Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Sampangi Ramayya vs S.Narayanappa . on 9 September, 2014
Bench: Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, Prafulla Chandra Pant
ITEM NO.6 COURT NO.5 SECTION XII
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 29814/2011
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 15/03/2011
in SA No. 674/2001 passed by the High Court Of Madras)
SAMPANGI RAMAYYA Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
S.NARAYANAPPA & ORS. Respondent(s)
(with interim relief and office report)
Date : 09/09/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAFULLA CHANDRA PANT
For Petitioner(s)
Mr. Veeranjaneyulu K.L.N.V., Adv.
Mr. Jogy Scaria,Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. G. Balaji, Adv.
Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, Adv.
M/s. Mahalakshmi Balaji & Co.,Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal stands disposed of in terms of signed order.
(Neeta) (Usha Sharma) Sr. P.A. COURT MASTER (Signed order is placed on the file) Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Neeta Sapra Date: 2014.09.20 12:30:52 IST Reason: 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9025 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP(C)No. 29814 of 2011) SAMPANGI RAMAYYA Petitioner(s) VERSUS S.NARAYANAPPA & ORS. Respondent(s) O R D E R Leave granted.
This appeal has been preferred by plaintiff-appellant against the judgment and decree dated 15th March, 2011 passed by High Court of Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal No. 674 of 2001. By the Impugned judgment, the High Court reversed the finding of the appellate court, held that there was no willingness on the part of the plaintiff-appellant and affirmed the order passed by the trial court.
The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
The plaintiff-appellant entered into an agreement for purchase of suit property admeasuring 2 acres for a sum of Rs.35,000/- on 5th July, 1994. He paid consideration amount of Rs.28,000/- in advance. The sale was to be completed within one year. The plaintiff-appellant noticed that the defendant-landlord was looking for a third party to sell the property hence, he sent a notice dated 2nd December, 1994 for execution of the sale on 6 th December, 1994 at the Registrar’s office. As per the plaintiff-appellant, later on he came to know that the 2 defendant-landlord sold the property to the third defendant on 5 th December, 1994.
The trial court dismissed the Suit on appreciation of evidence and held that there is a discrepancy in the testimony of the plaintiff-appellant with regard to the sale deed and further as claimed by the plaintiff the same ink was not used in writing and signing the documents. The trial court further held that there was no willingness on the part of the plaintiff-appellant. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellant filed the appeal. The learned Principal District Judge, Dharmapuri at Krishnagiri by judgment dated 31st January, 2001 allowed the appeal being A.S.No.52 of 1999 holding that the difference of ink cannot be the reason for declaring the agreement to sell invalid and that the plaintiff-appellant gave notice to the defendant showing his willingness to perform the contract.
The High Court in the Second Appeal by impugned judgment and decree dated 15th March, 2011 framed following substantial questions of law:
"1. Whether the lower appellate court is justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance when the plaintiff put a false case of possession?
2. Whether the lower appellate court is right in displacing the burden of proof upon the appellant, when it is the obligation of the plaintiff to prove and establish the genuineness?
3. Whether the courts below are right in accepting Ex.A1 of having been executed on 5.7.94 when the documentary proof under Ex.A6 is otherwise?
4. Whether the lower appellate court should not have applied the principles under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and dismiss the suit assuming the agreement is true?3
5. When the plaintiff had pleaded the performance of the contract as 6 months on 5.7.1994 and when sufficient time is available for performance and when a notice is issued on 2.12.94 should not the courts below come to a conclusion that the document under Ex.A1 cannot be true?
6. When there is contradiction as regards the period by which the agreement should be implemented or enforced, the lower appellate court is right in coming to a conclusion that the time for performance is one year?
7. Whether the courts below ought not to have held that the appellant being a bona fide purchaser of value and not having knowledge of agreement is entitled to protection under the provision of Specific Relief Act."
and held that plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he was willing to perform the contract.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties on 7 th July, 2014 this Court passed the following order:
“Learned counsel for the respondents is allowed two weeks’ time to take instructions as to why this court will not direct the defendants to pay back the sale consideration in favour of the petitioner with reasonable interest.
Post the matter after three weeks.” In spite of the notice, respondent nos. 2 and 3-original owners have not appeared. On instruction, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 submits that respondent no. 1 is ready to pay back the consideration amount in favour of the plaintiff-appellant with reasonable interest as may be ordered by this Court. Respondent no. 1 will pay on behalf of the original owners.
Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant argued the case on merits and referring to the notice dated 2 nd December, 1994 submits that appellate court rightly held that there was willingness on the part of the plaintiff-appellant. It was 4 further contended that the plaintiff-appellant is ready to pay back the consideration amount to respondent no. 1 with reasonable interest.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Taking into consideration the fact that the original owners though executed the agreement with the plaintiff-appellant on 5th March, 1994 but subsequently sold the property in favour of defendant no.3-respondent no. 1 by sale deed dated 5 th December, 1994 i.e. prior to the filing of the suit. Defendant no.3-Respondent no.1 had no information about the earlier contract. Now about 20 years have passed, defendant no.3-respondent no. 1 is in possession of the suit property. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the performance of contract would involve hardship on the part of defendant no.3-respondent no.1 which he did not foresee, whereas non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff-appellant, instead of decreeing the suit for specific performance, we grant compensation in favour of the plaintiff-appellant which defendant no.3-respondent no.1 has agreed to pay. We, accordingly, direct the defendant no.3-respondent no.1-(S.NARAYANAPPA) to pay the plaintiff-appellant lump sum amount of Rs.3 lacs (Rupees Three Lakhs only) within two months, failing which the defendant no.3-respondent no.1 shall pay interest @ 9% from the date of this 5 judgment. The judgment and decree dated 15 th March, 2011 stands modified to the extent above.
The appeal stands disposed of with aforesaid observations.
………………………………………………………………………J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
………………………………………………………………………J.
NEW DELHI; (PRAFULLA CHANDRA PANT)
SEPTEMBER 09, 2014