Madhya Pradesh High Court
Subodh Mittal vs The Chairman And Managing Director, ... on 22 August, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001(5)MPHT215
Author: Dipak Misra
Bench: Dipak Misra
ORDER Dipak Misra, J.
1. Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the petitioner has called in question the defensibility of the order dt. 23-9-99 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge, in Misc. Appeal No. 40/99 whereby he has affirmed the order dt. 17-9-99 passed in C.S. No. 124-A/98 by the learned 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, Jabalpur whereby the Court of first instance returned the plaint to present the same in appropriate Court.
2. The facts as have been unfurled are that the petitioner as plaintiff initiated a civil litigation being C.S. No. 124-A/98 for setting aside the order of dismissal passed against him and for issuance of a direction for re-instatement. The admitted facts are that the petitioner was posted at New Delhi when the order of dismissal was passed. The Assistant General Manager, Calcutta was the disciplinary authority who passed the order of dismissal. The appellate authority was the General Manager, Calcutta who affirmed the order of dismissal. Challenging the aforesaid orders the petitioner filed the aforesaid suit seeking declaration that the order of dismissal and affirmation thereof by the appellate authority are illegal and the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits. After issuance of notice of the suit the defendants, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director and other functionaries of Allahabad Bank, filed their written statement and took an objection with regard to the maintainability of the suit at Jabalpur on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. Thereafter an application was filed that the suit is not maintainable and hence, the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff/petitioner. The Court of first instance by the impugned order dt. 17-9-98 allowed the application and directed for return of the plaint. Being aggrieved the petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 40/99 before the learned Appellate Judge and prayed for grant of leave under Section 20(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') to sue at Jabalpur. The learned Appellate Judge came to hold that the Court at Jabalpur has no jurisdiction and on that basis did not grant leave to the petitioner to sue at Jabalpur.
3. Assailing the aforesaid order, it is submitted by Mr. Nitin Agarwal, learned counsel for the applicant that the Courts below have fallen into error by opining that the Courts at Jabalpur have no territorial jurisdiction inasmuch as the regional office of Allahabad Bank is situate at Jabalpur and, therefore, it can be deemed that the Allahabad Bank is having its business at Jabalpur and the petitioner is entitled to prosecute his lis in view of the language employed in the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code. It is contended by Mr. Agarwal, that in case this Court holds that the said Explanation is not attracted to the present case then leave may be granted under Section 20(b) of the Code to sue at Jabalpur. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance on the cases of Surinder Kumar Arora v. The Bengal National Textile Mills Ltd. Calcutta, AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 156, Dwarka Das and Ors. v. Hanumandas and Ors. AIR 1961 Rajasthan 187, Jaichand Lal v. Firm Kesrichand Bhawarlal and Ors. AIR 1962 Rajasthan 88, The Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. v. Ranjit Kumar Mishra, AIR 1980 Orissa 152 and B.G. Guttal v. R.R. Diwakar and Ors., AIR 1977 Karnataka 211.
Combating the aforesaid submissions it is put forth by Mr. Menon, learned counsel for the non-applicants that the Explanation to Section 20 cannot be read in isolation and it is to be read conjointly with Clause (c) of Section 20 and, therefore, it cannot be construed that wherever there is a branch office of the Corporation it should be deemed that the cause of action arises in the local limits of that branch. Submission of the learned counsel is that where the principal office is situate aggrieved person is entitled to sue in that place whether the cause of action arises or not at that place, but as far as subordinate office is concerned cause of action has to arise in that place. The learned counsel has further canvassed that this is not a fit case for grant of leave under Section 20(b) of the Code. In support of his submissions he has placed reliance on the cases of Bholanath Agarwal and Anr., v. The Empire of India Life Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1948 Lahore 56, Bharat Insurance Co., Delhi v. Wasudeo Ramchandra, AIR 1956 Nagpur 203, Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1961 Kerala 50, and Smt. Kamala Chopra v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. AIR 1975 Delhi 15.
4. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner can be categorised into two compartments; first, the Explanation to Section 20 confers jurisdiction on the Courts at Jabalpur to entertain the controversy and second assuming the Courts at Jabalpur have no jurisdiction leave can be granted under Section 20(b) to the petitioner to prosecute his grievances in the Courts at Jabalpur.
5. I shall first advert myself to that limb of the argument which is related to the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code. On a bare reading of the Explanation it is quite clear that the cause of action is inextricably connected with the subordinate office and both cannot be segregated. In the case of Bholanath Agarwal (supra) it has been held as under:
"A Corporation can be said to carry on business at the place where it has a branch office only in respect of cause of action which arises wholly or in part at such place. If no part of the cause of action accrues at the place of the Branch office, the mere fact of the Corporation having a branch office at the place will not give the Court jurisdiction.' In the case of Bharat Insurance Co. (supra) it has been held as under:
"The result of Explanation 2 to Section 20 is to restrict the meaning of 'carries on business' in clause (a) in relation to Corporation. A Corporation can be sued at its sole or principal office in India. At any place where it has a subordinate office, it can be sued only in respect of a cause of action arising at such a place."
In the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra) a Division Bench of Kerala High Court after referring to number of decisions ruled thus :
"If no part of the cause of action arises at the place where the branch office is situate, the mere fact of the Corporation having a branch office will not give the Court of that place jurisdiction to entertain a suit."
In the case of Central Warehousing Corporation v. Central Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1973 Andhra Pradesh 387 wherein the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has expressed the view as under:
"Explanation II has two distinct parts. (1) A Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India; and (2) A Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office at such place. So far as the second part is concerned, if any cause of action arises at any place where it has also a subordinate office, it shall be deemed to carry on business there and a suit could be instituted in the Court having jurisdiction over such place....."
The High Court of Delhi in the case of Kamala Chopra (supra) expressed the similar view. In the said case an action was sought to be initiated at Delhi in respect of Life Insurance Corporation. The Court held that as no part of the cause of action had arisen at Delhi where the branch of subordinate office is situated the mere fact of the Corporation having a branch office would not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain a suit. In the aforesaid case reliance was placed on Bholanath Agarwal (supra) and Nedungadi Bank (supra).
6. In the case of Surinder Kumar Arora (supra) a learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court opined that the suit against the Corporation having several branch offices can be filed at any place where branch office is situate though cause of action has not arisen there.
7. In the case of The Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. (supra) a learned Single Judge of Orissa High Court proceeded to some extent in this regard but kept the issue open by observing that it was not necessary to resolve the controversy in that case.
8. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Surinder Kumar Arora (supra). I respectfully agree with the view expressed by High Courts of Lahore, Nagpur, Delhi and Kerala. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the Courts at Jabalpur have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit solely on the ground that the office of Regional Manager is situated at Jabalpur.
9. Now to the second limb of argument of Mr. Agarwal. Submission of Mr. Agarwal is that when the petitioner had applied for grant of leave before the Lower Appellate Court under Section 20(b) of the Code the said Court should have granted leave. Submission of learned counsel is that as the regional office is situate at Jabalpur the defendants would be in a position to properly contest the case, and, therefore, the Appellate Court has fallen into error in refusing the leave. To substantiate the aforesaid proponement he has placed reliance on the case of B.C. Guttal (supra) wherein a learned Single Judge has opined that while granting leave under Section 20(b) it is to be seen whether the defendants should be unduly troubled. He has also drawn the inspiration from case of Dwarka Das & Ors. (supra) wherein a learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court expressed that leave under Section 20(b) can be granted by the Appellate Court in appropriate case after the plaint is ordered to be returned by the Trial Court.
10. Relying on the aforesaid decisions Mr. Agarwal has pressed hard for setting aside that part of the order of the Appellate Court wherein leave has been refused. The question that arises for consideration is whether in the present case leave should be granted or not. As far as the legal position is concerned there is no dispute that leave can be granted to sue where the defendants do not reside or carry on business or personal work for gain in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In the present case the facts as have been narrated are that the petitioner was dismissed while he was working in Pahargang branch in respect of allegations made against him while he was Branch Manager at Noida Branch and Sadar Bazar Branch, New Delhi. It is highlighted by Mr. Menon that the allegations pertain to the activities of the petitioner at Delhi and there have been series of documents which have been accepted during the proceeding and that apart all the witnesses who have been examined during the departmental enquiry belong to New Delhi. In this factual matrix, submission of Mr. Menon is that it would not be proper to grant leave to the petitioner to sue at Jabalpur. Appreciating the aforesaid submission, I am of the considered opinion this is not a fit case where leave should be granted. Hence, I concur with the view taken by the learned Appellate Judge.
11. In view of my preceding analysis, I do not find any merit in the civil revision and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.