on which date, the loan of Rs 6 lakhs was given to the accused. It was during cross-examination, he gave the date as November 2011. Under Section 118(b), a presumption shall be made as to date that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn on such date. Admittedly, the cheque is dated 27-2-2012, there is not even a suggestion by the complainant that a post-dated cheque was given to him in November 2011 bearing the date 27-2-2012. Giving of a cheque on 27-2-2012, which was deposited on 1-3-2012 is not compatible with the case of the complainant when we read the complaint submitted by the complainant especially para 1 of the complaint, which is extracted as below:
"1. The accused is a very good friend of the complainant. The accused requested the complainant a hand loan to meet out urgent and family necessary a sum of Rs 6,00,000 (Rupees Six lakhs) and on account of long standing friendship and knowing the difficulties, which is being faced by the accused the complainant agreed to lent hand loan to meet out the financial difficulties of the accused and accordingly the complainant lent hand loan Rs 6,00,000 (Rupees Six lakhs) dated 27-2-2012 in favour of the complainant stating that on its presentation it will be honoured. But to the surprise of the complainant on presentation of the same for collection through his bank the cheque was returned by the bank with an endorsement "Funds Insufficient" on 1-3-2012."
Para-29:- Thus, there is a contradiction in what was initially stated by the complainant in the complaint and in his examination-in-chief regarding date on which loan was given on one side and what was said in cross-examination in other side, which has not been satisfactorily explained. The High Court was unduly influenced by the fact that the accused did not reply to the notice denying the execution of cheque or -26- legal liability. Even before the trial court, appellant-accused has not denied his signature on the cheque."
39. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rajaram Through L.Rs. Versus Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through L.Rs. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 48 of Para No. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 39 & 41 as under:-
"Para 26:- This Court in the case of Baslingappa v. Mudibasappa (supra) has summarized the principles on Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. It will be relevant to reproduce the same.
Para 27:- It can thus be seen that this Court has held that once the execution of cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the N.I. Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. It has however been held that the presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. It has further been held that to rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. It has been held that inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.
Para 28:- In the said case, i.e. Baslingappa v. Mudibasappa (supra), the learned Trial Court, after considering the evidence and material on record, held that the accused had raised a probable defence regarding the financial capacity of the complainant. The accused was, therefore, acquitted. Aggrieved thereby, the complainant preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court reversed the same and convicted the accused. This Court found that unless the High Court came to a -27- finding that the finding of the learned Trial Court regarding financial capacity of the complainant was perverse, it was not permissible for the High Court to interfere with the same. Para 29:- In the present case, the accused appellant had examined Mr. Sarsaiyyn, Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 18, Circle (II)(5), who produced certified copies of the Income Tax Returns of the complainant for the financial year 1995-1996, 1996-1997, 1997- 1998 and 1998-1999. The certified copies of the Income Tax Returns established that the complainant had not declared that he had lent Rs. 3 lakh to the accused. It further established that the agricultural income also was not declared in the Income Tax Returns.
Para 30:- The learned Trial Court further found that from the income which was shown in the Income Tax Return, which was duly exhibited, it was clear that the complainant(s) did not have financial capacity to lend money as alleged.
Para 39:- In the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the defence raised by the appellant satisfies the standard of "preponderance of probability".
Para 41:- In that view of the matter, we are further of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal of the appellant."
40. It has been held in the case of Rajaram S/O Sriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) through L.RS. Versus Maruthachalam (Since Deceased through L. RS. Reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 46 at para-20 as follows:-
"Para-20:- After analyzing all these pieces of evidence, the learned Trial Court found that the Income Tax Returns of the complainant did not disclose that he lent amount to the accused, and that the declared income was not sufficient to give loan of Rs.3 lakh. Therefore, the case of the complainant that he had given a loan to the accused from his agricultural income was found to be unbelievable by the -28- learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court found that it was highly doubtful as to whether the complainant had lent an amount of Rs.3 lakh to the accused. The learned Trial Court also found that the complaint had failed to produce the promissory note alleged to have been executed by the accused on 25th October 1998. After taking into consideration the defence witnesses and the attending circumstances, the learned Trial Court found that the defence was a possible defence and as such, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. Applying this principle, the learned Trial Court had found that the accused had rebutted the presumption on the basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses and attending circumstances."
41. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Jharkhand High Court on various occasions that payment of friendly loan without giving any specific date or dates to the accused petitioner in absence of any witness led to suspicious transaction.
42. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Somnath Biswas, son of R.S. Biswas Versus The State of Jharkhand reported in 2018 (3) JCR 185, Paragraph No. 6 as under:-
"Para 6:- We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned judgment of acquittal by the appellate court as also the judgment of the learned trial court. Learned appellate court has been guided by the fact that the endorsement by the Bank clearly indicated that the cheque was not valid. Why the cheque was not valid or valid had to be shown by the complainant through his evidence and/or by examination of the banker, which he failed to do. The -29- complainant also failed to state clearly the date and time of the friendly loan or any documentary evidence of such friendly loan having been advanced to the accused. In those circumstances, we are of the considered view that the complainant-petitioner has failed to make out any case for grant of leave to appeal."
43. The Supreme Court has also held that the issuance of blank cheque with signature only by the accused may not go in favour of the holder of the cheque, i.e. the complainant.
44. In view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of the discussion made above, it is evident that opposite party no. 2 had rebutted the presumption in light of the Section 139 of the N. I. Act.
45. Therefore, this Court finds that no illegality has been committed by the learned Appellate Court below while coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had no financial capacity to pay loan amount to the opposite party no. 2 and thus, this Criminal Revision is devoid of merit and the judgment dated 26.03.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2019 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur is upheld.
46. Thus, this Criminal Revision No. 482 of 2021 is hereby dismissed.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) Kamlesh/A.F.R. -30-