Madras High Court
Sri Sowdeswari Charitable Trust vs S.Rajan on 15 October, 2012
Author: S.Rajeswaran
Bench: S.Rajeswaran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 15.10.2012
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.RAJESWARAN
C.R.P.(PD)Nos.2313 and 2314 of 2010
and M.P.Nos.1 to 3 of 2010
1.Sri Sowdeswari Charitable Trust
No.13-A, Murugaiah Layout,
A.K.S. Nagar,
Coimbatore 641 001.
2.S.K.Duraisamy ... Petitioners in both the CRPs.
Vs.
1.S.Rajan
2.Raju
3.M.Palanisamy
4.A.Palanisamy
5.R.Subramaniam
6.D.Rajamanickam
7.R.Rajagopal
8.D.K.Duraisamy ... Respondents in both the CRPs.
COMMON PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 115 of C.P.C., against the fair and decreetal order made in I.A.Nos.810 and 524 of 2009 respectively in O.S.No.130 of 2009 dated 17.03.2010 on the file of the 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore.
For Petitioners : Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan (senior counsel)
Senior Counsel For Mr.T.R.Rajaraman
For Respondents : Mr.N.Anand Venkatesh (for R1)
COMMON ORDER
The defendants 1 and 3 filed C.R.P.(PD)No.2313/2010 before this Court and they are aggrieved by the order of the 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore in I.A.No.810/2009 in O.S.No.130/2009 dated 17.03.2010.
2.The very same defendants 1 and 3 filed C.R.P.(PD)No.2314/2010 and this time they are aggrieved by the order passed by the very same District Judge, Coimbatore in I.A.No.524/2009 in the very same suit i.e. O.S.No.130/2009.
3.Since a common order has been passed in both I.A.No.524/2009 and I.A.No.810/2009 on 17.03.2010, a common order is being passed by me also to dispose of both the revision petitions. Thus, the facts which are necessary for deciding the issues are as follows:
O.S.No.130/2009 has been filed by the plaintiffs for the following reliefs:
In these circumstances, it is necessary to have the defendants 2 to 8 restrained from the activities of the Trust and all its institutions like the School.
(2) Removal of the All Board Members from important Posts like President, Secretary, etc. (3) Further dis-qualified members from becoming a Trustee in future.
(4) Criminally proceed against them and have them punished for recklessly risking the lives of children, staffs and Public by making them use the unauthorized constructions without approval and for furnishing for false information to the District Collector for getting School License and also (5) Recover compensation of money from these members.
The plaintiff submits that they are entitled to Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants 2 to 8 from (1) Acting as Trustees of the first defendant Trust (2) Further use their position as President, Secretary, etc. or any other Office bearers and further (3) From carrying out their threat of taking action against the Plaintiff with a force of feigned Trust majority And (4)To render total accounts for all misleads done by them in putting up constructions etc. without the approval of the authorities and also for losses caused by them to this Trust as also to its parent Trust the Sowdeswari Charitable Trust.
4.They also filed I.A.No.524/2009 under Section 92 CPC to grant leave to institute the suit seeking the reliefs against the defendants.
5.Respondents 1 and 2 in I.A.No.524/2009 filed a counter statement and opposed the granting of leave under Section 92 CPC.
6.The defendants in O.S.No.130/2009 have filed I.A.No.810/2009 under Order VII Rule 11 to reject the plaint.
7.In I.A.No.810/2009, the defendants have stated that the suit filed by the plaintiff is a scheme suit and after filing and numbering the suit, they filed an application in I.A.No.524/2009 under Section 92 CPC. They have further stated that as per Section 92, leave should be obtained first before numbering the suit, but, in this case, suit itself was numbered and taken on file without granting leave, as is evident from the application in I.A.No.524/2009. Hence, they prayed for the rejection of the plaint itself.
8.I.A.No.810/2009 was opposed by the plaintiffs by filing a counter stating that on such technicalities the plaint should not be rejected.
9.I.A.Nos.524/2009 and 810/2009 were taken up together by the 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore and by order dated 17.03.2010, the trial court allowed I.A.No.524/2009 by granting leave and dismissed I.A.No.810/2009 filed by the defendants to reject the plaint. Aggrieved by the common order dated 17.03.2010, passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, both the above revision petitions have been filed by the defendants 1 and 3 under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code.
10.Heard Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. I have also gone through the entire documents available on record.
11.A perusal of the common order would show that before the 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore, an objection was raised on behalf of the revision petitioners that only the Principal District Court and Sub Court would have jurisdiction and Additional District Courts have no jurisdiction to try a suit filed under Section 92 CPC. However, this objection has been brushed aside by the Court below by stating that the Additional District Judges have full power of discharge of all or any of the functions of the District Judge under the Civil Court Act. The learned Judge very much relied on Section 3(A) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act. The learned Judge had found that the suit was originally filed in the Principal District Court and only thereafter it was transferred and after transfer, the Additional District Court will have equal and full power to decide the suit. Consequently, it was held by the Court below that the Additional District Court has got power to try the suit.
12.In so far as the leave is concerned, granting leave during the pendency of the suit is not prohibited and the arguments raised on behalf of the defendants is too technical.
13.Before this Court, the main ground urged by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the 1st Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to grant leave under Section 92 CPC, as according to the learned senior counsel it is the Principal District Court which alone can entertain an application under Section 92 CPC and it cannot be transferred to any other Additional District Court. In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel very much relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (1) CTC 602 (Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust and others vs. A.G.Syed Mohideen and others).
14.A perusal of the above judgment would make it very clear that in so far as the suits under Section 92 are concerned, the District Courts and Subordinate Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any pecuniary limits. The pecuniary limits mentioned in Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act do not apply to suits under Section 92 CPC. In fact, if Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act is applied to decide the jurisdiction of the Courts with reference to suits under Section 92 of the Code, it will then lead to anomalous position.
15.The relevant portion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment cited above, reads as follows:
7.Section 92 provides that a suit under that Section can be instituted in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government. When it is read in a normal manner, it means that the Suits under Section 92 should be filed in the District Court or in the Subordinate Court. When the language is clear and unambiguous and when there is no need to apply the tools of interpretation, there is no need to interpret the work 'or', nor any need to read it as a substitutive word, instead of its plain and simple meaning denoting as 'alternative'.
8.Assuming that there was any need for applying the principles of interpretation, let us next consider whether the work 'or' was used in Section 92 of the Code in a substitutive sense. It is clear from section 92 of the Code that the legislature did not want to go by the general Rule contained in Section 15 of the Code that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits relating to public Trusts. The intention of the law makers was that such Suits should be tried by the District Court. At the same time, the law makers contemplated that if there was heavy wok load on the District court, the State Government should be enabled to empower any other Court (within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the whole or any part of the subject matter is situate), also to entertain such Suits. Therefore, the work or is used in he ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative, giving a choice. The provisions of Section 92 do not give room for interpreting the word or as a substitutive, so as to lead to an interpretation that when the Government notified any other Court, such notified Court alone will have jurisdiction and not the District Court. If the intention was to substitute the Court empowered by the State Government in place of the Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, instead of the words 'may institute a Suit in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government', the following words would have been used in the section :
'may institute a Suit in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or when any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government, then in such Court empowered by the State Government,' OR ' may institute a Suit in the Court notified by the State Government.'
9.The provisions of Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act specifying the pecuniary limits of District Courts and Subordinate Courts, is subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the express provisions of Section 92 specifying the Courts which will have jurisdiction to entertain Suits under that Section, neither the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Code nor the provisions of Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act will apply to such Suits. Section 92 is a self contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction in regard to Suits under that Section does not depend upon the value of the subject matter of the Suit. Therefore, insofar as the Suits under Section 92 are concerned, the District Courts and Subordinate Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any pecuniary limits. We find that the learned District Judge had held that he had jurisdiction because the value of the subject matter was Rs.10 lakhs, apparently keeping in view, Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act. We make it clear that the pecuniary limits mentioned in Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act, do not apply to Suits under Section 92 of the Code. In fact, if Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act is applied to decide the jurisdiction of Courts with reference to Suits under Section 92 of the Code, it will then lead to the following anomalous position: The District Court will have jurisdiction if the vlaue of the subject matter exceeds Rs.5 lakhs. The Subordinate Court will have jurisdiction where the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs.1 lakh but does not exceed to Rs.5 lakhs. That would mean that a Suit under Section 92 of the Code, where the subject matter does not exceeds Rs.1 lakh, cannot be filed in any Court as Section 92 confers jurisdiction only on District Court and Subordinate Courts. This obviously was not intended. Be that as it may.
10.We do not therefore approve the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in P.S.Subramanian which ignores the earlier decisions of that Court and decisions of other High Courts which have consistently taken the view that where jurisdiction is also conferred on any other Court by the State Government by a notification (under Section 92 of the Code or under any similar provision), then that Court and the District Court will have concurrent jurisdiction. We may in this behalf refer to the decisions in Annamalai vs. Slaiyappa, AIR 1935 MAD. 983 ; Dakor Temple Committee v. Shankerlal, AIR 1944 Bom. 300 ; R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal, AIR 1962 Mad. 450 ; and Pazhukkamattom Devaswom v. Lakshmi Kutty Amma, 1980 Kerala LT 645.
16.In view of the above judgment, it is very clear that the provisions of Section 92 do not give room for any interpretation and therefore, the reliance placed on by the 1st Additional District Judge on Section 3(A) of the Civil Courts Act is misconceived as Section 92 CPC will not grant jurisdiction on Additional District Courts.
17.In the result, both the revision petitions are allowed. The leave granted by the Additional District Judge is set aside and the plaint filed by the plaintiffs is rejected. However, liberty is given to the plaintiffs to move the appropriate court, if necessary. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also closed.
15.10.2012 cse/vs Internet:Yes.
Index: Yes.
To The 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore.
S.RAJESWARAN, J.
cse/vs C.R.P.Nos.2313 and 2314 of 2010 and M.P.Nos.1 to 3 of 2010 15.10.2012