Karnataka High Court
Peer Pasha vs National Investigating Agency on 5 April, 2023
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF APRIL, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO.10458 OF 2021 (GM - RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.18017 OF 2021 (GM - RES)
WRIT PETITION NO.18055 OF 2021 (GM - RES)
IN WRIT PETITION NO.10458 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
PEER PASHA
S/O LATE ABDUL MAZEED,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
NO.827/B, 14TH CROSS,
NEAR FARIDA SHOE FACTORY,
GOVINDAPURA MAIN ROAD,
AC POST,
BENGALURU - 560 045.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY
REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
OFFICE AT HIGH COURT COMPLEX,
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2
2. K.G.HALLI POLICE
BENGALURU CITY POLICE
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
OFFICE AT HIGH COURT COMPLEX,
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI P.PRASANNA KUMAR, SPL.PP FOR R1;
SRI THEJESH P., SPL.PP FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT FIRSs BEARING NOS. CRIME
NO.229/2020 U/S 143, 147, 148, 353, 333, 332, 436, 427 AND 149
OF IPC, SECTION 4 OF PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO PUBLIC
PROPERTY ACT 1984 INVESTIGATED BY THE R1 AT ANNEXURE-C
WHEREIN PETITIONER ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED NO.5, FIR FILED
BY THE R2, AS CRIME NO.228/2020 U/S 143, 147, 148, 353, 436,
427 AND 149 OF IPC, SEC.4 OF PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO
PUBLIC PROPERTY ACT 1984 AT ANNEXURE-B WHEREIN
PETITIONER ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED NO.5, CRIME 234/2020 U/S
143, 147, 148, 427, 435 AND 149 OF IPC AT ANNEXURE-D
WHEREIN PETITIONER ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED NO.26, AND
CRIME NO.236/2020 U/S 143, 147, 148, 324, 323, 427 AND 149
OF IPC AT ANNEXURE-E WHEREIN PETITIONER ARRAIGNED AS
ACCUSED NO 22 ARE ILLEGAL AND CONSEQUENTLY QUASH THE
SAME AND ETC.,
IN WRIT PETITION NO.18017 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
MUZAMMIL PASHA
S/O SYED MUMTAZ
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
R/AT NO.1727, 1ST STAGE,
3
2ND BLOCK, YASIN NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 043.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI.MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY
REPRESENTED BY
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
OFFICE AT:
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. STATE BY D.J. HALLI POLICE STATION
BENGALURU CITY POLICE
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.P.PRASANNA KUMAR, SPL.PP FOR R1;
SRI.THEJESH.P, SPL.PP FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT FIRS BEARING NOS. I.E, FIR
FILED BY THE R2 AS CRIME NO.197/2020 U/S 427, 149, 440, 435,
152 OF IPC, WHEREIN ACCUSED IS ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO.21
AFTER COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION SAME AT ANNEXURE-B,
CRIME 198/2020 U/S 149, 152, 353, 323, 332 OF IPC WHEREIN
ACCUSED IS ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO 39 AFTER COMPLETION OF
INVESTIGATION SAME AT ANNEXURE-C, CRIME NO.199/2020 U/W
4
427, 149, 435, 152, 440 OF IPC WHEREIN AFTER INVESTIGATION
ACCUSED IS ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO.39 SAME AT ANNEXURE-D,
CRIME NO.200/2020 U/S 144, 147, 427, 143, 436, 324, 148, 307,
152, 435, 440, 149, 332, 353 OF IPC AND U/S 2(B) 2(A) OF KPDLP
ACT OF 1981 WHEREIN ACCUSED IS ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO.34
AFTER COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION SAME AT ANNEXURE-E,
CRIME NO.201/2020 U.S 144, 147, 427, 143, 436, 148, 307, 152,
435, 440, 149, 353 OF IPC AND U/S 2(B) 2(A) OF KPDLP ACT OF
1981 WHEREIN ACCUSED IS ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO.33 AFTER
COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION SAME AT ANNEXURE-F, CRIME
NO.202/2020 U/S 144, 147, 427, 143, 436, 323, 148, 307, 152,
435, 440,149, 332, 353 OF IPC AND U/S 2(B) 2(A) OF KPDLP ACT
OF 1981 WHEREIN ACCUSED IS ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO.33
AFTER COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION SAME AT ANNEXURE-G,
CRIME NO.203/2020 U/S 144, 147, 427, 143, 436, 148, 152, 435,
440, 149, 353 OF IPC AND U/S 2(B) (A) OF KPDLP ACT OF 1981
AND ETC.,
IN WRIT PETITION NO.18055 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
MUZAMMIL PASHA
S/O SYED MUMTAZ
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
R/AT NO.1727, 1ST STAGE, 2ND BLOCK
YASIN NAGAR, BENGALURU - 43.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY
REPRESENTED BY
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
OFFICE AT:
5
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. STATE BY K.G.HALLI POLICE
BENGALURU CITY POLICE
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT COMPLEX
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.P.PRASANNA KUMAR, SPL.PP FOR R1;
SRI.THEJESH.P, SPL.PP FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING DECLARE THAT FIRS BEARING NOS I.E, CRIME
NO.228/2020 U/S 143, 147, 148, 353, 436, 427 AND 149 OF IPC,
SEC.4 OF PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO PUBLIC PROPERTY ACT
1984 AT ANNEXURE-B FIR FILED BY THE R2 AS WHEREIN
PETITIONER ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED NO.1, CRIME NO.229/2020
U/S 143, 147, 148, 353, 333, 332, 436, 427 AND 149 OF IPC, SEC
4 OF PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO PUBLIC PROPERTY ACT 1984
INVESTIGATED BY THE R1 AS SPL.C.C.141/2021 AT ANNEXURE-C
WHEREIN PETITIONER ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED NO.2 CRIME
NO.232/2020 U/S 143, 147, 148, 427 AND 149 OF IPC,
INVESTIGATED BY THE R2 AT ANNEXURE-D AND ETC.,
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
6
ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court calling in question registration of different crimes and seeking consequential mandamus to treat Crime Nos. 227 of 2020 and 195 of 2020 alone to be the crimes for filing of charge sheets against the petitioners.
WRIT PETITON NO.10458 OF 2021:
2. Shorn of unnecessary details facts in brief, as projected by the prosecution are as follows:-
The petitioner/accused No.5 in Special C.C.No.141 of 2020;
accused No.5 in Crime Nos. 227 and 228 of 2020; accused No.26 in Crime No. 234 of 2020 and accused No.22 in Crime No.236 of 2020 is before this court calling in question registration of aforesaid crimes against the petitioner on the ground that it is in violation of the settled principle of law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of T.T.ANTONY VS. STATE OF KERALA reported in (2001) 6 SCC 881 that registration of multiple FIRs on a solitary incident, would be contrary to law.7
3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 11-08-2020, one Naveen posts a defamatory statement on social media against Prophet Mohammed. The said statement was circulated, due to which, on the same day at about 7.30 p.m., people started gathering in front of Devarajeevanahalli ('DJ Halli') and Kadugondanahalli ('KG Halli') Police Stations. At about 8.00 p.m., the house of the local Member of the Legislative Assembly was ransacked; the allegation was that, it was brunt as well by hundreds of people coming within the limits of both DJ Halli and KG Halli Police Stations. On the said incident, a crime comes to be registered in Crime No.219 of 2020. At 8.15 p.m. on the same day, the house of Naveen P. who had posted the statement on the social media was ransacked by hundreds of people. This comes to be registered as crime in Crime No.208 of 2020. At about 11 p.m., hoards of people gathered in front of KG Halli Police Station demanding arrest of Naveen P., nephew of R. Akhanda Srinivasamurthy, Member of Legislative Assembly from Pulakeshinagar. The ground of demand for arresting was derogatory remarks made in the face book account. Despite earlier complaint and a complaint against Naveen P. being lodged, the mob 8 that gathered in front of KG Halli Police Station did not disperse.
The Police had to resort to lathi charge. It is at that point in time, it is alleged that, the mob started attacking the police and public properties on a large scale and damaged several public and private properties, which happened notwithstanding imposition of prohibition under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. in and around the Police station i.e., both DJ Halli and KG Halli. The mob violence escalated and the accused are alleged to have pelted stones around the place of the Police Station and on the public properties in and around the Police Station. It is further alleged that people shouted slogans, police station was attacked and the police personnel who were all on duty were beaten. The unruly mob did not stop. They started vandalizing police station and setting on fire the vehicles parked in front of the KG Halli Police Station and other places nearby police station.
4. Based upon the aforesaid incident several crimes come to be registered - the first of the crime to be registered against the petitioner was in Crime No.227 of 2020. In Crime No.227 of 2020, the petitioner along with others are alleged to have attacked one 9 police constable - Manjunath on his face and head with an intention to kill him. Therefore, offices punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 307, 332, 353 r/w 149 of the IPC are alleged against the petitioner. The said crime comes to be registered at 9.00 p.m. on 11-08-2020.
5. On further allegations, one more crime in Crime No.228 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 353, 427, 436 r/w 149 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 comes to be registered at 11.20 p.m. on 11-08-2020. The allegation in the said crime is that, the petitioner along with others illegally trespassed into the police station of K.G.Halli holding sticks and arsons, closed the station gate and the mob started burning vehicles parked in front of the police station. Three TVS Apache motorcycles and one Hoysala jeep were set on fire in front of the police station. It is alleged that the petitioner along with others pelted stones on the nearby traffic police station and the miscreants smashed glasses of several seized vehicles which were parked in front of the police station.
106. The police again registered a crime in Crime No.229 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 333, 332, 353, 427, 436 r/w 149 of the IPC along with Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. This comes to be registered at 1.00 a.m. on 12-08-2020. The allegation for registration of the crime is that, the complainant one Police Inspector Ajay was on a patrolling duty within K.G.Halli police station limits. About 800 people assembled in front of the police station forming an unlawful assembly carrying deadly weapons and were trying to rush into the police station. All of them gathered in front of the police station, shouted slogans against the police and called in loud voices to stab and kill the police and described the police as children of prostitutes and the mob alleged to have threatened the police that if they are not allowed to kill Naveen, who had posted derogatory comments, in front of the police station, they would not stop the activity that they were carrying on. The further allegation is, damage to Government property by setting ablaze several vehicles as is alleged in other crimes. This forms the 3rd crime on the incident.
117. The police again registers a crime on 13-08-2020 at 12.15 p.m. in Crime No.234 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 427, 435 r/w 149 of the IPC. In this, the complainant is the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police Mr. Prasanna Kumar. It has alleged in the complaint that he was deputed for night rounds within the jurisdiction of K.G.Halli police station and on 11-08-2020 and at 11.30 p.m., he witnessed all that had happened which was subject matter of crime in the aforesaid crimes. The additional fact here is, the crowd that gathered had damaged the name board of the Police station, 13 chairs, 2 ceiling fans, 3 windows, and broke glasses of the windows in the police station.
The loss to the public property was to the tune of ` 1,00,000/-. This forms the fourth crime registered on the said incident.
8. The 2nd respondent further registers crime in Crime No.236 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 427 r/w 149 of the IPC. The said crime comes to be registered on 13-08-2020 at 1.30 p.m. and the allegations and offences are verbatim similar. The complainant here is one Ravi Kumar. It is alleged that Ravi Kumar is working with Suvarna news Channel and 12 was present in the crime scene in his own car Maruti Alto 800 and when he reached K.G.Halli police station, he saw 800 to 900 miscreants assembled and committing ruckus and rioting. The camera man was beaten and the camera was destroyed. The glasses of Maruti Alto were broken, which resulted in loss of `90,000/-. Therefore, the offences punishable as quoted supra were alleged. This forms the fifth crime.
9. The sixth crime comes to be registered in Crime No.237 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 307, 332, 353 r/w 149 along with Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. The complainant is one L.Narayana.
The complaint is registered on 13-08-2020 at 2.30 p.m. The allegation is verbatim similar to what is alleged in the earlier crime in Crime No.227 of 2020, the contents of it are therefore, not reiterated.
10. After completion of investigation, the National Investigating Agency files charge sheets in all the afore-quoted crimes arraigning the petitioner as accused in the respective crime numbers. In Special C.C.No.141 of 2021 which arose out of crime 13 No.229 of 2020, the petitioner is accused No.5; in C.C.No.55011 of 2020 arising out of Crime No.227 of 2020 the petitioner is accused No.5; in C.C. No.54378 of 2020 arising out Crime No.228 of 2020 the petitioner is again accused No.5; in C.C.No.54672 of 2020 arising out of Crime No.234 of 2020 the petitioner is accused No.26 and in C.C. No.55027 of 2020 arising out of Crime No.236 of 2020 the petitioner is accused No.22. The petitioner being aggrieved by the registration of multiple crimes and multiple charge sheets has knocked the doors of this Court alleging that it is in violation of law.
WRIT PETITON NOs.18017 & 18055 OF 2021:
11. The petitioner is common in both these cases. The contentions are similar to what is alleged in Writ Petition No.10458 of 2021. In these cases, there are several crimes registered against the petitioner and provisions of offences change from C.C to C.C. There are close to 15 crimes registered against the petitioner. The crime numbers and the petitioner arrayed as accused would read as follows:
14"Petitioner in W.P.No.10458/2021 as per charge sheet Crime No. Spl.C.C / C.C.No. Accused No. 229/2020 141/2021 5 227/2020 55011/2020 5 228/2020 54378/2020 5 234/2020 54672/2020 26 236/2020 55027/2020 22 " Common petitioner in W.P.Nos.18017/2021 & 18055/2021 as per charge sheet Crime No. Spl.C.C / C.C.No. Accused No. 195/2020 152/2021 1 197/2020 52684/2021 21 198/2020 51335/2021 39 199/2020 52681/2021 39 200/2020 51389/2021 34 201/2020 51388/2021 34 202/2020 51387/2021 33 203/2020 51336/2021 28 205/2020 51458/2021 34 206/2020 51460/2021 34 212/2020 50398/2021 29 220/2020 55013/2021 25 221/2020 52680/2021 41 223/2020 54872/2020 34 227/2020 50399/2021 32 228/2020 54378/2020 1 229/2020 141/2021 2 231/2020 50466/2021 34 232/2020 67/21 (S.C.) 16 233/2020 52848/2021 12 234/2020 50397/2021 16 and 38 235/2020 50385/2021 11 236/2020 55027/2020 12 237/2020 56/2021 (S.C.) 1 245/2020 50465/2021 33 249/2020 52683/2021 19 15 The contents of each of the crime need not be gone into as they are the same as are alleged in Writ Petition No.10458 of 2021. The addition in these cases is inclusion of offences punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The contentions that drives the petitioner to this Court in these petitions are also similar to what is contended in Writ Petition No.10458 of 2021.
12. Heard Sri Mohammed Tahir, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri P.Prasanna Kumar, Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri P. Thejesh, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.2.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioners would contend with vehemence that for a solitary incident that happens on 11.08.2020 between 9 p.m. to 1.00 a.m. on the next day, multiple FIRs have been registered against the petitioners and several others. All those FIRs will have to be treated as additional charge sheets to one of the charge sheets that are filed by the respondents. Registering multiple crimes and filing multiple charge sheets would be in violation of plethora of judgments rendered by the Apex Court on the issue. He would seek quashment of the 16 charge sheets and to treat the crime in Crime No.227 of 2021 to be the main case and all other charge sheets that are filed as additional charge sheets to the said criminal case arising out Crime No.227 of 2020.
14. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/National Investigating Agency would seek to defend the action of filing different charge sheets for different crimes albeit on the very same incident on the ground that offences alleged against the petitioners in each of the charge sheets are entirely different.
The complainants are different and the time of occurrence of the offence in all the charge sheets is entirely different. The incident of posting a derogatory post on face book by one Naveen might have triggered the contents of all the charge sheets but that does not mean that they are verbatim similar to each other. Few of the crimes are registered after two days and few of the crimes are registered immediately and law permits conduct of trial for more than one offence notwith-standing the fact that the same has arisen out of the same incident. He would seek to place reliance on Section 227 of the CrPC to defend the action. It is his further 17 submission that against accused in Writ Petition No.18017 of 2021 the offences punishable under Karnataka Prevention of Destruction & Loss of Property Act, 1981 is also alleged while it is not the case in the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.10458 of 2021. It is his submission that the learned counsel for the petitioner is seeking to mix up the issues and deviate the offences that are alleged against them. He seeks dismissal of the petitions as charge sheets are already filed and the trial is on.
15. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and perused the material on record.
16. In the light of the aforesaid submissions made by the respective learned counsel what is germane to be considered is whether registration of multiple FIRs against the petitioners on certain solitary incident is tenable or otherwise. It is not disputed that the fact that triggered the entire incident is a face book post or a post on social media which led to unrest or rioting. The facts are elaborately narrated hereinabove and they would not require any reiteration. It becomes necessary to notice the line of law as 18 enunciated by the Apex Court in the facts of the kind, as well as registration of multiple FIRs on a solitary incident. At the outset I deem it appropriate to notice the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Apex Court in the case of T.T. ANTONY v. STATE OF KERALA1 has held as follows:
"19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) CrPC. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC.
20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station 1 (2001) 6 SCC 181 19 has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 CrPC."
The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment holds that on a solitary incident if multiple FIRs are registered, it would become an abuse of the process and violate the rights of an accused.
17. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has laid much emphasis on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of AMITBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHAH v. CBI2 wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
"Summary 58.1. This Court accepting the plea of CBI in Narmada Bai [(2011) 5 SCC 79 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 526] that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed CBI to "take over"
the investigation and did not grant the relief prayed for i.e. registration of a fresh FIR. Accordingly, filing of a fresh FIR by CBI is contrary to various decisions of this Court.
58.2. The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, the investigating officer has to 2 AIR 2013 SC 3794 20 form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) of the Code.
58.3. Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
58.4. Further, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of the police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Code. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report(s) to the Magistrate. A case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter- case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered with by the High Court by exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
2158.5. The first information report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.
58.6. In the case on hand, as explained in the earlier paragraphs, in our opinion, the second FIR was nothing but a consequence of the event which had taken place on 25-11- 2005/26-11-2005. We have already concluded that this Court having reposed faith in CBI accepted their contention that Tulsiram Prajapati encounter is a part of the same chain of events in which Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi were killed and directed CBI to "take up" the investigation.
58.7. For vivid understanding, let us consider a situation in which Mr A having killed B with the aid of C, informs the police that unknown persons killed B. During investigation, it revealed that A was the real culprit and D abetted A to commit the murder. As a result, the police officer files the charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Code with the Magistrate. Although, in due course, it was discovered through further investigation that the person who abetted Mr A was C and not D as mentioned in the charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code. In such a scenario, uncovering of the later fact that C is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge-sheet under Section 173(8) of the Code will serve the purpose.
58.8. Likewise, in the case on hand, initially CBI took a stand that the third person accompanying Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi was Kalimuddin. However, with the aid of further investigation, it unveiled that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Therefore, only as a result of further investigation, CBI has gathered the information that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Thus a second FIR in the given facts and circumstances is unwarranted : instead filing of a supplementary charge-sheet in this regard will suffice the issue.
58.9. Administering criminal justice is a two-end process, where guarding the ensured rights of the accused under the Constitution is as imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It is definitely a daunting task but equally a compelling 22 responsibility vested on the court of law to protect and shield the rights of both. Thus, a just balance between the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our view this is a fit case for quashing the second FIR to meet the ends of justice.
58.10. The investigating officers are the kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their reliable investigation is the leading step towards affirming complete justice to the victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable evidences to establish the same.
Conclusion
59. In the light of the specific stand taken by CBI before this Court in the earlier proceedings by way of assertion in the form of counter-affidavit, status reports, etc. we are of the view that filing of the second FIR and fresh charge-sheet is violative of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution since the same relate to alleged offence in respect of which an FIR had already been filed and the court has taken cognizance. This Court categorically accepted CBI's plea that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR and in spite of the fact that this Court directed CBI to "take over" the investigation and did not grant the relief as prayed, namely, registration of fresh FIR, the present action of CBI filing fresh FIR is contrary to various judicial pronouncements which is demonstrated in the earlier part of our judgment.
60. In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the second FIR dated 29-4-2011 being RC No. 3(S)/2011/Mumbai filed by CBI is contrary to the directions issued in judgment and order dated 8-4-2011 by this Court in Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat [(2011) 5 SCC 79: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 526] and accordingly the same is quashed. As a consequence, the charge-
23sheet filed on 4-9-2012, in pursuance of the second FIR, be treated as a supplementary charge-sheet in the first FIR. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of both the parties and it is for the trial court to decide the same in accordance with law. Consequently, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the persons arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 5 of 2013."
The issue before the Apex Court was concerning killing of one Tulsiram Prajapati. The Apex Court holds that in a situation of A having killed B with the aid of C, informs the Police that unknown killed B. During investigation it was revealed that A was the real culprit and D abetted A to commit the murder. They were all a part of solitary conspiracy. The Apex Court holds in such a scenario of later fact that C is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge sheet under Section 173(8) of the Code would serve the purpose. Drawing these illustrations from paragraphs 55 to 58 the Apex Court at paragraphs 59 and 60 holds that multiple FIRs on that solitary incident was unwarranted as the incident was killing of one Tulsiram Prajapati.
2418. The Apex Court in the case of BABUBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT3 was again considering an identical issue whether two FIRs could be registered by one Sub-Inspector of Police on the occurrence of the incident at village Dhedhal near the pond and later found the motor cycle somewhere else which was used for the crime and some persons had been locked inside their houses which were also set on fire. Though it was a solitary incident, this is in two parts. It is in that light the Apex Court holds that multiple FIRs could not be registered.
19 In the case of SMT. VISHALAKSHI BHAT v. STATE OF KARNATAKA4 this Court has held as follows:
"6. The present cases are clearly of that nature in which a common charge sheet ought to have been filed. Similarly, in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah's case the Supreme Court has reiterated the procedure that should be followed and has cautioned the courts as regards the examination of the facts and circumstances giving rise to multiple first information reports and the test of sameness to find out whether the multiple cases relate to the same incident in respect of the same transactions. In T T Anthony's case it is also laid down as follows:
"However, the sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a
3
2010 (12) SCC 254
4
Crl.P.No.8703/2016 dated 11.01.2017
25
citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.PC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. may, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution."
And the Court has indicated the correct course of action as being that the note ought to have been taken on the findings and contents for the courts to streamline the investigation to ascertain true and correct facts, collect the evidence in support thereof form an opinion under Section 169 and 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the case may be and forward the report under Section 173(2) or Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Magistrate concerned.
7. In the light of the fact that these cases have been filed over a period of time and are pending at various stages and that in some cases charge sheets have been filed, the proper course to be adopted as laid down in Amith Shah's case would be that it is the first charge sheet which would prevail and the subsequent charge sheets in respect of the similar transactions involving the same petitioner ought to be treated as supplementary charge sheets and the FIRs to be treated as additional statements.
8. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the earliest of the case launched against the 26 petitioner which is now registered in C.C. No.7358/2016 and that all the other cases which are the subject matter of these petitions are subsequent matters. Therefore, it would be prudent to allow the petitions and quash the charge sheets filed and the respective FIRs in each of these cases shall be treated as additional information and the statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the charge sheets that would have necessarily filed in the independent cases shall be submitted as supplementary charge sheets and all these cases shall be tried together in C.C. No.7358/2016.
9. It is necessary that a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter case filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or vital report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is forwarded to the Magistrate, it is necessary for this Court to quash the same in exercise of power under Section 482 as laid down by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the respective FIRs and the charge sheets in the above cases stand quashed.
10. It would also be necessary for the respective Investigating Officer involved in each of the cases to approach the court below which shall return the charge sheets to the concerned Investigating Officer who in turn shall hand over the same to the Investigating Officer in the case that was instituted against the petitioner namely, C.C. No.7358/2016 on the file of the I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who shall in turn proceed in terms of the directions issued herein above and the charge sheets laid before the court. The original records pertaining to each of the cases shall also stand transferred to the aforesaid court which shall try the case as one."
27In the case of PRANABJYOTI BARMAN v. UNION OF INDIA5 the Gujarat High Court has held as follows:
"17. In the light of aforesaid settled propositions of law and applying the best of sameness, if we read the two FIRS together it becomes clear that both the FIRS have been filed referring to the same incident of the year 2010. In Anju Chaudhury (supra), it has been held that where several offences are a part of same transaction, the "test of sameness" has to be applied, whether they are so related to one another on the point of purpose or cause and effect, so as to result in a one continuous action. It has been held that second FIR in respect of same offence forming part of same transaction as complained in the first FIR is not permissible. Commencement of the re- investigation after completion of previous investigation, pursuant to the first FIR and filing of report based on such investigation before the Court is not permissible. Further, it has been held that inbuilt safeguards provided under the CrPC are principles akin to double jeopardy, fair investigation and prevention of abuse of power by investigating agency .... .... ....
19. In view of the findings and discussions above, this Court is of the opinion that instead of quashing the second FIR, it would be suffice if the second FIR is treated as statement under Section 162 CrPC. Accordingly, it is directed that learned trial Court will proceed with the matter by clubbing both the cases together by the same Court, by treating the second FIR as statement under Section 162 CrPC."
20. It now becomes germane to notice the judgment relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. The learned counsel for NIA places reliance upon a three Judge Bench judgment 5 Crl.P.No.1516 of 2019 dd. 22-02-2021 28 of the Apex Court in the case of LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE6 wherein it is held as follows:
"10. The application for amalgamation of cases is under Section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads as under:
"223. What persons may be charged jointly.--The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely--
(a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction;
(b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence;
(c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months;
(d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction;
(e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last- named offence;
(f) persons accused of offences under Sections 411 and 414 of the Penal Code, 1860 or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence;
(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Penal Code, 1860 relating to counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence; and the 6 (2003) 11 SCC 786 29 provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply in all such charges:
Provided that where a number of persons are charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the Magistrate may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and if he is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together."
It is thus to be seen that irrespective of the applicability of clauses (a) to (g), Section 223 gives to the Magistrate a discretion to amalgamate cases. The Magistrate has to be satisfied that persons would not be prejudicially affected and that it is expedient to amalgamate cases. As has been set out hereinabove, on a prior occasion the application for amalgamation has been rejected by the Special Judge. The High Court has also rejected the appeal. Under the circumstances, a fresh application for the same relief would not normally lie. Faced with this situation it had been submitted that the present application for amalgamation had been made as the High Court had already held that there was a single conspiracy and had given liberty to apply for amalgamation at a later stage. It is thus necessary to see what the High Court held in the case of Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2000) 3 Pat LJR 357] . Paragraphs 28 to 32 read as follows:
"28. The fact that separate cases have been registered and are being investigated separately and also the fact that this Court during investigation while considering the question as to whether remand in one case will mean the remand in all other cases, has held that some of the cases form different transactions, are not decisive to the question involved in the case. This Court made observations during the course of investigation while deciding the question of remand only. The separate investigation by itself is not decisive of the fact that all the cases are separate. It is only after investigation that the question has to be decided as to whether they are part of the same transaction or not. Similarly, the fact that the accused persons in both the cases are not common is also not an important fact as 30 even in the cases of single transaction, different offences are committed by different sets of the accused persons. The relevant question that was to be considered by the trial court was whether the series of the acts committed by the accused persons forming different offences at different times and at different places were with a view to fulfil one common purpose and there was a community of criminal intent so as to form a single transaction or different offences were committed independently with a view to fulfil different purpose or object though there was similarity between the purpose and object in the cases. Even if the trial court would have found that the offences alleged to have been committed did not form one transaction, it should have also considered the cases of the petitioners in terms of the proviso to Section 223 of the Code whether it was expedient in the ends of justice to hold a joint trial on such prayer being made in writing by the accused persons and the same was not causing any prejudice to any of the accused persons. The trial court has also not made any effort to find out as to what is the view of the other accused persons facing the trial. For all these reasons, the order passed by the trial court suffers from legal infirmity.
29.***
30. The next question is as to what order should be passed in this case after having came to the conclusion that the order passed by the Special Judge suffers from legal infirmity. Whether the matter is to be remanded for fresh consideration at this stage or some other direction is to be given taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case.
31. During the course of argument and in the written argument filed on behalf of one set of the accused, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the offences committed in these two cases and other cases are the part of the same transaction, but they have not given the details of other cases. In other cases either charge-sheets have been submitted or the same are still to be submitted. In that circumstance, this question 31 cannot be decided by taking into consideration the allegation made in these two cases only. If this question is decided only after taking into consideration the allegations in these two cases then that matter will not come to an end as this question will be reagitated time and again by the petitioners and other accused persons as and when the other cases will be ripe for framing of the charges and the result would be that the trial will not proceed in any case.
32. Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case arising out of the Animal Husbandry Scam, I am of the view that the said question is to be decided only when other cases are also ready and reach the stage of framing of the charges. At that stage, if a proper application is filed by the accused persons or by some of the accused persons, the trial court will consider the said question. While considering the question if some of the accused persons have not prayed for joint trial, then the trial court will also consider their stand in the light of the legal positions indicated above. The trial court will also consider whether it will be possible or practicable to dispose of all the cases or some of the cases jointly or they should be tried separately. It is to be clarified that the paramount consideration should be the cause of justice."
It is thus to be seen that the High Court has not concluded that there was a single conspiracy. The High Court has correctly held that this question can be decided only when the other cases are also ready and reach the stage of framing of the charges. As has been indicated above, all the cases have not reached the stage of framing of the charges. Three of the cases are still at the appearance stage. Two of the cases are at the stage of framing of charge. Thus in any case, the application was premature. Moreover, the present attempt is likely to result in delay in trial of Case No. RC 20(A)/96-Patna which has progressed considerably. The High Court has also correctly held that it is the trial court which would have to consider the stand of other accused persons who have not prayed for joint trial. It is to be seen that apart from the appellants there are a large number of other accused persons. Most of the other accused persons have 32 not applied for joint trial. This Court does not know what their stand is. When this was pointed out to the counsel for the appellants, it was stated that affidavit of consent, for joint trial, by all the accused in all the cases would be filed before this Court. In our view this is not the stage when such affidavits could be filed. The consent had to be obtained before the application for amalgamation was made. It was for the Special Judge to consider whether it was expedient and in the interest of justice that all accused persons, in all the cases, be tried jointly. It is neither expedient nor proper that the appellants be permitted to bypass the trial court in this manner.
11. There is another more important reason why these appeals cannot be allowed. This Court, in the case of CBI v. Braj Bhushan Prasad [(2001) 9 SCC 432 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 576] considered the question whether these cases stood transferred to the State of Jharkhand by virtue of the Bihar Reorganisation Act. Opposing a transfer it was submitted that the cases related to an alleged single conspiracy which had taken place in Patna. It was submitted that the trials thus had to continue in Patna. This Court considered what were the main offences in those cases. Admittedly these six cases are part of the cases considered by this Court. Paragraphs 34 to 37 read as follows:
(SCC pp. 444-45) "34. What is the main offence in the charges involved in all these 36 cases? It is undisputed that the main offence is under Section 13(1)(c) and also Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The first among them is described thus:
'13. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,--
***
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently
misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do;' The next offence is described like this:
'13. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,--33
***
(d) if he,--
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest;'
35. We have no doubt in our mind that the hub of the act envisaged in the first of those two offences is 'dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates'. Similarly the hinge of the act envisaged in the second section is 'obtains' for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means.
36. The above acts were completed in the present cases when the money has gone out of the public treasuries and reached the hands of any one of the persons involved. Hence, so far as the offences under Section 13(1)(c) and Section 13(1)(d) are concerned the place where the offences were committed could easily be identified as the place where the treasury concerned was situated. It is an undisputed fact that in all these cases the treasuries were situated within the territories of Jharkhand State.
37. Thus, when it is certain where exactly the offence under Section 13 of the PC Act was committed it is an unnecessary exercise to ponder over the other areas wherein certain allied activities, such as conspiracy or preparation, or even the prefatory or incidental acts were done, including the consequences that ensued."
Thus it has already been held, by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, that the main offences were under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It has been held that the offence of conspiracy is an allied offence to the main 34 offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The cases are before the Special Judges because the main offences are under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The main offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act in each case is in respect of the alleged transaction in that case. As conspiracy is only an allied offence, it cannot be said that the alleged overt acts are in the course of the same transaction. We are bound by this decision. In any case we see no reason to take a different view. As it has already been held that the charge of conspiracy is only an allied charge and that the main charges (under the Prevention of Corruption Act) are in respect of separate and distinct acts i.e. monies siphoned out of different treasuries at different times, we fail to see as to how these cases could be amalgamated."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Apart from the afore-quoted judgment relied on by the respondent it is germane to notice the other set of judgments which considered multiple FIRs being registered in cases of rioting. The Apex Court in the case of ANJU CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH7 has held as follows:
"A cardinal question of public importance and one that is likely to arise more often than not in relation to the lodging of the first information report (FIR) with the aid of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") or otherwise independently within the ambit of Section 154 of the Code is as to whether there can be more than one FIR in relation to the same incident or different incidents arising from the same occurrence.
... ... ... 7 (2013) 6 SCC 384 35
14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in-charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that 36 such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.)
15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case.
16. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] the Court was concerned with the registration of a second FIR in relation to the same facts but constituting different offences and where ambit and scope of the investigation was entirely different. Firstly, an FIR was registered and even the charge-sheet filed was primarily concerned with the offence of conspiracy to cheat and misappropriation by the two accused. At that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars (case property) out of the country. It was also not known that some other accused persons were parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the court, which subsequently surfaced in London. Earlier, it was only known to the police that the pillars were stolen as the property within the meaning of Section 410 IPC and were in possession of the accused person (Narang brothers) in London.
17. The Court in Ram Lal Narang [(1979) 2 SCC 322:
1979 SCC (Cri) 479] declined to grant relief of discharge to the 37 petitioner in that case where the contention raised was that entire investigation in the FIR subsequently instituted was illegal as the case on same facts was already pending before the courts at Ambala and courts in Delhi were acting without jurisdiction. The fresh facts came to light and the scope of investigation broadened by the facts which came to be disclosed subsequently during the investigation of the first FIR. The comparison of the two FIRs has shown that the conspiracies were different. They were not identical and the subject-matter was different. The Court observed that there was a statutory duty upon the police to register every information relating to cognizable offence and the second FIR was not hit by the principle that it is impermissible to register a second FIR of the same offence.
18. The Court held as under : (Ram Lal Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] , SCC pp. 337-
38, paras 20-22) "20. Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working of the criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of the other persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the 38 offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of CrPC in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light.
21. As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in CrPC, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance 39 of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.
22. As in the present case, occasions may arise when a second investigation started independently of the first may disclose a wide range of offences including those covered by the first investigation. Where the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the first case, it is up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior court to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrates themselves may take action suo motu. In the present case, there is no problem since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the prosecuting agency. It was submitted to us that the submission of a charge-sheet to the Delhi Court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala Court amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. We do not think that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge-sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 CrPC, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would have done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal permission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice.
40We are also satisfied that there has been no illegality. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed."
19. In M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka [(1999) 3 SCC 247 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 397] , this Court took the view that even where the article of charge was similar but for a different period, there was nothing in the Code to debar registration of the second FIR. The Court opined that the FIR was registered for an offence under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act related to the period 1-8-1978 to 1-4-1989 and the investigation culminated into filing of a report which was accepted by the Court. The second FIR and subsequent proceedings related to a later period which was 1-8-1978 to 25- 7-1978 under similar charges. It was held that there was no provision which debar the filing of a subsequent FIR.
20. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181:
2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] , the Court explained that an information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of the Code is commonly known as the first information report (FIR). Though this term is not used in the Code, it is a very important document. The Court concluded that second FIR for the same offence or occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences was not permissible. In this case, the Court discussed the judgments in Ram Lal Narang [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] and M. Krishna [(1999) 3 SCC 247 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 397] in some detail, and while quashing the subsequent FIR held as under : (T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] , SCC pp. 198-99 & 204, paras 23-25 & 35) "23. The right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is a statutory right over which the court does not possess any supervisory jurisdiction under CrPC. In King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [(1943-
44) 71 IA 203] the Privy Council spelt out the power of the investigation of the police, as follows : (IA p. 212) '... In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as Their Lordships think, be an unfortunate 41 result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.'
24. This plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is, however, not unlimited. It is subject to certain well-recognised limitations. One of them, is pointed out by the Privy Council, thus : (Khwaja Nazir case [(1943-44) 71 IA 203] , IA p. 213) '... if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation....'
25. Where the police transgresses its statutory power of investigation the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and this Court in an appropriate case can interdict the investigation to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
***
35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) CrPC before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside."
21. The judgment of this Court in T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] came to be further explained and clarified by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash [(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 42 211] , wherein the Court stated as under : (Upkar Singh case [(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , SCC pp. 297- 300, paras 17-18 & 23-25) "17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.
18. This Court in Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi [(2002) 1 SCC 714 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 269] discussing this aspect of law held : (SCC p. 717, para 11) '11. The learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the ground that final report had 43 been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it.' ***
23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.
24. We have already noticed that in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] this Court did not consider the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counterclaim, on the contrary from the observations found in the said judgment it clearly indicates that filing a counter-complaint is permissible.
25. In the instant case, it is seen in regard to the incident which took place on 20-5-1995, the appellant and the first respondent herein have lodged separate complaints giving different versions but while the complaint of the respondent was registered by the police concerned, the complaint of the appellant was not so registered, hence on his prayer the learned Magistrate was justified in directing the police concerned to register a case and investigate the same and report back. In our opinion, both the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the same is hit by Section 161 or 162 of the Code which, in our considered opinion, has absolutely no bearing on the question involved. Section 161 or 162 of the Code does 44 not refer to registration of a case, it only speaks of a statement to be recorded by the police in the course of the investigation and its evidentiary value."
(emphasis in original)
22. Somewhat similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court in Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat [(2006) 1 SCC 732 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 481] , wherein the Court held that the subsequent FIRs cannot be prohibited on the ground that some other FIR has been filed against the petitioner in respect of other allegations filed against the petitioner.
23. This Court also had the occasion to deal with the situation where the first FIR was a cryptic one and later on, upon receipt of a proper information, another FIR came to be recorded which was a detailed one. In this case, the Court took the view that no exception could be taken to the same being treated as an FIR. In Vikram v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 332 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 362] , the Court held that it was not impermissible in law to treat the subsequent information report as the first information report and act thereupon. In Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(1970) 2 SCC 113 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 328] also, this Court examined the question as to whether cryptic, anonymous and oral messages, which do not clearly specify the cognizable offence, can be treated as FIR, and answered the question in the negative.
24. In matters of complaints, the Court in Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar [(2012) 1 SCC 130 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 513] expressed the view that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of a second complaint even on the same facts, provided that the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or where the complete facts could not be placed before the court and the applicant came to know of certain facts after the disposal of the first complaint. The Court applied the test of full consideration of the complaints on merits. In para 18, the Court held as under:
(SCC p. 136) "18. Thus, it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint 45 even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, the second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit."
25. The first information report is a very important document, besides that it sets the machinery of criminal law in motion. It is a very material document on which the entire case of the prosecution is built. Upon registration of FIR, beginning of investigation in a case, collection of evidence during investigation and formation of the final opinion is the sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. The possibility that more than one piece of information is given to the police officer-in-charge of a police station, in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences, cannot be ruled out. Other materials and information given to or received otherwise by the investigating officer would be statements covered under Section 162 of the Code. The court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of "sameness" to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible, this is the view expressed by this Court in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 12 SCC 254 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] . This judgment clearly spells out the distinction between two FIRs relating to the same incident and two FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the same incident, etc.
26. To illustrate such a situation, one can give an example of the same group of people committing theft in 46 a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions. Even if the incidents were committed in close proximity of time, there could be separate FIRs and institution of even one stating that a number of thefts had been committed, would not debar the registration of another FIR. Similarly, riots may break out because of the same event but in different areas and between different people. The registration of a primary FIR which triggered the riots would not debar registration of subsequent FIRs in different areas. However, to the contra, for the same event and offences against the same people, there cannot be a second FIR. This Court has consistently taken this view and even in Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P.[(2010) 14 SCC 444:
s(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 757] , the Court took the view that :
(SCC p. 448, para 14) "14. ... There cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first information report."
27. Now, we should examine the facts of the present case in the light of the principles stated supra. The complaint/application under Section 156(3) filed by Respondent 2 was founded on the condolence meeting which was attended by a large number of persons including the persons named in the complaint. According to Respondent 2, named persons had given speeches which were communal, provoking and were creating disharmony between the communities, and encouraging people to commit criminal offences rather than to follow the due process of law. The complaint of Respondent 2 did not relate to any event prior to the holding of the meeting and participation of the stated persons. This complaint was of a general nature and related to various communal riots that occurred subsequent to and as a result of the meeting. Thus, it related to a different case, grievance and alleged commission of offences at the time and subsequent to the holding of the meeting.
28. First Information Report No. 145 of 2007 lodged by Hazrat, son of Bismillah related to the burning of a shop prior to holding of a meeting. He categorically stated that he did not know the persons or names of the 47 perpetrators who attacked the shop where he was working. This incident occurred at 6 p.m. as per the records while the meeting itself, as per Respondent 2 was held after 8 p.m., though on the same date. His report clearly states that when he was going back to his house at about 8.30 p.m., he stopped at the place where the meeting was being held. The FIR registered by Hazrat was against unknown persons and related to a particular event and commission of a particular crime. There was no question of any provocation, conspiracy or attempt by the persons premeditatedly committing the offences which they committed. As per the FIR, it was an offence committed at random by some unknown persons. The registration of such FIR was neither intended to be nor was it in fact in relation to a matter of larger investigation, or commission of offences, as alleged by Respondent 2.
29. Even the offences which are stated to have been committed, and for which the two FIRs were registered in these respective cases were different and distinct. In the complaint filed by Parvez Parwaz, which was registered as a FIR, names of the persons were mentioned and a general investigation was called for, while FIR No. 145 of 2007 registered by Hazrat, was against unknown persons for damage of his property, which was for a specific offence, without any other complaint or allegation of any communal instigation or riot. In other words, these were two different FIRs relatable to different occurrences, investigation of one was in no way dependent upon the other and they are neither interlinked nor interdependent. They were lodged by different persons in relation to occurrences which are alleged to have occurred at different points of time against different people and for different offences. Requirement of proof in both cases was completely distinct and different. Thus, there was no similarity and the test of similarity would not be satisfied in the present case. Thus, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that lodging of the subsequent FIR was not a second FIR for the same occurrence as stated in FIR No. 145 of 2007, and thus, could be treated as a first information report for all purposes including investigation in terms of the 48 provisions of the Code. It was not in the form of a statement under Section 162 of the Code"
(Emphasis supplied) The question posed before the Apex Court was that whether there can be more than one FIR in relation to the same incident or different incidents arising from the same occurrence. Answering the said issue the Apex Court considers the entire spectrum of law right from RAM LAL NARANG, T.T. ANTONY and all other cases on identical issues and holds that in certain situations multiple FIRs registered will not be hit by the doctrine of sameness. The Apex Court at paragraph 14 elaborates Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Cr.P.C. and considers whether the incident is separate; offences are similar or different or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first and then the second FIR could be registered. It also considers that if the FIR is about the same incident or offence or is based on distinct and different facts and the scope of enquiry is different, it will not be appropriate for any Court to lay down one strait-jacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This would become a matter of trial. The Apex Court further holds that any 49 other material and information given or received otherwise would become statement under Section 162 of the Code but that does not mean that FIR should not be registered. The Apex Court also considers certain illustrations and at paragraph 29 on the facts of the case holds that two FIRs could be registered on the same incident. The Apex Court considers that FIRs registered were different and distinct. That was also a case of rioting. Therefore, in a case of rioting it is not the case that multiple FIRs should not be registered. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners were all cases where one solitary incident had led to multiple FIRs against one accused. The facts in the case at hand are not akin to what led to the Apex Court in rendering those judgments.
22. Reference is being made to a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh rendered in the case of JAKIR HUSSAIN KASANGI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH8.
The question before the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High 8 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 240 50 Court can be gathered from the first paragraph and it reads as follows:
"The petitioners in all these writ petitions seek the issue of writs of mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in allowing the registration of multiple FIRs and conducting an investigation into all of them, in relation to the same set of facts, as unconstitutional. They also pray as a consequence, a direction to the respondents to tag all subsequently registered FIRs to the first FIR and also to set aside all the Prisoner Transit warrants issued against them."
The Division Bench considers the issue and holds as follows:
17. The main thrust of the argument before the Supreme Court was that a balance had to be struck between the sweeping power of investigation available to the police and the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution. Accepting the said argument, the Supreme Court held in para-27 of the report as follows:
A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C., nay, a case of 51 abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
18. A careful look at all the observations of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony would show that the bar to the registration of a second FIR was read into the Code of Criminal Procedure, whenever the second or subsequent information related to the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or same incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. The emphasis laid by the Supreme Court was on the sameness of the truth and substance of the gravamen of the charges.
19. As we have pointed out earlier, an important aspect to be noted in the decision of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony is that the Supreme Court did not quash the two FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 registered at two different places on the very date of the occurrence, but quashed only the FIR filed after 3 years pursuant to the recommendation of the commission of inquiry. Therefore, it follows that the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court was not applied to the second FIR filed on the same date.
20. In Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India, a 3-
member Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with a batch of writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking bail in the nature as prescribed under Section 438 of the Code. The petitioners in Narinderjit Singh Sahni were inspired by the earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court, one in V.K. Sharma v. Union of India (2000) 9 SCC 449 and another in P.K. Sharma dated 05-5-2000. Actually the petitioners in Narinderjit Singh Sahni sought the very same reliefs as granted to the petitioners in V.K. Sharma which was followed in another 52 case P.K. Sharma v. Union of India, but a Two Member bench of the Supreme Court found it difficult to accept the orders passed in V.K. Sharma and P.K. Sharma. Therefore, the Two Member bench referred the petitions in Narinderjit Singh Sahni to a larger bench. The main thrust of the argument before the 3- member bench in Narinderjit Singh Sahni was that the chase given to the very same accused by different police for the same set of offences was an infraction of Article 21. It is relevant to note at this stage that the petitioners before the Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni included the Chairman and Managing Director of a group of companies (about 40 companies) having 50 branches all over the country, which accepted deposits from the public. When the companies failed to repay the deposits and the cheques issued by them bounced, criminal proceedings came to be initiated at various places including Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Chandigarh, Udaipur, Gurhgam, Ghaziabad, Ludhiana, Dehradun and Ambala.
21. Interestingly, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the batch of cases before us are nothing but a repetition of the very same arguments advanced before the Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni. In brief, two contentions were raised before the Supreme Court, namely,
(a) that due to the production warrants issued by various Courts in various States, a situation had arisen whereby the accused can never be released, but had to be shuttled from one place to another on a Bharat Darshan (probably at the cost of the State) and (b) that when all the cases registered against the accused are basically under Section 420 read with Section 120B of the IPC, there cannot be several cases jeopardising the fundamental rights of the accused.
22. Dealing with the alleged infraction of Article 21, the Supreme Court opined in para-54 of its judgment that a deprivation of personal liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law would not amount to an infraction of Article
21. In para-61 of the judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out in Narinderjit Singh Sahni that the proposition that an accused being involved in a large number of criminal cases in different parts of the country, if not able to be released from custody even on getting bail orders in some cases would tantamount to a violation of the right under Article 21 cannot be accepted.
5323. The Supreme Court went on to point out in para-61 that it would be a misplaced sympathy of the Court on white- collared accused persons whose acts of commission and omission had ruined a vast majority of poor citizens of the country. After pointing this out, the Supreme Court recorded its disapproval of the orders passed in V.K. Sharma and P.K. Sharma.
24. More importantly the Supreme Court dealt with the question of consolidation, though not in so many words, in para- 64 of the judgment and held as follows:
As regards the issue of a single offence, we are afraid that the fact situation of the matters under consideration would not permit to lend any credence to such a submission. Each individual deposit agreement shall have to be treated as separate and individual transaction brought about by the allurement of the financial companies, since the parties are different, the amount of deposit is different and also the period for which the deposit was effected. It has all the characteristics of independent transactions and we do not see any compelling reason to hold it otherwise.
25. Having said so in para-64 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held in para-67 of the judgment in Narinderjit Singh Sahni that in regard to the prayer for consolidation the petitioner would be at liberty to approach the High Court in accordance with law.
26. In Kari Choudhary v. Most. Sitadevi, the mother-in-
law of a lady lodged a FIR claiming that a few persons from outside sneaked into the bedroom of her daughter-in-law and murdered her. In the course of investigation into the FIR so lodged, the police found that it was the mother-in-law and her other daughters-in-law, who had conspired to kill the victim. Therefore after sending a closure report in respect of the FIR lodged by the mother-in-law, the police registered a second FIR against the mother-in-law and others. The validity of the second FIR was challenged and when the matter landed up before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court observed as a general proposition that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But the Court nevertheless 54 pointed out in paragraph-11 of the judgment that when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same agency.
27. In State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal another 3-member bench of the Supreme Court was confronted with yet another case of similar nature. In that case, a company by name Golden Forest (India) Limited and its Directors faced prosecution in different Courts for offences under Sections 406, 420, 468, 471 and 120B of the IPC read with Section 7(2) of the Punjab Reforms Act, 1972, on the allegation that the company collected deposits from thousands of members of the public promising to repay the same, but failed to repay on the maturity date. The Director of the Company filed 2 petitions under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court, praying under one for the dropping of the charges and praying in another for the trial of all cases in one Court. The High Court followed the order passed by the Supreme Court in V.K. Sharma and transferred all cases pending in different Courts in the State of Punjab to the Court of a Special Judicial Magistrate. It was this order of the High Court that was challenged by the State of Punjab before the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal. While pointing out that the orders passed in V.K. Sharma were not to be treated as a precedent, even as per its own terms, the Supreme Court held in para-7 as follows:
In the present case, different people have alleged to have been defrauded by the respondent and the company and therefore each offence is of distinct one and cannot be regarded as constituting a single series of facts/transaction.
28. Having said so in para-7, the Supreme Court probably opened a small leverage in para-8 by making an observation that in that case the High Court did not invoke its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to transfer the cases to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It must be pointed out at this stage that the decision of the Two Member Bench of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court either in Narinderjit Singh Sahni or in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal.
5529. In Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, a three Member Bench of the Supreme Court had to consider the correctness of the decision in T.T. Antony, upon a reference made to it by a Two Member Bench. In Upkar Singh, there were two FIRs by rival groups, one group making allegations against the other. What was argued before the Supreme Court in Upkar Singh was that as per the decision in T.T. Antony, a second FIR in the nature of a counter case is not registerable, once a FIR is already registered on the complaint of one party. But the Supreme Court pointed out in Upkar Singh that such a conclusion did not flow out of the decision in T.T. Antony. Therefore in effect, the Supreme Court was concerned in Upkar Singh only with the validity of a counter complaint to a complaint. Upkar Singh was also not a case of successive FIRs by different persons against the same accused.
30. In Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, a Multi State Cooperative Bank failed to repay its depositors. Alleging that the Managing Director and other officers of the Bank had defalcated the funds of the Bank, a criminal complaint was first registered with the local police at the instance of the Bank for the offences under Sections 405, 406, 408, 409 and 120B of the I.P.C. But within a few days, the High Court of Gujarat passed an order in a Public Interest Litigation directing the CBI to conduct an investigation into the deeds and misdeeds of the very same set of officers. Therefore, the CBI registered another FIR within a month of the registration of the first FIR by the local police. Later the CBI also took over the investigation into the first complaint.
31. Thereafter, the Multi State Cooperative Bank filed a series of party-wise complaints for offences under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467 and 471 read with 120B of the IPC. On all these complaints, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ordered an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. The accused filed an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to recall its order on the ground that the CBI is already investigating into the very same set of offences. But the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that what was investigated by the CBI was with respect to specific offences of fraud and misappropriation pertaining to Mumbai Branch and 56 that the offences for which complaints were filed before the Magistrate pertained to the Ahmadabad Branch. The accused challenged those orders before the High Court unsuccessfully and the matter landed up in the Supreme Court. The accused placed heavy reliance upon the decision in T.T. Antony but the Supreme Court held that the case of the accused in Rameshchandra did not fall within the principles enunciated in T.T. Antony. The Court pointed out that the complaints of malfeasance and misfeasance registered later, were not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences nor were they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence.
32. In Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, one FIR came to be registered on the basis of an oral message received on telephone and the second FIR was registered after receipt of grater details. The trial Court convicted a group of persons and the High Court upheld the same. When the matter landed up in Supreme Court, it was argued that the second FIR was unlawful. But the said contention was rejected by the Supreme Court by pointing out that a cryptic and anonymous oral message, which did not in terms clearly specify the commission of a cognizable offence, cannot be treated as First Information Report. In other words the argument relating to the validity of the second FIR was rejected on the reasoning that there was virtually one clear FIR and the other was cryptic and vague.
33. In Pramod Kumar Saxena v. Union of India, what was before the Supreme Court was a writ petition under Article 32 praying for (i) the release of the petitioner on bail in connection with all the cases listed in the annexure, (ii) a direction to all concerned to release the petitioner on bail, in the event of his arrest pursuant to any other criminal case with respect to the same offence and (iii) a direction to the State to evolve a mechanism to ensure the presence of the petitioner in all the cases as well as the speedy disposal of all cases. The grievance of the petitioner in Pramod Kumar Saxena was that he was implicated as an accused in as many as 48 cases in 6 different States for alleged offences under Sections 406, 409 and 420 read with Section 120B of IPC and also under Section 138 of the 57 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and that, therefore, he is not able to come out of the jail despite securing bail.
34. Though the Supreme Court held in Pramod Kumar Saxena that the petitioner deserved some relief, the Court categorically ruled in para-34 of its judgment as follows:
So far as consolidation of cases and trial of all the cases in one Court is concerned, as observed hereinabove, such relief cannot be granted. V.K. Sharma, wherein such relief was granted, has been expressly overruled by Rajesh Syal.
35. It is to be noted that even in Pramod Kumar Saxena, the Supreme Court did not take note of T.T. Antony, but took note of the order passed in V.K. Sharma and the decisions in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal and Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India.
36. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, the validity of the fresh investigation undertaken by the Central Bureau of Investigation after the filing of the charge sheet before the Criminal Court by the local police for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120 B of I.P.C. r/w Sections 13(1)(d)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in connection with a scam relating to the appointment of Panchayat Secretaries, was in question. The Supreme Court held that the second FIR lodged by the CBI was on a wider canvass and that it was lodged after holding a detailed preliminary enquiry. Pointing out the distinction between an offence committed by an individual or two and an offence disclosed in a scandal involving a large number of officers, the Supreme Court cited with the approval, the decision in Ram Lal Narang. In Nirmal Singh, the Supreme Court took note of the distinction made in T.T. Antony to the decision in Ram Lal Narang and thereafter held in paragraph 50 of its decision as follows:
We must also bear in mind the distinction between crime committed by an individual or a group of persons vis-a-vis a scam which means "to get money or property from, another, under false pretences, by gaining the confidence of the victim, also includes; swindle; defraud".58
37. In C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, which came to be known popularly as Dharmapuri bus burning case, two FIRs, one lodged with regard to the attack on a road transport corporation bus and another lodged with regard to the burning of a bus carrying college students on a tour, were taken up together and a consolidated charge sheet was filed. The most interesting aspect of this case is that in all other cases where there were multiple FIRs, the accused sought consolidation or at least challenged the investigation into the second complaint. But in this case, the accused assailed the consolidation of the investigation into two different FIRs on the ground that the crimes under both the FIRs formed part of the same incident in which a mob destroyed the property and indulged in crime. In order to repel the contention of the accused that consolidation was illegal, the Supreme Court invoked the ratio decidendi in T.T. Antony.
38. In Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court took note of (1) Ram Lal Narang; (2) TT Antony; (3) Upkar Singh; (4) Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh; and (5) Nirmal Singh Kahlon and eventually held in paragraph-17 that it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the police officer-in- charge of the police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more cognizable offences and that in such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the diary. After saying so, the Supreme Court summed up the law as follows:
In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward 59 with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.
39. In Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P., the first FIR was registered for an offence under Section 307 I.P.C., immediately after the victim was taken to the hospital with burn injuries. After her death a second FIR came to be registered for an offence under Section 302 IPC. The trial Court convicted the accused for an offence under Section 304 Part-II IPC and the same was confirmed by the Supreme Court. On a further appeal, to the Supreme Court, the validity of the second FIR was questioned on the basis of T.T. Antony. While rejecting the said contention, the Supreme court observed in paragraph-14 of the decision in Chirra Shivraj that there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the First Information Report. But since in Chirra Shivraj, the first FIR was registered on the basis of the information provided by the victim herself and the second FIR (though unnecessary) was registered after her death, the Supreme court pointed out that no prejudice was caused to the accused.
40. In Shiv Shanker Singh v. State of Bihar, two FIRs came to be registered, in relation to a dacoity, allegedly committed in the house of two brothers. The first was at the instance of one brother and another was at the instance of other brother, whose son was killed during the dacoity. The police closed the first FIR as false on the ground that there were property disputes between the brothers. The investigation into the second FIR resulted in the filing of the charge sheet against the brother, who filed the first FIR. The charge sheet filed pursuant to the second FIR was for offences under Sections 302 and 506 IPC etc. The accused filed a protest petition, but the same was rejected. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the first contention of the accused was based upon the decision in T.T. Antony that there cannot be two FIRs in respect of the same incident. But the Supreme Court held in paragraph- 6 its decision that the law does not prohibit registration and investigation of two FIRs in respect of the same incident in case the versions are different and that the test of sameness has to be applied.
6041. In Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., one of the two issues before the Supreme Court was whether a second FIR could have been lodged and entertained, when on similar and identical cause of action and allegations, one FIR had already been registered. After taking note of the decisions in Ram Lal Narang, T.T. Antony, Upkar Singh, Kari choudhary and Babu Bai, the Supreme Court summed up the position in paragraph- 24 of its judgment as follows:
From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident. The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint.
42. In Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle laid down in TT Antony that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the subsequent decisions in Upkar Singh, Babubai, Chirra Shivraj and C. Muniappan, reaffirmed the principle laid down in TT Antony. After referring the ratio laid down in TT Antony, the Supreme Court took up for consideration the second question as to what would constitute the same transaction. The Supreme Court, in Amitbhai, quoted with approval a passage from the decision of the Privy Council in Babulal v. Emperor (AIR 1938 PC 130) to the effect that if several persons conspire to commit offences, and commit overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy (a circumstance which makes the act of one, the act of each and all the conspirators), these acts are committed in the course of the same transaction, which embraces the conspiracy and the acts done under it. The common concert and agreement which constitute the conspiracy, serve to unify the acts done in pursuance of it.61
43. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., the vexed question as to whether a second FIR is permissible, arose out of the breaking out of the communal violence in Gorakhpur on 27.01.2007. A criminal complaint was registered and a charge sheet was also filed later. But after 10 months, a private complaint came to be lodged by an individual before the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging that those who instigated the communal violence on 27.01.2007 conducted a public meeting and made hate speeches spreading fear amongst the members of a particular community. The Magistrate refused to refer the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code, on the ground that a FIR had already been registered into the incidence that followed the meeting. The complainant took the matter to the High Court by way of a revision, and the High Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate to reconsider the matter. The order of remand passed by the High Court was challenged by way of Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. One of the grounds raised before the Supreme Court was that there cannot be two FIRs registered in relation to the same occurrence or different events or incidents two or more but forming part of the same transactions. While dealing with the said issue, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph-15 that it is a settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence.
But the Supreme Court added a note of caution as follows:
However, where the incident is separate;
offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered.
44. Again in paragraph-16 the Supreme Court held in Anju Chaudhary that the question has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. The Court indicated that no 62 straightjacket formula, uniformly applicable to all cases can be laid down and that it will always be a mixed question of law and facts.
45. After taking note of the previous decisions in Ramlal Narang, M. Krishna, TT Antony, Rameshchanra Nandlal Parikh, Vikram and Shiv Shankar Singh, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph-23 of its decision in Anju Chaudhury as follows:
The Court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of sameness to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, or in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed.
46. In fact in paragraph-24 of the decision in Anju Chaudhury, the Supreme Court took the example of the same group of people committing theft in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions and held that even if the incidents were committed in close proximity of time, there could be separate FIRs and institution of even one stating that a number of thefts had been committed, would not debar the registration of another FIR.
47. Dealing with the rule enunciated in Section 220 of the Code, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph- 40 of its decision in Anju Chaudary that though the law recognizes common trial or a common FIR for one series of acts, so connected together as to form the same transaction, the expression same transaction from its very nature, is incapable of exact definition. The Court left it to the common sense and not artificial or technical sense to decide whether or not in the very facts of a case, it can be held to be one transaction. Finally the Court pointed out that for determining whether several offences form part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one 63 continuous action. The Court went on to state that where there is commonality or purpose or design, where there is continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction.
48. In Yanab Sheikh @ Gagu v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles enunciated in Anju Chaudhary and held that a second FIR about the same occurrence between the same persons and with similarity of scope of investigation cannot be registered and by applying the test of similarity it may be hit by the proviso to Section 162 of the Code.
Analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court:
49. Our research has taken us to the above 21 decisions of the Supreme Court where this vexed question came up for consideration again and again. The summary that we have given above under the caption Evolution of the Law, can also be given in a capsule in the form of a tabular column so that the distinction that the Supreme Court drew between different types/categories of case could be easily appreciated.
S.NO Decision The dispute arose out of Whether the Second (2nd) FIR or Multiple FIRs filed are Valid or Invalid
1. Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Valid Administration) and Om Prakash Narang v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 2 SCC 322 Arose out of theft of two sandstone pillars of great antiquity.
2. M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (1999) Valid 3 SCC 247 Arose out of amassing wealth disproportionate to ones source of income.
3. V.K. Sharma v. Union of India, (2000) 9 (White-Collar Crime) Valid SCC 449 Arose out of swindling a large (Multiple FIRs) number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date.
4. Mohan Bhaitha v. State of Bihar, (2001) Note : - The question involved 4 SCC 350 Arose out of a dowry death. here is not concerned about 64 whether there can be more FIRs than one but whether there can be more trials than one.
Held : - Offences more than one committed by the same persons could be tried at one trial, if they can be held to be in one series of facts so as to form the same transaction.
5. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 Third (3rd) FIR Invalid.
SCC 181 Arose out of police firing resulting into deaths of few people and injuries to a large number of people.
6. Narinderjit Singh Shani v. Union of Valid (Multiple FIRs) India, (2002) 2 SCC 210 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date.
7. Kari Chaudhary v. Most. Sita Valid Devi, (2002) 1 SCC 714 Arose out of a murder case.
8. State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal, (2002) 8 (White-Collar Crime) Valid SCC 158 Arose out of swindling of a large (Multiple FIRs) number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date.
9. Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 Valid SCC 292 Arose out of an attempt to murder and house-trespass cases
10. Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State Valid (Multiple FIRs) of Gujarat (2006) 1 SCC 732 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date.
11. Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) Valid 12 SCC 332 Arose out of a murder case.
12. Pramod Kumar Saxena v. Union of Valid (Multiple FIRs) India, (2008) 9 SCC 685 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date.
13. Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Valid 65 Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 Arose out of scandal involving selection of Panchayat Secretaries.
14. C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Investigation of the Second FIR Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 Arose out of was clubbed with the setting fire to a university bus and investigation of the First FIR. In several public buses. essence, two complaints/FIRs are clubbed together and investigated jointly.
15. Bahubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 Invalid SCC 254 Arose out of altercation that took place between members of the two communities.
16. Chirra Shivraj v. Sate of AP, (2010) 14 Second F.I.R. held Valid because SCC 444 Arose out of an attempt to SHO made a mistake by recording murder case. information as a fresh F.I.R. and that this mistake should not make the case of prosecution weak especially when no prejudice had been caused.
17. Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Valid Bihar, (2012) 1 SCC 130 Arose out of dacoity and murder.
18. Surender Kaushik v. State of UP, (2013) Invalid 5 SCC 148 Arose out of fake and fraudulent documents prepared by the accused persons.
19. Amitbhai Anilchandra Invalid Shah v. CBI, (2013) 6 SCC 348 Arose out of murder cases
20. Anju Chowdry v. State of UP, (2013) 6 Valid SCC 384 Arose out of a hate speech.
21. Yanab Sheikh@gagu v. State of West Invalid Bengal, (2013) 6 SCC 428 Arose out of a murder case.
Conclusion to be drawn:
50. From the above table, it could be seen that the cases in which the validity of multiple FIRs was raised, fell at lease into six categories, such as (1) murder/attempt to murder; (2) mob violence leading to destruction of property, murder and/or encounter; (3) theft/dacoity; (4) abuse of official position, adoption of corrupt practices and amassing of wealth; (5) hate 66 speech; and (6) companies receiving deposits from innumerable persons and there after defaulting in repayment. Out of the 21 cases listed above, 5 cases alone relate to non-repayment of deposit money by finance companies. In all these five cases where innumerable complaints were lodged by depositors, the Supreme Court did not choose to interfere. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony on which heavy reliance is placed by the counsel for the petitioners cannot go to the rescue of the petitioners.
51. Despite the fact that the decision of the Two Member bench in T.T. Antony was not taken note of in (i) Narinderjit Singh Sahni, (ii) State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal and (iii) Pramod Kumar Saxena, it is clear that in all those 3 decisions, the Supreme Court was concerned with the cases of persons who collected money from innumerable persons but failed to repay the same. The decision in T.T. Antony arose out of offences relating to Law and Order, Public Order and the Police Firing.
52. When the offences alleged against the writ petitioners in the present batch of cases relate to collection of deposits and failure to repay, the ratio decidendi in (i) Narinderjit Singh Sahni, (ii) Rajesh Syal and (iii) Pramod Kumar Saxena alone would apply and not the ratio in T.T. Antony.
Two High Court Decisions.
53. Having disposed of the contention revolving around T.T. Antony, let us now take up for consideration, the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Akbaruddin Owaisi v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. The said decision arose out of two hate speeches allegedly delivered by the writ petitioner, one at Nizamabad on 08-12-2012 and another at Nirmal on 22-12-2012. Interestingly, two FIRs came to be registered in respect of the speech delivered at Nizamabad on 08-12-2012, one by the Police themselves at Nizamabad and another in the Osmania University Police Station in Hyderabad on a private complaint lodged by an individual which was referred to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The petitioner before the learned single Judge in Akbaruddin Owaisi did not attack the FIR registered in Nirmal, but confined his attack only to the registration of two FIRs one at Nizamabad and another at 67 Hyderabad in respect of the very same speech delivered at Nizamabad.
54. While allowing the writ petition in part and directing the transfer of investigation in both the FIRs to the CID, the learned Judge took note of two decisions, relating to hate speeches, one of the Delhi High Court in Maqbool Fida Husain v. Raj Kumar Pandey of the Supreme Court in S. Khushbu v. Kanniammal. While the case before the Delhi High Court related to a famous painter against whom several criminal complaints came to be registered on the ground that his paintings denigrated Hindu Gods, the case in S. Khushbu related to a speech made by an actor which was taken exception to by chauvinists in several parts of the State of Tamil Nadu leading to the registration of multiple FIRs.
55. The decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi arose out of a single cause of action, if we may borrow the said expression from the Civil Law. A single speech propagated or published or televised or publicised in different places cannot result in the prosecution of the individual in different Courts since the transmission of a single message cannot tantamount to different acts of crime. We must also point out at this stage that while the learned Judge, in his decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi, took note of T.T. Antony, S. Khushbu and M.F. Hussein, he did not take note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni, Rajesh Syal and Pramod Kumar Saxena. Therefore, we do not think that the decision rendered in a case relating to a single act of crime committed by an individual, which, when propagated or publicised, is taken advantage of by several individuals to witch-hunt the person, cannot apply to a case where innumerable persons are alleged to have been cheated at different places at different points of time. To say that the offences committed against all those persons are punishable under the very same provisions and that therefore there cannot be multiple FIRs would be equivalent to saying that a person committing a series of thefts in several places cannot be made to face separate prosecutions in respect of each act of theft committed against different individuals at different points of time.
56. Unfortunately, the decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Narinderjit Singh Sahani (2) Rajesh Syal and (3) Promod Kumar Saxena were not cited before the learned Judge in 68 Akbaruddin Owaisi. As a consequence, the learned Judge opined in Paragraph-21 of his decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi that the declaration of law in TT Antony had not been diluted in any subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court even though exceptions were carved out.
57. But, nevertheless the learned Judge enlisted in Akbaruddin Owaisi at least 12 different types of cases where the rule that any further complaint against the same accused for the same incident, subsequent to the registration of a case is prohibited under the Code, will not apply. It will be useful to extract the relevant paragraph-21 of the decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi as follows : The declaration of law, in T.T. Antony, has not been diluted in any subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court even though exceptions have been carved out. (Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah). The rule, that any further complaint against the same accused for the same incident, subsequent to the registration of a case is prohibited under the Cr.P.C, will not apply:--
(i). in case the FIRs are not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences nor are they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence as the one alleged in the first FIR. (Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, 2006 (3) SCJ 242 - (2006) 1 SCC 732).
(ii). where the incident is separate and the offences are similar or different, or where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first. (Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2013 (5) SCJ 825 : (2013) Cri.L.J. 776 (SC).
(iii). where several distinct offences/incidents have been reported. In such a case the investigating agency should issue separate FIRs under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. (Jagathi Publications Ltd. Rep. by Y. Eshwara Prasad Reddy v. Central Bureau of 69 Investigation : 2012 (2) ALT (Crl) 285 (A.P.) : 2012 (2) ALD (Cri) 762).
(iv). to cryptic, anonymous or oral messages which do not clearly specify a cognizable offence and cannot be treated as an FIR. No exception can be taken if, upon receipt of proper information, another detailed FIR is recorded, and the detailed FIR is treated as the FIR. (Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1970) 2 SCC 113; Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (1) ALT (crl.) 179 (SC) : 2008 (1) SCJ 227 = (2007) 12 SCC 332).
(v). where, for an earlier period, there was an FIR which was duly investigated into and culminated in a final report which was accepted by a Competent Court. (M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka ((1999) 3 SCC 247 : AIR 1999 SC 1765).
(vi). where the earlier complaint was decided on insufficient material or was passed without understanding the nature of the complaint, or where complete facts could not be placed before the court and the applicant came to know of certain facts after the disposal of the first complaint. In such cases the test of full consideration of the complaints on merits must be applied. (Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2012 (1) ALT (crl.) 383 (SC) : 2012 (2) SCJ 291 = (2012) 1 SCC 130).
(vii). in cases where there are different versions, they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, and when new discovery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage and can also surface in another proceeding. (Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab : (2009) 1 SCC 441; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat : (2010) 12 SCC
254).
(viii). even in cases where the first complaint is registered and investigation initiated, it is possible to file a further complaint based on the material 70 gathered during the course of investigation. (Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash ((2004) 13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC 4320 : 2005 (1) ALT 22 (DN SC); Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979 CriLJ 1346) : (1979) 2 SCC 322).
(ix). where two FIRs are lodged in respect of the same incident having materially different allegations of commission of different cognizable offences. (T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001 Cri LJ 3329 : (2001) 6 SCC 181; Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash ((2004) 13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC 4320) = 2005 (1) ALT 22 (DN SC).
(x). to a counter claim by the accused in the first complaint, or on his behalf, alleging a different version of the said incident. In case there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, it would be treated as two different FIRs and investigation can be carried under both of them by the same investigating agency. (Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004) 13 SCC 292; Kari Choudhary v. Most. Sita Devi : 2002 (1) ALT (Crl.) 198 (SC) = (2002) 1 SCC 714 : AIR 2002 SC 441); Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P (2008 Cri LJ 4668 (Allahabad High Court)).
(xi). where the FIRs are regarding independent and distinct offences, registration of a subsequent FIR cannot be prohibited on the ground that some other FIR had been filed against the petitioner in respect of other allegations made against him. (Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 1 SCC 732).
(xii). in cases where the same group of people commit offences in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions. Even if these incidents are committed in close proximity of time, there can be separate FIRs. (Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2013 (5) SCJ 825 : (2013) Cri.L.J. 776).
58. It may be of interest to note that in Akbaruddin Owaisi a forceful argument was made against the prohibition of a second FIR on the ground that if the information provided by 71 the de facto complainants in the second or subsequent FIRs are treated only as a statements under Section 162 of the Code, it may be possible for the State to withdraw the prosecution without the knowledge or objection from the victim, leaving the victim in the lurch. But, the said argument was rejected by the learned Judge in Akbaruddin Owaisi in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the report on the ground that there is no prohibition in the law even for an informant or complainant or an initiator of criminal prosecution to object to the withdrawal of a complaint by the State."
(Emphasis supplied) The Division Bench considers the entire spectrum of the law right from RAM LAL NARANG, T.T. ANTONY, AMITBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHAH and all other judgments on the issue and at paragraph 57 while drawing up certain conclusions at sub-para (xii) supra holds that in cases where the same group of people commit offences in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions, even if the incidents are committed in close proximity of time, there can be separate FIRs.
23. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court as quoted hereinabove, what would unmistakably emerge is that it is not a law that there can never be multiple FIRs. Multiple FIRs cannot be registered against individual accused by the very same complainant or different accused on the very same incident.
72The case at hand forms a distinction from those well settled principle of law that multiple FIRs would be hit by the doctrine of sameness. This is a case of rioting. Rioting happens at two different jurisdictions - one within the jurisdiction of DJ Halli Police Station and the other in the jurisdiction of KG Halli Police Station.
The incidents of violence are different as narrated in those respective complaints. The complainants may be policemen but they are different. Different complainants have narrated different incidents, although those incidents have triggered from a solitary fact. Therefore, what would become applicable is the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of ANJU CHAUDHURY and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, considers all the judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and answers the issues against the accused by holding that multiple FIRs are permissible.
24. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/NIA would also sound acceptance as Section 220 of the Cr.P.C. permits conduct of trial for more than one offence. Section 220 CrPC reads as follow:-
73"220. Trial for more than one offence.--(1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.
(2) When a person charged with one or more offences of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of property as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 212 or in sub-
section (1) of Section 219, is accused of committing, for the purpose of facilitating or concealing the commission of that offence or those offences, one or more offences of falsification of accounts, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.
(3) If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of such offences.
(4) If several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when combined, and for any offence constituted by any one, or more, of such acts.
(5) Nothing contained in this section shall affect Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
25. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that this would result in multiple trials and would defeat the right of the petitioners. The Apex Court in the case of SURENDER KAUSHIK AND OTHERES v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND 74 OTHERS9 considering multiple crimes registered and also considering the judgments in the case of T.T.ANTONY and BABUBHAI holds that the solution is to be before the concerned Court. It is for the concerned Court to hold a common trial. Merely because there are multiple charge sheets filed and would result in multiple trials, the charge sheets would not get vitiated. The Apex Court has held as follows:
"25. In the case at hand, the appellants lodged FIR No. 274 of 2012 against four accused persons alleging that they had prepared fake and fraudulent documents. The second FIR came to be registered on the basis of the direction issued by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in exercise of power under Section 156(3) of the Code at the instance of another person alleging, inter alia, that he was neither present in the meetings nor had he signed any of the resolutions of the meetings and the accused persons, five in number, including Appellant 1 herein, had fabricated documents and filed the same before the competent authority. FIR No. 442 of 2012 (which gave rise to Crime No. 491 of 2012) was registered because of an order passed by the learned Magistrate. Be it noted, the complaint was filed by another member of the governing body of the Society and the allegation was that the accused persons, twelve in number, had entered into a conspiracy and prepared forged documents relating to the meetings held on different dates. There was allegation of fabrication of the signatures of the members and filing of forged documents before the Registrar of Societies with the common intention to grab the property/funds of the Society. If the involvement of the number of accused persons and the nature of the allegations are scrutinised, it becomes crystal clear that every FIR has a different spectrum. The allegations made are distinct and separate.9
(2013) 5 SCC 148 75 It may be regarded as a counter-complaint and cannot be stated that an effort has been made to improve the allegations that find place in the first FIR. It is well-nigh impossible to say that the principle of sameness gets attracted. We are inclined to think so, for if the said principle is made applicable to the case at hand and the investigation is scuttled by quashing the FIRs, the complainants in the other two FIRs would be deprived of justice. The appellants have lodged the FIR making the allegations against certain persons, but that does not debar the other aggrieved persons to move the court for direction of registration of an FIR as there have been other accused persons including the complainant in the first FIR involved in the forgery and fabrication of documents and getting benefits from the statutory authority. In the ultimate eventuate, how the trial would commence and be concluded is up to the court concerned.
The appellants or any of the other complainants or the accused persons may move the appropriate court for a trial in one court. That is another aspect altogether. But to say that it is a second FIR relating to the same cause of action and the same incident and there is sameness of occurrence and an attempt has been made to improvise the case is not correct. Hence, we conclude and hold that the submission that the FIR lodged by the fourth respondent is a second FIR and is, therefore, liable to be quashed, does not merit acceptance."
(Emphasis supplied) Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the conduct of multiple trials would itself vitiate the proceedings, again sans countenanced.
26. The other submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioners have been languishing in jail for the 76 last 4 years and are not able to get bail in the light of offences alleged under the NIA and, therefore there should be a direction for speedy trial at least. This submission would merit acceptance.
Though there cannot be a direction to the concerned Court to conclude the trial within a time frame, the Court should also consider that right to speedy trial is fundamental right or a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as is held by the Apex Court in plethora of cases. Therefore, it is necessary for the court to expedite the trial and for the petitioners to cooperate with the trial as the case whoever it is and the crime whatever it is they are entitled to speedy trial.
27. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The challenge to the registration of multiple FIRs, stands rejected.
(ii) The concerned Court is at liberty to conduct a common trial on all the charge sheets.77
(iii) The concerned Court shall endeavour to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible.
Sd/-
JUDGE bkp