National Green Tribunal
Om Prakash Yadav vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 May, 2026
Item No.07
BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
CENTRAL ZONE BENCH, BHOPAL
(THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING (WITH HYBRID OPTION)
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ)
IN THE MATTER OF:
OM PRAKASH YADAV,
S/O SHRI B.P. YADAV,
AGE 41 years,
R/o. Vill- Bhuruara, Uchehra,
District-Satna (MP) ..... Appellant
Versus
1. State of Madhya Pradesh,
Through Principal Secretary Mining,
State of M.P., Paryawas Bhawan,
Bock "A" IInd Floor, Jail Road,
Bhopal (MP) Respondent No.01
2. The District Collector,
Office of The Collector, Satna (MP) Respondent No.02
3. Divisional Forest officer,
Forest Division, Civil Lines, Satna, Respondent No.03
District Satna
4. State Environment Impact
Assessment Authority (SEIAA),
Paryavaran Parisar, E-5, Arera Respondent No.04
Colony, Bhopal (MP)
5. SH. Gorelal Tamkar,
S/O SH. Lakmi Tamkar,
R/o Gouri Shankar Mandir Ke Pass,
Vill- Unchehra Dist. Satna MP Respondent No.05
COUNSELS FOR APPELLANT(S):
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Tripathi, Adv.
1
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENT(S):
Mr. Sachin K. Verma, Adv. with Ms. Harshita Tejwani, Adv. for MPSEIAA
Mr. Abhinmanyu Shrivastava, Adv. for R-5
Mr. Prashant M. Harne, Adv, for State of MP
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEO KUMAR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE MR. SUDHIR KUMAR CHATURVEDI, EXPERT MEMBER
Date of completion of hearing and reserving of order : 07.05.2026
Date of uploading of order on website : 19.05.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The State Environment Impact Assessment Authority, SEIAA, Madhya Pradesh vide order dated 21.03.2022 considered the proposal of Mr. Om Prakash Yadav, Appellant, with regard to the grant of Environmental Clearance (EC) in the Matter No.6662/2020 and passed an order as follows:-
"विषयः -प्रकरण कं. 6662/2020 पररयोजना प्रस्तािक की ओमप्रकाश यादि, वनिासी- ग्राम वपपरा, तहसील उन्छे रा, वजला सतना (म.प्र.) द्वारा फशी पत्थर खदान (ओपनकास्ट सेमी मैकेनाइज्ड विवि,) उत्पादन क्षमता 2970 घनमीटर प्रवतिषष रकिा 1.759 हेक्टेयर, खसरा कं. 132/1क2, ग्राम वपपरा, तहसील-उन्छे रा, वजला सतना (म.प्र.) राज्य स्तरीय पयाष िरण समाघात वनिाष रण प्राविकरण की 711 िीं बैठक वदनांक 09.03.2022 को वनम्नानुसार वनणषय वलया गया-
The case was discussed in 681 SEIAA meeting dated 04-08-2021 and it was recorded that the EC was granted in 588th SEIAA meeting dtd 12-12-2019 and EC issued to PP vide Letter No. 3824 dated 07- 01-2020.
Shri Gorelal Tamrakar has complaint and submitted with all supporting documents against the decision of SEIAA vide application dated 18.03.2020 for review as the Case No. STA/16/36 has been 2 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. rejected by DEIAA vide letter No. 2869/Khanji/2017 dated 26.09.17 due to the objection raised by Forest Dept, Satna vide their letter No. 6345 dtd 01-08-2016 stating that the forest route has been utilized for transportation. DFO, Satna vide their letter No. 1284 dated 01-02- 2020 and EC issued to Shri Omprakash Yadav for the Khasra No. 132/1 ka/1 area 1.759 ha village Pipra, Tehsil Unchehra, District Satna.
After reviewing the documents submitted by Shri Gorelal Tamrakar it appears that Shri Omprakash Yadav has submitted false NOC of DFO, Satna vide their letter No. 11111 dtd 04-06-2016, which is a gross violation of regulatory ethics and attract the following provision of EIA notification 2006, para "8" (vi) Describe concealment and/or submission false misbeneficin information or data which is material to screening or scoping or approval or decision on the application shall make the appreciation decide for rejection and cancellation of prior environmental clearance granted on that basis Rejection of an application or cancellation of a prior environmental clearance already granted so such granted shall be decided by the regulatory authority, after giving a personnel hearing to the applicant, and following the principles of material of natural justice. After detailed discussions, it is decided that the prior ED issued to PP vide letter no. 3824-25/SEIAA/20 dated 07-01-2020 to Shri Omprakash yadav for Khasra No. 132/1 kall area 1-759 ha village pipra, Tehsil Unchehra, District Satna shall be kept in abeyance, PP may be called for clarification in the next meeting of SEIAA.
PP vide letter dated 27.10.21 has requested to remove the abeyance on prior environmental clearance issue to him, and also requested to grant permission to appear the mine.
After detailed discussions, it is decided to call PP for submission of false information in the name of DFO, and factual status of the earlier EC issued by DEIAA, Satna. It is also decided to call DFO, Satna for presenting all NOCs provided by DFO office, Satna in the forthcoming meeting of SELAA.
संजय स्तरीय पयाषिरण समाघात वनिाष रण प्राविकरण द्वारा विस्तृत चचाष एिं विचार विमशष उपरां त सिष सम्मवत से वनणषय वलया गया वक प्राविकरण द्वारा जारी पयाष िरण स्वीकृवत पत्र कं. 2824 वदनां क 07. 01.2020 को वनरस्त वकया जाये। पररयोजना प्रस्तािक ि सिे संबंवितों को सूवचत वकया जाये।3
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
उपरोक्त वनणषय अनुसार आपका प्रकरण वनरस्त वकया जाता है ।"
2. Aggrieved by the order, the Appellant has filed this appeal on 02.02.2026. Submissions of the Appellant are that without any material on record and without any basis the SEIAA has cancelled the Environmental Clearance on the basis of previous reports mentioning the complaint in the communication dated 18.08.2021 and 20.12.2021 regarding submission of fake Environmental Clearance to counter Appellant No.04 and, in fact, all these objections were considered as specified in the communication dated 12.08.2016. It is also submitted that the Appellant was mining for minor mineral stone in an area in Village-Pipra, Tehsil-Unchehra, District-Satna, and never transported its produce through forest land.
3. It is further submitted that the Appellant's Mine Land No. 132/1K/2, measuring 1.965 hectares, adjoins Land No. 148 and 150, registered in the name of the Madhya Pradesh government. The appellant has been transporting its goods on the public road constructed under the Prime Minister's Road Scheme. This violation did not violate any forest or environmental laws, and neither has any damage to the forest or environment been caused, nor is it likely to be.
4. In reply to the above contention, learned Counsel for the SEIAA has argued that vide letter dated 18.08.2021, the SEIAA has communicated to the Appellant that due to deliberate, concealment and submission of false or misleading information, the previous EC granted has been kept in abeyance and has been reserved for consideration in the next meeting. The matter was raised before Hon'ble the High Court, Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by filing the 4 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Writ Petition No. 4208 of 2023. The Hon'ble the Court discussed the matter and found that petitioner was called upon by the authorities before taking action and before passing the final order, suspension was done. So, there is substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice.
5. Further submissions of the learned Counsel for the SEIAA are that the Appellant submitted online EC application to the Respondent No.4 MPSEIAA, which was duly forwarded to MPSEAC for its appraisal, in its 408th meeting dated 27.11.2019 the MPSEAC recommended the to grant/issue environmental clearance in favour of the Appellant. In pursuance of the recommendation by MPSEAC the answering respondent no. 4 MPSEIAA in its 588th meeting dated 12.12.2019 granted EC in favour of the Appellant relying upon the conditional NOC issued by the Divisional Forest Officer Satna vide letter No. 11611 dated 04.11.2010 and the GPS location and spot map prepared by Sub- Divisional Officer (Forest) Satna vide letter no. 1111 dated 04.06.2016. The Respondent No.4/MPSEIAA out of the blue was shocked and surprised after the perusal of the letter dated 01.02.2020 received from Divisional Forest Officer Satna inter-alia stating that the Appellant had obtained the mining quarry of flag stone by concealment of actual facts and the mineral transportation has to be carried out through forest area therefore the forest department has not consented to the sanction of the operation of which quarry lease, since 2015 the appellant had made repeated efforts to obtain EC from the then District Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority (In Short, DEIAA) which were refused, the DEIAA had refused the proposal/application for EC made by the appellant on 26.09.2017 on the ground of the objections made by the 5 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. DFO Satna in view of the fact that the forest area is going to be utilized for transportation which is prohibited as per Forest (Conservation) Act 1980 and the subjective area comes within the prohibited forest range.
6. It is further argued that the Appellant applied to obtain EC from MPSEIAA after the gap of two years and did not disclose the latest rejection/refusal of DEIAA and the objection of forest department and obtained the EC on the basis of old documents. The EC came to the notice of the forest department therefore the forest department is bringing all the relevant facts to the knowledge of respondent no. 4 for revocation of EC. Subsequently, a complaint was made by Shri Gorelal Tamrakar before the answering respondent No. 4 MPSEIAA vide its letter dated 18.03.2020 wherein he requested to review of the EC granted as the appellant while applying the EC had concealed the material information pertaining to the fact that DEIAA had cancelled/rejected the proposal for EC of the appellant on 26.09.2017 on the ground of the objections made by the DFO Satna thereby stating that the forest area is going to be utilized for transportation which is prohibited as per Forest (Conservation) Act 1980 and the subjective area comes within the prohibited forest range, thus requested to cancel the EC.
7. Further, it is submitted that the MoEF&CC vide its letter dated 16.03.2020 informed the answering respondent No. 4 MPSEIAA about the complaint received by them on 30.01.2020 with regard to the EC granted on 07.01.2020 in favour of the appellant and requested them to take necessary action. The relevant portion of the letter dated 16.03.2020 is quoted as under:-
6
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
"2.0 The said complaint alleges that EC was obtained by the project proponent through discrepancy of the factual/background information and by erroneous method. The following are alleged in the complaint:
i. The Flag Stone Quarry is located at khasra no.132/1KA2 which is near to residential area Khasra no. 132/IKA1.
ii. The area near to mining approved land, khasra no. 48, wherein constructed well is the only source of drinking water to the entire village.
iii. Approximately 60 meter from mining approved land at khasra no.44/3 is school premises.
iv. The area near to mining approved site is Forest land at khasra no.148, 150 where road construction is being done. Thus, the complainant requested that considering the above facts of the project, the EC to be cancelled as most urgent."
8. It is further argued that the Respondent No.4 MPSEIAA vide letter dated 01.06.2020 informed District Collector, District Satna about the complaint received by Shri Gorelal Tamrakar and further requested to provide factual status on the basis of site inspection for taking necessary action in this regard. In furtherance of the complaints received and request made by the DFO Satna, the documents were reviewed which was submitted by Shri Gorelal Tamrakar and it was found that the appellant had submitted NOC of DFO, Satna for obtaining EC which was not in existence at the relevant time and the DEIAA had already refused the EC, which amounts to a gross violation of the regulatory ethics thereby violating the provision of Para 8(vi) of the EIA Notification 2006. The relevant portion of the Para 8 is quoted below:-
"Deliberate concealment and/or submission of false or misleading information or data which is material to screening or scoping or 7 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
appraisal or decision on the application shall make the application liable for rejection, and cancellation of prior environmental clearance granted on that basis. Rejection of an application or cancellation of a prior environmental clearance already granted, on such ground, shall be decided by the regulatory authority, after giving a personal hearing to the applicant, and following the principles of natural justice."
9. It is further submitted that consequently the EC was kept in abeyance by the MPSEIAA in its 681th meeting dated 04.08.2021 and accordingly the answering respondent no.04 vide its letter dated 18.08.2021 called the appellant for the clarification. The Appellant vide its letter dated 27.10.2021 had requested for revocation of keeping the EC in abeyance issued in favour of the appellant. The answering respondent no. 4 MPSEIAA in its 693rd meeting dated 25.11.2021 after a detailed discussion decided to call the DFO, Satna in person for presenting NOCs provided by the DFO Office, Satna. The Respondent No.4 MPSEIAA in its 711th meeting dated 09.03.2022 after detailed discussions and deliberations decided to review the decision of granting EC in favour of appellant, after the review the EC was refused which was duly informed to the appellant by the answering respondent no.4 MPSEIAA vide its letter dated 21.03.2022.
10. It is further submitted that the Appellant never came with clean hands for obtaining EC, rather had submitted NOCs which were disputed by the forest department itself, the appellant had withheld the vital order of DEIAA and objection of forest department which amount to fraud with the answering respondent no. 4 for obtaining EC and now the appellant is actually trying to mislead and misguide.
11. It is further argued that there was a gross violation of the regulatory ethics mentioned in para 8(6) of the EIA Notification, 2006. Thus, the 8 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Respondent in pursuance of the EIA Notification and on the basis of all the letters and complaints discussed and decided according to rules and communicated the order to the Appellant.
12. The report of the Forest Department with regard to the facts and different cases registered against the Appellant in violation of environmental laws and encroachment on the forest land has been enumerated in the communication Annexure R-4/5 as follows:-
................x.......................x.........................x............ श्री गोरे लाल ताम्रकार गु०पो० उचेहरा वजला सतना के संदवभषत आिेदन से श्री ओम प्रकाश यादि वपता श्री भागित प्रसाद यादि के द्वारा ग्राम वपपरा तहसील उिेहरा वजला सतना के खसरा क्रमां क 132/15/2 रकिा 1.759 है ० में पुरानी एन०ओ०सी० िषष 2010 की लगाकर संचालक महोदय के यहां से तथ्ों को छु पाकर प्रवतबंवित क्षेत्र में वदनांक 03.11.2015 को फशी पत्थर की खदान 10 िषष के वलए स्वीकृत करायी गई है । िन विभाग को इसकी जानकारी हुई तो िन विभाग ने तत्काल खदान वनरस्तगी के वलए शासन ि आपको लेख वकया गया है था। स्वीकृत कराई गई खदान का माल पररिहन िनभूवम से होना है । इसवलए िन विभाग की सहमवत नहीं है। खदान की वनरस्तगी के वलए श्रीमान प्रमुख सवचि खवनज सािन विभाग म०प्र० शासन भोपाल में अपील की गई थी, जो आज भी विचारािीन है । िषष 2015 से कई बार वजला कमेटी (DEIAA) से पयाष िरणीय स्वीकृत (EC) वलये जाने का प्रयास वकया गया, लेवकन िन विभाग की आपवि ि स्वीकृत क्षेत्र प्रवतबंवित क्षेत्र के अन्दर होने से वजला कमेटी (DEIAA) के द्वारा पयाष िरणीय स्वीकृत (EC) प्रदान नहीं की गई है । श्री ओम प्रकाश यादि द्वारा चुपचाप 5 िषष बाद ई०सी० प्राप्त करने के वलए वसया कमेटी भोपाल के समक्ष तथ्ों को छु पाकर आिेदन वकया एिं वजला कमेटी ि िन विभाग की आपवि को छु पाकर पुराने दस्तािेजों के आिार पर पयाष िरणीय स्वीकृत ई०सी० प्राप्त कर ली है । वजसकी जानकारी होने पर पुनः ई०सी० वनरस्तगी हेत लेख वकया जा रहा है । स्वीकृत खदान से लगे हुए खसरा नम्बर 132/1क/1 में माकान एिं खसरा नम्बर 48 मे कुआं वनवमषत है । खसरा नम्बर 44/3 आबादी में स्कूल स्थावपत है । लगे हुए खसरा नम्बर 148 एिं 150 की समस्त भूवमयां िन है, वजससे होकर खदान का माल पररिहन वकया जाना है । सम्पूणष जां च पूिष में ही हो चुकी है । इसी कारण से वजले से ई०सी० प्रदान नहीं की गई थी।
संदवभषत आिेदन से श्री ओम प्रकाश यादि द्वारा तथ्ों को छु पाकर भू-प्रिेश की अनुमवत प्राप्त करने का प्रयास वकया जा रहा है , वजससे भू-प्रिेश की अनुमवत प्राप्त कर वपटपास हावसल करना चाहते है , वजसका उपयोग िन भूवम के अिैि उत्खवनत पवटया पत्थर के 9 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
पररिहन में वकया जायेगा तथा इनके विरूद्ध अिैि उत्खनन के कई प्रकरण भी दजष हैं। उपरोक्त कारणों को दे खते हुए प्रवतबंवित क्षेत्र में भू-प्रिेश की अनुगवत न दे ने तथा खदान वनरस्तगी हे तु लेख वकया गया है । (संित आिेदन एिं सहपत्रों की छायाप्रवत संलग्न है पररवशष्ट-1)।
...............................................
"उपिनमण्डल अविकारी सतना के पत्र कमां क 1524 वदनां क 12.09.2017 अनुसार परसगवनया गार की िन सम्पदा एिं िनक्षेत्रों / िन्यजीिों की सुरक्षा की दृवष्ट से संरवक्षत करने तथा पयाष िरण को सिुवलत बनाये रखने एिं उत्खनन गवतविवियों पर रोक जारी रखने हे तु प्रवतिेदन प्रस्तुत वकया गया था, वजसके सम्बन्ध में विस्तृत प्रवतिेदन इस कायाषलय के पत्र कमां क/मा०वच०/9885 वदनां क 18.09.2017 द्वारा आपको भेजा जाकर पृष्ां कन कमां क / मा०वच०/9886 वदनां क 18.9.2017 से प्रवतवलवप कवमश्नर रीिा, मुख्य िनसंरक्षक रीिा, माईवनंग अविकारी सतना को दी गई है "। अतः उत्खनन लीज की अनुमवत वदया जाना उवचत नहीं होगा" के सम्बन्ध में लेख वकया गया था। श्री ओम प्रकाश यादि वपता श्री भागित प्रसाद यादि के द्वारा पवटया पत्थर अिैि रूप से पररिहन करने पर िन अपराि प्रकरण कमां क 106/05 वदनां क 18.04.2018 पंजीबद्ध वकया जाकर न्यायालय चालान जररये कोटष केश नम्बर 155/18 वदनां क 13.10.2018 को वकया गया है , जो माननीय न्यायालय में विचारािीन है। (पी०ओ०आर० की छायाप्रवत संलग्न है पररवशष्ट-3) उपरोक्त के सम्बन्ध में स्टे ट इनिायषमेन्ट इम्पेक्ट एससमेन्ट अथाररटी एम०पी० एरे रा कालोनी भोपाल के द्वारा पयाष िरणीय अनुमवत के सम्बन्ध में स्वीकृवत जारी की गई है , जो पत्र पृष्ां कन कमां क 3825 वदनां क 07.01. 2020 से इस कायाष लय को भी पृष्ां वकत है । (पत्र की छायाप्रवत संलग्न है पररवशष्ट-4) अतः उपरोक्त स्थल में भू-प्रिेश दे ने के पहले समस्त विन्दु ओं का पूिष परीक्षण करने की आिश्यकता है तथा परसमवनयां पठार में उत्खनन गवतविवियों को बन्द रखना उवचत होगा। "
13. It is further argued that several complaints were received with regard to the Appellant regarding transportation of the mining from the forest land and different criminal First Information Report have been lodged against the violator.
14. Contentions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant are that Khasra Nos. 148 and 150 are not the forest land while the report submitted by the Forest Department has been filed which discloses that it is a forest land. The Appellant has himself communicated to the Forest 10 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Department for construction of the road from the land of the Forest Department which is land Survey No. 148 and 150. This is an admitted case by the Appellant.
15. The submission of the learned Counsel for the State are that a letter was issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, Satna Forest Division vide its letter No. मा.वच./9885 dated 18.09.2017 to the Collector, Satna, with regard to conservation of forest areas of Parasmania Plateau for the continuation of ban on excavation. It is submitted that, the Parasmania Plateau has been heavily exploited over the past several decades. Mineral extraction from forest areas has been rampant and illegal under the guise of a few approved stone quarries surrounding the forest areas. Taking a serious note of the uncontrolled extraction of mineral resources from forest areas, the district collector of Satna imposed a complete ban on mining activities in 2010. It is also submitted that, during the discharge of forest protection responsibilities, the forest workers in the Parasmaniya plateau have also been subjected to mass attacks by the excavation mafia and forest mafia, against whom legal action was also taken with the help of the police. It is submitted that the Parasmaniya Plateau and the surrounding forest area are connected to the Panna Tiger Reserve buffer zone. Due to the increasing pressure of tigers in the Panna Tiger Reserve, and occasionally during the mating season, radio-collared tigers and tigresses from the Panna Tiger Reserve and tigers from other forest areas have been observed regularly roaming and resting on the Parasmaniya Plateau. It is also submitted that, Considering the above important reasons, the DFO vide aforementioned letter prayed to take a policy decision, for not granting permission for excavation in the Paratmania Plateau, so that the development of the 11 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. forest area, wildlife, and environment along with the residents there, can be carried out smoothly. Regarding the Environmental Clearance in the approved excavation lease in village Vipara, Tehsil Umehra to Shri Omprakash Yadav, resident of village Bhuraura, Tehsil Uchehra, the DFO, Satna, Forest Division vide its letter No. मा.वच./2193 dated 25.02.2019 recommended to the Collector (Mining), Satna, that it was not appropriate to grant permission for excavation lease as the presence of wild animals has been observed directly on the roadsides or in the open forest area and cases of animal loss, animal injury and human injury have been recorded and there was a ban on excavation activities in the Parasmaniya Plateau for preservation of forest wealth and forest areas/wildlife.
16. It is further submitted that a letter was issued by the Conservator of Forest, Satna Forest Division vide letter No. मा.वच./1283 dated 01.02.2020 to the Collector, Satna informing that the matter concerns the grant of a floor stone quarry lease to Shri Om Prakash Yadav, S/o Shri Bhagwat Prasad Yadav, over Khasra No. 132/15/2 (area 1.759 hectares) situated at Village Pram Pipra, Tehsil Uchehra, District Satna, for a period of 10 years vide approval dated 03.11.2015. It is alleged that such approval was obtained by relying upon an outdated NOC dated 2010 and by suppressing material facts from the competent authority, despite the land falling within a restricted area. The Forest Department objected to the grant and recommended cancellation of the lease, citing that transportation of mineral would necessarily pass through forest land and that the area is ecologically sensitive, with presence of wildlife including tiger and leopard. An appeal for cancellation of the lease remains pending before the Principal Secretary, 12 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Mineral Resources Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh. Repeated attempts since 2015 to obtain Environmental Clearance (EC) from the District Environment Impact Assessment Authority (DEIAA) were unsuccessful due to objections from the Forest Department and the restricted status of the land. Subsequently, the Appellant approached the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA), Bhopal, and obtained EC by allegedly concealing prior objections and material facts.
17. It is further submitted that the mining site is adjacent to residential and sensitive locations including a house (Khasra No. 132/1A/1), a well (Khasra No. 48) and a school (Khasra No. 44/3), while adjoining lands (Khasra Nos. 148 and 150) are forest areas. Allegations also include attempts to secure land entry permission and pit pass through misrepresentation, facilitating illegal excavation and transportation of stone. Additionally, prior instances of illegal mining and transportation have been recorded against the lessee, including registration of Forest Crime Case No. 106/05 dated 18.04.2018 and pending Court Case No. 155/18 dated 13.10.2018. A reminder was again issued by the Conservator of Forest, Satna Forest Division vide letter No. मा.वच./2767 dated 06.03.2020 to the Collector, Satna stating abovementioned information for the preservation of forest wealth and forest areas/wildlife and for animal injury and human injury. Various forest crime cases have been registered by the Forest Division on the Appellant and Preliminary Offence Report (POR) has been filed against the Appellant.
18. The Forest Department has further communicated to the Collector, Satna, that illegal mining is being done from the forest land indirectly 13 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. affecting the movement of the tiger in the tiger reserve area and requested that the mining should not be permitted from the forest land.
19. In view of the above facts, a proper decision has been taken according to law.
20. Learned Counsel for the SEIAA has argued that the appeal is barred by time.
21. In the matter of M.A. No. 247/2012 in Appeal No. 76/2012 (Nikunj Developers Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.) decided on 14.03.2013, which was reported in Manu (GT) 0030/283, wherein it was held as follows:-
"5. The stand taken by the non-applicant is that there is no cause much less a 'sufficient cause' shown by the applicant, for condonation of delay. There is complete inaction and negligence on part of the applicant, right from 2nd of June, 2012, till 20th September, 2012, the date on which the appeal was filed. Even if it is taken to be correct that the brother of applicant no. 3 was ill and he died as a result of his illness on 13th June, 2013, even then there is no reason stated post 13th June, 2012 as to why the appeal was not filed till 20th September, 2012. In the alternative, the submission is that even if it is assumed that there is sufficient cause shown by the applicant for condonation of delay, still this Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to condone the delay because the appeal has been filed beyond the prescribed period of 90 days, which includes even the extended period of 60 days. Thus, in their submission, the appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed, being barred by limitation.
6. Now, firstly, we have to examine the interpretation of the expression 'sufficient cause', as it emerges from the various judgments of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of India. The use of expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 16 of the NGT Act is not a legislative innovation but is a derivative reference from other enactments. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, also uses the same expression 'sufficient cause. An applicant praying for condonation of delay in instituting the appeal under Section 16 of the NGT Act is 14 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. required to show a sufficient cause, if the appeal is filed beyond a period beyond 30 days from the date of communication of the Environmental Clearance order as prescribed.
7. The expression 'sufficient cause' is not to be construed in isolation. The attendant circumstances and various other factors have to be taken into consideration by the Courts/Tribunals while dealing with the question of condonation of delay. Thus, it is important at this stage to deal with the meaning and connotation, that this expression has received in various judicial pronouncements, in some elucidation.
8. The term 'sufficient cause" has to be considered keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' implied by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. This view μας expressed by Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1335
9. The term 'sufficient cause must receive a liberal meaning and has to be incorporated so as to introduce the concept of reasonableness, as it is understood in its general connotation. Certainly, the Limitation Act is a substantive law and its provisions have to be adhered to in a manner that once, a valuable right accrues in favour of one party, as a result of unexplained sufficient or reasonable cause and directly as a result of negligence, default or inaction of the other party, such a right cannot be taken away lightly and in a routine manner.
10. The Courts have also taken the view that the expression 'sufficient cause' be considered with pragmatism in a justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for every day's delay.
11. "Sufficient cause must necessarily be tested on the touchstone of doctrine of reasonableness. It may not be a very appropriate approach to apply principles of limitation with absolute rigidity resulting in irreparable injustice to the parties, a balanced approach may better serve the ends of justice.15
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
12. In P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Anr., J.T. 1997 (8) 189, the Supreme Court took the view that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
13. However, the Courts have also taken the view that the approach of the Courts must be to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles the decision on merits, thus, showing greater inclination to accept a liberal approach.
14. The equitable principles have also been applied to the law of limitation but with great circumspection. The clear language of law will always prevail over the equitable principles as equity cannot defeat the law. At this stage we may notice some of the principles which have been reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajghunath Rai Bareja and another us Punjab National Bank and Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 230 where the Court held as under:
*30. Thus, in Madamanchi Ramappa and Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojjappa (1964/2SCR673 this Court observed:
"What is administered in Courts is justice according to law, and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law".
31. In Council for Indian School Certificate Examination v. Isha Mittal and Anr.: (2000)7SCC521 this Court observed:
"Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law."
32. Similarly in P.M. Latha and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors. [2003/2SCR653 this Court observed:
"Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled law.
33. In Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and Ors v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. [2003/3SCR409 this Court observed:
It is now well settled that when there is a conflict between law and equity the former shall prevail....16
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
34. Similarly in Nasiruddin and Ors. Agarwal (2003/1SCR634 this Court observed Sita Ram In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom....
35. Similarly in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. AIR2003SC153 this Court observed:
...Equitable considerations have no place where the statute contained express provisions....
36. In India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (2002/SUPPSSCR522 this Court held that ...The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations....
39. In Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO (1973) 2 SCR 502, this Court observed:
In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear.
15. In a more recent judgment, the Supreme Court, in Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 685, while dealing with the expression sufficient cause, elaborately stated the principles of condonation of delay. It also elucidated the approach to be adopted by a Court in such cases and held as under:
"It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of 17 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay, equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect sufficient cause as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression 'sufficient cause implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word sufficient means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bonafide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a 18 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
cause is sufficient to see if it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention."
18. .........According to the non-applicant, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to condone the delay in view of the language of Section 16 of the NGT Act, which reads as under
"16. Tribunal to have appellate jurisdiction. Any person aggrieved by,- *********h. an order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, granting environmental clearance in the area in which any industries, operations or processes or class of industries, operations and processes shall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986;
********* may, within a period of thirty days from the date on which the order or decision or direction or determination is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal:
Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed under this section within a further period not exceeding sixty days."
19. From language of the above provision it is clear that the Tribunal loses jurisdiction to condone the delay if the delay is of more than 90 days. Every appeal has to be filed within 30 days from the date of communication of the order. That is, what an applicant is required to ensure before the appeal is heard on merits. However, the Tribunal has been vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal which is filed after 30 days from the date of communication of an order. This power to condone the delay has a clear inbuilt limitation as it ceases to exist if the appeal is filed in excess of 60 days, beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 30 days from the date of communication of such order. To put it simply, once the period of 90 days lapses from the date of communication of the order, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. The language of the provision is clear and explicit. It admits of no ambiguity and the legislative intent that Tribunal should not and cannot condone the delay in excess of 90 days in all, is clear from the plain language of the provision.
19 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
20. As stated in the cases Hiralal Ratan Lal and India Houses (supra) the period of limitation statutorily prescribed, has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed and or departed from, on equitable consideration. Further, in construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is that of literary construction. We do not see any reason to expand the scope of the provision and interpret the proviso to Section 16 in the manner that Tribunal can be vested with the power of condoning the delay beyond 90 days. Such interpretation would be contrary to the specific language of the Section and would defeat the very legislative intent and object behind this provision.
21. This controversy need not detain us any further as it is no more res integra and stands answered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others (2010) 5 SCC 23 where the court held as under:
"29. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company: (2001) 8 SCC 470. The precise question considered in that case was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two- Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi: (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (supra), Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai: (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held:
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to Sub-
section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter"
wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.20
Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, Sub-section (3) would not be an application "in accordance with" that Sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasized by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court".
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to "proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
30. In Singh Enterprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur and Ors. (supra), the Court interpreted Section 35 of Central Excise Act, 1944, which is pari materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed:
8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation Act") can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order.
However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was 21 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.
22. The same view was reiterated in Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd.: (2008) 3 SCC 73.
"31. In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and Anr. (2009) 5 SCC 791, a three-Judge Bench considered the scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that High Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period specified in Section 35H thereof. The argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for condonation of delay was rejected by the Court and observed:
"30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and 22 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded"
would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.
32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, 23 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory."
23. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 uses the expression 'not thereafter' while the provision under our consideration uses the terms 'not exceeding'. Both these expressions use negative language. The intention is to divest the Courts/Tribunals from power to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Once such negative language is used, the application of provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or such analogous provisions would not be applicable.
24. The use of negative words has an inbuilt element of 'mandatory'. The intent of legislation would be to necessarily implement those provisions as stated.
25. Introduction or alteration of words which would convert the mandatory into directory may not be permissible. Affirmative words stand at a weaker footing than negative words for reading the provisions as 'mandatory'. It is possible that in some provision, the use of affirmative words may also be so limiting as to imply a negative. Once negative expression is evident upon specific or necessary implication, such provisions must be construed as mandatory. The legislative command must take precedence over equitable principle. The language of Section 16 of the NGT Act does not admit of any ambiguity, rather it is explicitly clear that the framers of law did not desire to vest the Tribunal with powers, specific or discretionary, of condoning the delay in excess of total period of 90 days. At this stage, we may also refer to Principle of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 13th Edition, where it is stated as under:
"(c) Use of negative words another mode of showing a clear intention that the provision enacted is mandatory, is by clothing the command in a negative form. As stated by CRAWFORD: "Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. And this is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience." As observed by SUBBARAO, J.: "Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative".
Section 80 and Section 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890; Section 15 of the Bombay Rent 24 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Act, 1947; section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925; section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899; section 108 of the Companies Act, 1965; section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; section 55 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 (as amended in 1956); section 10A of Medical Council Act, 1965 (as amended in 1993) and similar other provisions have therefore, been construed as mandatory. A provision requiring 'not less than three months' notice' is also for the same reason mandatory.
But the principle is not without exception. Section 256 of the Government of India, 1953, was construed by the Federal Court as directory though worded in the negative form. Directions related to solemnization of marriages though using negative words have been construed as directory in cases where the enactments in question did not provide for the consequence that the marriage in breach of those directions shall be invalid. Considerations of general inconvenience, which would have resulted in holding these enactments mandatory, appear to have outweighed the effect of the negative words in reaching the conclusion that they were in their true meaning merely director. An interesting example, where negative words have been held to be directory, is furnished in the construction of section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, where compliance of clause (c) has been held to be directory; although compliance of clauses (a) and (b) which are connected by the same negative words is understood as mandatory. These cases illustrate that the rule, that negative words are usually mandatory, is like any other rule subordinate to the context, and the object intended to be achieved by the particular requirement."
26. The provision of Section 16 of the NGT Act are somewhat similar to Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thus, adopting an analogous reasoning, as was adopted in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra), we would have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to condone the delay when the same is in excess of 90 days from the date of communication of the order to any person aggrieved.
27. Thus, the application must fail on this ground alone. We are of the considered view that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay of 19 days in filing the present appeal, the same being in 25 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
excess of 90 days computed from the admitted date of communication of order, that is 2nd June, 2012."
22. In light of above discussion, we are of the view that the appeal is barred by limitation and not maintainable. Further, we have also discussed on merit and appeal is devoid of any merit. Thus, the Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) is dismissed.
Sheo Kumar Singh, JM Sudhir Kumar Chaturvedi, EM 19th May, 2026, Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) RK 26 Appeal No.07/2026(CZ) Om Prakash Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.