Delhi District Court
Deepak Tyagi vs Supreme Court Bar Association ... on 25 April, 2026
Digitally signed
by
DHARMENDER
DHARMENDER RANA
RANA
Date:
2026.04.25
16:21:47 +0530
DLND010064552024
IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT JUDGE- 01,
NEW DELHI DISTRICT, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS,
NEW DELHI
Presided over by :- SH. DHARMENDER RANA (DHJS)
Arbitration No. 478/2024
Deepak Tyagi,
S/o Late DPS Tyagi,
R/o F-183, First Floor,
Lane no.1, Laxmi Nagar,
Delhi- 110092.
Also at:
T-1, Appt No. 01013,
Supreme Towers, Sector-99
Noida, U.P.
Office at:
A-2, LGF, Lajpat Nagar,
New Delhi- 110024. ......... Petitioner
Versus
1. Supreme Court Bar Association Multistate
Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd (Regd),
Through its ACEO M C Setavad Chambers
Arbitration Room 117, Bhagwan Dass Road,
New Delhi- 110001
2. Mr. Satish Pandey,
A-2631, Green Field Colony,
Sector-42, Faridabad,
Haryana. ........ Respondents
ARBTN/478/2024 Page 1 of 9
Digitally signed
by
DHARMENDER
DHARMENDER RANA
RANA
Date:
2026.04.25
16:21:52 +0530
Petition presented on : 14.08.2024
Arguments Concluded on : 25.04.2026
Order Pronounced on : 25.04.2026
ORDER
1. The petitioner herein assails the Award dated 08.05.2024 whereby his claim challenging the election of Mr. Satish Pandey (respondent no.2) as a member of Board of Directors of Supreme Court Bar Association Multistate Co- operative Group Housing Society Ltd. (respondent no.1), was rejected.
2. Shorn off all unnecessary details:- The Petitioner has challenged the election of Sh. Satish Pandey (respondent no.2) on the ground that he was professionally engaged by respondent no.1 in two cases. The main stay of the challenge was Section 43 (1) (i) of Multi-state Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as MCS Act), which is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
"43. Disqualifications for being a member of board (1) No member of any multi-State co-operative society or nominee of a member, society or a national co-operative society shall be eligible for being chosen as, or for being, a member of the board of such multi-State co-operative society or a national co-operative society, or of any other co-
operative society to which the multi-State co-operative society is affiliated, if such member--
(i) is retained or employed as a legal practitioner on behalf of or against the multi-State co-operative society, or on behalf of or against any other multi-State co-
ARBTN/478/2024 Page 2 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDERDHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:21:57 +0530 operative society which is a member of the former society."
3. Petitioner, who has opted to address arguments in person, has forcefully argued that Ld. Arbitrator has committed a patent illegality by rejecting the claim of the petitioner. It is argued that once the respondent no.2 was professionally engaged by respondent no.1 for all practical purposes "he was retained as a legal practitioner" on behalf of respondent no.1 and thus, the statutory bar u/s 43 (1) (i) of MCS Act was squarely applicable in the case at hand. It is submitted that Ld. Arbitrator has committed patent illegality by ignoring the specific statutory mandate provided under Section 43 (1) (i) of MCS Act. Petitioner places strong reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter on MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Limited, (2019) 4 Supreme Court Cases 163.
Petitioner submits that all his contentions have been duly noted and correctly paraphrased herein as above.
4. Respondent no.2 has forcefully argued that this Court, within its limited scope under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, is not competent to substitute its own subjective opinion and thus a detailed and reasoned Award calls for no interference.
5. Counsel for respondent no.1 submits that respondent no.2 was infact engaged by respondent no.1 for two cases and his professional fees was duly paid. It is argued that the engagement ARBTN/478/2024 Page 3 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:22:01 +0530 of respondent no.2 by respondent no.1 by any stretch of imagination, cannot be called to be "retainership".
Counsel for respondent no.1 and respondent no.2 also fairly endorses that all their contentions have been correctly noted hereinabove and they have nothing more to say.
6. I have heard the rival submissions and carefully perused the record.
7. Before adverting to the rival claims of the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to remind itself of the scope of powers U/s 34 of the Arbitration Act. It has been held in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. Civil Appeal no. 5627 of 2021, Arising out of SLP (C) no. 4115 of 2019 decided on 09.09.2021 as under:
"...22. A cumulative reading of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, the legislative intent with which the 1996 Act is made, Section 5 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act would make it clear that judicial interference with the arbitral awards is limited to the grounds in Section 34. While deciding applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, courts are mandated to strictly act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34, refraining from appreciation or re- appreciation of matters of fact as well as law. (See: Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited. v. Northern Coal Field Limited. 1, Bhaven Construction Through Authorised Signatory Premjibhai K. Shah v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. and Another2 and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran3 ).
23. For a better understanding of the role ascribed to courts in reviewing arbitral awards while considering applications filed under 1 (2020) 2 SCC 455 2 2021 SCC OnLine SC 8 3 (2012) 5 SCC 306 ARBTN/478/2024 Page 4 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:22:06 +0530 Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it would be relevant to refer to a judgment of this Court in Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) 4 wherein R.F. Nariman, J. has in clear terms delineated the limited area for judicial interference, taking into account the amendments brought about by the 2015 Amendment Act. The relevant passages of the judgment in Ssangyong (supra) are noted as under:-
"34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression "public policy of India", whether contained in Section 34 or in Section 48, would now mean the "fundamental policy of Indian law" as explained in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49:
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] i.e. the fundamental policy of Indian law would be relegated to "Renusagar" understanding of this expression. This would necessarily mean that Western Geco [ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] expansion has been done away with. In short, Western Geco [ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] ,as explained in paras 28 and 29 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , would no longer obtain, as under the guise of interfering with an award on the ground that the arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach, the Court's intervention would be on the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post amendment. However, insofar as principles of natural justice are concerned, as contained in Sections 18 and 34(2) (a)(iii) of the 1996 Act, these continue to be grounds of challenge of an award, as is contained in para 30 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] .
35. It is important to notice that the ground for interference insofar as it concerns "interest of India" has since been deleted, and therefore, no longer obtains. Equally, the ground for interference on the basis that the award is in conflict with justice or morality is now to be understood as a conflict with the "most basic notions of morality or justice". This again would be in line with paras 36 to 39 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , as it is only such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court that can be set aside on this ground.
36. Thus, it is clear that public policy of India is now constricted to mean firstly, that a domestic award is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, as understood in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49: (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], or 4 (2019) 15 SCC 131 ARBTN/478/2024 Page 5 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:22:10 +0530 secondly, that such award is against basic notions of justice or morality as understood in paras 36 to 39 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204]. Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b)(ii) was added by the Amendment Act only so that Western Geco [ONGC v.
Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] , as understood in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , and paras 28 and 29 in particular, is now done away with.
37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an additional ground is now available under sub-section (2- A), added by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is not subsumed within "the fundamental policy of Indian law", namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality.
38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Para 42.2 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award.
40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of ARBTN/478/2024 Page 6 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:22:15 +0530 jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2-A).
41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , while no longer being a ground for challenge under "public policy of India", would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse."...
25. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root of the matter. In other words, every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression 'patent illegality'. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of law not linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope of the expression 'patent illegality'. What is prohibited is for courts to re-appreciate evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible grounds for interference with a domestic award under Section 34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one, or interprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which no fair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters not allotted to them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findings would make itself susceptible to challenge on this account. The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Also, consideration of documents which are not supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity falling within the expression 'patent illegality'...
8. In the case at hand, the nub of the issue is whether engagement of respondent no.2 by respondent no.1 for two cases would tantamount to retainership or not?
ARBTN/478/2024 Page 7 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDERDHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:22:20 +0530
9. In this context, it would be apt to reproduce herein the relevant portion of the Award, dealing with the issue, here as under:-
" (s) The words used in the section 43 of the Act specifically state RETAINED or EMPLOYED. In my opinion, engagement by the society of Sh. Satish Pandey in two specific cases, one which has been disposed off and one which is pending, does not fall under category of being retained or employed by the society. Retainer is when person hires an attorney on the basis of a period of time and not for what he does. A retainer is something altogether different. "A retainer is .. the fee which the client pays when he retains the attorney to act for him, and thereby prevents him from acting for his adversary." Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2, September 20, 1991, State Bar of Georgia, issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia, citing Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). "Thus, retainer fees are earned by the attorney by agreeing to be 'on call' for the client and by not accepting employment from the client's adversaries. McNulty, George & Hall Vs. Pruden, 62 Ga. 135, 141 (1878). Employment is understood in terms of salary."
10. Evidently, the Ld. Arbitrator has elaborately dealt with the issue and given his detailed finding extracted herein as above. The reasoning adopted by the Ld. Arbitrator cannot be castigated as 'perverse' or 'manifestly illegal' which no reasonable man can adopt. The word 'retained', in my humble understanding, conveys a sense of continuity of affairs with respect to period of time and the purpose of engagement. Mere casual engagement for two cases shall not constitute a contract/ arrangement of 'retainership' between respondent no.1 and respondent no.2. Even otherwise also, mere erroneous ARBTN/478/2024 Page 8 of 9 Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date:
2026.04.25 16:22:25 +0530 application of law cannot be interfered under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act unless it is found to be opposed to public policy i.e. it is vitiated by fraud or corruption or it is against the fundamental policy of Indian law or against the most basic notions of morality or justice. I concur with the respondents that this Court, acting within its limited scope of interference under Section 34 of A & C Act, cannot substitute its own subjective opinion upon the mere asking of the petitioner.
11. Thus, I have absolutely no reasons to entertain the challenge under Section 34 of the A & C Act against a well reasoned and detailed Award. The petition fails. Ordered accordingly. Copy of this order be given dasti to the parties.
12. File be consigned to record room after necessary compliance. Copy of this order be sent to Ld. Arbitrator.
Pronounced in open Court
on 25.04.2026 (Dharmender Rana)
District Judge - 01
PHC/New Delhi
ARBTN/478/2024 Page 9 of 9