Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rajinder Lal Capoor vs Uco Bank And Anr. on 11 July, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2007(2)SLJ289(P&H)
JUDGMENT P.S. Patwalia, J.
1. Petitioner joined the service of the United Commercial Bank as a Clerk on 28.3.1957. During his four decades of service with the Bank, the petitioner rose to be a Branch Manager. It is his contention that during his employment he had earned the appreciation of his superiors and his service for all these years was without any blemish.
2. A few days before his superannuation, petitioner was served with a show- cause notice dated 24.10.1996 wherein he was asked to explain about certain irregularities. One of the allegations against the petitioner in this show cause notice related to the sanction and disbursement of loan under the Prime Minister Rozgar Yojna (hereinafter to be referred as, 'PMRY') to one Paramjit Singh son of Chuhar Singh. The allegation was that the amount recommended by the Chairman, Task Force Committee had been increased from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. One lac. The petitioner filed a reply on 26.10.1996 denying all those allegations.
3. Shortly thereafter another show cause notice was served on the petitioner dated 30.10.1996. Petitioner alleges that this was served upon him just as he was to retire on superannuation. In this notice, the allegations related to sanction of loan to one Satinder Singh son of Jagir Singh under the PMRY by the Branch office, Kohara where the petitioner was discharging the duties as a Manager. Petitioner duly replied to this show cause notice as well immediately on receipt of the same and denied all the allegations levelled against him.
4. Petitioner contends that after his replies to the show cause notices, no action was taken and therefore the petitioner concluded that this replies had been found satisfactorily and the matter was dropped. However in spite of that the petitioner's retiral benefits including his Provident Fund were not released to him. On approaching the Bank, the petitioner learnt that his retiral benefits were not being released for the reason that though the aforementioned Paramjit Singh and Satinder Singh had been sanctioned loans of Rs. 50,000/- each by the Chairman of the Task Force Committee, yet the petitioner had enhanced them to Rs. One lac each on which account the matter was being examined by the Bank. In this situation the petitioner submits that since he was in dire need of money, he asked the Bank to keep Rs. One lac as security in the form of two fixed deposits out of retiral benefits and release the remaining amount. Petitioner has also placed on record letter dated 14.5.1998 wherein the Regional office of the Bank at Chandigarh had recommended that the petitioner should be allowed his retiral benefits after retirement and no regular departmental enquiry should be initiated against him. However, in spite of this letter when even till November, 1998 his retiral benefits were not released, the petitioner was constrained to serve a legal notice for the same on 23.11.1998.
5. It is only after the service of the legal notice that the petitioner, was served with a charge sheet dated 13.11,1998 wherein irregularities in the sanction and disbursement of loans under the PMRY to Paramjit Singh son of Chuhar Singh and Satinder Singh son of Jagir Singh constituted the allegations levelled against the petitioner. A reference to these allegations shall be made in detail in the succeeding paragraphs.
6. Petitioner further states that he was constrained to file Civil Writ Petition No. 537 of 1999 praying for release of his retiral benefits in which notice of motion was issued to the Bank. After issuance of notice of motion, this Court directed the then Zonal Manager Shri R.K. Samaiya to appear before the Court in person. When he did not appear on the date fixed, the petitioner states, that this Court had ordered for the issuance of warrants but on the request of the learned Counsel appearing for the Bank, warrants were not issued on an assurance that Shri Samaiya would appear before this Court on the next date which was fixed as 4.6.1999. Petitioner states that however Shri Samaiya did not take his appearance before the Court in correct spirit and shortly thereafter another charge sheet dated 12.7.1999 was served upon him.
7. A regular departmental enquiry was held on the statement of allegations contained in the charge sheet dated 13.11.1998. Thereafter the Enquiry Officer submitted his report, a copy of which was supplied to the petitioner. Finally by an order dated 27.9.1999, Shri R.K. Samaiya the then Assistant General Manager and Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner imposed the penalty of removal from the Bank service with immediate effect upon the petitioner. After the order of removal was passed against the petitioner, the petitioner preferred an appeal against the same. While the appeal was still pending, Civil Writ Petition No. 537 of 1999 came up for hearing on 29.8.2000, on which date it was disposed of with a direction to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal filed by the petitioner within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order of this Court. Thereafter by an order dated 1.12.2000 the appeal filed by the petitioner was also rejected. The petitioner has therefore approached this Court by way of this writ petition challenging the order dated 27.9.1999 by which he has been removed from service as also the order dated 1.12.2000 by which his appeal has been rejected.
8. The Bank has filed a reply opposing this writ petition. Besides defending the impugned orders on merits and pointing out that there were serious allegations against the petitioner on which basis he has rightly been removed from service, the action of the Bank in serving a charge sheet on the petitioner after his retirement has been sought to be justified on the strength of "Regulation 20(1)(a)(iii) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees Service Regulations, 1979 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the Regulations') which is as hereunder:
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(iii) The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initialed will cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. The concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or allowance after the date of superannuation; He will also not be entitled for the payment of retirement-benefits till the proceedings are completed and final order is passed thereon except his own contributions to CPF.
9. When the matter was listed for hearing before this Court, Mr. Deepak Sibal, learned Counsel for the petitioner by way of CM. No. 7842 of 2006 had placed on record an affidavit of the petitioner wherein it was stated that Paramjit Singh who was disbursed a loan of Rs. One lac as also Satinder Singh who was disbursed a loan of Rs. 95,000/- under the PMRY have repaid loans along with interest and as a result thereof, their accounts have been closed and no amount is outstanding against the aforementioned persons towards the Bank, This affidavit has been supported by a letter dated 22.12.2004 written by the present Manager of the Kohara Branch to the petitioner also stating the same facts. A copy of this application had been supplied to Mr. Pawan Bansal, learned Counsel appearing for the Bank who did not dispute correctness of the facts stated therein.
10. I have heard Mr. Deepak Sibal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and also Mr. Pawan Bansal, learned Counsel for the respondents and have also perused the paper-book.
11. At the outset it would be appropriate to reproduce the statement of allegations levelled against the petitioner and the charge sheet on the basis of which petitioner has been removed from service. The same are as hereunder:
STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS
(d) Sh. R.L. Capoor (PFM No. 4074) MMGS-II while functioning as Manager of Kohara Branch had committed the following irregularities:
1. The General Manager, Distt. Industries Centre, Ludhiana vide his letter dated 29.10.1996 confirmed that the Chairman Task Force Committee (PMRY) has recommended and forwarded an application for a loan of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of Sh. Paramjit Singh s/o Sh. Chuhar Singh through Distt. Coordinator, Ludhiana to B/O Kohara, whereas Mr. Capoor has sanctioned and disbursed an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. One lac only) instead of Rs. 50,000/- approved by them.
The debit balance in the loan a/o Sh. Paramjit Singh s/o Chuhar Singh was Rs. 86,349/- as on 30.6.98. Bank is likely to incur loss as the account has become NPA.
2. Similarly, the Chairman, Task Force Committee (PMRY) has recommended a loan application for financial assistance of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of Sh. Satinder Singh s/o Sh. Jagir Singh for the purpose of B/O Kohara through Distt. Coordinator, Ludhiana vide their letter dated 12.2.1996. It is observed that Mr. Capoor has sanctioned and disbursed an amount of Rs. 95,000/- to Sh. Satinder Singh instead of Rs. 50,000/- that too for 'Dairy' and not for the purpose recommended by the Task Force Committee (PMRY).
The following irregularities have been observed in the said PMRY loan account of Sh. Satinder Singh:
(a) The said loan application of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of Sh. Satinder Singh s/o Sh. Jagir Singh for the purpose of 'Cream Separator' was forwarded to B/O Kohara by the Distt. Coordinator, Ludhiana vide his letter dated 12.2.1996. The same has been changed as loan application of Rs. 95,000/- in favour of Sh. Satinder Singh s/o Sh. Jagir Singh for the purpose of 'Dairy' which is contrary to the originally sponsored application. The project report is also replaced at a later stage as one partly prepared project report for 'Cream Separator' appear on the book of the affidavit relating to the income of the borrower.
(b) The signatures of Sh. Satinder Singh which appear on the loan application of Rs. 95,000/- do not tally with the signatures of Sh. Satinder Singh which appear on all the loan documents executed by him.
(c) The signature of the Chairman, Task Force Committee (PMRY) appears to have been forged as the same is totally different from the signatures of the Chairman, TFC (PMRY) on other applications received.
(d) The application was entered at Serial No. 23, Page No. 97-98 of the proposal register of the branch for the purpose of 'Cream Separator' for Rs. 50,000/-. However, at a later stage, the purpose and the amount was altered to 'Dairy' and Rs. 95,000/- respectively.
(e) On 14.6.1996, an amount of Rs. 58,000/- was disbursed in the said loan account out of which two Manager's cheques amounting to Rs. 19,500/- and Rs. 5,000/- were issued in favour of Sh. Paramjit Singh who is the real brother of Sh. Satinder Singh (Borrower). Moreover, the proceeds of these cheques were credited to SB A/C No. 3343 which stands in the joint names of Sh. Paramjit Singh and Sh. Satinder Singh (Borrower).
(f) The receipts in respect of buffaloes purchased were neither obtained nor kept in Bank's record at the time of disbursement of loans.
(g) The original training certificate is not available in Bank's record, however, a photo copy of the same is available which bears certificate No. 4051 and batch No. 37 dated 10.5.1996. On comparing the same with other PMRY certificates issued by the NITCON, the said certificate appears to be a fake one.
(h) It is observed that Sh. Satinder Singh s/o Sh. Jagir Singh was plying a 'minibus' financed by our same branch on 7.7.90 as such he was not eligible for loan under PMRY.
The debit balance in the said loan account was Rs. 76,251/- as on 30.6.98. Bank is likely to incur the loss as the account has become 'NPA'.
3. The training certificate in respect of Sh. Satinder Singh (a borrower under PMRY) bears the certificate No. 4051 dated 10.5.1996 whereas another training certificate in respect of Sh. Paramjit Singh which was issued earlier on 23.4.96 bears the certificate No. 4416. Either of the said certificates or both these certificates may be fake which Mr. Capoor did not care to verify.
4. Sh. Capoor sanctioned and disbursed the loans to following borrowers under PMRY in the absence of training certificate which is a pre-requisite for sanctioning the same. The training certificates were not found on record:
(i) Jai Shankar
(ii) Sikandar Singh
(iii) Sachmail Singh Sh. Capoor has, thus, deliberately displayed indifference towards Bank's interests thereby causing wrongful loss to the Bank.
12. It is on the aforestated allegations that an enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. Even though the enquiry report is not on record, yet I had asked the Counsel for the parties to produce the same. The same was produced and I have perused the same. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the charges would be very relevant for determination of the controversy raised in this writ petition. In regard to the first allegation, the Enquiry Officer held the first part of the allegation that amount of loan sanctioned was Rs. 50,000/- but the amount disbursed was Rs. One lac to be proved. However, the second part of the allegation that the Bank was likely to suffer a loss as the amount had become NPA was not proved. The concluding lines of the enquiry report regarding charge No. 1 are as hereunder:
ALLEGATION No. 1In view of the foregoing the allegations as in para 1 are proved but those in para 2 of this allegation are not proved.
Similarly, on charge No. 2, the allegations have been taken up one by one. While allegations at 2(a) and (b) are held to be proved, allegation (c) relating to forgery of the signatures of the Chairman of the Task Force Committee have been held not to be proved by the Enquiry Officer. The findings are as hereunder:
Irregularity No. (c).
I have persued the documentary and oral evidence erred and although I find some variation, ought yet in the absence of proper evidence coming from the P.O. to this effect I cannot take the irregularity as established. Further, in the allegation the word used is 'appears' therefore, after considering it with the lack of evidence, I take the irregularity as not proved.
Thereafter while allegations (d) and (e) have been held to be proved, allegations (f), (g) and (h) have been held not to be proved. The findings on these are as hereunder:
Irregularity No. (f) I have persued the evidence referred by both the parties and also their contentions. On the basis of the arguments of the P.O. the irregularity is not established and I accept the arguments of the defence in this regard. The reference to Exd 4 by P.O. is not well placed and the defence argument is also not very weighty. The contention of the P.O. obtaining or managing the receipts lateron is not established. Hence, the irregularity is not proved.
Irregularity No. (g) I have persued the evidence referred and the contentions of the either side. The P.O. could not produce convincing evidence to prove the allegation as the witness MW3 was also not sure as to which of the 2 i.e. Exm. 13 and Exm. 15 was a fake one. The best evidence would have come from a letter/report from the concerned certificate issuing authority, and in view of it the irregularity is not established. Moreover, in the charge sheet the word used is 'appears' and the P.O's. conclusion is also similar.
Irregularity No. (h) Therefore, even though, the MW-1 had stated him to be ineligible yet I cannot accept it as the P.O. has not brought any evidence oral or otherwise to prove that his income fell above the level of eligibility rendering the borrower as not eligible. I accept the arguments of defence and hold that the irregularity is not established.
Thereafter the Enquiry Officer has dealt with the last para of the allegations to the effect that the Bank was likely to suffer a loss on account of the fact that the amount had become NPA. Even this part of the allegation was held not to be proved. The relevant conclusion is as hereunder:
GENERAL In the last para of the allegation, it is stated that the debit balance of Rs. 76,257/- as on 30.6.1998 was likely to be a loss as the account had become NPA.
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I take this irregularity as not proved.
Thereafter the allegation levelled in para (3) was also held not to be proved. The relevant observations are as hereunder:ALLEGATION No. 3
On thorough consideration of all the contentions and my observations in regard to the two certificates in question, I have come to the conclusion, that the best authority to give a clear opinion as to their genuiness was the NITCON who imparted training, and a mere reference by the Bank at the relevant time to NITCON would have provided the clinching answer to the question. In the absence of any such solid evidence coming on record, I cannot hold the CSOE guilty of the alleged lapse although the mere examination of the certificate does raise doubts about the genuineness of the certificates. The allegation is thus not proved.
Thereafter even allegation No. 4 was held not to be proved. The relevant observations are as hereunder:ALLEGATION No. 4
The circular referred by the P.O. about which MW-3 also deposed has not been exhibited and only on going through I could say anything but on the contrary the EXD-12 proves the contentions of the defence that the certificates of training were not required. In view of the foregoing the allegation is not proved.
13. Here the stage is not to examine the nature of the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the light of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. A combined reading of the statement of allegations and the findings of the Enquiry Officer would show that in so far as the first allegation is concerned, the Enquiry Officer has divided the same into two parts and has held the first part relating to disbursement of amount of Rs. One lack instead of Rs. 50,000/- approved by the Chairman of the Task Force Committee to be proved, whereas the second part that the Bank was likely to suffer any loss has been held not to be proved. In this regard, Mr. Deepak Sibal has made two submissions. Firstly he relies upon Circular No. CHO/SISS/23/95-96 dated 31.7.1995 wherein it is clearly stated that the Board of Directors had delegated powers to the Branch Managers in Scale-I and II to sanction loan upto Rs. One lac in respect of PMRY scheme. This circular has been placed on the record of this case as Annexure P-5. The relevant portion of the same is re-produced hereunder:
During the last year, some of the Branch Managers in Scale-I and II did not have the necessary sanctioning powers to sanction and disburse the PMRY applications sponsored to them. This had resulted in considerable delay and Divisional Officers were required to process these applications and advise sanctions to those branches which could not dispose of applications at their level. To obviate this difficult situation, our Board of Directors have recently vested the Branch Managers in Scale I and II with necessary sanctioning powers and the Branch Managers in Scale I and II are now authorised to sanction composittre (sic ? composite) loans (both term loan and working capital finance) upto Rs. 1 Lac in each case in respect of PMRY scheme sponsored to them. This delegation of powers has already been advised vide H.O. Circular No. CHD/SISB/18/95-96 dated 16.6.1995.
Mr. Sibal therefore states that even if it is presumed that the petitioner had sanctioned a sum of Rs. One lac over and above Rs. 50,000/- approved by the Chairman, Task Force Committee, yet he was authorised to do so by virtue of this circular. Secondly Mr. Sibal submits that a reading of the allegations itself shows that the Chairman of the Task Force Committee had made "recommendation to the Manager". Since it was a recommendation in terms of the circular reproduced hereinabove, the petitioner as Manager was fully entitled to take a final decision in the matter. It is therefore stated that since the second part of the allegation has not been found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer and in the first part there is no irregularity on the part of the petitioner in view of the instructions dated 31.7.1995. This allegation has no legs to stand and cannot be held against the petitioner.
14.Having examined this contention, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Sibal's submission. The instructions dated 31.7.1995 clearly give powers to the Managers to sanction loans under the PMRY scheme upto Rs. One lac. Therefore, even the Chairman of the Task Force Committee had recommended disbursement of Rs. 50,000/-. The petitioner as Manager was entitled to examine this recommendation and had the powers to sanction the loan upto Rs. One lac. Petitioner has therefore not transgressed his powers. It is also important to mention that there is no allegation of embezzlement of funds of misappropriation of any money on the part of the petitioner. I am therefore of the opinion that in view of the circular dated 31.7.1995 the first allegation is not made out against the petitioner.
15. So far as allegation No. 2 is concerned, the substance of the allegation in Sub-paras (a), (b), (d) and (e) which have been held to be proved is two fold. Firstly it is alleged that in the original application, the purpose of loan was for 'Cream Separator'. It was later altered to 'Dairy'. Further the loan was initially for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- but enhanced to Rs. 95,000/- by the petitioner against the recommendations of the Task Force Committee. The second part of the allegation is that out of the amount of Rs. 58,000/-, Rs. 24,800/- was disbursed by way of a Manager cheque issued in favour of Paramjit Singh real brother of the borrower and the proceeds were credited in a savings bank account which was in the joint names of Paramjit Singh and borrower Satinder Singh. The rest of the allegations relating to forging the signatures of the Chairman, Task Force Committee and the fact that the Bank was likely to suffer a loss as the account was become NPA was held not to be proved. On the same reasoning as given in relation to charge No. 1, since the petitioner as Manager could sanction the loan upto Rs. One lac. I am of the opinion that the first part of this allegation cannot be held to be a misconduct committed by the petitioner. It is however correct that both the cheques should have been issued in favour of the borrower himself. However, here again it is important to note that there is no allegation of embezzlement or misappropriation of Bank's money levelled against the petitioner.
16. So far as allegation Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned, the same have been held not to be proved by the Enquiry Officer.
17. It is in this background that the order of removal has now to be examined. A reading of the order of removal would show that the Disciplinary Authority is concurring with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore those charges which have been held not to be proved by the Enquiry Officer cannot be made the basis of penalty. A reading of the order of removal would show that the Disciplinary Authority to hold against the petitioner on charge No. 1 has recorded the following findings:
....It is a well laid procedure that it is the Task Force Committee which approves the amount of the loan to be granted to an applicant. The branch officials have no powers to either reduce or to enhance the quantum of loan to be granted to an applicant....
I am of the opinion that this finding cannot be sustained in the face of circular Annexure P-5. By the said circular the Board of Directors have specifically vested the Branch Managers with sanctioning powers and have authorised them to sanction loan upto Rs. One lac. It is for this reason that the Task Force Committee only makes a recommendation. The conclusion therefore that the branch officials have no power to reduce or enhance the quantum of loan cannot be sustained in the face of circular Annexure P-5.
18. Still further the Disciplinary Authority has proceeded to again independently examine the record and has recorded the findings which are even beyond the allegations made in the charge-sheet. These findings recorded and which are the basis of impugned order of penalty are extracted hereunder:
I have carefully examined the loan applications as forwarded by the Distt. Coordinator. In case of Sh. Paramjit Singh, it is evident even if one has a casual look, he will find that it was recommended for granting of loan for Rs. 50,000/- only, however, by forgery the figure 2 has been inserted in front of 20,000/- just to make it Rs. 2,20,000/-. Similarly, figure 3 in the amount of Rs. 30,000/- has been altered to figure 8 and thereafter figure 7 has been inserted in front of the said altered figure 8, so as to read total amount of Rs. 50,000/- on overwriting has been done to make it 0 and figure 1 has been inserted as to Rs. 10,00,000/- under PMRY scheme, the loan could be granted upto Rs. 1,00,000/-, The CSCE has admitted that in fact the loan application of Sh. Paramjit Singh was received for granting the loan of Rs. 50,000/- but since Sh. Paramjit Singh requested that the loan amount for Rs. 50,000/- was not sufficient, the application of the loan was given to one Sh. Rajinder Sharma, Block Inspector who was working DIC, Ludhiana for making the necessary amendments. He brought the application back making it for granting the loan of Rs. 1.00 Lac to Sh. Paramjit Singh. This is an unbelievable story...."
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This shows that his cuts were dishonest in accepting the application of Sh. Paramjit Singh where a clear forgery/material alteration has been committed in quantum of loan as to make it read from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 10.00 lacs, which took Rs. 1.00 lacs.
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In the case of Sh. Satinder Singh I found that the application was mooted for sanctioning of Rs. 50,000/- for cream separator. The documents reveal that the application for cream separator was removed and in place thereof an application for granting loan of Rs. 1.00 lacs for Dairy was implemented....
Still further the Punishing Authority while examining the issue has recorded a finding that there was misappropriation of Bank's funds and corruption on the part of the petitioner. These findings are as hereunder:
....This is sheer misappropriation of the Bank's funds.
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As a matter of fact the corruption in any form either it is committed in dishonest performance of one's duties or it is committed by unlawful means, halts the socio-economic progress of the society. Basically corrupts eatsaway the fibre of deliverance in the society which ultimately snatches away the rights and dues of the society from the welfare State. PMRY scheme is a welfare scheme initiated by the Govt. towards the goal of Welfare State but delivery of this scheme gets defiled when the acts of corruption are committed by the implementing authorities. I note with deep pain and scar in my heart that if one become corrupt in implementing the welfare scheme alike PMRY, this stops the jumbo of welfare on one hand while on the other hand it leads the system to become completely unconcerned for the public welfare by punishing those who have made the system unconcerned for the instant case.
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He directly or indirectly committed the acts of corruption by material altering the loan amounts in the applications of above two borrowers which were not approved by Task Force Committee, by implementing the changed application and by allowing the misappropriation of the loan amount. These acts of omission and commission are certainly denounceable and the. person like CSDE who has committed these acts of omission and commission deserve the exemplary punishment for the purposes that the socio-economic growth of our society, policy and institution should not suffer because of corrupt acts on the part of the its serving officials. I feel that in such cases the penalty of dismissal is only the last penalty which should have been effected but because of the facts and CSDE has attained the age of superannuation, I feel that penalty of removal from service which shall not be disqualification to his future employment will suffice to serve the ends of justice.
It is therefore clear from a reading of the portions extracted above that the impugned order of penalty is based upon conclusions which are either not borne out from the record or upon allegations which were not subject matter of the charge sheet. These can be enumerated as hereunder:
(i) Firstly in the order of penalty a finding has been recorded on charge No. 1 that the branch officials have no power to enhance or reduce the quantum of loan approved by the Task Force Committee. This finding is against the circular Annexure P-5. Moreover, it is to be seen that the Task Force Committee merely makes a 'recommendation' which necessarily has to be approved by the branch officials.
(ii) Secondly a finding has been given in the impugned order that there was* forgery and material alterations in the loan application of Shri Paramjit Singh. There is no such charge in the charge sheet.
(iii) Thirdly a finding has been recorded in the impugned order of penalty that the documents reveal that the original loan application of Shri Satinder Singh was removed and a fresh application was introduced. There is again no such charge in the charge sheet.
(iv) Fourtly it is concluded that there was misappropriation of Bank's funds and also that the petitioner was guilty of corruption by dishonestly performing his duty by unlawful means. Again there is no such charge in the charge sheet.
It is therefore apparent that the impugned order of penalty is based on findings recorded on allegations which were not the subject matter of the charge sheet. The petitioner therefore had no opportunity to meet these allegations. This has resulted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Still further on charge No. 1 a finding has been recorded which according to him is against the delegation of powers granted by the circular Annexure P-5. This also vitiates the order of penalty. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned order imposing the penalty of removal from service of the petitioner is against law and is liable to be set aside. Since, I am setting aside the order of penalty, the order passed in appeal upholding the said order also cannot stand and the same is also set aside.
19. Normally as a result of this finding, the matter should have been remanded back to the Punishing Authority for the issuance of a fresh order as justifiable in the facts and circumstances of this case. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments has held that in exceptional and rare cases and to shorten litigation, the Courts or the Tribunal can also impose an appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. These observations have been made while examining the quantum of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority in the light of Wednesbury' s Principle in Damoh Panna Sugar Rural Regional Bank and Anr. v. Munna Lal Jain . After examining in detail various judgments Hon'ble the Supreme Court has stated as under:
15. To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/ Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
This view has again been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. and Ors. 2006(1) SLJ 77 (SC) : 2005(4) RSJ 636, and stated as hereunder:
11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury' s case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
12. To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
Still further a Bench of this Court in Kailash Sharma v. State of Punjab through Secretary to the Govt. Punjab, Education Department 2004(2) RSJ 134, while quoting from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar , it has been noted as hereunder:
17. In Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar (supra), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated the view expressed in the decisions to which reference has been made hereinabove and held:
It is settled that the Court should not interfere with the Administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court in the sense that it was in-defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of Wednesbury Principle the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
Therefore, unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
Since I have already held that the impugned order of penalty is vitiated as being against law, the question now remains as to whether or not the present case falls in the class of an exceptional and rare cases where to shorten the litigation, an appropriate punishment can be imposed by this Court by recording cogent reasons. In this regard the following facts are relevant:
(i) Firstly the petitioner was to retire from service on 1.11.1996. By now 10 years have elapsed since that date. The petitioner has been agitating therefore for the last one decade and now would be close to 70 years of age.
(ii) Secondly another important factor to be taken into consideration is that the petitioner had rendered almost 40 years of service in the Bank. It is undeniable position that throughout all these 40 years his service was without any blemish.
(iii) Thirdly even out of four allegations levelled against the petitioner, allegations 3 and 4 have been held not to be proved and second part of the first allegation has also been held not to be proved. In view of the delegation of powers to the Branch Managers to sanction and enhance the loan to Rs. One lac, I am of the opinion that the first part of the allegation also cannot be held to be a misconduct committed by the petitioner. Even if it is presumed that on the recommendations of the Task Force Committee to sanction a loan of Rs. 50,000/-, the petitioner had sanctioned a sum of Rs. One lac which was within his jurisdiction. Similarly sanctioning a loan of Rs. 95,000/- against Rs. 50,000/- in the case of Satinder Singh cannot be held to be beyond the powers of the petitioner as Branch Manager. The allegations regarding forgery of the signatures of the Chairman of the Task Force Committee and regarding the Regional Training Certificate appear to be fake one have already been held not to be proved. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that basically the sting out of the allegations against the petitioner is removed. All that can remain at best can be certain procedural irregularities.
(iv) It also cannot be lost sight of the fact that the borrower had repaid the entire loan along with interest and therefore the Bank has not suffered, any loss on this score.
(v) It also cannot be lost sight of the fact that petitioner's Regional office had recommended on 14.5.1998 that the petitioner should be allowed his retiral benefits after retirement and no regular departmental enquiry should be initiated against him. Thus, the Regional Office was also of the view that the allegations did not justify an enquiry against the petitioner.
(vi) Further I am also of the opinion that for the last one decade the petitioner has been denied his retiral benefits. He has therefore, in my opinion, suffered sufficient for any procedural irregularity committed by him.
For the reasons aforementioned, I am of the opinion that this case can be said to be one such case where to shorten the litigation, this Court can impose an appropriate punishment to give a quietus to the matter. A reading of the impugned order of penalty would show that the Bank had imposed the penalty of removal which was not to be considered a disqualification for his future employment. Since by then the petitioner had already retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, the only consequence of this was to deny him his retiral benefits which he had earned by devoting 40 years of his life in the service of the Bank. It is not denied by the respondents that for this entire period, his service was without blemish. Allegation Nos. 3 and 4 have been held not to be proved by the Enquiry Officer. I am of the opinion that allegation No. 1 is also not made out against the petitioner. Out of allegation No. 2, only 2(a), (b), (d) and (e) have been held to be proved against the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer. A reading of these allegations would show that the first allegation is that the purpose of the loan to be sanctioned to Satinder Singh was changed from 'Dairy' to 'Cream Separator'. The other allegations are that the signatures of Satinder Singh on the application did not tally with his signatures on the other documents and that while disbursing the loan amount to Satinder Singh, two cheques were issued, one in favour of Paramjit Singh who is real brother of Satinder Singh. Both these cheques were credited in the joint account of the borrower and Paramjit Singh. It is therefore clear that there is no allegation of embezzlement of the Bank's funds. There is no loss to the Bank as it is admitted position that the entire amount of the loan has been repaid. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that removing the petitioner after 40 years of unblemished service and at a stage when he had already passed the age of superannuation would be grossly disproportionate to the allegations aforementioned. The punishment as imposed therefore, in my opinion is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Om Kumar v. Union of India 2001(2) SCC 386, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary Reviewing Authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.
Similarly in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. , the following observations occur:
A review of the above legal position would establish that the Disciplinary Authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
Both these judgments have been quoted with approval in V. Ramana's case (supra).
In view of the facts as aforestated and also the fact that the entire loan amount stands repaid and the allegations aforementioned, if any, are merely procedural, I am of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if the penalty is converted to that of compulsory retirement.
20. For the reasons aforementioned, I am of the opinion that in the exceptional facts and circumstances of this case and to give a quietus to the litigation, it would be appropriate if this matter is closed at this stage itself by directing the Bank to permit the petitioner to compulsorily retire with effect from the date of his superannuation i.e. 1.11.1996. The petitioner shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits flowing from setting aside the order of compulsory retirement including all his retiral/terminal dues. In view of the findings recorded by me that the decision of the Bank to remove the petitioner from service cannot be sustained, it necessarily therefore follows that retiral benefits due to the petitioner were withheld by the Bank for no justified reason. The petitioner is therefore entitled to interest on the delayed payment of retiral benefits at the rate of 6% per annum from 1.1.1996 upto the date they are actually paid to him.
21. Before concluding this matter, I may notice that the petitioner has made a prayer in the prayer clause that the charge sheet itself should be quashed. However, a reading of the petition and the grounds therein would show that there is no pleading to substantiate this prayer. Petitioner has not laid out the factual basis or the grounds on which this prayer is based. Counsel for the petitioner rather sought to substantiate this ground by relying on Clause 20(1)(a) reproduced in the written statement to contend that disciplinary proceedings would have to be initiated as per that clause before a person retires from service. He states that since in the present case, the charge sheet was issued after the petitioner retired, the proceedings are therefore vitiated. I am, however, not inclined to entertain this prayer of the petitioner in the absence Of proper pleadings and grounds being set out in the writ petition to substantiate the same. It is common knowledge that in all service rules/regulations, the employer has power to initiate disciplinary proceedings by issuance of a charge sheet even after retirement in certain situations. It is quite possible that the Bank also may have such regulations which, however, would not have been pleaded before this Court in the absence of a proper challenge on this account having been laid in the writ petition. Hence, this prayer of the petitioner is declined.
For the reasons recorded above, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders Annexures P-10 and P-11 removing the petitioner from service and rejecting his appeal against the said order are quashed. The petitioner shall be considered to have been compulsorily retired with effect from the date of his superannuation i.e. 1.11.1996. He is entitled to all consequential benefits as a result of his retirement including pension etc., along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The respondents are directed to release all the retiral dues to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.