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Orissa High Court

2017 vs State Of Odisha on 2 November, 2021

Author: S.K. Sahoo

Bench: S.K. Sahoo

                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

                                       JCRLA No. 60 of 2018

        From judgment and order dated 21.03.2018 passed by the Addl.
        Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge, Sundargarh camp at
        Rourkela in Special G.R. Case No.417 of 2013/Trial No.29 of
        2017.
                             ---------------------------

               Prafulla Mundari @ Pelka .......                                          Appellant

                                                   -Versus-


               State of Odisha                         .......                           Respondent


                      For Appellant:                     -       Mr. Arun Kumar Budhia
                                                                 Amicus Curiae


                      For Respondent:                    -       Mr. Arupananda Das
                                                                 Addl. Govt. Advocate
                                           ---------------------------

        P R E S E N T:

                         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO

        ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Date of Hearing and Judgment: 02.11.2021
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

S.K. SAHOO, J.           The appellant Prafulla Mundari @ Pelka faced trial in

        the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge,

        Sundargarh camp at Rourkela in Special G.R. Case No.417 of

        2013/Trial No.29 of 2017 for commission of offences punishable

        under section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and section 6 of
                             // 2 //




the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

(hereafter 'POCSO Act') on the accusation that he committed

rape on the victim girl, who was aged about eight years at the

time of occurrence, in a dilapidated house situated at village

Lindra under Bisra police station in the district of Sundargarh.

            The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and

order dated 21.03.2018 found the appellant guilty of both the

charges and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (five thousand), in

default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the

offence under section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code. No

separate sentence was awarded for the conviction of the

appellant under section 6 of the POCSO Act in view of the

provision under section 42 of the said Act.

2.          The prosecution case, as per the first information

report lodged by one Minaketan Mundari (P.W.10), the father of

the victim before the Inspector in-charge of Bisra police station

on 24.02.2013 is that on that day in the afternoon at about

03.00 p.m., the appellant called the victim girl who was aged

about eight years to a dilapidated house and opened her pant

and committed rape on her and after the occurrence, the victim




                                                         Page 2 of 25
                                  // 3 //




returned home and disclosed about the incident crying before her

mother.

               On the basis of such first information report, Bisra

P.S. Case No. 20 dated 24.02.2013 was registered under section

376(2)(h) of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the POCSO

Act. P.W.14 Subodha Kumar Mallik, Inspector in-charge of Bisra

police station after registration of the case, took up investigation,

examined the victim, informant, mother of the victim and other

witnesses, seized the wearing apparels of the victim girl, sent

the victim girl for her medical examination to Bisra C.H.C.,

arrested the appellant on 24.02.2013, seized the wearing

apparels in presence of witnesses, sent the appellant to Bisra

C.H.C. for medical examination, visited the spot and prepared

the spot map, seized the biological samples of the victim girl

collected by the medical officer, forwarded the appellant to the

Court on 25.02.2013 and made a prayer to the Court for

dispatch of the exhibits to the R.F.S.L., Sambalpur for chemical

examination, received the medical examination reports of the

victim    as   well   as   the    appellant   and   on   completion   of

investigation, submitted charge sheet on 30.05.2014 under

section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the

POCSO Act against the appellant.



                                                             Page 3 of 25
                             // 4 //




3.          The defence plea of the appellant is one of denial and

it is pleaded that there was civil dispute between both the

families for which a false case has been foisted against him.

4.          Initially, the learned trial Court framed charges under

section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the

POCSO Act on 24.03.2015, but subsequently on 19.03.2018

charge was reframed under section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal

Code and section 6 of the POCSO Act against the appellant and

since the appellant refuted the charges, pleaded not guilty and

claimed to be tried, the sessions trial procedure was resorted to

prosecute him and establish his guilt.

5.          During course of trial, in order to prove its case, the

prosecution has examined as many as fourteen witnesses.

           P.W.1 Rajgobind Mahali stated that the wearing

apparels of a girl were seized in his presence by police and his

signatures were taken in two documents.

           P.W.2 Mahendra Mahali is a witness to the seizure of

wearing apparels of the victim and the appellant such as top,

pants, T shirt and gamucha vide seizure lists Exts.1/1 and 2/1

respectively. He further stated that when a gathering of people

called the appellant and confronted him about the occurrence, he

admitted the fact.



                                                        Page 4 of 25
                             // 5 //




            P.W.3 Ghanashyam Naik is an independent witness

and also a witness to the seizure of one sealed vial containing

vaginal swab of the victim and one vial containing pubic hair of

the appellant vide seizure lists Ext.3 and 4 respectively.

            P.W.4 Samarai Mundari is a co-villager of the

informant and the appellant and he did not support the

prosecution case and was declared hostile by the prosecution

and cross-examined.

            P.W.5 Jamuna Mundari is the aunt of the victim

(P.W.9) and sister-in-law of the informant (P.W.10). She stated

that when she was returning from work on one evening, she

heard from the villagers that the appellant had raped her niece

and she went to the house of the informant (P.W.10) and there

the mother of the victim (P.W.11) informed her that the

appellant had raped the victim.

            P.W.6 Bijaya Kumar Mundari is the brother-in-law of

P.W.10 and brother of P.W.11. He stated that when he was

returning from his work, he heard from P.W.11 that the appellant

raped the victim, who is his niece.

            P.W.7 Shyamlal Mundari is an independent witness,

who stated that on 24.02.2013 in the afternoon, he heard from

the villagers that the appellant had raped the minor daughter of



                                                         Page 5 of 25
                             // 6 //




the informant (P.W.10), who was aged about five to six years at

the time of occurrence.

             P.W.8 Ramesh Chandra Sandil, who is a co-villager of

the informant and the appellant, is the scribe of the F.I.R.

(Ext.5).

             P.W.9 is the victim. She supported the prosecution

case and stated about the commission of rape on her by the

appellant.

             P.W.10 Minaketan Mundari is the informant of the

case and he is the father of the victim (P.W.9). He stated that on

the date of occurrence, when he returned home from work, his

wife (P.W.11) informed him about the misdeeds of the appellant

in committing rape of the victim (P.W.9) and at that time, he

asked the victim who told him about the incident. He stated that

on his production, police seized the wearing apparels of the

victim and prepared seizure list vide Ext.1/1. He also proved the

consent on the medical examination report of the victim vide

Ext.6.

             P.W.11 Sini Mundari is the mother of the victim

(P.W.9), who stated that when her younger daughter informed

her about the incident, she asked the victim who narrated the

entire incident of rape before her.



                                                       Page 6 of 25
                                // 7 //




               P.W.12 Eprem Tirkey was working as the Constable

at Bisra police station, who stated that on the basis of command

certificate issued by the Investigating Officer, he escorted the

victim and the appellant to the hospital for their medical

examination      and   after   medical        examination,    the   hospital

authority collected vaginal swab of the victim and the pubic hair

and semen of the appellant keeping the same in two sealed vials

and handed over to him, which produced before the I.O. which

were seized as per seizure lists Exts.3 and 4 respectively.

               P.W.13 Dr. Gujaram Majandi was the Medical Officer

of Bisra C.H.C., who medically examined the appellant and the

victim on police requisition and proved the medical examination

reports vide Exts.7 and 9 respectively. He also proved his

observation on the medical examination report of the appellant

vide Ext.8.

               P.W.14 Subodha Kumar Mallik was the Inspector in-

charge of Bisra police station and he is the Investigating Officer

of the case.

               The   prosecution         exhibited   twelve   numbers     of

documents. Ext.1/1 is the seizure list of the wearing apparels of

the victim, Ext.2/1 is the seizure list of one red and green colour

half pant, one black and blue colour T shirt and red colour



                                                                Page 7 of 25
                             // 8 //




gamucha of the appellant, Ext.3 is the seizure list of one sealed

vial containing vaginal swab of P.W.9 presented by P.W.3, Ext.4

is the seizure list of two vials containing pubic hair and semen of

the appellant, Ext.5 is the F.I.R., Ext.6 is the consent of P.W.10

on the medical examination report of P.W.9, Ext.7 is the injury

report of the appellant, Ext.8 is the medical examination report

of the appellant, Ext.9 is the medical report of P.W.9, Ext.10 is

the spot map, Ext.11 is the prayer for forwarding M.Os. and

Ext.12 is the copy of forwarding report.

            No witness was examined on behalf of the defence.

6.         Learned trial Court after analyzing the evidence on

record, came to hold that the victim was eight years of age at

the time of incident and that the appellant committed rape on

the victim and that the prosecution has been able to prove the

charges under section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and

section 6 of the POCSO Act against the appellant.

7.          Mr. Arun Kumar Budhia, learned Amicus Curiae

appearing for the appellant contended that the evidence of the

victim (P.W.9) that the appellant after removing her pant

inserted his penis into her vagina and anus is not corroborated

by the medical evidence. The doctor (P.W.13), who examined

the victim on the very day of occurrence has stated that he did



                                                        Page 8 of 25
                             // 9 //




not find any external or internal injury on her person suggestive

of forcible sexual intercourse and the genitals were intact and

there was no sign and symptoms of recent sexual intercourse. It

is further argued that though the victim stated in her evidence

that the appellant inserted his penis in her vagina and anus and

that to by making her lie on the ground, but she disclosed before

her parents i.e. P.Ws. 10 and 11 that the appellant rubbed his

penis on her vagina. Learned counsel further submitted that as

per the report submitted by the learned trial Court along with the

report of the Jail doctor, the appellant is now aged about eighty

years and the Medical Officer, Jail Hospital, Special Jail, Rourkela

has reported that the appellant is suffering from different age

related ailments and he is unable to take care of his personal

hygiene and his routine activities without the assistance of his

co-inmates. Learned counsel further submitted that since the

appellant has remained in custody for more than eight years and

eight months as he was forwarded to Court on 25.02.2013, in

view of his alarming health condition, in case the impugned

judgment and order of conviction is upheld, the sentence

awarded to the appellant deserves to be reduced to the period

already undergone by him.




                                                         Page 9 of 25
                             // 10 //




            Mr. Arupananda Das, learned Additional Government

Advocate, on the other hand, contended that the victim girl

appears to be a truthful witness and she stood the test of cross-

examination very well and nothing has been elicited in her cross-

examination so as to disbelieve her testimony. The evidence of

the victim is also getting corroboration from the evidence of her

parents and in such a scenario, the evidence of the doctor

regarding absence of external and internal injury suggestive of

forcible sexual intercourse or absence of any sign or symptoms

of recent sexual intercourse cannot be a ground to discard the

testimony of the victim. Learned counsel further submitted that

complete penetration is not required for establishing the offence

charged in view of the definition of 'rape' as per section 375 of

the Indian Penal Code, which was substituted by the Act 13 of

2013 and came into force on 03.02.2013. Since the occurrence

has taken place on 24.02.2013, the said definition of 'rape'

would be applicable in this case and therefore, it can be said that

the prosecution has successfully established the charge under

section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and section 6 of the

POCSO Act against the appellant. Learned counsel further

submitted that the appellant has admitted his guilt before the

villagers which is stated by P.W.2, who is a co-villager. He



                                                       Page 10 of 25
                             // 11 //




further argued that since minimum sentence prescribed under

section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code has been imposed on

the appellant by the learned trial Court, the question of reducing

the sentence does not arise in this case and therefore, the

appeal should be dismissed.

8.          In this case, the victim (P.W.9) is the star witness on

behalf of the prosecution. So far as the age of the victim is

concerned, the F.I.R. indicates that the victim was aged about

eight years at the time of occurrence. The victim herself while

giving her evidence on 02.03.2016 has stated her age to be ten

years and that she was a student of Class-IV. Nothing has been

elicited in the cross-examination of the victim to disbelieve her

age. The doctor (P.W.13) has also stated the age of the victim to

be eight to twelve years and the evidence of the doctor has

remained unchallenged inasmuch as no cross-examination has

been made to the doctor. Of course, the Investigating Officer has

stated that he has not seized any documents to show the date of

birth of the victim and as per the disclosure of the family

members about the age of the victim, the same was mentioned,

but since the evidence of the victim as well as the doctor has

remained unchallenged, I am of the humble view that the finding

of the learned trial Court that the victim was below twelve years



                                                       Page 11 of 25
                              // 12 //




of age at the time of incident is quite justified. Learned counsel

for the appellant has also not challenged the age of the victim.

            The victim was tested by the learned trial Court by

putting some questions and it was found that she was able to

give rational answers. Being examined as P.W.9, the victim has

stated that on the date of occurrence, she along with her sister

was playing on the verandah of their house and their father was

not present in the house and their mother was cooking food and

at that time the appellant came and gave her money and took

her to another house situated nearby and there the appellant by

removing her pant, inserted his penis in her vagina and anus

(MORA PICHARE AND JUNGHA SANDHIRE THOKLA). On the

question put by the Court as to what happened thereafter, the

victim replied 'SUAI KARI THOKLA MOTE'. The victim further

stated that after the appellant left, she came to her house and

narrated   the   incident   before      her   mother.   In   the   cross-

examination, she has also stated that there was no quarrel

between her family and the family of the appellant. She further

stated that she did not seek any permission from her mother to

accompany the appellant. She stated that her parents had never

tutored her as to what to say in the Court. She denied the

suggestion given by the learned defence counsel that the



                                                             Page 12 of 25
                            // 13 //




appellant had not given her any money and not taken her to a

house and removed her pant and inserted his penis into her

vagina and anus.

           The mother of the victim being examined as P.W.11

has stated that when the victim (P.W.9) was asked, she

informed that the appellant called her to a nearby dilapidated

house while she was playing in the verandah with her sister and

there the appellant made her lie on the ground, removed her

chadi and rubbed her penis on her vagina. She denied the

suggestion given by the learned defence counsel that there was

any quarrel between the two families and that they had taken

heavy loan from the appellant and that in order to escape from

the liability of loan, a false case was foisted against the

appellant. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to

disbelieve the evidence of P.W.11.

           The evidence of the father of the victim, who has

been examined as P.W.10 also corroborated the evidence of the

victim and he stated that when he asked the victim, she told him

that on that day at about 03.00 p.m. to 04.00 p.m. the appellant

took her to a dilapidated house, removed her pant and rubbed

his penis on her vagina and anus. Therefore, the evidence of the

victim is corroborated by the statements of her parents.



                                                      Page 13 of 25
                            // 14 //




           It is pertinent to note that the occurrence in question

took place on 24.02.2013 and on the very day, the matter was

reported to the police and the victim was also medically

examined on that date. Therefore, there was no time for

concoction of any case and prompt lodging of the first

information report is also another factor, which goes in favour of

the prosecution.

           P.W.2, who is a co-villager of the informant, has

stated that he got information from the informant about the

offence committed by the appellant and when the gathering

called the appellant and confronted him about the fact, he

admitted the fact. Then the appellant was kept in the custody of

some of the villagers and the matter was reported to the police.

In the cross-examination, he has stated that twenty to twenty

five persons had gathered. However, in the accused statement,

no question has been put to the appellant on such admission. A

confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate

substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An

admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively

incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession. (Ref: Pakala

Narayana Swami -Vrs.- Emperor; A.I.R. 1939 PC 47). Only

voluntary and direct acknowledgment of guilt is a confession but



                                                      Page 14 of 25
                            // 15 //




when a confession falls short of actual admission of guilt, it may

nevertheless be used as evidence against the person who made

it or his authorized agent as an 'admission' under section

21 of the Evidence Act. (Ref: Central Bureau of Investigation

-Vrs.- V.C. Shukla ; A.I.R. 1998 SC 1406). When a statement

falls short of a plenary acknowledgment of guilt, it would not be

a confession, even though the statement is in respect of some

incriminating facts, which taken, along with other evidence,

tends to prove the guilt of the accused. However, such a

statement would, indeed, be admission. (Ref: Irsad Alam

-Vrs.- The State of Bihar, 2014 Criminal Journal 2107). The

surrounding circumstances under which the admission was

stated to have been made, absence of any specific material as to

what was confronted to the appellant and what was his answer

to such confrontation made before twenty to twenty five persons

and more particularly when this material circumstance was not

put to the appellant in his statement recorded under section 313

of Cr.P.C., the prosecution cannot be permitted to rely on this

admission. Thus, the evidence of P.W.2 no way helps the

prosecution case.

            The victim was medically examined on the date of

occurrence and the doctor (P.W.13) has stated that he found no



                                                      Page 15 of 25
                             // 16 //




external or internal injury on her person suggestive of forcible

sexual intercourse, the clothes were intact and there was no tear

and her pant was stained with semen. The doctor further stated

that the genital was intact and there was no sign or symptoms of

recent sexual intercourse and the age of the victim was opined

to be eight to twelve years. Though the biological samples along

with the seized wearing apparels of both the victim and the

appellant were sent for chemical analysis, but the reports were

not obtained from the R.F.S.L., Sambalpur to be proved by the

prosecution during trial. Delay in analysis of the exhibits and

delay in communication of its results by the Forensic Science

Laboratories to the Courts create hindrance to the early disposal

of the criminal trial. It is the solemn duty of the State to engage

more number of efficient analysts in different laboratories to see

that right to speedy trial which is a fundamental right guarantee

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not denied to any

accused.

            In view of the definition of 'rape' as per the amended

provision of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, which came

into force from 03.02.2013, it is apparent that complete

penetration of the penis either into the vagina, mouth, urethra

or anus of a woman is not necessary to make out a case of rape.



                                                       Page 16 of 25
                             // 17 //




If there is penetration of penis, to any extent, into any of such

part of the body of a woman, that would come within clause (a)

of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and the man committing

such act can be stated to have committed rape. Explanation I

makes it very clear that for the purpose of section 375 of the

Indian Penal Code, 'vagina' shall also include labia majora.

            In the case of Beirangai -Vrs.- State of Mizoram

and Ors., reported in (2020) 4 Gauhati Law Times 411, a

Division Bench of Gauhati High Court, Aizawl Bench held as

follows:


           "25. Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is the
           punishment provided for aggravated penetrative
           sexual assault, which not only requires that the
           condition/s provided in Section 5 of the POCSO
           Act, 2012 are satisfied, but that the conditions
           provided in Section 3 of the POCSO Act, 2012
           are present. Thus, while Section 3(a) requires
           penetration of the vagina by the penis, the
           words used by the learned Trial Court, while
           framing charge under Section 6 of the POCSO
           Act, 2012, is that the appellant tried to insert his
           penis into the vagina of the prosecutrix. The use
           of the word "tried to insert" leads to an inference
           that an attempt to rape or penetrative sexual
           assault had been made, but had not led to



                                                        Page 17 of 25
                 // 18 //




actual penetration. However, the framing of
charge under Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012,
read with facts of this case, implies penetration
by the appellant's penis into the vagina of the
prosecutrix, thereby attracting Section 3(a) of
the POCSO Act, 2012. In any event, the attempt
to insert the penis into the victim's vagina, after
rubbing it with soap to oil it would also attract
Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act, 2012 as the
rubbing of the vagina with soap to oil the same
and touching of the vagina by the penis would
amount to manipulation of any part of the body
of the child so as to cause penetration into the
vagina. Penetration of the penis into the vagina
is not sine qua non for attracting Section 3(c),
as the same is taken care of by Section 3(a).
Thus, rubbing of soap or oil the victim's private
parts, so as to cause penetration and the
meaning of attempt to penetrate the vagina
would come within the meaning of the word
"manipulation", as provided in Section 3(c). As
the prosecutrix is below 12 years of age, Section
5(m) is attracted and thus, we find no infirmity
with the framing of charge being made against
the appellant under Section 6 POCSO Act, 2012,
only because of the use of the words "tried to
insert"."




                                            Page 18 of 25
                                  // 19 //




           In the case of Santhosh -Vrs.- State of Kerala

reported in 2021 (4) Kerala Law Times 656, a Division

Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows:


           "32.....One of the crucial aspects to be noticed in
           section 375 as it stood prior to the amendment
           in   2013,     is    that,       it    provided        for    "sexual
           intercourse" and "penetration" (of any degree).
           In Sakshi -Vrs.- Union of India : (2004) 5
           SCC    518,     the      Honourable              Supreme       Court,
           adopted the dictionary meaning of the word
           "sexual        intercourse"                 as      "heterosexual
           intercourse involving penetration of the vagina
           by the penis". So, penile-vaginal interaction was
           one of the necessary ingredients for constituting
           the offence of rape, prior to the amendment. As
           noticed   above,         even         at    that    time,     judicial
           interpretations        sounded             different    notes     and
           often adopted very wide interpretation as to the
           degree    of        penetration            and     even      slightest
           penetration was treated as sufficient to attract
           the offence of rape. In the amendment proposed
           in Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 2012, the
           expression "rape" itself was proposed to be
           substituted with the expression 'sexual assault',
           to make the offence of sexual assault gender
           neutral and also for widening the scope of the
           offence of sexual assault. One of the objects of
           the said proposal was that the term "sexual


                                                                          Page 19 of 25
                  // 20 //




intercourse", which confined it to penile-vaginal
intercourse,   was     to   be    done      away    with.
However, in the report of Justice J.S. Verma
Committee, the proposal was to widen the scope
of definition of "rape" by retaining the said
expression in the statute, instead of substituting
it with ' "sexual assault". The proposal in Justice
J.S.   Verma        Committee       report       included
penetration    to     other      orifices    but     such
penetration was confined to orifices such as
vagina, urethra and anus. In the said report
section 375(b) proposed was "manipulates any
part of the body of a person so as to cause
penetration of the vagina or anus or urethra of
another person". In all the above stages, the
suggestions were made for amendments to
widen the scope of definition of offence of rape,
though it fell short of including any orifices other
than   vagina,      urethra      and     anus.      Later,
presumably     by     taking     into    account,     the
suggestions from other sources, the legislature
has further widened the said provision, by
including the penetration to any part of the body
of woman. As the provision stands at present in
375(c) what constitutes rape reads as: (c)
manipulates any part of the body of a woman so
as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra,
anus or any part of body of such woman or
makes her to do so with him or any other



                                                   Page 20 of 25
                       // 21 //




person; or". It includes penetration to other
parts of the body of woman and it is not
confined to vagina, urethra and anus. In the
amended provisions, the legislative intention is
very evident, and it is also a marked deviation
from   what      is      proposed        in   Justice    Verma
Committee report, wherein the penetration was
confined to vagina, urethra and anus alone.
When the amended definition of section 375 is
examined in the light of the gradual evolution of
definition of rape and the expansion thereof, in
our view, the expression "cause penetration into
the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of
such woman" as used therein, requires wider
interpretation so as to include any orifices
naturally present or any part of the body
manipulated to simulate a penetration and have
the effect/sensation of an orifice. It is crucial to
note that the said provision starts with the
words "manipulates any part of the body of a
woman      so    as      to      cause    penetration"      The
dictionary meaning of "manipulate: includes
"control        or          influence         cleverly        or
unscrupulously.". The word penetration means:
"a movement into or through something or
someone" The word, 'penetrate', as per 'The
Concise Oxford Dictionary', means 'the act or
process    of    making           way     into   or     through
something'; 'to enter or pass through or force a



                                                         Page 21 of 25
                  // 22 //




way into or through'. When the above provision
is read with the said definitions in common
parlance, we have no doubt in our mind that,
when the body of the victim is manipulated to
hold the legs together for the purpose of
simulating a sensation akin to penetration of an
orifice; the offence of rape is attracted. When
penetration is thus made in between the thighs
so held together, it would certainly amount to
"rape" as defined under Section 375. In short,
considering the intention of the legislature as
revealed from the above proposals, followed by
the enactment of Criminal Law Amendment Act,
2013 and gradual evolution of the concept of the
offence   of   "rape"       from   time   to   time,   the
irresistible conclusion is that, the definition of
rape as contained in section 375 would take in,
all forms of penetrative sexual assault onto
vagina, urethra, anus or any other parts of the
body so manipulated to get the feeling or
sensation of an orifice. The word manipulation
by itself includes an artificial creation. The effect
of manipulating the thighs to be held tightly
together is to cause penetration of the crevice,
when the muscles engulf the object which
penetrates to create or simulate the same effect
as in a normal penile-vaginal intercourse."




                                                  Page 22 of 25
                             // 23 //




            In the case in hand, the victim has stated in her

evidence that the appellant by removing her pant inserted his

penis in her vagina and anus. The learned trial Court mentioned

the exact words stated by the victim, such as 'MORA PICHARE

AND JUNGHA SANDHIRE THOKLA'. Thus, if properly translated,

the victim in fact stated that the appellant inserted his penis in

between the buttocks and the thighs. Even though the victim has

stated before her parents that the appellant after removing her

chadi rubbed his penis in her vagina but not stated about

insertion of penis in her vagina and anus, as stated by her in her

deposition (which seems to have not been properly translated by

the learned trial Court while recording evidence), but in my

humble view such act of rubbing the penis in the vagina of the

victim or penetrative sexual act between the buttocks or thighs

of the victim by the appellant would amount to an act of

manipulation of the body of the victim to obtain sexual

gratification which would come under clause (c) of section 375 of

the Indian Penal Code which includes "manipulates any part of

body of a woman so as to cause penetration into...or any part of

body of such woman". Non-noticing of any external or internal

injury on the person of the victim suggestive of forcible sexual

intercourse as per the evidence of the doctor (P.W.13) in such a



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                                  // 24 //




scenario, cannot be a ground to discard the prosecution case.

The minor variation in the evidence of the teen aged victim and

what she stated before her parents about rape is not sufficient to

disbelieve the prosecution case. Therefore, the learned trial

Court has rightly found the appellant guilty under section

376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and 6 of the POCSO Act.

9.          The    learned trial Court has imposed minimum

sentence prescribed under section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal

Code and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the

appellant   to   reduce    the     sentence   to   the   period    already

undergone by the appellant cannot be accepted. However, taking

into account the health condition of the appellant and his age as

per the report dated 12.08.2021 furnished by the learned trial

Court basing on the report of the Medical Officer, Jail Hospital,

Special Jail, Rourkela that the appellant is now eighty years of

age   and   suffering     from     Systemic   hypertension,       complete

blindness of right eye and diminished vision of left eye and that

due to old age debility and diminished vision, he is unable to

take care of his personal hygiene and his routine activities

without assistance of his co-inmates, the appellant is at liberty to

move the appropriate Government for remission of the sentence

through the Jail Superintendent as per the provision of section



                                                              Page 24 of 25
                                     // 25 //




432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in accordance with law,

which is over and above the remission granted or awarded to a

convict under the Jail Manual or other statutory rules and this

Court expresses no opinion on the same.

               Though the learned trial Court sent a copy of the

judgment to the District Legal Services Authority, Sundargarh to

award      compensation         as      per    the   provision   of   Victim

Compensation Scheme, it is not clear whether the same has

been done or not. A copy of this judgment along with the trial

Court record be sent to the concerned Court to take necessary

steps in that regard

               The JCRLA being devoid on merits, stands dismissed.

               Before parting with the case, I would like to put on

record my appreciation to Mr. Arun Kumar Budhia, the learned

Amicus Curiae for rendering his valuable help and assistance

towards arriving at the decision above mentioned. The learned

Amicus Curiae shall be entitled to his professional fees which is

fixed at Rs.7,500/- (rupees seven thousand five hundred only).


                                                     .................................
                                                       S.K. Sahoo, J.

Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 2nd November 2021/PKSahoo/RKM Page 25 of 25