Allahabad High Court
Kishan Lal Gupta vs Ixth Additional District Judge, ... on 27 August, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(1)AWC222, 1999 ALL. L. J. 1473, 1999 A I H C 3899, (1998) 34 ALL LR 612, (1999) 1 ALL WC 222, (1999) 1 ALL RENTCAS 373, (2000) 2 RENTLR 647, (1999) 1 RENCR 438
Author: J.C. Gupta
Bench: J.C. Gupta
JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. Heard petitioner's counsel.
2. Sri Santosh Kumar appears for the caveator-respondents.
3. This is tenant's writ petition challenging the concurrent orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority whereby application for release moved on behalf of the landlord-respondents under Section 21 (1) (b) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has been allowed. Both the Courts below have recorded a clear and categorical finding that the building in question is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. It has also been found that the landlord has made due compliance of Rule 17 of the Rules.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner firstly argued that the application for release was not maintainable as the same was moved before the Prescribed Authority within a period of three years from the date of purchase. This argument of the learned counsel on its face is fallacious and cannot be accepted. First proviso of Section 21 (1) of the Act provides that an application for release moved under clause (a) of Section 21 (1) of the Act shall not be entertained unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of purchase of the property sought to be released. The said proviso makes no reference to an application moved under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act. In the present case, since the Prescribed Authority was faced with an application under clause (b), the first proviso aforesaid was not attracted. In any view of the matter, the application was decided much after the expiry of three years. It has been held in a number of decisions including the latest Supreme Court case of Martin and Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional District Judge and others, AIR 1998 SC 492. that the word 'entertained' means 'decided'.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the Courts below have taken an erroneous view in law in treating the building in question as dilapidated, because all throughout the period when the proceedings remained pending before the Courts below, no portion of the building has fallen down. This argument of the learned counsel must also be rejected as untenable.
6. The word 'dilapidated' means in a state of disrepair but it is not necessary that the building should be in a fallen state or in ruinous condition. See the cases of Shyam Lal Goel v. VIth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1979 ALJ 1258 and Ram Avtar v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Moradabad, 1982 ARC 124. For the applicability of clause (b), all that is necessary is that the building has outlived its life and not that it should start falling, therefore, the mere fact that no portion of the building did actually fall down during this intervening period would not lead to a conclusive inference that the building is not in a dilapidated condition. The argument that before an application under clause (b) is allowed for the demolition and re-construction of the tenanted building, one must wait for the building to get on the verge of collapse would be a negation of the basic principles of safety and security, underlying the provisions of Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act and for this proposition. I am supported by the decision rendered in the case of Smt. Shanti Devi v. Ist Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1983 (1) ARC 20.
7. The finding of the Courts below that the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition is based on appraisal of oral evidence and also on the consideration of the reports of the Architects submitted from both sides. The authorities below have found the report filed on behalf of the landlord to be more detailed and convincing than the report submitted from the petitioners' side and cogent and valid reasons have been assigned in support of that conclusion.
8. No other point has been pressed or argued.
9. At this stage learned counsel for the petitioner made a request that the petitioner may be allowed a reasonable time of three months to vacate the premises in question and for that the petitioner is prepared to give an undertaking as may be asked for by this Court.
10. Having regard to the fact that the proceedings for release were initiated in the year 1984, the petitioner is allowed three months time to vacate the disputed accommodation subject to his filing an undertaking on affidavit before the Prescribed Authority that he shall hand over vacant possession of the disputed premises to the landlord-respondents without inducting any third person therein, on or before 30.11.1998. For a period of three weeks from today execution of the impugned order shall remain suspended. In the event of no such undertaking being filed within the aforesaid period of three weeks, the landlord-respondents shall be at liberty to get the release order enforced forthwith according to law. However, if the required undertaking is furnished and respected, the petitioner's eviction shall remain stayed till 30.11.1998.
With the above concession given to the petitioner, this writ petition is dismissed in limine.