Patna High Court
Raja Babu vs Babu Gauri Lal And Ors. on 24 February, 1928
Equivalent citations: 109IND. CAS.895, AIR 1928 PATNA 535
ORDER
1. The suit out of which the present appeal arises was brought by the plaintiff-respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Patna for rendition of accounts on the allegation that the defendant was his agent in a cloth shop. The suit was valued at Rs. 1,500 for the purpose of Court-fee and at Rs. 5,500 for purpose of jurisdiction. Court-fee was paid upon Rs. 1,500 which was the amount claimed by the plaintiff. A preliminary decree for account has been made by the learned Subordinate Judge and the defendant has preferred the present appeal. An objection was taken by the Stamp Reporter that the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction as well as for the purpose of Court-fee must be the same under the provisions of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and, therefore, the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction also must be taken to be Rs. 1,500 and if that is so, then the appeal would lie to the Court of the District Judge and not to this Court. The matter was referred to the Taxing Officer and he has decided that the valuation of the appeal should be Rs. 1,500 and not Rs. 5,500 which is the value put by the defendant-appellant upon his memorandum of appeal and upon which he has paid the Court-fee. The question is whether the appeal would lie to this Court or to the Court of the District Judge. It is conceded that under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the value of the suit would be the same for the purpose of jurisdiction as well as for the pupose of Court-fee and it is not denied that under Section 7iv(f) of the Court Fees Act the suit was properly valued at Rs. 1,500 and the Court-fee paid was the proper fee. It must, therefore, be held that the value of the suit was Rs. 1,500. Under Section 21 of the Bengal United Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act an appeal from a decree or order of a Subordinate Court shall lie to the District Judge where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or order was made did not exceed five thousand rupees. As the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction as well as for the purpose of Court-fee, in the present case, was Rs. 1,500 the appeal would lie under Section 21 to the Court of the District Judge and not to the High Court. It is however contended on the authority of Kuldip Sahay v. Harihar Prasad Jha 75 Ind. Cas. 871 : 3 Pat. 146 : 4 P.L.T. 638 : A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 161 that it was open to the defendant to put any valuation he liked upon the memorandum of appeal. The case, however, is no authority for the proposition urged by the learned Vakil for the appellant. In that case the suit was for possession and for accounts. The claim for possession was dismissed by the trial Court, but a decree was made for accounts. The trial Court observed in its judgment that the plaintiffs were not entitled to control or criticise the accounts. On appeal by the plaintiffs the lower Appellate Court modified the decree of the trial Court by giving the plaintiffs a right to examine and criticise the accounts. It was only against this part of the decree of the lower Appellate Court that an appeal was preferred to the High Court and the memorandum of appeal was valued at Rs. 200 although the value of the relief in the original suit was more than Rs. 1,000 and it was held that in the circumstances of that case it was open to the defendant appellant to value the appeal at any amount he thought proper, the appeal being only against a portion of the decree of the lower Appellate Court in which the plaintiff was given the right to examine and criticise the accounts. There is no authority for the proposition that the defendant can at his pleasure put any valuation upon the memorandum of appeal in order to alter the forum of appeal. Under Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act the appeal would lie to the District Judge's Court and it was not open to the defendant to prefer an appeal to this Court by merely enhancing the value of the appeal and putting a valuation which would make it appealable to the High Court. In the circumstances it must be held that the appeal was not properly presented to this Court and that the appeal lay to the District Judge's Court. The memorandum of appeal must, therefore, be returned to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court. It is not for us to say whether the defendant-appellant had sufficient ground for coming up to this Court instead of going to the District Judge's Court and when an application is made to the District Judge for extension of time for preferring an appeal to that Court it would be open to the appellant to urge that he had sufficient reason for not presenting the appeal to the District Judge's Court within the period of limitation.