Allahabad High Court
Rahmatullah vs State Of U.P. And Others on 5 September, 2013
Author: Krishna Murari
Bench: Krishna Murari
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5697 of 2011 Rahmatullah ------- Petitioner Versus State of U.P. & Ors. ------- Respondents Hon'ble Krishna Murari, J.
Heard Shri Satya Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel.
Petitioner was recruited as a Cook, a Group-D post on 11.09.2008 in Provincial Armed Constabulary Force (PAC) and posted in 37th Battalion, PAC, Kanpur. He was transferred from Kanpur Nagar to 49th Battalion, PAC, Mau Headquarters at Azamgarh on 12.02.2009. Vide order dated 20.11.2009, he was again transferred back to 37th Battalion, PAC, Kanpur Nagar on compassionate ground. Vide order dated 06.05.2010 passed by respondent no. 3, Commandent, 49th Battalion, PAC, Mau, his services were terminated invoking the provisions of U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (for short 1975 Rules). Petitioner made an appeal before respondent no. 2, Deputy Inspector General of Police, PAC, Varansi, which was also dismissed. The services of the petitioner was terminated by giving one month's notice on the ground that the same is no longer required.
It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that impugned order having been passed in purported exercise of powers conferred by 1975 Rules, is illegal and without jurisdiction since said Rules are not applicable to members of police force and their services are governed by provisions of U.P. P.A.C. Act, 1948 read with Police Act, 1861 of the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder.
Learned Standing Counsel, in reply, submitted that petitioner was a Cook, which is a Group-D post, hence, his services were governed by U.P. Police Group 'D' Employees Service Rules, 2009 (for short 2009 Rules). It was further submitted that in view of Rule 29 of the said Rules, the matters not specifically covered by said Rules, person appointed to a post under the Rules shall be governed by the Rules, Regulations and orders applicable generally to Government servant, hence, 1975 Rules were applicable and he being a temporary employee, his services have rightly been dispensed with in accordance with the provisions of the said Rules.
I have considered the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties.
Rule 29 of 2009 Rules reads as under.
"29. Regulation of other subjects:- In regard to the matters not specifically covered by these rules or by special orders, person appointed to a post in the service shall be governed by the rules, regulations and orders applicable generally to Government servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State."
2009 Rules do not contain any provision for disciplinary enquiry, punishment or termination of service and, hence, in view of Rule 29, the provisions in this regard with respect to Government servant will be applicable to Group-D employees and in this view of the matter, 1975 Rules become applicable. However, a circular dated 13th March, 2010 was issued from Police Headquarters, Allahabad, which reads as under.
^^mRrj izns'k iqfyl eq[;ky; bykgkcknA
la[;k% nl&375&2009 ¼prqFkZ Js.kh½ fnukad ekpZ 13] 2010
lsok esa]
leLr foHkkxk/;{k @ dk;kZy;k/;{k]
iqfyl foHkkx mRrj izns'kA
d`i;k iwoZ esa m0iz0 iqfyl cy esa fu;qDr prqFkZ Js.kh dehZ iqfyl vf/kfu;e&1881 ds izkfo/kkuksa ls u gksdj lkekU; jkT; dfrZ;ksa gsrq cuk;s x;s fu;eksa ls 'kkflr gksrs Fks ,oa rn~uqlkj m0iz0 ljdkjh lsod n.M ,oa vihy fu;ekoyh&1999 ds izkfo/kku bu ij iHkkoh FksA 2& m0iz0 ljdkj x`g iqfyl vuqHkkx&2 dh vf/klwpuk la[;k 1535@N%&iq0&22009&1100¼63½@09 fnukad 28-8-2008 }kjk iqfyl cy ds prqFkZ Js.kh ds dfeZ;ksa dks iqfyl vf/kfu;e&1861 dh /kkjk&2 ,oa /kkjk&48 dh mi/kkjk&2 vkSj 3 ds v/khu dj fy;k x;k gSA 3& m0iz0 v/khuLFk Js.kh ds iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa dh n.M ,oa vihy fu;ekoyh&1991 ds fu;e&2 esa izko/kkfur fd;k x;k gS fd ;g fu;ekoyh mi iqfyl v/kh{kd dh Js.kh ls fuEu v/khuLFk Js.kh ds iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa ij izo`Rr gksxhA 4& iqfyl cy esa dk;Zjr prqFkZ Js.kh dfeZ;ksa gsrq fuxZr mijksDr vf/klwpuk fnukad 28-8-09 ds ek/;e ls prqFkZ Js.kh ds dfeZ;ksa dks iqfyl cy ds lnL; ds :i esa lekfgr dj iqfy, vf/kfu;e&1861 ds vUrxZr cuk;s fu;eksa ls 'kkflr djus ds izkfo/kku fuxZr fd;s x;s gSaA vr,o iqfyl cy ds prqFkZ Js.kh dfeZ;ksa ij fnukad 28-08-2009 ls m0iz0 v/khuLFk Js.kh ds iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ska ,oa deZpkfj;ksa dh ¼n.M ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh&1991 ds izko/kku izHkkoh gksxsaA iwoZ ls yfEcr ekeyksa esa m0iz0 ljdkjh lsod ¼vuq'kklu ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh&1899 ds izkfo/kku ykxw gksxsaA 5& ,sls izdj.kksa dks iwoZ ls yfEcr ekuk tk;sxk ftuesa fnukad 28-8-09 ls iwoZ izkjfEHkd tkWap lekIr dh tk pqdh gS vkSj m0iz0 ljdkjh lsod ¼vuq'kklu ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh&1999 ds fu;e&7 vFkok 10 ds vUrxZr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k tk pqdk gSa vr% rn~uqlkj dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr djkbZ tk;A g0 vLi"V 13-9-10 iqfyl mi egkfujh{kd] LFkkiuk] mRrj izns'kA la[;k rFkk fnukad ogh& izfrfyfi % fuEufyf[kr dks d`i;k lknj lwpukFkZ izsf"kr%& 1& vij iqfyl egkfuns'kd] dkfeZd] m0iz0] y[kuÅA 2& vij iqfyl egkfuns'kd] LFkkiuk] @ iqfyl egkfujh{kd LFkkiuk m0iz0 y[kuÅA 3& iqfyl egkfuns'kd ds lgk;d @ iqfyl egkfujh{kd] m0iz0A** A perusal of the above circular goes to show that in accordance with the Government Notification dated 28.08.2009, Group-D employees have been included in the definition of police force as contained in Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861 and have been brought within the ambit and scope of the Act under Section 46 sub-Section (2) and (3). The Notification dated 13th March, 2010 further provides that Group-D employees being included in the definition of the police force shall be governed by the provisions of U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (for short 1991 Rules) w.e.f. 28.08.2009.
The question which arises for consideration is whether the services of the petitioner holding a Group-D post, which has been included in the definition of Police force, could have been terminated in exercise of powers under 1975 Rules when services of such employees has been brought within the purview of Police Act and Regulations. The issue whether services of a member of police force governed by the provisions of Police Act and U.P. Police Regulations could be terminated exercising the powers conferred by 1975 Rules already stands settled by a catena of decisions, wherein it has been held that once the field is occupied by the provisions of 1861 Act and police Regulations made in exercise of the powers conferred by said Act, Rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are inapplicable. Reference may be made to Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Sharma Vs. State of U.P., 2000 AWC (3) 2367, wherein it was held that:
"Thus, there can be no doubt that if the appropriate Legislature has enacted a law regulating the recruitment and conditions of service, the power of the Governor is totally displaced and he cannot make any Rule under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. In State of U. P. Vs. Babu Ram Upadhyaya, AIR 1961 SC 751, a decision rendered by a Constitution Bench, the Police Act and the U.P. Police Regulations came up for consideration and it was held as follows in paragraph 12 of the Reports :
"the result is that the Police Act and the Police Regulations made in exercise of power conferred on the Government under that Act, which were preserved under Section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, continue to be in force after the Constitution so fas as they are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution."
A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vijay Singh and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., 2004 (4) ESC (All) has held that Rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution do not apply to Police personnel as their services are governed by the Police Act, 1861 and the U.P. Police Regulations. In view thereof, the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975, may not be applicable. In paragraph 64 of the judgment, the Full Bench has observed as under :
"As herein the field is already occupied by the provisions of Act, 1861 which is in operation by virtue of the provisions of Article 313 of the Constitution, thus, Rules 1972 could not be attracted at all. The Government Orders issued for fixing the maximum age for recruitment on subordinate police posts operate in an entirely different field and are not in conflict with the Rules 1972. The case stands squarely covered by the Apex Court judgment in Chandra Prakash Tewari (supra) and, thus, it is not possible for us to take any other view. The submissions made by Mr. Chaudhary that pre-constitutional law stands abrogated altogether by commencement of the Rules 1972, is devoid of any merit. Therefore, our answer to question no. 1 is that the field stood occupied on account of the provisions of Section 2 of the Act 1861."
Reference may also be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Tiwari Vs. Shakuntala Shukla, AIR 2002 SC 2322, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the provisions of U.P. Government Servants (Criterion for Recruitment by Promotion) Rules, 1994 framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and the Government Order dated 5.11.1965 issued under Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861 held that Rules framed under proviso to Article 309 would not apply since the field is covered by statutory order under Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861.
Thus, the law stands settled by the decision of the Apex Court, Full Bench of this Court that the provisions of 1975 Rules are not applicable in case of a member of the police force governed by Police Act, 1861 and the Police Regulations.
By virtue of Notification dated 28.08.2009 issued by the State Government, Group-D employees have been included in the definition of police force contained under Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861 and are subject to the provisions of sub-Section (2) and (3) of Section 46 of the Act, hence, the provisions of 1975 Rules will not stand attracted. As per notification dated 13th March, 2010 issued by U.P. Police Headquarters w.e.f. 28.08.2009, services of all Group-D employees shall be governed by the provisions of 1991 Rules.
Learned Standing Counsel next contended that petitioner being only on probation and having not been confirmed, the termination simplicitor by giving one month's notice is not illegal as he was only a temporary employee having no right to hold the post.
In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that impugned order has been passed in violation of para 541 of U.P. Police Regulations applicable in the case in hand providing for procedure for discharge of a probationer constable, which has not been followed.
It is to be taken note of that constables in PAC are governed by 1948 Act. Section 5 of the said Act makes the provisions of U.P. Police Act 1861 and the Rules and Regulations framed with respect to matters not provided in 1948 Act applicable to PAC and that is how the Police Regulations become applicable to the petitioner, who was a probationer constable in PAC.
Para 541 of the Police Regulations reads as under :
"541. (1) A recruit will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. The period of probation will be two years except in the following cases:
(a) those recruited directly in the Criminal Investigation Department or District Intelligence Staff will be on probation for three years, and
(b) those transferred to the Mounted Police will be governed by the directions in paragraph 84 of the Police Regulations.
If at the end of the period of probation conduct and work have been satisfactory and the recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment.
(2) In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police officer he may dispense with his service. Before, however this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit must furnish his representation in writing and it will be duly considered by the Superintendent of Police before passing the orders of discharge.
(3) Every order passed by a Superintendent under sub-paragraph (2) above shall, subject to the control of the Deputy Inspector General be final."
A perusal of the above provisions go to show that if the Superintendent of Police is of the opinion that recruit is unlikely to make a good officer, his services can be dispensed with, but prior thereto the recruit must be given a notice regarding specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and with a liberty to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit is entitled to submit a representation in writing and before passing the order, the authority is under an obligation to consider the same. The supervisory power against an order of discharge has been conferred upon the Deputy Inspector General of Police vide Regulation (3).
There is nothing in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents to demonstrate that any notice was issued or any opportunity was provided to the petitioner informing him about the alleged act or omission on his part, on account of which an opinion was formed that he would not prove to be a good police officer and for that reason, is being discharged.
It is no doubt correct that for the purpose of discharging a probationer constable in accordance with the provisions contained in para 541 of the Regulations, no regular departmental enquiry is contemplated. Still the minimal requirement is that an incumbent to be discharged, must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds giving him an opportunity to submit his reply, which is required to be taken into consideration before taking any final decision. It is neither the case of the respondents set up in the counter affidavit nor any material has been placed before the Court that any such opportunity was given. The counter affidavit though demonstrates that a preliminary enquiry was conducted by 'Shivir Pal', of 49th Battalion, PAC, who submitted a report dated 14.02.2010. Even the preliminary enquiry report also nowhere shows that petitioner was given a notice or show cause in the manner as contemplated in para 541 (2) of the Regulations. It appears that 'Shivir Pal' while enquiring the matter, did record statement of the petitioner about his version and thereafter submitted his report, however, it is not reflected from the preliminary enquiry report that petitioner was informed about the material against him or he was afforded any opportunity to explain his case after considering the entire material adverse to him available with the respondents. The kind of preliminary inquiry which has been conducted by the respondents does not satisfy the requirement of para 541 of the Regulations inasmuch as it is one thing where employee is called upon and his statement is recorded, but it is totally a different aspect where the employee is informed of the entire complaint and material which is adverse against him and is liable to be considered by the authority concerned before passing an order.
In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is difficult to hold that procedure followed by the respondents satisfy the requirements of para 541 of the Regulations and the impugned order is not liable to be sustained being in violation of the procedure contemplated by paragraph 541 of the Regulations.
The last issue, which arises for consideration is that whether the impugned order can be held to be punitive in nature and bad having been passed without holding any regular inquiry and observing requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution read with 1991 Rules.
In the counter affidavit, clear case set up by the respondents is that the petitioner was charged of unauthorised absence, which was found to be proved in the preliminary enquiry report. A perusal of the report goes to show that the 'Shivir Pal', who conducted the preliminary enquiry formulated a charge, recorded statement of the petitioner, thereafter cross-examined him, examined certain other witnesses and after referring to certain documentary evidence, recorded the finding that charge against the petitioner stands proved. The said enquiry was only a preliminary enquiry and has not been conducted as a regular disciplinary enquiry by informing the charges to the petitioner and following the procedure laid down in 1991 Rules. The statement of witnesses recorded are also ex parte in nature, inasmuch as the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses not it does appear that after recording all such statements and evidences on the part of the department, petitioner was given any opportunity to place his defence, either oral or in writing.
It is well settled that a temporary Government servant or probationers are entitled to protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, just as permanent employees, despite the fact that temporary Government servants have no right to hold the post and their services are liable to be terminated at any time by giving them notice without assigning any reason either in terms of the contract of service or under the relevant rules governing the terms and conditions of the service. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 152.
Now coming to the issue whether the impugned order can be held to be punitive in nature and bad having been passed without holding any regular inquiry and observing requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution read with 1991 Rules, the clear case set up by the respondents in the counter affidavit is that the petitioner was charged of unauthorised absence, which was found to be proved in the light of the preliminary enquiry report, even though the order is innocuous without casting any stigma.
The language of the termination order, howsoever innocuous, it may be, the form is not conclusive of its true nature. IN order to attract the provisions of Article 311 (2), it has to be seen whether the misconduct or negligence was a mere motive for the order or it was the very foundation of the order. 'Motive' and 'foundation' are distinct though the distinction is very narrow and almost overlapping. Motive can be termed as something which stimulates or incited a person to do a particular act, whereas foundation can be termed as basis for doing the act. In other words, where there is suspicion of misconduct or negligence and the employeer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead going into the correctness of alleged charges, decides not to continue with the employment, simply terminates the services in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment or the service Rules, it is a case of motive whereas when the acts and omissions of an employee is treated to be misconduct, enquired and proved the same is a case of foundation, and in that eventuality, the order would be punitive in nature.
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. etc. etc. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896 while considering the question to the termination order is simpliciter or becomes punitive, has observed as under.
"The anatomy of a dismissal order is not a mystery, once we agree that substance, not semblance, governs the decision. Legal criteria are not so slippery that verbal manipulations may outwit the court. Broadly stated, the face is the index to the mind and an order fair on its face may be taken at its face value. But there is more to it than that, because sometimes words are designed to conceal deeds by linguistic engineering. So it is beyond dispute that the form of the order or the language in which it is couched is not conclusive. The court will lift the veil to see the true nature of the order.
Many situations arise where courts have been puzzled because the manifest language of the termination order is equivocal or misleading and dismissals have been dressed up as simple termination. And so, judges have delved into distinctions between the motive and the foundation of the order and a variety of other variations to discover the true effect of an order of termination. Rulings are a maze on this question but, in sum, the conclusion is clear. If two factors coexist, an inference of punishment is reasonable though not inevitable. What are they?
If the severance of service is effected, the first condition is fulfilled and if the foundation or causa causans of such severance is the servant's misconduct the second is fulfilled. If the basis or foundation for the order of termination is clearly not turpitudinous or stigmatic or rooted in misconduct or visited with evil pecuniary effects, then the inference of dismissal stands negated and vice versa. These canons run right through the disciplinary branch of master and servant jurisprudence, both under Article 311 and in other cases including workmen under managements. The law cannot be stultified by verbal haberdashery because the court will lift the mask and discover the true face.
Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinized, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal. Even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used.
On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive pecuniary cut-back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge. We need not chase other hypothetical situations here.
What is decisive is the plain reason for the discharge, not the strategy of a non-enquiry or clever avoidance of stigmatizing epithets. If the basis is not misconduct, the order is saved."
In the case of Ravindra Kumar Mishra Vs. U.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 2408, it was held that for finding out the effect of the order of termination, the concept of 'motive' and 'foundation' has to be kept in mind. It was further observed that no straitjacket test can be laid down to distinguish the two, namely, the 'motive' and 'foundation'. Whether motive has become the foundation has to be decided by the court with reference to the facts of a given case.
Again in Commissioner, Food and Supplies, U.P., Lucknow Vs. Prakash Chand Saxena, 1994 (5) SCC 177, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the question whether the order by which services were terminated was innocuous or punitive in nature had to be decided on the facts of each case. After considering the relevant facts in the light of the sorrounding circumstances. The benefit and protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution is available not only to temporary servants but also to a probationer and the court in an appropriate case, would be justified in lifting the veil to find out the particular nature of the order by which the services were terminated.
In a more recent judgment in the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court after reviewing the entire case laws on the subject, observed as under.
"The important principles which are deducible on the concept of "motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination or suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inqiury is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of "motive".
"Motive" is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, "motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry "
Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it will be noticed that the petitioner, who was holding a Group-D post, which subsequently, came to be included in the definition of the police force contemplated in Police Act, 1861 by means of a Government Notification dated 28.08.2009, and thus, the services stood governed by the provisions of Police Act and U.P. Police Regulations and the same were terminated during the period of probation without following the procedure prescribed under para 541 of the U.P. Police Regulations for discharge of a probationer, on the basis of a preliminary enquiry report, wherein he was found guilty of absenting himself from duty. The termination order apparently was founded on the report of the preliminary enquiry, which in the facts and circumstances, was held to establish his guilt and cannot be termed as an enquiry to consider his suitability which renders the order punitive in character. The facts of the case make it evident that to find out the guilt of the petitioner, the respondents held a preliminary enquiry, wherein the findings of guilt were recorded and the impugned order has been passed after holding that the alleged act of misconduct is proved against the petitioner, though the impugned order of termination itself does not mention anything, but the attending circumstances and material on record, leaves no room for doubt that after being satisfied with the guilt of the petitioner, the respondents followed a short cut method giving a go-bye to the procedure and passed the impugned order.
In view of the above facts and discussions, the writ petition succeeds and stands allowed. The impugned order of termination dated 06.05.2010 as well as revisional order dated 25.07.2010 are hereby quashed.
The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits as admissible under law. However, this judgment shall not preclude the respondents from proceeding afresh against the petitioner in accordance with law.
In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no orders as to costs.
September 5th, 2013 VKS