Karnataka High Court
Iragantappa Alias Veeragantappa vs Hanumanth And Ors. on 26 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(6)KARLJ342, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1828, 2003 A I H C 2929, (2003) 6 KANT LJ 342, (2003) 3 KCCR 1951
JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. We have heard the learned Counsels for the contesting parties as also the learned Government Advocate on merits. An interesting point of law has been canvassed in this writ appeal and it concerns the interpretation of Section 43-A of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. The allegation against the present appellant who was elected to the Panchayat from a reserved seat is that he had contested in the election on the representation that he belongs to Simpi Caste but the respondent 1 has brought it to the notice of the authorities at different levels that the appellant is a Lingayat, that there is documentary evidence in relation to his school certificate to this effect and that he has made a positively false statement to the Caste Verification Committee and obtained a caste certificate to the effect that he belongs to the Simpi Caste with the sole purpose of contesting on a reserved seat. The respondent 1-complainant had further pointed out that apart from wrongfully getting elected through such misrepresentation that the appellant was also elected as the Adhyaksha and that having regard to the fact that the fraud practiced by him on the Caste Verification Committee is something of extreme seriousness, the respondent 1 contended that the appellant should be disqualified and removed from office by the Government invoking the powers under Section 43-A of the Act. According to the respondent 1, the powers are delegated to the Deputy Commissioner and despite his complaint the Deputy Commissioner did not take any action and that was why he filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction to the authorities to act under the provisions of Section 43-A of the Act. The appellant has denied the correctness of the allegations and he has put forward certain explanations inter alia to the effect that it is because of personal and political enmity that the respondent 1 has complained against him etc., but we are not really concerned with the merits of the charges. The learned Single Judge issued a direction to the petitioner to submit a complaint to the Government to take necessary steps as contemplated under Section 43-A of the Act against respondent 4 if the allegations made in the complaint are established. Consequential directions were issued to the authorities to act on the complaint on a time-bound basis. It is against this order that the present appeal has been preferred.
2. The appellant's learned Counsel has advanced the submission that the ambit and scope of Section 43-A of the Act is restricted to different categories of acts that would in fact disqualify, and even removal from office provided these acts have been committed during the tenure of office of the candidate in question. In other words, what he submits is that Section 43-A will take cognizance only of post-electoral misdemeanors and that this section would have no application in relation to allegations of charges that pertain to an earlier point of time before the candidate has assumed the elected office. In support of his submission, the appellant's learned Advocate has relied on a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Parappa v. Nandarayappa and Ors., 1998(6) Kar. L.J. 657 (DB), wherein the Division Bench while interpreting some of the similar provisions under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act, 1966 recorded the finding that the scope of the section and in particular, the jurisdiction to hold an enquiry and to take action under this provision of the law is confined to situations that have arisen during the tenure of office. The submission canvassed therefore is that Section 43-A could have no application to the present charges and that consequentially the directions issued by the learned Single Judge are liable to be quashed.
3. The learned Government Advocate who is virtually an independent Counsel in this tussle has submitted that Section 43-A has been specially promulgated in order to enable the Government to disqualify and even remove from office persons who indulge in various forms of misbehaviour during their tenure of office and he has pointed out to the Court that there are different provisions of law for purposes of dealing with allegations that pertain to a period of time or to acts or activities which do not come within this limited area. His submission is that the authorities and the Government cannot be directed to act under Section 43-A as far as the present charges are concerned.
4. Mr. Patil, learned Counsel who represents the respondent 1 who is the complainant pointed out to us that the fraud that is alleged against the appellant came to the knowledge of his client after the limited period of thirty days that is prescribed for the filing of an election petition has elapsed. His submission is that this is a serious case and that a person who has indulged in a fraud of this type who would otherwise have been disqualified from contesting under Section 11 of the Act cannot be al-lowed to continue in office and that therefore, the grievance projected by his client is real and genuine and the second submission canvassed was that this was very much in the public interest and in consonance with the purity of public life that a person who has misrepresented to the authorities and obtained a false caste certificate, got elected and then became the Adhyaksha of the body cannot be allowed to get away with misconduct of this type. His submission is that apart from other remedies which are available to his client that the damage that can occur to the Panchayat by allowing a person guilty of such serious misconduct to continue in office necessarily requires that the Government must step in, disqualify him and remove him from office. In the light of what he has pointed out, his submission is that since it was too late to file the election petition that the more expedient remedy would be the one prescribed under Section 43-A of the Act because the Government is required to hold the enquiry and then pass proper orders and that consequently the directions issued by the learned Single Judge are perfectly justified and that no interference is competent. He also drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and Anr., , wherein the Supreme Court was considering an important point of law relating to the dangers of the High Court interfering in a situation wherein a candidate has fraudulently got elected and continues in office and where the argument was that the machinery provided was by way of election petition under the Representation of Peoples Act and the High Court is barred from exercising jurisdiction. The Supreme Court went into various aspects of the law and particularly the issue of eminent public interest and held that the jurisdiction of the High Court in such situations is not barred. We are in respectful agreement with this decision and it is not our view that the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred but what we are required to decide is as to whether the direction to the Government to act under Section 43-A is valid or not because that is the solitary issue before us. The broader issues relating to the election etc., which were agitated before the High Court in that case do not fall for decision before us because the respondent 1 has filed a criminal complaint and that case is sub judice. What we need to take note of is the fact that though the allegations are serious, that the appellant has not admitted them and it is his contention that he not only denies the charges but he has a valid explanation and such a situation can only be resolved through a trial. It is perhaps equally competent for the designated authority to hold an enquiry and record findings with regard to the validity or otherwise of the caste certificate since the broader issues are pending before the Criminal Court. It is that forum which will adjudicate on them and record its finding. Until that stage is reached, any action may be premature.
5. At this stage Mr. Patil pointed out to us that despite his client having taken up the issue in all seriousness that no effective redressal of any type has been obtained and that was the reason why he has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. He further points out that during the intervening period that the appellant has continued in office, that he has also held the post of Adhyaksha and that the tenure of his presidentship has almost come to an end. He submits that as often happens that the view taken by the authorities would be that since the period of office is over that the matter should be given a decent burial. We have taken note of this grievance and we fully see the distress of the complainant as far as the situation is concerned and the only means whereby we can provide succour to the complainant is by issuing a direction that in the event of the respondent 1 taking up the matter before the Caste Verification Committee for reconsideration of the grounds on which the caste certificate was issued, that the Committee will hear and dispose of the proceeding on a top priority basis without any level of delay whatsoever. In our considered view, an outer limit of two months from the date on which the complaint has been filed would be sufficient. Similarly, Mr. Patil is justified when he points out that if the Criminal Court takes several years to dispose of the proceeding that his client would be left with absolutely no remedy and having regard to this grievance which is justified, we direct the Criminal Court to dispose of the trial within an outer limit of three months from today.
6. As far as the main issue is concerned, we have very carefully applied our minds to the provisions of Section 43-A. It is true that this section empowers the Government, and that too for good reasons, to enquire into different heads and shades of misconduct committed by elected representatives of a Panchayat and if the result of the enquiry is adverse which disqualifies the candidate, to remove the person from office, the Legislature has for good reasons circumscribed the ambit and scope of Section 43-A and after looking at these provisions in relation to several other similar provisions, we find that it could be extremely hazardous to accept the argument put forward by the original petitioner namely, that different acts of misconduct which may have been committed in relation to other issues prior to the date of assumption of office can also form the subject-matter of enquiry under Section 43-A. We are not prepared to do any violence to the section or for that matter to go against the legislative intent for the simple reason that having regard to the general situation that is prevalent in relation to these bodies or for that matter all elected bodies where there are rivalries and hostilities it would open virtually a Pandora's box giving raise to complaints or anything under the sun committed in relation to all sorts of situations at any point of time and the result would be virtually disastrous. This section is limited to situations that arise in relation to the period of time when the candidate has held office and those are the parameters which a Court will have to enforce. It is in this background that we need to interpret Section 43-A as clearly limiting the act of misconduct to those committed only after the candidate has assumed office and during the tenure in office. Issues relating to corrupt practices, misconduct or other illegalities even with regard to the election will have to be dealt with separately. The Act itself makes provision under Sections 19 and 20 for taking action, As far as these situations, are concerned, there is also enough scope in appropriate cases for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if the situation so warrants. The cause of action in the present writ petition was confined to the complaint filed by the respondent 1 under Section 43-A of the Act and in our considered view that complaint was misconceived insofar as Section 43-A will have no application to the present charges. We make it clear that these observations are with regard to the present proceeding which are limited to the interpretation of the present section and that they shall have no other bearing on any other proceedings.
7. Having regard to the aforesaid findings, the appeal succeeds. We set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.