Bombay High Court
Shri. Raosaheb Mallapa Magdum And Ors vs Vadaana Shivajirao Mane And Ors on 3 September, 2019
Equivalent citations: 2019 (5) ABR 774, AIR 2019 BOMBAY 276, AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 854, (2019) 5 MAH LJ 844, (2020) 1 ALLMR 508
Author: Pradeep Nandrajog
Bench: Pradeep Nandrajog, Revati Mohite Dere, Bharati Dangre
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE SIDE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 7792 OF 2017
1. Shri. Raosaheb Mallapa
Magdum
Age 65 years, Residing at
Sangav, Taluka Kagal, Dist.
Kolhapur
2. Shri. Vikramsih Madavrao
Jadhav
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
3. Mrs. Vahida Enayat Mulla
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
4. Shri. Anil Sadashiv Mali
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
5. Ms. Surekha M. Patil
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
6. Ms. Shubhangi Sachin Swami
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
7. Ms. Meena Sukumar Kambale
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
8. Shri. Ranjit Jaising Kambale
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
9. Ms. Aparna Bashir Nadaf
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Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
10. Shri. Gajanan Mahadeo Salkar
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
11. Shri.Adinath J. Chougule
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
12. Shri. Pandurang Narayan Patil
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur .. Petitioners
Vs.
1. Vandana Shivajirao Mane
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
2. Tahsildar Kagal,
Having his office at Kagal,
Dist. Kolhapur
3. Grampanchayat Kasaba
Sangaon, at Kasaba Sangav,
Taluka Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
4. The Collector of Kolhapur,
Having his office at Kolhapur
5. Shri. Sanjay Namdeo Hegade,
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur
6. Ms. Mangal Balwant Jangam,
Residing at Sangav, Taluka
Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur .. Respondents
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....
Shri. S.S.Patwardhan for Petitioners
Shri. S.R. Ganbavale a/w Abhijit Adagule for Respondent No.1
Shri. A.A.Kumbhakoni Advocate General a/w P.P.Kakade
Govt. Pleader and Akshay Shinde for Respondent Nos. 2 and 4
....
CORAM : PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, C.J.,
REVATI MOHITE DERE &
SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, JJ.
DATED : SEPTEMBER 03, 2019
ORAL JUDGMENT [PER PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, C.J.]:
1. Vide order dated 14th September 2017 the following question has been referred to the Full Bench. The said question reads as under:
"Whether the action in terms of Rule 7 of Chapter - I of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, is required to be taken and the issue as to 'whether the time limit of 7 days from the date of receipt of requisition prescribed in Section 35(2) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1958 and Rule 2(3) of the Bombay Village Panchayats Sarpanch and Upa-::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 :::
jdk 4 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc Sarpanch (No Confidence Motion) Rules, 1975 to convene a meeting to consider the motion of No Confidence is mandatory or is directory?"
2. The facts which led to the reference being made are that on 12th May 2017 one-third members of the Panchayat served in the Tahsildar's office a requisition in the prescribed format for a motion of no-confidence against the Sarpanch. The Tahsildar was on leave and resumed duties on 23rd May 2017. On the same day, the Tahsildar issued notices to all the members of the Panchayat convening a meeting on 30 th May 2017 to consider the Motion of no-confidence. On 30 th May 2017 the motion was put to vote with thirteen members voting in favour of the motion and three against. The Sarpanch preferred an appeal to the Collector who vide order dated 1 st July 2017 quashed the resolution dated 30 th May 2017 inasmuch as the meeting was convened beyond seven days from the date of the receipt of the motion.
3. Section 35 of The Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 reads as under:
"35. Motion of no confidence.- (1) A motion of no confidence may be moved by not less than one- third of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 5 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc any meeting of the Panchayat against the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch after giving such notice thereof to the Tahsildar as may be prescribed. Such notice once given shall not be withdrawn.
(1A) In respect of the panchayat to which the Sarpanch is directly elected under section 30A-1A, the provisions of this section shall apply with the following modifications:-
(a) in sub-section (1), for the words "one-
third" the words "two-third" shall be substituted;
(b) in sub-section (3), for the portion beginning with the words "if the motion"
and ending with the words "against the Sarpanch;" the following portion shall be substituted, namely:-
"If the motion of no-confidence is carried by a majority of not less than three-fourth of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the panchayat, the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch, as the case may be, and ratified before the special Gram Sabha by the secret ballot in the presence and under the Chairmanship of the Officer appointed for the purpose by the Collector, shall forthwith stop, exercising all the powers and, performing all the functions and duties of the office ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 6 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc and thereupon such powers, functions and duties shall vest in the Upa-Sarpanch, in case the motion is carried out against the Sarpanch;";
(c) for the fourth proviso, the following provisos shall be substituted, namely:-
"Provided also that, no such motion of no-confidence shall be brought within a period of two years from the date of election of Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch and before the six months preceding the date on which the term of panchayat expires:
Provided also that, if the no-confidence motion fails, then no motion shall be brought before the passage of time of next two years."
(2) Within seven days from the date of receipt by him of the notice under sub-section (1), the Tahsildar shall convene a special meeting of the Panchayat for considering the motion of no confidence at the office of the Panchayat at a time to be appointed by him and he shall preside over such meeting. At such special meeting, the Sarpanch, or the Upa-Sarpanch against whom the motion of no confidence is moved shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings at the meeting including the right to vote.
(3) If the Motion is carried by a majority of
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not less than two-third of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Panchayat the Sarpanch or the Upa- Sarpanch, as the case may be, shall forthwith stop exercising all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of the office and thereupon such powers, functions and duties shall vest in the Upa- Sarpanch in case the motion is carried out against the Sarpanch; and in case the motion is carried out against both the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch, in such officer, not below the rank of Extension Officer, as may be authorized by the Block Development Officer, till the dispute if any, referred to under sub-section (3B) is decided:
Provided that, if the dispute so referred is decided in favour of the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, Upa- Sarpanch, thereby setting aside such motion, the powers, functions and duties of the Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch shall forthwith stand restored, and if the dispute is decided confirming the motion, the office of the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, Upa-Sarpanch shall be deemed to have fallen vacant from the date of the decision of the dispute, unless the incumbent has resigned earlier:::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 :::
jdk 8 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc Provided further that, in cases where the offices of both the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, the officer authorised under this sub-section shall, pending the election of the Sarpanch, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of the Sarpanch but shall not have the right to vote in any meetings of the panchayat:
Provided also that, where the office of the Sarpanch being reserved for a woman, is held by a woman Sarpanch, such motion of no-confidence shall be carried only by a majority of not less than three-fourth of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Panchayat:
Provided also that, no such motion of no-confidence shall be brought within a period of six months from the date of election of Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch. (3-A) If the motion is not moved or is not carried by a majority of not less than two-third of or, as the case may be, three fourth, of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Panchayat, no such fresh motion shall be moved against the Sarpanch or, ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 9 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch within a period of one year from the date of such special meeting.
(3-B) If the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch desires to dispute the validity of the motion carried under sub- section (3), he shall, within seven days from the date on which such motion was carried, refer the dispute to the Collector who shall decide it as far as possible, within thirty days from the date on which it was received by him and his decision shall be final".
4. It is obvious that sub-section (2) of Section 35 is at the fulcrum of the debate for it requires the Tahsildar to, within seven days from the date of receipt by him of the notice under sub-section (1) to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat to consider the motion of no-confidence.
5. With reference to the use of the word ' shall', in the decision reported as 2002 (1) Mh.L.J. 916 Mandabai Balnath Roham & Ors. Vs. Ashok Fakira Chandra & Ors. passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court and the decision reported as 2002 (4) Bom.C.R. 425 Ganesh Raghunath Samel Vs. State of Mh. & Ors. passed by a Division Bench of this Court, both holding that the statute was mandatory and because meetings therein were held beyond seven days from the date of receipt of ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 10 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc the notice, motions expressing no-confidence passed by majority were set aside. Another learned Single Judge, in the decision reported as 2003 (1) Mh.L.J. 420 Durgadas Ukhaji More & Ors. Vs.Addl. Commissioner Nasik Division & Ors. took a contra view. With reference to section 55 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, in the decision reported as 1988 Mh.L.J. 378 Ashok Maniklal Harkut Vs. Collector Amrvati & Ors. the view taken was that mere use of the word 'shall' with reference to a time limit for a no-confidence motion would not render the same mandatory.
6. Thus, noting the divergence the reference has been made.
7. Section 55 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act 1965 reads as under:
"55 (1) A president shall cease to be President, if the Council by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Councillors (excluding the co-opted Councillors) at a special meeting so decides. (2) The requisition for such special meeting shall be signed by not less than one-half of the total number of Councillors (excluding the co-
opted Councillors) and shall be sent to the Collector.
::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 :::jdk 11 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc (3) The Collector shall, within ten days of the receipt of a requisition under sub-section (2), convene a special meeting of the Council:
Provided that, when the Collector convenes a special meeting, he shall give intimation thereof to the President.
(4) (a) A meeting to consider a resolution under sub-section (1) shall be presided over by the Collector or any other Officer authorised by him in this behalf but he shall have no right to vote.
(b) The co-opted Councillors present at such meeting shall have no right to vote. (5) (a) On ceasing to be president under sub-
section (1), he may, within seven days from the date of his so ceasing to be President, apply in writing, to the State Government for dissolution of the Council, in which case that Government shall, by an order published in the Official Gazette, dissolve the Council. On the issue of such order, a fresh election to the Council and of President shall be held and the Council shall be res-established on such date as the State Government may specify in the said order. The Councillors of the new Council, including the President, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, hold office for so long only as the Councillors of the dissolved Council would have held office, if that Council had not been dissolved.
(b) If the President fails to apply for dissolution ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 12 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc of the Council within the period specified in clause (a), the State Government shall, by an order published in the Official Gazette direct that a fresh election to the office of the President shall be held within the period specified in the said order:
Provided that the date specified for the re- establishment of the Council or the period specified for the election of the President may, from time to time, be extended by the State Government by an order published in the Official Gazette for reasons to be stated in the order; so however that the extended dates or periods shall not be postponed beyond or exceed in the aggregate six months from the date or period originally specified. (6) If a President, due to the opposition of the Councillors, feels that he is unable to carry on his functions he may resign his office and seek re-election. If at the fresh election, he is re-
elected he, or if any other person is elected as President such other person, may, within seven days from the date of the re-election or election, as the case may be, apply in writing to the State Government for dissolution of the Council (excluding the President) in which case, that Government may, by an order published in the Official Gazette, dissolve the Council. On the issue of such order, a fresh election to the Council (excluding the President) shall be held and the Council shall be re-established on such ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 13 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc date as the State Government may specify in the said order. The President shall be deemed to be elected as the President of the new Council. The Councillors of the new Council, including the President, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, hold office for so long only as the Councillors of the dissolved Council would have held it, if that Council had not been dissolved.
(7) On the dissolution of a Council under sub-section (5)(a) or sub-section (b) the consequences specified in section 316 shall save as otherwise provided in sub-section (6) in respect of the President, ensue and any person or persons appointed to exercise and perform the powers and the duties of the dissolved Council shall receive such remuneration from the municipal fund as the State Government may determine.
(8) If the office of the President becomes vacant due to any reason, the Chief Officer shall report to the Collector and pending the election or nomination of a new President, the powers and duties of the President shall be exercised and performed by the Collector or such other Officer as the Collector may appoint. Any Officer appointed by the Collector shall receive such remuneration from the municipal fund as the Collector may determine."
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8. The words employed by the Legislature afford valuable insights into the intention of the Legislature while formulating a statutory provision. The literal rule of interpretation requires the Courts to interpret and enforce a provision of law by attaching the natural meaning to the connotations comprised therein. It thus follows that when the Legislature in its wisdom employs the expression "shall", the same ordinarily signifies a mandatory import whereas per contra use of the expression "may" evidences directory nature of the provision. However, it is settled beyond pale of controversy that the said principle is not absolute and the language employed by the Legislature is not dispositive of the matter.
9. In this regard, the Supreme Court in its authoritative pronouncement reported as (1961) 2 SCR 679 State Of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyay observed:
"29. ... When a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 15 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered."
10. The vexing issue arising for the consideration of this Court stems from divergence of views expressed by two Benches of this Court on the consequences, if any, which flow from the breach of stipulated time frame envisaged under sub- section (2) of Section 35 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959.
11. At the outset it would be apposite to notice the said provision that is under the lens of judicial examination, which we have already reproduced in paragraph 3 above.
12. One of the earliest decisions on the subject can be traced to a pronouncement rendered in the year 1697 reported as 91 E.R. 1039 Rex v. Ingram Et Al. The Cour t whil e ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 16 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc anal y s ing t he pr ovisions of Riot Act, 1411 mandating Justices to try rioters within the period of one month, pertinently observed:
"3. That tho' the words of the statute are, that the justices, &c. shall make inquiry within one month after the riot, &c. yet an inquiry by them after the month is good. For the statute intended only to hasten their proceedings, by subjecting them to the penalty in case they did not make enquiry within the month, and not to restrain their authority to the month, so as it could not be executed afterwards; for the lapse of the month makes them incur the penalty, but does not determine their power."
(Emphasis Supplied)
13. The said decision has been cited with approval by the Patna High Court in its decision reported as AIR 1973 Pat 377 Jay Narayan Mishra V. State Of Bihar & Ors. In the context of Rule 5 of Bihar High Schools (Constitution, Powers and Functions of Managing Committee) Rules, 1964 which requires the District Education Officer to accord his approval to the appointment made by Managing Committee within a period of 15 days, it had been contended that since no decision was arrived at within the prescribed period of time the appointment of the Management Committee w o u l d be ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 17 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc deemed to have been approved. The said submission was repelled by the Court after elaborately discussing the relevant principles of interpretation of such provisions dealing with exercise of powers by a public authority. It would be beneficial to extract the relevant portions herein under :
"27. In the case of (5) Mahesh Pd. Sinha v. Manjay Lal (A.I.R. 1964 Patna 53) a Division Bench of this Court was considering the question whether the requirements under the proviso to Sub- section (1) of Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act is mandatory or directory and in this connection quoted extensively the principles laid down in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, Halsbury's Laws of England and Sutherland Statutory Construction. The following passage in Article 656 of the Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition,Volume 36, at page 435 which has been quoted there may be usefully reproduced here:--
"Although no universal rule can be laid down, provisions relating to the steps to be taken by the parties to legal proceedings in the widest sense have been construed with some regularity as mandatory; and it has been observed that the practice has been to construe ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 18 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc provisions as no more than directory, if they relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice, to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, without at the same time promoting the main object of the Legislature."
29. I am tempted to quote from Maxwell, 11 edition, page 369, the statement of the law th under the heading "performance of Public Duty." It is said:--
"On the other hand, where the prescription of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, yet not promote the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 19 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them. It has often been held, for instance, when an Act ordered a thing, to be done by a public body or public officers and pointed out the specific time when it was to be done, that the Act was directory only and might be complied with after the prescribed time,"
35. It is well settled that where the time limit is not the essence of the law it is not to be held to be mandatory. In the case of (1) Barker v. Palmer aforesaid the question related to the procedure in court and it is well settled that provisions relating to such procedure are generally considered to be imperative. The same principles do not, however, apply to duties to be performed by public officers. It is well settled that where duties are to be performed by public officers the time limit prescribed for such performance are generally directory rather than mandatory."
(Emphasis Supplied)
14. The Privy Council in its decision reported as AIR ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 20 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc 1917 PC 142 Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin held that where the statute conspicuously omitted to attach any consequence for failure to follow a procedure for discharge of a public function, such provisions would be interpreted to be directory in nature as an interpretation resulting in declaration of the action to be null and void would cause great inconvenience and serious injustice. The neglect of public authorities in discharge of such functions though punishable would not affect the validity of the act.
15. Significantly, the Supreme Court in its decision reported as (1976) 2 SCC 895 State Of Mysore And Others v. V.K. Kangan And Others observed:-
"10. In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, one must look into the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. No doubt, all laws are mandatory in the sense they impose the duty to obey on those who come within its purview. But it does not follow that every departure from it shall taint the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination of the ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 21 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law-maker. And that has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it in one way or the other...."
(Emphasis Supplied)
16. The Supreme Court in its decision reported as (2003) 3 SCC 433 Balwant Singh & Ors v. Ram Kumar Sharma & Ors. categorically recognised the diametrically distinct approach adopted by Courts in the interpretation of statutory provisions dealing with public functionaries vis-a- vis private individuals. The Court observed:
"7. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It is a well- settled principle that if a thing is required to be done by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. In ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 22 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn.,Vol.3, at p. 107, and points out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers . Again, at p.109,it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non- compliance with the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as follows:
"As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive."
(Emphasis Supplied)
17. Profusion of authorities, as adverted to by us herein above leads to the inescapable conclusion that the fact that the Legislature shackles the public authority by imposing a time frame to discharge its statutory functions which are in the ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 23 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc nature of a public duty unequivocally evinces the legislative intent to hasten the performance of such functions. The fact that such functions could not be performed within the stipulated time frame owing to myriad reasons such as supervening impossibility or otherwise owing to negligent inertia, would not ipso facto invalidate the actions of such authority as the same would be in teeth with the salutary intendment of the Legislature. It is inconceivable that the Legislature which on one hand requires a public authority to discharge its functions promptly within a stipulated time frame; thus signifying its underlying importance, would itself envisage an embargo on the performance of the said functions beyond the said period of time. Needless to state, if the Legislature intends such drastic consequences, the same would be palpable from its express words or by overwhelming evidence of necessary implication.
18. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that notwithstanding sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 mandating the Tahsildar to convene a meeting of the Panchayat within seven days from the receipt of the notice under sub-section (1), if for some reasons the Tahsildar is unable to do so or deliberately ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 04/09/2019 22:56:40 ::: jdk 24 3.wp.7792.17.j.doc refrains from doing so, he may be personally liable for the wrong committed but that would not mean that a meeting convened beyond seven days would be corum non-judice. The decisions taken at the meeting would be legal and valid.
CHIEF JUSTICE REVATI MOHITE DERE, J.
SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.
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