Allahabad High Court
Fattan Singh vs Union Of India And Another on 26 March, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(3)AWC2115
Author: Kamal Kishore
Bench: Kamal Kishore
JUDGMENT Kamal Kishore, J.
1. This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22.5.1978 passed by Sri K. D. Shahi, the then learned IVth Additional District Judge. Lucknow confirming the Judgment and decree dated 21.4.1975 passed by Munsif South. Lucknow in Regular Suit No. 244 of 1970.
2. The brief facts of the present case are that the plaintiff-appellant has filed a suit for declaration that the removal order dated 1/2-12.1966 passed by the defendant No. 2 Assistant Security Officer. R. P. F.. Alambagh, Lucknow be declared null and void and the plaintiff be declared to be deemed in service. Besides this relief, the plaintiff-appellant has also prayed for recovery of Rs. 1,500 as arrears of salary and other allowances. The trial court as well as the first appellate court have decided the suit and the first appeal respectively against the plaintiff who was Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellant has preferred this second appeal.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records.
5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that no preliminary enquiry has been held by the respondents in this case as per the requirement of Regulation 19 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1966. No mode has been provided by which the preliminary enquiry may be conducted. The preliminary enquiry is Instituted for the satisfaction of the department for seeing as to whether a prima facie case is made out against the delinquent official or not. In the instant case, theft was committed in the railway wagon sometime during the month of April. 1965. The enquiry papers have been filed before the Courts below. Ext. A-2 is the report dated 1.5.1966 submitted by the A. S. I., Railway Protection Force to the Assistant Security Officer. The report shows the details regarding the incident of theft, etc. Paper Nos. Ga-48 and Ga-4 are further reports submitted by the A. S. I. and it is after these reports were submitted that the charge-sheet paper No. Ga-52 was made on 14.1.1966. The regulation does not provide any specific mode for conducting the preliminary enquiry and I agree with the findings of the Court below that substantial compliance of Rule 19 has been made by these fact finding reports of the A. S. I.
6. It has been further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that while issuing show cause notice, the final punishment has been suggested and this has vitiated the present proceedings. The aforesaid show cause notice is dated 1.11.1966 issued by Sri Avadhesh Kumar, Assistant Security Officer. Northern Railway. The Assistant Security Officer has only given an opinion that justice shall be made only by removing the plaintiff-appellant from service for which a show cause notice was issued. No final judgment was given on 1.11.1966 that the aforesaid punishment has been imposed on the delinquent official, i.e., the plaintiff-appellant. The theft was admittedly committed. The plaintiff-appellant was attending the said wagon and it seems quite probable that plaintiff-appellant was responsible for the theft in question. It has been urged that the plaintiff-appellant has not been supplied with the copies of all the relevant documents. There is no mention as to what important documents remained to be supplied to the plaintiff-appellant. In the departmental proceedings also, the plaintiff-appellant was assisted by a helper and was given full opportunity to defend himself. Under these circumstances. I find that no prejudice has been caused to the plaintiff-appellant as alleged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant.
7. Lastly, it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that Assistant Security Officer is not the appointing authority. Therefore, he has got no jurisdiction to remove the plaintiff-appellant from service. This argument advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is also not tenable. In Schedule I of R. P. P. Rules, the Assistant Security Officer has been mentioned as disciplinary authority for Rakshak for taking disciplinary action and passing orders of their removal, etc.
8. A bare reading of the Act, particularly Section 6, will show that the Act contemplates that the "Appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer" who is supposed to exercise powers in accordance with the rules made under the Act. The proviso to Rule 6 contemplates other authorities being authorised for making the appointment as may be delegated to such officers by the Chief Security Officer. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the Act contemplates appointment of members of the Force not only by the Chief Security Officer but also by others.. The question, therefore, arises is what is the meaning of the expression "appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer"? The expression "rest" in this section conveys the idea of overall control of appointment resting with the Chief Security Officer subject to the provisions of the Rules. As I have stated earlier, Section 6 of the Act contemplates appointment of the members of the Force by such authorities as may be authorised. The proviso to Section 6 contemplates specifically written order of delegation by the Chief Security Officer but this does not derogate from the power of the rule making authority to confer the said power.
9. In a case of like nature where dismissal of the employee of R. P. F. was challenged, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the ruling in Union of India and others v. Rajendra Singh, 1999 (1) UPLBEC 60, that the power of making appointment and removal of the members of Railway Protection Force is not confined to Chief Security Officer and such power can be exercised by other officers also.
10. In view of the aforesaid ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. I find that this second appeal is also liable to be dismissed.
The appeal is hereby dismissed. Costs easy.