Kerala High Court
Govindan Nair vs Abraham on 27 September, 2002
Author: J.B. Koshy
Bench: J.B. Koshy, K. Thankappan
JUDGMENT J.B. Koshy, J.
1. This Second Appeal was referred to the Division Bench by Justice Chettur Sankaran Nair by Order of Reference dated 20.7.1992 doubting the correctness of the judgment in Kunjamma v. Bhageerathy Amma (1990 (1) KLT 504) in so far as it holds that the amount found due in the preliminary decree should be deposited within 30 years from the date on which the mortgage money has become due as right of redemption of mortgage is permanently lost by that time. According to the above judgment, in view of Article 61 of the Limitation Act, right to redeem mortgage is lost after 30 years from the date on which the mortgage money has become due. After the above limitation period, relationship of mortgagor or mortgagee is not subsisting as Article 61 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of 30 years to redeem or recover possession of the immovable property and the period of Limitation Act is not extended by filing of a suit or passing of a preliminary decree within that period. The Court observed as follows:
"Article 61 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of 30 years to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged and time begins to run when the right to redeem or recover possession accrues. The period of limitation for foreclosure by a mortgagee is also 30 years and the starting point of limitation is the same. The deposit can be made by the mortgagor so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists. It cannot be said that the relationship subsist seven after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under Article 61 of the Limitation Act. The period of limitation is not in any way extended by the passing of the preliminary decree. The right of the mortgagee to get a final decree debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the property will also come to an end on the expiry of 30 years from the date on which the mortgage money has become due. The mortgagor cannot, therefore, wait for years and years and then make a deposit and file an application for a final decree. In other words, the deposit of the amount found due in the preliminary decree has to be made before the date fixed in the preliminary decree or within the period of limitation prescribed in Article 61 of the Limitation Act, viz., within 30 years from the date on which the mortgage money has become due."
We also note that a similar reference was made by Justice R. Bhaskaran in S.A.No. 215/90.
2. We may first answer the referred question before going to the other questions of law raised in this appeal. In this case, facts are not disputed. Property was mortgaged on 27.5.1122 (ME) (11.1.1947) for a period of 12 years. The period expired on 11.1.1959. Contention based on the observation of the learned Single Judge in Kunjamma's case (supra) is that since the mortgage money is not deposited before 11.11.1989, the right to redeem mortgage money is extinguished by operation of Article " 61(a) of the Limitation Act. (For answers to reference, we are now not referring the contention raised under Order XXXIV Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to deposit of money after passing of preliminary decree.). Admittedly, mortgage amount of Rs. 600/- was deposited only on 19.1.1990, after expiry of 30 years. Hence, the contention is that notwithstanding the filing of suit within 30 years of the time fixed for redemption of mortgage or passing of a preliminary decree, in view of non-payment of mortgage money within 30 years from the date from which the mortgage money has become due, right to redeem mortgage is extinguished.
3. Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act comes under Part V of the Limitation Act which prescribes law of limitation for filing suits relating to immovable property. It reads as follows:
"PART V Suits Relating to Immovable Property Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which begins to run
61. By mortgagor-
(a) to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged;
Thirty years When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues
(b) xx xx XX XX
(c) xx xx XX xx"
4. A simple reading of Article 61 (a) would reveal that limitation is fixed under this Article for filing suits for redemption of mortgage. Heading of Part V refers to Quits' and what is mentioned in first column is 'description of suit'. Under the above column, in Article 61 suit by mortgagor is covered. Therefore, period of limitation fixed in column No. 2 under Article 61 (a) is only for filing suits by mortgagor. It is settled law that Article 61 (a) is not restricted to the suit for redemption by the original mortgagor but governs all suits for redemption brought against the mortgagee by a person entitled to redeem a mortgage. The right of redemption of a mortgage is conferred by Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. Right to redeem usufructuary mortgage is provided under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. No time limit is fixed in the above section. Only right to redeem the property after money has become due is mentioned. The Supreme Court in Murarilal v. Dev Karan (AIR 1965 SC 225) has held that even in areas where Transfer of Property Act does not apply the principle of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply to enable the mortgager to redeem the mortgage and to enforce the right by filing a suit for redemption. In this case, admittedly, the suit was filed on 17.5.1965 within 30 years of time fixed for redeeming the mortgage. Article 61 (a) fixed time for filing suit for redemption of mortgage as 30 years and not for payment of money. In other words, right to redeem mortgage is not extinguished merely because the mortgage money is not paid or deposited within 30 years. Article 61 (a) prescribes only time limit of filing suit. Hence, we are of the opinion that the view expressed in Kunjamma's case (supra) on this point is not correct and has to be overruled.
5. In Hamzabi and Ors. v. Syed Karimuddin and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 414, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"2. The right of the mortgagor to redeem had its origin as an equitable principle for giving relief against forfeiture even after the mortgagor defaulted in making payment under the mortgage deed. It is a right which has been jealously guarded over the years by courts. The maxim of "once a mortgage always a mortgage" and the avoidance of provisions obstructing redemption as "clogs on redemption" are expressions of this judicial protection. (See Pomal Kanji Gavindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, (1989) 1 SCC 458, in this context). As far as this country is concerned, the right is statutorily recognised in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section gives the mortgagor right to redeem the property at any time after the principal money has become due by tendering the mortgage money and claiming possession of the mortgaged property from the mortgagee. The only limit to this right is contained in the proviso to the section which reads:
"Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a court." "
However, under Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, the suit for redemption has to be filed within 30 years. Therefore, on the expiry of 30 years, right of redemption will not be lost as held in Kunjatnma's case (supra); but, suit to redeem mortgage cannot be filed after 30 years,
6. Now, we may come to the facts of this case and other questions involved. Mortgage was executed on 27-5-1122 (M.E.) (11.1.1947) for a period of 12 years. The period fixed for the mortgage expired on 11.1.1959 and on 17.5.1965, this suit was filed for redemption of the mortgaged property. The preliminary decree for redemption of mortgage was passed on 12.8.1968. As per the preliminary decree, plaintiffs were allowed to redeem and recover the plaint schedule properties from the defendants on deposit of mortgage amount, value of improvements due to the defendants and cost of the defendants in the suit. Plaintiff was entitled to get mesne profits at the rate fixed in the final decree proceedings. The question as to what is the value of improvements and mesne profits has to be decided in the final proceedings. In the decree, defendants were also liable to pay to the plaintiffs Rs. 90/- as damages and mutual set off was also allowed. The decree also directed the defendants to apply for issue of a fresh commission for assessing the value of improvements and directed the plaintiff to apply for passing a final decree within one month from that date. The defendants questioned the preliminary decree by filing A.S. No. 187/70 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam. The District Court allowed the same and the matter was remanded to the trial court. C.M.A. No. 132/73 was filed before this Court by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree in A.S. No. 187/70 and the appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed and this Court remanded the matter to the First Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam for reconsidering the matter. The Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam again reconsidered A.S. No. 187/70 and appeal was dismissed confirming the preliminary decree. Against that S.A. No. 419/75 was filed by defendants 1 to 5 and 7. Even though correctness of the preliminary decree was affirmed, the contention of fourth defendant that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was left open. Therefore, the preliminary decree came into finality only on 20.12.1977. Even before the operative decree was passed by the High Court in S.A. No. 419/75, final decree application I.A. No. 3392/68 was filed on 12.9.1968. On 9.10.1980, I. A. No. 3392/68 in O.S. No. 130/65 filed for passing a final decree was dismissed as not maintainable. Against that plaintiff filed A.S. No. 25/01 on the file of the Additional District Court, Ernakulam. The District Court allowed the appeal and the final decree application was remanded to the trial court. The contention that final decree application was barred by time and preliminary decree was not enforceable due to non-deposit of the mortgage amount in time was not accepted.
7. Against the above judgment in A.S. No. 25/81 defendants filed C.M.A. No. 99/84 before this Court. But, by judgment dated 9.12.1987, this Court held as follows:
"2. A preliminary decree was passed on 12.8.1968 directing that the application for final decree should be filed within one month. But, that judgment and decree were taken in appeal as A.S. No. 187/70 and later came to this Court as C.M.A. No. 132/73, when the matter was sent back to the appellate Court. Thereafter, the appellate court again dismissed the appeal and a Second Appeal No. 419 of 1975 was filed in this Court. That was disposed of on 20.12.1977 modifying the trial court's decree. The decree of this Court is the operative decree. Therefore, the contention that the application for final decree was filed beyond time cannot be accepted as correct. The Munsiff Court was wrong in dismissing the final decree application on that account.
3. The second ground on which the application was dismissed was that the mortgage amount was not deposited. The amount is not fixed before ascertaining the value of improvements. Therefore, that reasoning also is wrong. The question of value of improvements was not also adjudged correctly and the question of kudikidappu rights claimed by the 4th defendant requires fresh consideration. On these grounds, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court and the matter was remanded to that court. I do not think that the order of remand calls for any interference by this Court as it is eminently a just order, warranted by law and required to correct a patent mistake committed by the trial court."
Thereafter, before passing of the decree, mortgage money was deposited on 19.1.1990 and cost was deposited on 25.1.1990. Final decree was passed on 13.9.1990 wherein value of improvements was fixed at Rs. 27,206/- with a direction to deposit the same before 20.11.1990. The above was deposited within time. Mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100 per annum was awarded from the date of deposit of mortgage money till delivery of possession. Against that defendant filed appeal A.S. No. 5/91. Final decree was modified and value of improvements was fixed at Rs. 17,079.62. Kudikidappu right of fourth defendant in respect of 10 cents was upheld and that portion is deleted from the final decree. Therefore, fourth defendant got ownership right (kudikidappu right) over 10 cents of land under the Kerala Land Reforms Act and balance only can be redeemed. The appellants' contentions that the final decree application is not maintainable because (1) the mortgage money was deposited only on 19.1.1990 after the right to redeem mortgage money was extinguished by the operation of Article 61 (a) of the Limitation Act; (2) final decree application was not filed in time as prescribed by the Court in the preliminary decree; and (3) time for deposit of mortgage money under Order XXXIV Rule 7 of CPC was over were repelled by the Sub Court, Muvattupuzha and appeal was dismissed. Against the above decision in A.S. No. 5/91, defendants filed second appeal and the matter was referred to us. While rejecting the contentions of the appellants, the court below also referred to the judgment in C.M.A. No. 99/84 and found that all these points were already considered in the remand order and found that the parties are bound by the remand order.
8. First question to be considered is whether right to redeem is extinguished on the expiry of 30 years' time limit after the date fixed for redeeming the mortgage in view of Article 61 (a) of the Limitation Act. We have already answered this point and held that the right to redeem will not be extinguished on the expiry of 30 years on the basis of Limitation Act. But, a suit for redemption cannot be filed after 30 years in view of Article 61(a).
9. With regard to filing of application within the time prescribed by the Court in the preliminary decree dated 12.8.1968 directing the plaintiff to file final decree application within one month (it was filed only on 17.9.1968 after a delay of seven days), we note that the above decree was taken in appeal by the defendants in time. In the appeal, preliminary decree was set aside and the matter was finalised only by the judgment in S.A. No. 419/75 dated 20,12.1977. But, final decree application was filed much before that, on 17.9.1968 itself. Thereafter, preliminary decree was set aside in A.S. No. 187/70. Even, if final decree application is filed on 20.12.1977, it would not have been time barred as preliminary decree application was finalised only on 20.12.1977. Admittedly, bar under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is not attracted as within one month and seven days of the first preliminary decree, final decree application was filed. Therefore, it cannot be stated that final decree application was belated.
10. The last contention raised is in respect of Order XXXIV Rules 7 and 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The mortgage money of Rs.600/- was deposited only on 19.1.1990. Even if operational decree is the decree of the Second Appeal, time for depositing the mortgage money as per Order XXXIV, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, expired on 20.6.1978 (after six months) and, therefore, right for redeeming the mortgage is lost. Hence no orders can be passed on the final decree application as right to redeem was completely lost. We note that in C.M.A. No. 99/84, this point urged by the defendants (appellants herein) was not accepted by this Court. We also note that the contention of fourth defendant for the benefit of Section 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was left open in S.A. No. 419/75 (passed in the preliminary decree proceedings) and only in final decree proceedings, that too, only in appeal, it was held that he will be entitled to 10 cents of property as kudikidappu right. The benefits were finally computed only after final decree and before final decree was passed, mortgage amount and cost was paid. The mortgage money was deposited on 19.1.1990 and cost of Rs. 50/- was deposited on 25.1.1990. But, final decree was passed on 13.9.1990.
11. In Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, Fifteenth Edition, it is stated as follows:
"Where the suit is for redemption of an usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor can redeem by making the payment as declared even after the time fixed by the Court, the reason being that under Sub-section (1), Clause (ii)(b) the Court cannot cut off his right to redeem on his failure to pay within the time mentioned in the preliminary decree (Azim v. Sultan, (1945) 24 Patna 575; ('46) A.P. 99, following the principle laid down in Saligram v. Muradan, (1903) 25 All. 231 ; Rudrappa v.Puttalakshamma, 1953 Mys. 652, (1954) A. Mys. 118; Palton Mahto v. Jagaru Mahto, (l914) A. Pat. 276".
12. The Patna High Court in Md. Azim and Ors. v. Md. Sultan and Ors., AIR (33) 1946 Patna 99, observed as follows:
"Now a preliminary decree in a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage may, under Clause (c)(i) of Rule7(1)of Order XXXIV, Civil P.C., fix a time for payment of the amount declared due under the decree. But default in making the payment of the amount declared under the decree within the time fixed does not operate to debar the plaintiff mortgagor from all right to redeem the mortgaged property. ..... In the case of a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagor need not ask for extention of the time fixed for payment by the preliminary decree under the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7. The provisions of that sub-rule apply to the case of mortgage for foreclosure or sale only. ..... The mortgagor's right to redeem the mortgaged property subsists until a final decree debars the mortgagor from all right to redeem, and that in the case of a mortgage by conditional sale, or an anomalous mortgage the terms of which provide for for closure only and not for sale."
In other words, right to redeem the mortgaged property subsists and so long as the right is there, it is always open to a mortgagor to avail himself of that right on payment of the amount declared due under the preliminary decree. This view gain support from the observations of the Supreme Court in Hamzabi's case referred to in paragraph 5 of this judgment. It was also pointed out that the defendants also did not apply for final decree taking recourse to Rule 7(1)(iii)(c)(2). The above provision is not applicable in usufructuary mortgage. The matter was considered by the Apex Court in K.Parameswaran Pillai v. K. Sumathi and Anr., (1993) 4 SCC 431, after considering the provisions of Rule 7 and Rule 8(1) of Order XXXIV CPC, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff can make payment of redemption money at any time before the date of final decree. The Apex Court held as follows:
".........Till date of passing the final decree and its execution or till the remedy is barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 the Court has power and jurisdiction to entertain the application to pass the final decree. At any time before the remedy is barred, it is open to the plaintiff to deposit the redemption money under the preliminary decree".
13. Here, it is not disputed that final decree application was not barred by limitation under Section 137 of the Limitation Act and the redemption money as ascertained in the preliminary decree was deposited before the final decree was passed. Amount found in the final decree was also deposited within the time prescribed under the final decree.
14. It is argued by the appellants that in Mohammed Abdul Khader v. Kunju Sayed (1991 (1) KLT 53 SC) it was held that in suit for redemption of usufructuary mortgage even if preliminary decree is not mentioning any time for payment of redemption money, it has to be paid within the statutory period of six months (Order XXXIV Rules 7 and 8) unless extended by the Court. Here, in this case, admittedly, the amount was not paid within six months from the date of passing of the preliminary decree, that is, operational decree dated 20.7.1970. Therefore, the case of the appellants is that since the amount was not deposited within six months, final decree passed is illegal. We note that in Mohammed Abdul Khader's case (supra), even final decree application was not filed. The decree was confirmed in appeal on 16.11.1965 and limitation for the purpose started from that date. The amount was not paid within six months and the payment was prolonged. Final decree application was also not filed in time. The contention was that since the amount was not fully determined, the decree could not be called a preliminary decree at all and another preliminary decree has to be passed and, therefore, the petition was filed before the Court for ascertaining of time when the redemption price should be deposited. The contention was that even the final decree application need not be filed and mortgage money need not be deposited before passing another preliminary decree, ascertaining the final amount. That was not accepted. It is true that the decision of the Apex Court in Parameswaran Pillai's case (supra) was not considered in the above judgment. But, there is no conflict between the above decisions. In Mohammed Abdul Khader's case (supra), the Apex Court held that if no time is fixed in the preliminary decree for depositing the amount ascertained in that decree, time to deposit the amount is six months from the date of preliminary decree in view of Order XXXIV Rule 7(1)(c)(i). In that case, final decree application was not filed. It is not laid down in the above judgment that if the amount found in the preliminary decree is not deposited within the time fixed by that decree or within six months as prescribed under 0. XXXIV, Rule 7(1)(c)(i), right of redemption is permanently relinquished or filing of a final decree application is barred in the case of an usufructuary mortgage. Hence, it is clear that final decree application can be filed after preliminary decree within the time limit prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, If such an application is filed in time, Court has power and jurisdiction to pass final decree and before remedy is barred, plaintiff can deposit the redemption money as quantified under the preliminary decree before the final decree as held in Parameswaran Pillai's case (supra). In view of Order XXXIV Rule 8(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiff can deposit the amount found due under Rule 7(1) before passing the final decree. This is apart from the power of the Court to extend the time of payment before passing final decree under Rule 7(2). It is now well settled that right to make an application for final decree accrues on the date fixed in the preliminary decree for payment. Therefore, in view of the decision in Mohammed Abdul Khader's case (supra), if no time is fixed in the preliminary decree for payment of money, starting period of limitation for the purpose of Article 137 of the Limitation Act for filing application for final decree starts from the expiry of six months from the date of passing the final decree. It was also held by the Privy Council that if the preliminary decree is appealed from, time begins to run only from the date of appellate decree and not from the date fixed for payment in the preliminary decree as held by Privy Council in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh, (1926) 51 MLJ 781 PC, (See also: Fitzholmes v. The Bank of Upper India in Liquidation, (1927) 52 MLJ 366 PC). As far as this case is concerned, there is no dispute that the application for final decree was filed within the time prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. It was also held that payment under Rule 8(1) of Order XXXIV can be made at any time before passing of a final decree. (See: Angammal v. Mahommed Sulaiman Labbai, AIR 1946 Mad. 38). Limitation to file an application under Order XXXIV Rule 8(1) to pass a final decree starts running and continues to run its course from the date of expiry of the period fixed in the preliminary decree and if no period is fixed, within six months from the date of the preliminary decree in view of Order XXXIV, Rule 7(1) unless time is extended by an order of the Court. Here, admittedly, final decree application was filed within the time as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and the amount quantified in the preliminary decree was deposited before passing of a final decree.
15. In any event, on the facts of this case, a threadbare discussion on this point may not be necessary as these matters are decided between the parties in the earlier proceedings in C.M.A. No. 99/84 and parties are bound by that decision. There was a decision by the Court in C.M.A. No. 99/84 dated 9.12.1987 that final decree application is not time barred for non-payment of deposit as prescribed under Order XXXIV Rule 7 of CPC. Appellants did not challenge the same. Therefore, in view of the judgment in C.M.A. No. 99/84, appellants cannot question the same. We are of the view that the appellants cannot take up that point again. The contention of the defendants that final decree application was time barred as the amount was not deposited within the time prescribed under Order XXXIV Rule 7 of CPC within six months was rejected by the Second Additional District Judge, Ernakulam in A.S. No. 25/81. That was not accepted and C.M.A. No. 99/84 against the above judgment was dismissed by this Court. This point was specifically considered. (See the relevant portion of C.M.A. judgment in paragraph 7 supra). The appellants did not file any appeal and the matter has become final. Now, the Court below decided the matter as directed in the remand order.
16. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that it is a pure question of law. Hence, there is no res judicata or estoppel. In Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (AIR 1971 SC 2355). It was held that a question relating to jurisdiction of a court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that Court. In other words, if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the Statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata even between the same parties as it will assume status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the legislature. The same view was taken in Isabella Johnson v. MA. Susai, (1991) 1 SCC 494. There, the question was whether the petition for eviction can be filed before the Rent Controller or civil court. It was held that even if a previous decision is there that the case can be filed only before the civil court, it cannot be filed in civil court and only before the Rent Control Court in view of the provisions of the A.R Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act. There, clear ouster of jurisdiction was prescribed by the Statutes and by erroneous decision, the Court cannot assume jurisdiction. But, here, the question to be decided depends upon a bundle of facts also. Further, even though there is question of law involved, it is not a question relating to the pecuniary or territorial or inherent jurisdiction of the Court; but, application of time bar, which itself depends on a bundle of facts and settled between the parties in the earlier proceedings. The matter is covered by a remand order. The remand order is not passed in an interlocutory application. When final decree application was dismissed, appeal suit was filed. From that judgment, Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was filed before this Court and the order was passed and considered these questions and these questions have become final between parties. In an identical matter, the Supreme Court held that in such cases, courts will be bound by the remand order. Trial court's jurisdiction on remand is circumscribed and fettered by the order of remand. Once the remand order has become final, parties are also bound by the same and one cannot set the hands of the clock backwards. It was held as follows in paragraph 12 of the decision reported in Om Prakash v. Amarjit Singh & Anr. (1988 (Supp) SCC 780):
"12. Appellant's entitlement to adduce fresh evidence and to have plaintiff's witnesses recalled for cross-examination turns upon and is circumscribed by the order of remand. The order of remand dated February 14, 1986, not having been appealed against by either side had assumed finality. As observed by this Court in Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, an order, which is appealable under Order XLIII, CPC, if not appealed against, becomes final and its correctness is no more open to examination in view of the provisions of Section 105(2) of the Code which provides that where any party, aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies, does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. It is true that the correctness of the view taken by the District Judge in the course of the remand order that the date of the signing of the application and not the date of its initial filing was the relevant date for purposes of reckoning limitation is open to doubt in the light of the directions of the High Court permitting appellant to sign that application. But, that order of remand, as stated earlier, was not appealed against by the appellant. The trial court was right in its view that its jurisdiction on remand was circumscribed and fettered by the terms of the order of remand".
17. We also note that out of the mortgaged property, ten cents of land was given to the fourth respondent and balance was ordered to be redeemed after paying full redemption money and other amount and the parties are bound by the earlier remand order. Judgment in C.M.A. No. 99/84 has become final and points settled there cannot be re-agitated as trial court cannot go beyond the remand order. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal is dismissed. In view of the facts of the case, parties shall bear their respective costs.
In the Cross Objection, respondents 1 to 4 challenges the granting often cents of land as kudikidappu right under Section 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act to the fourth respondent. The above decision is based on facts and no interference is required in a Second Appeal as no question of law is raised. Cross Objection is also dismissed.