Calcutta High Court
Assistant Collector Of Customs For ... vs Hoare Miller & Co. Ltd. on 2 May, 1986
Equivalent citations: AIR1987CAL181, 1986(10)ECC220, 1987(11)ECR193(CALCUTTA), 1986(25)ELT516(CAL), AIR 1987 CALCUTTA 181, (1987) 11 ECR 193, (1986) 10 ECC 220, (1985) 25 ELT 516
JUDGMENT Dipak Kumar Sen, J.
1. The facts and proceedings leading up to this appeal are, inter alia, as follows :
2. At the material time, a Notification No. IPC (Genl. 44)/65 issued by the Ministry of Commerce was in force. The said Notification read as follows ; --
"S. O. 3613 -- In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (18 of 1947), the-Central Government hereby prohibits the import and export of all goods, whether directly or indirectly, into or from any port or place in India, from or to any place in Rhodesia."
No. IPC (Genl. 44)/65 P. Sabanayagam Chief Controller of Imports & Exports".
3. M/s. Hoare Miller & Co. Ltd., the respondent in this appeal carries on the business, inter alia, of export of jute goods from India. In or about September 1967, the respondent presented three shipping bills to the Customs authorities at Calcutta for export of 80 bales of hessian bags and 50 bales of jute twist. On amendment of the shipping bills the goods were shown as intended to be shipped by the vessel s.s. "Roy Bank". The Port of discharge was shown to be Beira and the country of the final destination was shown as East Africa. On or about 14th Oct. 1967, a notice dated the 5th October 1967 issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs for Exports, Calcutta, the appellant 1. was served on the respondent. By the said notice the respondent was directed to show cause why the goods covered by the said shipping bills should not be confiscated under Section 113(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 and why penal action should not be taken against the respondent under Section 114 of the said Act.
4. It was alleged in the said notice, inter alia, that after the shipping bills had been classified on the basis of the declarations and after the respondent produced a sample drawn from the consignment of jute twine, correspondence between buyers and sellers were called for by the authorities. On scrutiny of the said correspondence it was found that the contract in respect of the goods intended for export had been entered into by the respondent and one M/s. Union Agencies (Distributors) Private Ltd. of Rhodesia. The name of M/s. Factors Zambia Ltd. of Zambia which was an associate of M/s. Union Agencies was utilised as a cover and the name of M/s. J. M. Barnett & Co., Beira was utilised as the agent of the said Rhodesian Company for diversion of the goods to Rhodesia.
5. It was contended that exports to Rhodesia were prohibited in terms of the Government of India Order No. 9/65 dt. 17th Nov. 1965 contained in the said Notification. It was contended further that the respondent by filing the said shipping bills attempted to exports goods to Rhodesia in contravention of the aforesaid prohibition and as such, the said goods had become liable to confiscation under Section 113(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the respondent was liable to penal action under Section 114 thereof for having attempted to contravene Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Section 3 of Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947.
6. By a letter dated the 21st October 1967 the respondent, without prejudice to its right and contentions, stated that the said notice was arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction and the same was devoid of material particulars and was vague and unintelligible. The appellant 1 was requested to furnish particulars and to allow the respondent inspection of documents specified in the said letter. The respondent also asked for extension of time to file their reply to the said show cause notice.
7. By a letter dt. 30th Oct. 1967 the appellant No. 1 granted to the respondent an extension of time for three weeks.
8. On the 3rd Nov. 1967 a letter was addressed by the Advocate on record of the respondent to the Assistant Collector of Customs for Exports, Calcutta, and the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, the appellants 1 and 2 demanding justice and calling upon them to recall or cancel the said notice.
9. On 9th Nov. 1967, the respondent moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution against the appellants 1 and 2 and the Union of India the appellant 3, when a Rule nisi was issued calling upon the appellants to show cause why appropriate writs should not be issued directing them to withdraw, cancel or rescind the said notice to show cause dt. 1st Oct. 1967 and all proceedings pending thereunder, to act according to law and for cancelling or quashing the said notice and all proceedings thereunder. A writ in the nature of prohibition was also sought commanding the appellants to forbear from giving any effect to or taking any steps pursuant to or in furtherance of the said notice.
10. It was contended in the writ petition, inter alia, that the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports was an authority under the Exports (Control) Order, 1962 and the imports (Control) Order, 1955 promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred by Section 3 of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and that the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports was not competent to act on behalf of the Central Government for the purpose of Section 3. The said notification dt. 17th Nov. 1965 having been issued by the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports in purported exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947 was illegal, invalid and void.
11. It was contended further that the said Notification dt. 17th Nov. 1965 was beyond the powers conferred by Section 3(1) of the said Act inasmuch as it completely prohibited the export of all goods and did not specify the goods in respect of which the prohibition was to operate. It is contended that Section 3(1) of the said Act did not authorise the Central Government to prohibit the export of all goods generally.
12. Dinesh Chandra Mondal, the then Assistant Collector of Customs for Exports, affirmed an affidavit on 30th July 1968 which was filed in opposition to the said application and in answer to the said Rule. It was contended in the said application, inter alia, that the application was premature as only a show cause notice had been issued and that the question of illegality or otherwise of the transaction was a matter to be adjudicated. It was contended further that the Customs Act, 1962, a complete code by itself, provided for remedies by way of appeal or revision against orders passed and actions taken under the said Act. The application was not maintainable as the respondent had not resorted to the alternative remedies.
13. It was denied that the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports was not competent or authorised to act on behalf of the Central Government for the purpose of Section 3 of Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The other allegations in the petition were denied and the contention raised therein were disputed in the said affidavit.
14. Joydeb Mitra, the Chief Accountant of the respondent affirmed an affidavit on 24th June 1975 which was filed in reply to the said affidavit of Dinesh Chandra Mondal.
15. The said application was disposed of by a judgment and order dt. 7th July 1975. The application was allowed and the Rule was made absolute by the learned Judge in the first Court. The notice dt. 5th Oct. 1967 was directed to be quashed by an appropriate writ and the appellants were restrained from proceeding under the said notice.
16. The present appeal is from the said judgment and order dt. 7th July 1975. It appears from the judgment that at the hearing it was urged first that it was the Central Government which was authorised to impose prohibition of exports under the Imports & Exports (Control) Act of 1947 and not the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. It was next contended that Section 3 of the Act of 1947 did not empower the Central Government to restrict import indirectly. The impugned notice of prohibition was also stated to be invalid inasmuch as there was no specification of the goods intended to be prohibited.
17. On construction of Section 3 of the Act of 1947 the learned Judge held that to the extent the said section empowered the Central Government to make provision for prohibition or restriction or control imports and exports in all cases, the same was wide enough to cover cases of both direct and indirect exports. On the second contention that is whether the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports was authorised to issue the said notification dt. 17th Nov. 1965, the learned Judge noted the respective contentions of the parties but did not express any opinion on the point. On the third ground the learned Judge accepted the contention of the respondent that the prohibition in the instant case on all goods was not permissible under Section 3 of the Act of 1947. The said section empowered the Central Government to prohibit the imports and exports of goods of specified description and unless the description of the goods were specified the prohibition was invalid. The learned Judge noted and applied the principles laid down in a decision of the Bombay High Court in Karl Ettlinger & Co. v. Chagandas & Co., reported in AIR 1915 Bom 232. where Section 19 of the Indian Sea Customs Act, 1878, the language of which was more or less similar to the language of Section 3 of the Act of 1947 was construed.
18. At the hearing before us learned Advocate for the appellants the Customs authorities drew our attention to Section 3 of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947 which reads as follows : --
"(1) The Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling in all cases or in specified classes of cases and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the order : --
(a) the import, export carriage coastwise or shipment as ships stores of goods of any specified description;
(b) the bringing into any port of place in India of goods of any specified description intended to be taken out of India without being removed from the ship or coveyance in which they are being carried.
(2) All goods to which any order under Sub-section (1) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the import or export has been prohibited under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly."
Construing the said section, learned Advocate submitted that in the instant case the goods have been sufficiently specified or described by specifying the ultimate destination of the goods viz.. Rhodesia. It was submitted that this was a prohibition which was covered within the expression "all cases" in the said section.
19. Learned Advocate submitted further that a prohibition imposed under Section 3 of the Act of 1947 would be deemed to be a prohibition under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 and all provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 would have effect in respect of such prohibition. Learned Advocate drew our attention to Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 the relevant portion of which reads as follows : --
"(1) If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do for any of the purposes specified in Sub-section (2), it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit either absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be fulfilled before or after clearance), as may be specified in the notification, the import or export of goods of any specified description.........
(2) The purposes referred to in Sub-section (1) are the following : --
(q) the fulfilment of obligations under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security;
(v) any other purpose conducive to the interest of the general public."
20. Construing the said section, learned Advocate submitted that the objects for which prohibition under the said section could be imposed were attracted to the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. 1947 and prohibition under the 1947 Act could also be imposed for the said object. It was submitted that prohibition of export of all goods to Rhodesia had been imposed in public interest and in order to implement the policy of the Government of India to impose an economic sanction on Rhodesia as a protest against the colour bar as prevailing in Rhodesia. Learned Advocate submitted that this was a mischief which was intended to be prevented by the Act of 1947 and, in that background, Section 3 of the Act of 1947 should be construed liberally so that the public policy was implemented and the interest of the general public of India was maintained.
21. Learned Advocate also drew our attention to Section 4 of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947 which reads as follows : --
"4. Continuance of existing orders -- All orders made under Rule 84 of the Defence of India Rules or that rule as continued in force by the Emergency Provisions (Continuance) Ordinance 1946 (Continuance of existing Orders XX of 1946), and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall so far us they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. continue in force and be deemed to have been made under this Act."
22. Learned Advocate submitted that Rule 84 of the Defence of India Rules as prevailing in 1947 which was more or less in the same terms was continued by the said section. In support of his contentions learned Advocate for the appellants cited the following decisions : --
(a) C. T. A. Pillai v. H. P. Lohia, . In this case it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that it was within the competence of the Central Government to prohibit import altogether under Section 3 of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947 or to restrict or control it by prescribed provisions. It was held further that goods, import of which was prohibited in general, may be permitted to be imported by the Central Government for a limited purpose and such restricted import with conditions was not beyond the competence of the Central Government.
(b) Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, . In this case the Supreme Court considered and construed Section 3 of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act. 1947 and held that the preamble of the Act laid down the policy of the Legislature and such preamble laid down sufficient guideline to the Central Government for exercise of its powers under Section 3 of the Act. The said section cannot be attacked on the ground that it amounted to legislation by delegation or that questions of policy had been left to the delegates. The Supreme Court also noted that the Act of 1947 postulated the continuation of the Rules and Orders and controls imposed by the Defence of India Act and held that it should be assumed that the object of the Act of 1947 was to continue the provisions of the earlier legislation. The preamble of the predecessor Act and relevant provisions thereof could be looked into to find out what was the object of the legislature in promulgating the Act.
(c) R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, . In this case the Supreme Court noted with approval the principles laid down in the well-known English decision viz., Heydon's case reported in (1584) 76 ER 637. It was laid down in that case that though prima facie a Statute has to be construed literally but to arrive at the proper meaning it was necessary to consider the aims, scope and object of the entire Act. It was necessary to consider what was the law before the Act was passed; what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; what remedy the legislature had provided and the reasons for such remedy.
(d) State of U. P. v. C. Tobit, . In this case the Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in the case noted above and laid down as follows : --
"It is well settled that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the set of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In order, therefore, to come to a decision as to the true meaning of a word used in a Statute one has to inquire as to the subject-matter of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view."
(e) Collector of Customs, Madras v. Mathella Sampathu Chetty, . In this case the Supreme Court laid down tests for ascertaining the reasonableness postulated of the restrictions in Clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19 of the Constitution. It was laid down that no standard or pattern can be laid down but the nature of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied, the disproportion of imposition and the prevailing conditions at the material time should all be considered. This decision does not appear to be of any particular relevance to the instant case.
23. Learned Advocate also cited Smith v. Hughes reported in (1960) 2 All ER 859. Section 1 of the Street Offences Act of 1959 of England laid down that it would be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution. Persons convicted under the said Act appealed against their conviction on the ground that they were not physically present in the street but were found to be in houses adjoining the street. The English Appeal Court held that the mischief which was intended to be prevented by the Act was the prevention of soliciting in the streets. In each case solicitation was projected and addressed to somebody who walked in the street and the facts warranted the conviction.
24. On the question of authority of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports in issuing the said impugned notification the learned Advocate for the appellant drew our attention to Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act 1897 the material part whereof is as follows :
"3. Definitions -- In this Act, and in all General Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,--
(8) 'Central Government' shall -
(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President;"
25. The learned Advocate submitted that in the notification it appears that the prohibition has been imposed by the Central Government which should mean the President and the prohibition has been imposed validly and properly. The appellant No. 1, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, has signed the said notification only for the purpose of authentication of the same.
26. Learned Advocate for the respondents contended to the contrary. He submitted that under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 to impose a valid prohibition or restriction of Imports or Exports, the goods of which imports and exports were being prohibited or restricted had to be specified by their description. He submitted that the destination of the goods exported or the source or origin of the goods in cases of import were not the description of the goods. The description must relate to the inherent character of the goods for the purpose of identification of the goods. Learned Advocate submitted that this interpretation has been laid down and followed by the authorities themselves. He drew our attention to Imports (Control) Order, 1955. Section 3 of the said order reads as follows :
"(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Order, no person shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule 1, except under and in accordance with a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any Officer specified in Schedule II."
He also drew our attention to Schedule I of the said order where the specific description of the goods had been given and in no case the destination or source of the goods was included.
27. Learned Advocate next referred to the exports (Control) Order, 1977 promulgated under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. Clause 3 of the said order reads as follows : --
"Restrictions on export of certain goods -
(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Order, no person shall export any goods of the description specified in Schedule I, except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the Central Government or by an Officer specified in Schedule II."
28. The learned Advocate drew our attention to the Schedule I of the said order where, as in the Import (Control) Order, description of goods have been given but in no case either the destination or the source of the goods had been indicated. The description pertained to the goods only.
29. Learned Advocate also drew our attention to several prescribed forms issued by the Import & Export (Control) Authorities viz., form for applications for advance license under the Duty Redemption Scheme; form for actual user; form for applications of export. He also referred to the Notice of the Export Rules, 1967 and publication of Daily List and Rules, 1955 and 1957. In each of these forms and rules the description of the goods and the destination or source or the goods have been shown separately.
30. Learned Advocate for the respondent next drew our attention to Article 77 of the Constitution, the material part whereof is as follows :
"77.-- (1) All executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President;
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President."
He also cited the Article 166 relating to State Government, the relevant part of which is as follows :
"166.-- (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order of instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor."
31. Learned Advocate contended that in the instant case the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports by issuing the said notification by signing his own name has assumed the authority of the Central Government and/or the President. Unless it could be shown that he was authorised to do so, the notification would be invalid. He submitted that even assuming the words 'President' should be read for the words 'Central Government' in the body of the notification, the execution of the order also must be in the name of the President and the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports cannot sign the notification in his name only.
32. Learned Advocate for the respondent contended that though this point had not been-decided in the first Court and though no cross-objection has been filed by the respondent it was open to the respondent to urge the point in this appeal in support of the judgment and order.
33. Learned Advocate for the respondent cited the following decisions.
(a) State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, . In this case an order of preventive detention under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 stated, inter alia, that the Governor of Bombay was satisfied ..... and is pleased to direct that the said ..... be detained. The order was signed by the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department as "by an order of the Governor of Bombay". The Supreme Court held that the order was expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by Article 166. If the expression 'in his name' was recorded in the order it would have put the matter beyond controversy.
(b) Ghaio Mal & Sons v. State of Delhi . In this case it was held by the Supreme Court that where the Chief Commissioner, Delhi was the competent authority empowered to grant L. 2 licence for wholesale and retail vend of foreign liquor to the public, a letter from the Under Secretary, Finance to the Government of Delhi addressed to the Commissioner of Excise, Delhi stating that the Chief Commissioner has been pleased to approve the grant L. 2 licence to a licensee was not a proper grant of licence. This was a interdepartmental communication ndt authenticated either by the authority concerned or a person authorised by him.
(c) Virdhachalam Pillai v. Chaldean Bank, . This decision was cited for the proposition that a respondent in an appeal was entitled to challenge the correctness of findings against it in the lower Court in order to support a decree which had been passed against the appellant.
(d) P. B. Pardasani v. The State, . In this case, sanction to prosecute a Central Government employee though in the name of the Central Government was, however, signed only by the Deputy Secretary of the Government of India. It has held by a learned Judge of the Punjab High Court that the sanction in question was given by the Deputy Secretary in his own right and was not an authentication of an order issued in the name of the President. There was nothing on record to show that the Deputy Secretary had authority to act in the name of the Central Government or the President. The order of sanction was held to be invalid.
(e) Assistant Controller of Customs for Prevention v. New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd., . This decision of a Division Bench of this Court was cited for the proposition that under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil P. C. the respondent in an appeal was entitled to challenge the correctness of the findings against it in order to support the judgment passed against the appellant.
(f) Sri Chandra, Prabhuji Jain Temple v. Hari Krishna, . This decision was cited for the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court that where the respondent had a decree in their favour, they could support the said decree on any of the grounds decided against them by the Court which passed the decree and when the respondents sought to do this they were only supporting and not attacking the decree.
(g) Karl Ettlinger & Co. v. Chagandas & Co., reported in AIR 1915 Bom 232. In this case, the plaintiff, a German firm doing business in London entered into a contract on the 24th July 1914 with the defendant firm in India through their London agents under which the defendant agreed to supply the plaintiff 1000 tons of manganese to be shipped from Bombay to Antwerp, the shipment being in September. On the 7th Sept. 1914, the defendant telegraphed to the plaintiff that owing to Force Majeure the contract was cancelled. The plaintiff refused to accept the cancellation and sued the defendant for damages. The defendant contended inter alia, that export of manganese from India was prohibited by the Government of India Notification of the 5th Aug. 1914 which was published on the 7th Aug. 1914 and as such, performance of the contract became impossible. The Notification which was relied on by the defendant was found to have prohibited export of ammunition and explosives and all materials used in the manufacture thereof. Construing the said Notification a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court held that under the India Sea Customs Act. 1878 the Government was empowered to prohibit export of specified articles or things. The learned Judge held that the specification had to be exact and nominatim. A prohibition could not be imposed on goods falling under the group under a vague description.
34. On the question of the authority of the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports it appears that there is some confusion as to whether the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports purported to exercise his authority for and on behalf of Central Government or whether the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports only authenticated an order passed by the Central Government. The order, no doubt, has been expressed to be made in the name of the Central Government and if we apply the relevant section of the General Clauses Act we have to read the word 'President' for the Central Government in the body of the order. We also take note of the fact that under the Authentication (Orders and other Instruments) Amendment Rules, 1965 it has been provided that orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in the case of orders and other instruments inserted, namely, relating to the office of the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, by the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, This is Rule 2(ii) (aa) of the Authentication Rules of 1958, as amended. Therefore, it is clear that the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports has been authorised to authenticate orders passed in the name of the President.
35. We have some doubts whether in view of the specific provision of Article 77 of the Constitution an order expressly required to be made in the name of the President can be made in the name of the Central Government as has been done in the instant case and then support the order under the General Clauses Act. This aspect of the matter has not been gone into in any of the decisions cited before us. We also note that it has not been shown that the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports is authorised to act on behalf of the Central Government. We also note the contention of the respondent that this order might have been made in the name of the Central Government but it has not been executed on behalf of the Central Government, because the Chief Controller has signed his own name. We also note, that in grounds Nos. 20 and 21 of the grounds of appeal it is contended by the appellant that the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports was competent or authorised on behalf of the Central Government to sign and issue the said notification and to act on behalf of the Central Government. In the view we have taken on the other aspect of the matter on which we intend to dispose of this appeal we also would not like to express any opinion on this aspect.
36. On the other point raised, that is the permissibility of general prohibition of export of all goods to Rhodesia, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent appears to be of substance. The expressions 'in all cases' and 'in specified classes of cases' in Section 3 of the Act appears to us to refer to cases of transaction of export and import and not goods. In the instant case, the specific class of exports prohibited were exports to Rhodesia. This is permissible under Section 3 of the Act of 1947, But Section 3 further enjoins the authority to specify the description of the goods, the imports and exports of which are prohibited. On a plain reading of the section, goods the export of which is prohibited, must be specifically described. In the instant case, there is no such description. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that the ultimate destination of the goods is a sufficient description of the goods. Other orders passed by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Act of 1947, forms prescribed and the rules promulgated in respect of import and export of goods support the contention of the respondent. We note that under the current Defence of India Rules, 1971 the Government has been empowered to prohibit or restrict imports and exports of goods. Rule 126 specifically provides that the Central Government may by notified order prohibit or restrict the import and export of all goods or goods of any specified description from or to any specified person or class of persons. This is Sub-rule (2) of the Rule 126. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 126 further empowers the Central Government to prohibit or restrict or control in all cases or in specified classes of cases and subject to exceptions as may be made, the import or export of all goods or goods of any specified description. It is, therefore, clear that in a parallel legislation which is in pari materia with Act of 1947 a distinction has been made between goods of specified description and all goods. We also agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that Section 3 of the Act of 1947 empowers the authorities to impose restriction on trade and therefore, should be construed with some strictness.
37. For the reasons as above, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal and we affirm the same. This appeal is dismissed.
38. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
39. The learned Advocate for the appellants made an oral application for a certificate from us stating that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. It appears to us that this case has been decided on well settled principles for construction of statutes and no new or substantial question of public importance has been raised. The application is rejected.
Shyamal Kumar Sen, J.
40. I agree.