Himachal Pradesh High Court
Shobha Nath Ram & Anr vs Satnam on 23 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:23796 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Review Petition No.112 of 2024 .
Reserved on: 08.07.2025
Date of Decision: 23.07.2025
Shobha Nath Ram & Anr. .... Petitioners
Versus
Satnam ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioners : Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sanjay Bhardwaj, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Hitesh Kumar, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge Review Petition No.112 of 2024 The petitioners/appellants have filed the present petition seeking review of the judgment dated 22.11.2023, passed by this Court in RSA No.23 of 2023, titled Sobha Nath Verma & Anr. Vs. Satnam Singh.
2. It has been asserted that the petitioners/appellants had framed the following substantial questions of law in the memorandum of appeal: -
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1. Whether the impugned judgment passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court below is the result of misreading, misinterpretation, .
as well as misconstruing the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record by the parties and further set aside the well- reasoned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in the Counter Claim filed by the Appellants/Defendants?
2. Whether the findings recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court below that the Appellants/Defendants have not disputed the correctness of Exhibit PW-3/B are sustainable, more particularly, when the Appellants/Defendants have proved the actual cost of the construction raised by the Respondent/Plaintiff while examining DW-2, who has proved details of measurement by report Ex. DW-2/B?
3. Whether the learned lower Appellate Court is right in not awarding interest from the date of institution of the Counter Claim till passing the decree, that too without assigning any reason, especially when the learned Trial Court had awarded interest @12% per annum on the decreetal amount in favour of the Appellants/Defendants?
3. A submission was made regarding the non-awarding of interest from the date of institution of the counterclaim till the passing of the decree. It was also proposed as a substantial question of law No.3. The Court considered the point concerning the reduction of the amount and the interest, but did not consider the denial of the interest from the date of ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 3 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) filing of the counterclaim. This is an error apparent on the face of the record; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition .
be allowed and the judgment be reviewed.
4. I have heard Mr. J. L. Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Sanjay Bhardwaj, learned counsel, for the petitioners/appellants and Mr. Hitesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent.
5. Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioners/appellants submitted that the petitioners/appellants had taken a specific plea that the learned Appellate Court had not awarded the interest from the date of institution of the counterclaim till passing the decree without assigning any reason. The Court had considered the reduction of the interest but not the fact that the interest was not awarded from the date of institution of the counterclaim, but from the date of the judgment. This is an error apparent on the face of the record; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment be recalled.
6. Mr. Hitesh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the Court had rightly dismissed the ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 4 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) appeal. The provisions of Section 152 cannot be invoked to correct the error in the judgment. He relied upon the judgment .
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. & Anr. [(1999) 3 SCC 500], in support of his submission.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The scope of the review was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1090, and it was observed at page 342:
37. Read in conjunction with Section 114CPC, Order 47 Rule 1 thereof has three broad components which need to be satisfied to set the ball for a review in motion -- (i) "who" means the person applying must demonstrate that he is a person aggrieved; (ii) "when", means the circumstances a review could be sought; and
(iii) "why", means the grounds on which a review of the order/decree ought to be made.
Finally comes the "what", meaning thereby the order the court may make if it thinks fit. Not much attention is generally required to be paid to components (i) and (ii) because of the overarching difficulties posed by component
(iii). However, in deciding this reference, component (i) would also have a significant role apart from the Explanation inserted by way of an amendment of CPC.
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38. Let us now briefly attempt a deeper analysis of the provision. We are conscious that the provisions relating to review have been .
considered in a catena of decisions, but the special features of these RPs, coupled with the fact that two Hon'ble Judges of this Court have delivered a split verdict, make it imperative for us not to miss any significant aspect.
39. A peep into the legislative history would reveal that Rule 1 of Order 47CPC, which is part of the First Schedule appended thereto, bears a very close resemblance to its predecessor statutes, i.e. Section 623 of the Codes of Civil Procedure of 1877 and 1882. The solitary legislative change brought about in 1976 in Order 47CPC resulted in the insertion of an Explanation at the foot of Rule 1, which is at the heart of the controversy here.
40. The first and foremost condition that is required to be satisfied by a party to invoke the review jurisdiction of the court, whose order or decree, as the case may be, is sought to be reviewed, is that the said party must be someone who is aggrieved by the order/decree.
41. The words "person aggrieved" are found in several statutes; however, the meaning thereof has to be ascertained about the purpose and provisions of the statute. In one sense, the said words could correspond to the requirement of "locus standi" about judicial remedies. The need to ascertain the "locus standi" of a review petitioner could arise if he is not a party to the proceedings but claims the order or decree to have adversely affected his interest. In terms of Order XLVII of the 2013 Rules read with Order 47CPC, a petition for review at the instance of a third party to the proceedings too is maintainable, the quintessence being that he ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 6 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) must be aggrieved by a judgment/order passed by this Court. This is what has been held in Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar .
Jagad [Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, (2019) 18 SCC 586]. That is, of course, not the case here. Normally, in the context of Rule 1 of Order 47CPC, it is that person (being a party to the proceedings) suffering an adverse order and/or decree who, feeling aggrieved thereby, usually seeks a review of the order/decree on any of the grounds outlined therein. The circumstances where a review would lie are spelt out in clauses (a) to (c).
42. Order 47 does not end with the circumstances as Section 114CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review power under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC is available to be exercised, subject to fulfilment of the above conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the following grounds:
(i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or
(ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
(iii) any other sufficient reason.
43. Insofar as (i) (supra) is concerned, the review petitioner has to show that such evidence (a) was available on the date the court made the order/decree, (b) with reasonable care and diligence, it could not be brought by him before the court at the time of the order/decree,
(c) it was relevant and material for a decision, and (d) because of its absence, a miscarriage of justice has been caused in the sense that had it been produced and considered by the court, the ultimate decision would have been otherwise.
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44. Regarding (ii) (supra), the review petitioner has to satisfy the court that the mistake or error committed by it is self-evident and such .
mistake or error can be pointed out without any long-drawn process of reasoning, and, if such mistake or error is not corrected and is permitted to stand, the same will lead to a failure of justice. There cannot be a fit-in-all definition of "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record", and it has been considered prudent by the courts to determine whether any mistake or error does exist, considering the facts of each case coming before it.
45. With regard to (iii) (supra), we can do no better than refer to the traditional view in Chhajju Ram [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11: AIR 1922 PC 112], a decision of a Bench of seven Law Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It was held there that the words "any other sufficient reason" mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously", meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably, Chhajju Ram [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11: AIR 1922 PC 112] has been consistently followed by this Court in a number of decisions starting with Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42: AIR 1954 SC 526].
46. There are recent decisions of this Court which have viewed "mistake" as an independent ground to seek a review. Whether or not such decisions express the correct view need not detain us since the review here is basically prayed in view of the subsequent event.
::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS8 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) Xxxxx J. Other precedents on review
59. Precedents on the aspect of review are .
legion, and we do not wish to burden this judgment by tracing all the decisions. However, only a few that were considered in the split verdict, some of which were cited by the parties before us and some that have emerged from our research on the subject and are considered relevant, are discussed/referred to here.
60. Two of these decisions, viz. A.C. Estates v. Serajuddin & Co. [A.C. Estates v. Serajuddin & Co., 1965 SCC OnLine SC 295 : (1966) 1 SCR 235: AIR 1966 SC 935] and Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan [Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan, (1971) 2 SCC 200] were rendered prior to the introduction of the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order 47CPC. Significantly, even without the Explanation, substantially the same view was expressed.
61. In A.C. Estates [A.C. Estates v. Serajuddin & Co., 1965 SCC OnLine SC 295 : (1966) 1 SCR 235: AIR 1966 SC 935], a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court, while dismissing the civil appeal and upholding the order of the High Court of Calcutta, held as follows : (SCC OnLine SC para
16) "16. ... Our attention in this connection is drawn to Section 29(5) of the Act, which gives power to the Controller to review his orders and the conditions laid down under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But this cannot be a case of review on the ground of discovery of new and important matter, for such matter has to be something which exists at the date of the order and there can be no review of an order ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 9 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) which was right when made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event (see Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma .
Rao v. Vellanki Venkatrama Rao [Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatrama Rao, 1900 SCC OnLine PC 12 :
(1899-1900) 27 IA 197] )." (emphasis supplied)
62. The next is the decision of a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court in Shatrunji [Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan, (1971) 2 SCC 200]. While dismissing an appeal and upholding the order [Mohd. Azamat Azim Khan v. Shatrunji, 1963 SCC OnLine All 50] of the Allahabad High Court, reference was made to "any other sufficient reason" in Rule 1 of Order 47CPC and the decision in Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao [Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatrama Rao, 1900 SCC OnLine PC 12: (1899-1900) 27 IA 197] whereupon it was held: (Shatrunji case [Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan, (1971) 2 SCC 200], SCC pp. 203-204, para 13) "13. ... the principles of review are defined by the Code, and the words "any other sufficient reason" in Order 47 of the Code would mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified immediately previously in that order. The grounds for review are the discovery of new matters or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or the review is asked for on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. In Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatrama Rao [Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS
10 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) Rao v. Vellanki Venkatrama Rao, 1900 SCC OnLine PC 12: (1899-1900) 27 IA 197] Lord Davey at IA p. 205 of the Report said that 'the .
section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event'." (emphasis supplied)
63. What was laid down in Netaji Cricket Club [BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741], upon reading Order 47CPC, can be better understood in the words of the Hon'ble Judge authoring the judgment. The relevant passages are quoted hereunder: (SCC pp. 764-65, paras 88-90) "88. ... Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code, in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit.
89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record, but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason.
90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court, which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking, may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 11 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words .
"sufficient reason" in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit."
In the next paragraph, their Lordships quoted a portion of para 35 from the larger Bench decision in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42: AIR 1954 SC 526] but held that "the said rule is not universal".
64. Netaji Cricket Club [BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741] was followed in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab [Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 7 SCC 38]. It was held there that Rule 1 of Order 47CPC does not preclude the High Court or a court from taking into consideration any subsequent event, and that if imparting justice in a given situation is the goal of the judiciary, the court may take into consideration (of course, on rare occasions) the subsequent events.
65. This Court, in para 20 of the decision in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 782 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 265 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 96], after surveying previous authorities and following Chhajju Ram [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11: AIR 1922 PC 112] and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42: AIR 1954 SC 526] summarised the principles of review and ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 12 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) illustrated when a review would be and would not be maintainable. Despite the observation in Netaji Cricket Club [BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, .
(2005) 4 SCC 741] limiting Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42: AIR 1954 SC 526], Kamlesh Verma [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Kartar Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1525] thought it fit to agree with the latter decision.
66. Recently, in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (2022) 17 SCC 255: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034], a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges has accepted the meaning of the ground "for any other sufficient reason" as explained in Chhajju Ram [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11: AIR 1922 PC 112], Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42: AIR 1954 SC 526] and Kamlesh Verma [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Kartar Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1525].
9. This Court had recorded the following finding in Para No.24 of the judgment: -
24. In the present case, there was no contractual rate of interest. Learned Trial Court awarded the interest @12% per annum but did not provide any justification for the same. The defendants claimed that they had taken the loan from the Bank, but there is no evidence that the transaction between the parties was commercial, and the rate of interest was brought to the notice of the plaintiff. Hence, the interest @12% per annum could not have been awarded, and the learned First Appellate Court had rightly ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS 13 ( 2025:HHC:23796 ) reduced the rate of interest to 6% from 12% awarded by the learned Trial Court.
10. It is apparent that the Court had dealt with the .
reduction of the interest from 12% to 06% but had not adverted to the fact that the learned Appellate Court had awarded the interest from the date of the judgment and not from the date of filing of the counterclaim, as was awarded by the learned Trial Court. No finding was recorded whether the learned Appellate Court was justified in disallowing the interest from the date of filing of the counterclaim without assigning any reason. The Court had also not held that the substantial question of law proposed by the petitioners/appellants was not a substantial question of law but a pure question of fact. It appeared that the part of the substantial question of law regarding disallowing of the interest from the date of filing of the counterclaim escaped the attention of the Court; therefore, the plea taken by the petitioners/appellants that the judgments suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record is correct as a plea taken in the memorandum of appeal was noticed but was not decided.
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11. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the judgment dated 22.11.2023 passed in RSA No. 23 of .
2023 is ordered to be recalled.
12. The present petition stands disposed of.
RSA No. 23 of 202313. The judgment dated 22.11.2023 has been recalled as r to per the order passed in Review Petition No.112 of 2024.
List this matter before the appropriate Bench having the Roster.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd July, 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez) ::: Downloaded on - 23/07/2025 21:22:17 :::CIS