Allahabad High Court
Kalicharan And Others vs The State Of U.P. on 29 September, 2022
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Reserved on 20.09.2022 Delivered on 29.08.2022 Court No. - 84 Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 2625 of 2021 Revisionist :- Kalicharan And Others Opposite Party :- The State Of U.P. Counsel for Revisionist :- Ashutosh Yadav, Abhilasha Singh, Nagendra Kumar Singh, Pradeep Kumar, Swati Agrawal Srivastava Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A., Sushil Kumar Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Sri Udai Karan Saxena, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Swati Agrawal Srivastava, Advocate for revisionists, has submitted arguments, which are in two folds. Firstly, that summoning of revisionists (three in numbers), under Section 319 Cr.P.C., is contrary to judgment passed by Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab and others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 and Brijendra Singh and others vs. State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706, that, Trial Court has to make out an opinion to see whether much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (applicants) complicity has come on record. However, there is no satisfaction of this nature in the impugned order. Relevant para 15 of the judgment in Brijendra Singh (supra), is quoted hereinafter:
"15. This record was before the trial court. Notwithstanding the same, the trial court went by the deposition of complainant and some other persons in their examination-in-chief, with no other material to support their so- called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the ''evidence' recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements which was already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of investigation of the case. No doubt, the trial court would be competent to exercise its power even on the basis of such statements recorded before it in examination-in-chief. However, in a case like the present where plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether ''much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants) complicity has come on record. There is no satisfaction of this nature. Even if we presume that the trial court was not apprised of the same at the time when it passed the order (as the appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is more troubling is that even when this material on record was specifically brought to the notice of the High Court in the Revision Petition filed by the appellants, the High Court too blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing the discussion contained in the order of the trial court and expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has been done. Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny."
(Emphasis given by Court for revisionists)
2. Second fold of the argument of learned Senior Advocate is that, during pendency to challenge to order passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. trial has been concluded against originally charge sheeted accused, wherein Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 07.09.2022 has acquitted said accused from the offence under Section 302 IPC, therefore, there would be no justification that present revisionists may go through the same procedure wherein same evidence has to be led again and most likely outcome of trial will be same.
3. The above submissions are vehemently opposed by Sri Sushil Kumar, learned counsel appearing for Opposite Party No. 2. He submitted that Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence of eye witnesses, i.e., PWs 1, 2 and 3 that all the three revisionists have also assaulted deceased, who not only received multiple injuries but died due to strangulation and said witnesses had witnessed the incident and further that in a case where a person is summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. he has to face de novo trial, therefore, there will be no consequence of acquittal of the charge sheeted accused for the same offence after the trial.
4. The Court proceeds to consider the second argument of learned Senior Advocate, which was vehemently opposed by counsel for Opposite Party No. 2 and AGA that what will be the consequence of conclusion of trial of charge sheeted accused if for the same offence accused persons summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to face de novo trial?
5. This issue has been considered recently by Supreme Court and law has been reiterated in A. T. Mydeen and another vs The Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1017 and relevant paragraphs are mentioned hereinafter:
"39. The provisions of law and the essence of case-laws, as discussed above, give a clear impression that in the matter of a criminal trial against any accused, the distinctiveness of evidence is paramount in light of accused's right to fair trial, which encompasses two important facets along with others i.e., firstly, the recording of evidence in the presence of accused or his pleader and secondly, the right of accused to cross-examine the witnesses. These facts are, of course, subject to exceptions provided under law. In other words, the culpability of any accused cannot be decided on the basis of any evidence, which was not recorded in his presence or his pleader's presence and for which he did not get an opportunity of cross-examination, unless the case falls under exceptions of law, as noted above.
40. The essence of the above synthesis is that evidence recorded in a criminal trial against any accused is confined to the culpability of that accused only and it does not have any bearing upon a co-accused, who has been tried on the basis of evidence recorded in a separate trial, though for the commission of the same offence."
(Emphasis supplied)
6. As held in A.T. Mydeen (supra), that the accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to face trial de novo and evidence led in other trial for the same offence cannot be relied on against accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C., who has to tried on the basis of evidence recorded in separate trial though for the same offence. Therefore, the second argument of learned Senior Advocate is hereby rejected.
7. Now the Court proceeds to consider the first argument, whether the order summoning revisionists under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is legally sustainable or not?
8. The scope of summoning under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has recently been considered and reiterated by Supreme Court in Sugreev Kumar vs. State of Punjab and another, (2020) 14 SCC 472 and relevant paras are mentioned hereinafter:
"10. It remains trite that the provisions contained in Section 319 CrPC are to achieve the objective that the real culprit should not get away unpunished. By virtue of these provisions, the Court is empowered to proceed against any person not shown as an accused, if it appears from evidence that such person has committed any offence for which, he could be tried together with the other accused persons. In Hardeep Singh (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court has explained the purpose behind this provision, inter alia, in the following:
"12. Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the enactment of Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure.
13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by punishing the real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?
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19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong that an accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved even at the stage of investigation or inquiry even though he may be connected with the commission of the offence."
11. As regards the degree of satisfaction required for invoking the powers under Section 319 CrPC, the Constitution Bench has laid down the principles as follows:
"95. At the time of taking cognizance, the court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. Under Section 319 CrPC, though the test of prima facie case is the same, the degree of satisfaction that is required is much stricter. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vikas v. State of Rajasthan, held that on the objective satisfaction of the court a person may be "arrested" or "summoned", as the circumstances of the case may require, if it appears from the evidence that any such person not being the accused has committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the already arraigned accused persons.
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105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.
106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if "it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence" is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not "for which such person could be convicted". There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused."
12. Thus, the provisions contained in Section 319 CrPC sanction the summoning of any person on the basis of any relevant evidence as available on record. However, it being a discretionary power and an extraordinary one, is to be exercised sparingly and only when cogent evidence is available. The prime facie opinion which is to be formed for exercise of this power requires stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity of a person. The test to be applied is the one which is more than a prime facie case as examined at the time of framing charge but not of satisfaction to the extent that the evidence, if goes uncontroverted, would lead to the conviction of the accused." (Emphasis supplied)
9. Supreme Court also considered the scope of Section 319 in a recent judgment in Sartaj Singh vs The State Of Haryana and another, (2021) 5 SCC 337 and relevant paras are mentioned hereinafter:
"6.1.2 In the said case, the following five questions fell for consideration before this Court.
(i) What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised?
(ii) Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
(iii) Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
(iv) What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?
(v) Does the power under Section 319 CrPC extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged?"
xxx xxx "6.1.4 While answering Questions (iii), namely, whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial, this Court, in the aforesaid decision has observed and held as under:
"58. To answer the questions and to resolve the impediment that is being faced by the trial courts in exercising of powers under Section 319 CrPC, the issue has to be investigated by examining the circumstances which give rise to a situation for the court to invoke such powers. The circumstances that lead to such inference being drawn up by the court for summoning a person arise out of the availability of the facts and material that come up before the court and are made the basis for summoning such a person as an accomplice to the offence alleged to have been committed. The material should disclose the complicity of the person in the commission of the offence which has to be the material that appears from the evidence during the course of any inquiry into or trial of offence. The words as used in Section 319 CrPC indicate that the material has to be "where ... it appears from the evidence" before the court.
59. Before we answer this issue, let us examine the meaning of the word "evidence". According to Section 3 of the Evidence Act, "evidence" means and includes:
"(1) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;
such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the court;
such documents are called documentary evidence."
xxx
78. It is, therefore, clear that the word "evidence" in Section 319 CrPC means only such evidence as is made before the court, in relation to statements, and as produced before the court, in relation to documents. It is only such evidence that can be taken into account by the Magistrate or the court to decide whether the power under Section 319 CrPC is to be exercised and not on the basis of material collected during the investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
82. This pretrial stage is a stage where no adjudication on the evidence of the offences involved takes place and therefore, after the material along with the chargesheet has been brought before the court, the same can be inquired into in order to effectively proceed with framing of charges. After the charges are framed, the prosecution is asked to lead evidence and till that is done, there is no evidence available in the strict legal sense of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The actual trial of the offence by bringing the accused before the court has still not begun. What is available is the material that has been submitted before the court along with the chargesheet. In such situation, the court only has the preparatory material that has been placed before the court for its consideration in order to proceed with the trial by framing of charges.
83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be utilised, rather it is that material after cognizance is taken by a court, that is available to it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence, that the court can utilise or take into consideration for supporting reasons to summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the court, who may be on the basis of such material, treated to be an accomplice in the commission of the offence. The inference that can be drawn is that material which is not exactly evidence recorded before the court, but is a material collected by the court, can be utilised to corroborate evidence already recorded for the purpose of summoning any other person, other than the accused. This would harmonise such material with the word "evidence" as material that would be supportive in nature to facilitate the exposition of any other accomplice whose complicity in the offence may have either been suppressed or escaped the notice of the court.
84. The word "evidence" therefore has to be understood in its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 CrPC. The court, therefore, should be understood to have the power to proceed against any person after summoning him on the basis of any such material as brought forth before it. The duty and obligation of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously on such material after evidence has been led during trial.
85. In view of the discussion made and the conclusion drawn hereinabove, the answer to the aforesaid question posed is that apart from evidence recorded during trial, any material that has been received by the court after cognizance is taken and before the trial commences, can be utilised only for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The "evidence" is thus, limited to the evidence recorded during trial.
6.1.5 While answering Question (ii) namely, whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. means as arising in examination-in-chief or also together with cross-examination, in the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under:
86. The second question referred to herein is in relation to the word "evidence" as used under Section 319 CrPC, which leaves no room for doubt that the evidence as understood under Section 3 of the Evidence Act is the statement of the witnesses that are recorded during trial and the documentary evidence in accordance with the Evidence Act, which also includes the document and material evidence in the Evidence Act. Such evidence begins with the statement of the prosecution witnesses, therefore, is evidence which includes the statement during examination-in-chief. In Rakesh (2001) 6 SCC 248 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1090 : AIR 2001 SC 2521, it was held that: (SCC p. 252, para 10) "10. ... It is true that finally at the time of trial the accused is to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness to test its truthfulness. But that stage would not arise while exercising the court's power under Section 319 CrPC. Once the deposition is recorded, no doubt there being no cross-examination, it would be a prima facie material which would enable the Sessions Court to decide whether powers under Section 319 should be exercised or not."
87. In Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1998) 7 SCC 149 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1554 : AIR 1998 SC 3148, this Court held that: (SCC p. 156, para 20) "20. ... it is not necessary for the court to wait until the entire evidence is collected for exercising the said powers."
88. In Mohd. Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC 1899, it was held that the prerequisite for exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC is the satisfaction of the court to proceed against a person who is not an accused but against whom evidence occurs, for which the court can even wait till the cross-examination is over and that there would be no illegality in doing so. A similar view has been taken by a two Judge Bench in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 13 SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135. This Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 16 SCC 785 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 355 seems to have misread the judgment in Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC 1899, as it construed that the said judgment laid down that for the exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, the court has to necessarily wait till the witness is cross-examined and on complete appreciation of evidence, come to the conclusion whether there is a need to proceed under Section 319 CrPC.
89. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the diverse views expressed in the aforementioned cases. Once examination-in-chief is conducted, the statement becomes part of the record. It is evidence as per law and in the true sense, for at best, it may be rebuttable. An evidence being rebutted or controverted becomes a matter of consideration, relevance and belief, which is the stage of judgment by the court. Yet it is evidence and it is material on the basis whereof the court can come to a prima facie opinion as to complicity of some other person who may be connected with the offence.
90. As held in Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC 1899 and Harbhajan Singh (2009) 13 SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135, all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words "such person could be tried" instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of subsection (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination,undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
91. Further, in our opinion, there does not seem to be any logic behind waiting till the cross-examination of the witness is over. It is to be kept in mind that at the time of exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, the person sought to be arraigned as an accused, is in no way participating in the trial. Even if the cross-examination is to be taken into consideration, the person sought to be arraigned as an accused cannot cross-examine the witness(es) prior to passing of an order under Section 319 CrPC, as such a procedure is not contemplated by CrPC. Secondly, invariably the State would not oppose or object to naming of more persons as an accused as it would only help the prosecution in completing the chain of evidence, unless the witness(es) is obliterating the role of persons already facing trial. More so, Section 299 CrPC enables the court to record evidence in absence of the accused in the circumstances mentioned therein.
92. Thus, in view of the above, we hold that power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the stage of completion of examination-in-chief and the court does not need to wait till the said evidence is tested on cross-examination for it is the satisfaction of the court which can be gathered from the reasons recorded by the court, in respect of complicity of some other person(s), not facing the trial in the offence.
xxx xxx 6.2 Considering the law laid down by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) and the observations and findings referred to and reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that (i) the Court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned and the Court need not wait till the cross-examination of such a witness and the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination; and (ii) a person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the basis of the evidence collected in the form of statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial.
xxx xxx 6.4 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC 368, after considering the observations made by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) referred to hereinabove, this Court has further observed and held that even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in the charge-sheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in FIR but not implicated in charge-sheet can be summoned to face the trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused." (Emphasis supplied)
10. Considering Sugreev Kumar (supra) and Sartaj Singh (supra) that the answer to Question-3 by Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh (supra) would be relevant and, as quoted above, wherein it is categorically held that word "evidence" in Section 319 Cr.P.C. means only such evidence as is made before the Court, in relation to statements, and as produced before the Court, in relation to documents. It is only such evidence that can be taken into account by the Magistrate or Court to decide whether the power under Section 319 CrPC is to be exercised and not on the basis of material collected during the investigation.
11. In view of above observation of Constitution Bench that while considering the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Court of Magistrate has to make an opinion only on the basis of evidence produced before Court and he is not required to look into the material collected during investigation and has to make out an opinion/ satisfaction that a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the Court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity as well as the test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.
12. On the basis of above legal position the Court scrutinize the impugned order and examination-in-chief of PWs-1, 2 and 3 on which the impugned order was passed.
13. PW-1, Shiv Lal in categorical terms has stated as under:
"दिनांक 26.3.18 का सुबह के लगभग 9.00 बजे रामनरेश व मनीराम सौच के बाद वापस अनीता के घर पास आये देखा कि सुघड़पाल सरिया से सावित्री देवी हसिया से रामकिशोर व कालीचरन डण्डों से मेरी पुत्री के साथ मारपीट कर रहे थे।"
14. PW-2, Mani Ram in categorical terms has also stated as under:
"मैं एकदम दौड़कर पहुँचा तो देखा कि अनीता को सुघड़पाल, रामकिशोर, सावित्री देवी कालीचरन चारो लोग लाठी डण्डों व सरिया व हंसिया से मार रहे थे। बाद मैने रोका तो तब तक इन लोगों ने गला दबाकर अनीता की हत्या कर दी। और मुझे भी धक्का मार कर बाहर भगा दिया।"
15. Lastly, PW-3, Ram Paresh in categorical terms has also stated as under:
"दूसरे दिन सुबह दिनांक 26.3.18 को जब हम लोग सौच क्रिया से निवृत्त होकर वापस आ रहे थे तो हमने अपनी बहन की चीख पुकार सुनी, कह रही थी भईया बचाओ भईया बचाओ। सुघड़पाल के हाथ में सरिया थी रामकिशोर के हाथ में डण्डा था। सावित्री के हाथ में हसिया था, कालीचरन के हाथ में डण्डा था। चारो एक साथ मार रहे थे। जब हम नजदीक पहुँचे तो हमें धक्का मार भाग गये। हम अपनी बहन के पास पहुँचे तो देखा कि उसके पूरे चेहरे गर्दन पीठ कन्धों पर चोटे थी मेरी बहन की हत्या अभियुक्त सुघड़पाल उसकी सावित्री देवी, उसके पिता कालीचरन व भाई राम किशोर ने मिलकर की है।"
16. The above quoted parts of prosecution witnesses have in equal terms alleged the involvement of all three revisionist also and allegations are also corroborated with the post-mortem report which opined that cause of death was due to asphyxia and shock and haemorrhage due to anti mortem injuries and strangulation. Therefore, in the impugned order dated 20.09.2021 Trial Court after considering Hardeep Singh (supra) as well as the above referred evidence has come to the conclusion that considering the examination-in-chief more than prima facie case was made out against revisionists. I, therefore, do not find any irregularity in the impugned order whereby revisionists are summoned under Section 302/34 IPC. So far as observations made in Brijendra Singh (supra) are concerned, since the impugned order satisfies the test prescribed by Constitution Bench judgement in Hardeep Singh (supra), as referred in Sugreev Kumar (supra) and Sartaj Singh (supra), only evidence brought before the Court has to be considered. Therefore, the revisionists will not get any help from observations made in Brijendra Singh (supra).
17. As discussed above, the revisionists have to go through de novo trial and it will have no effect of the trial concluded against other accused wherein they have been acquitted. Therefore, while rejecting the prayer made in this revision, it is disposed of with the direction that Trial Court shall conclude trial expeditiously, preferably within a period of one year from today, subject to the calender of the Court.
Order Date :-29.09.2022 AK