Chattisgarh High Court
Dr. Prabhakar Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 September, 2021
Author: P. Sam Koshy
Bench: P. Sam Koshy
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AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Writ Petition (S) No. 4831 of 2020
1. Dr. Prabhakar Singh S/o Late Shri B. Singh Aged About 57 Years R/o -
House No. 200, Metrogreen Colony, In Front of Bhawan School, Saddu,
Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh).
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary, Department of Agriculture
Development, Farmers Welfare and Biotechnology, Mahanadi Bhawan,
Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur
(Chhattisgarh).
2. Agriculture Production Commissioner Agriculture Department, Mahanadi
Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District -
Raipur (Chhattisgarh).
3. Director, Horticulture and Social Forestry Directorate, Indrawati Bhawan,
Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh).
4. Indra Gandhi Krishi Vishwavidyalaya Through - Its Registrar, Indra Gandhi
Krishi Vishwavidyalaya, Krishak Nagar, Labhandi, Raipur, District Raipur
(Chhattisgarh).
---Respondents
For Petitioner : Shri Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate.
For State : Shri Kunal Das, Panel Lawyer.
For Respondent No.4 : Shri Shashank Thakur, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy
Order on Board
30.09.2021 .
1. Aggrieved by the order of punishment dated 18.02.2020 (Annexure P/2) and the rejection of the Departmental Appeal by the appellate authority dated 19.08.2020 (Annexure P/1), the present writ petition has been filed. Vide Annexure P/2 the petitioner was inflicted with minor punishment of stoppage of two annual increments without cumulative effect and Vide Annexure P/1 the Departmental Appeal stands rejected.
2. Facts of the case in brief is that the petitioner substantively is a Professor and HOD in Horticulture Department in Indira Gandhi Krishi University, Raipur. In the year 2019 i.e. on 14.01.2019 the services of the petitioner was placed on deputation with the State Govt. The petitioner remained on -2- deputation for a period between 15.01.2019 to 27.05.2020. The petitioner stood repatriated back to his parent department on 11.06.2020.
3. While the petitioner was discharging his duties on deputation with the State Govt. a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 12.12.2019 in respect of certain alleged deficiencies in the discharge of his duties and on the basis of which it was said that the govt. has been put to loss. The petitioner gave a detailed reply denying all the averments made in the said show cause notice specifically stating that the allegations which have been leveled against the petitioner was not one which was actually to be discharged by the petitioner, but was to be discharged by the other authorities in the department and the petitioner had specifically named the authorities who were responsible for the said work. Without further conducting any preliminary enquiry or a detailed departmental enquiry, the State authorities vide Annexure P/2 straightway imposed the minor punishment of withholding of two annual increments without cumulative effect. The petitioner preferred a detailed appeal to the appellate authority which too stood rejected vide Annexure P/1 leading to filing of present writ petition.
4. Primary challenge to the disciplinary action is firstly on the ground that the order of penalty is in contravention to Rule 20 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short, the Rules, 1966) inasmuch as the punishment has been imposed without consultation with the parent or lending department which in the instant case is the the Indira Gandhi Krishi University. Secondly the challenge is on the ground that once when there is a categorical denial of the factual aspects pertaining to the allegations and the complaints made against the petitioner in the show cause notice, the respondent authorities ought to have conducted a departmental enquiry, if not, at least some sort of -3- enquiry before imposition of the punishment which again in the instant case has not been done. That, the punishment has been straightaway passed by the respondent authorities without meeting the grounds raised by the petitioner in the reply to the show cause notice.
5. The counsel for the petitioner referred to Clause-(i) of Rule 20(2) of Rules, 1966 wherein it is specifically envisages that in the event of the borrowing department intending to impose any of the punishment reflected in Clause-
(i) to (iv) of Rule 10, the borrowing department needs to consult the lending department and on the opinion of lending department an appropriate decision should be taken. The said rule further provides also the option left with the borrowing department in the event of there being difference of opinion between the borrowing department and the lending department. Since in the instant case no consultation was done, the entire action gets vitiated on that ground.
6. The counsel for the petitioner further drew the attention to the show cause notice Annexure P/5 and P/6 whereby while Annexure P/5, the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and Annexure P/6, reply of the petitioner was submitted to the authorities, in Annexure P/6 there is a categorical denial of the entire factual matrix of the complaint made in the show cause notice giving specific details in respect of the alleged complaints levelled against the petitioner. That coupled with the fact that in the reply itself the petitioner had specifically mentioned he not being the appropriate authority. That it was infact the responsibility of some other authority in the department and these are facts which have not been ascertained or discussed or dealt with while imposing penalty Annexure P/2.
7. As regards the contention of the petitioner so far as non compliance of the requirement under Clause-(i) of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 20 of Rules, 1966. -4- There is an admission of this fact by the lending department who have categorically stated in their reply that punishment has been imposed without consultation with the lending department. This fact is not disputed by the State authorities also in their reply inasmuch as there is no rebuttal.
8. For proper appreciation of the contention, it would also be relevant to refer to the rule position as it stands and for that Clause-(i) of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 20 and the proviso mentioned therein is reproduced hereinunder :
"(2) In the light of the findings in the disciplinary proceedings conducted against the Government servant;
(i) if the borrowing authority is of a opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 10 should be imposed on the Government servant, it may, after consultation with the lending authority, make such orders on the case as it deems necessary :
Provided that in the event of a difference of opinion between the borrowing authority and the lending authority, the services of the Government servant shall be replaced at the disposal of the lending authority"
9. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of a decision of the MP High Court in this regard. In the case of B.L. Satyarthi Vs. State of MP & Another, 2015(1) MPLJ where dealing with the powers under Rule 20, one of the points discussed by the MP High Court was the objection which the petitioner has raised in the present writ petition. In paragraph 12 the Division Bench of MP High Court, after referring to other issues under Rule 20 has as regards the objection of the petitioner in the instant petition are concerned, has held as under:
"12..........Apart from the above a perusal of Rule 20(2) and the proviso to Rule 20(2)(i) and (iii) also clarifies the position. After the departmental proceeding initiated by the Borrowing Department is completed and the finding of enquiry is recorded, in the light of the finding if the Borrowing Department wants to impose any of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of Rule 10, then after consultation with the lending department the punishment can be imposed. However, the proviso to Rule 20(2)(i) indicates that if there is any difference of opinion between the Borrowing Department and lending department that the service of the -5- employee has to be replaced at the disposal of the lending department......."
10. From the plain reading of the aforesaid rule position as also the judicial pronouncement by the Division Bench of the MP High Court it stands established that while an employee was on deputation and the borrowing department intended to take a disciplinary action against the deputationist, there ought to had been a consultation mandatorily required before imposition of punishment. In the instant case from the pleadings of the reply submitted by either of the respondents it stands established that there was no such consultation made before the punishment order was passed.
11. In view of the same, the impugned order of punishment is not sustainable in the eyes of law and the same apparently is in violation of Clause-(i) of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 20 of Rules, 1966 and the same therefore deserves to be and is accordingly set aside.
12. As regards the second ground raised by the petitioner, it would also be relevant at this juncture to take note of the reply to the show cause notice Annexure P/6 which the petitioner has submitted and which again for ready reference is being reproduced hereinunder to better understand the categorical denial and explanation provided in respect of each of the allegations that were levelled against the petitioner:
m|kfudh Qlykssa gsrq lapkyuky; esa iquxZfBr ekSle vk/kkfjr Qly iquxZfBr ekSle vk/kkfjr chek ;kstuk dk dk;Z Jh HkwisUnz dqekj ik.Ms;] Qly chek ;kstuk ds vij lapkyd] m|ku] rks"k.k pUnzkdj ofj"V fdz;kUo;u ds laca/k esa m+|ku fodkl vf/kdkjh ,oa Jh lkSjo iVsy foHkkxh; i= dzekaad 5143 xzkeh.k m|ku fodkl vf/kdkjh dks vkcafVr gS fnukad 17-09-2019 ,oa rFkk N-x- 'kklu d`f"k foHkkx ds vkns'k dzekad lela[;d i= fnukad 8950@,Q&08@89@WBCIS 05-10-2019 }kjk vkidks @16&17@14&2 fnukad 05-05-2016 }kjk izLrko Hkstus gsrq ys[k ekSle vk/kkfjr le;&lhek esa ugha fd;s tkus fd;s tkus ds ckotwn ds laca/k esa Jh HkwisUnz dqekj ik.Ms;] vij yxHkx 2 ekg O;rhr gksus lapkyd m|ku ls izkIr Li"Vhdj.k ds vij -6- ds mijkar foHkkx dks lapkyd m|ku us ys[k fd;k gS fd] flracj] jkT; Lrjh; Qly chek 2019 dks vk;ksftr dszrk&fodszrk lEesyu ds leUo; lfefr dh cSBd vk;kstu esa iwjs ekg O;Lr gksus rFkk vi;kZIr gsrq izLrko miyC/k djk;k vf/kdkjh@rduhdh veys ,oa dk;Z dh x;k gSA vf/kdrk ds ifj.kke Lo:i jkT; Lrjh;
Qly chek lfefr dh cSBd gsrq izLrko miyC/k djkus esa vokafNr foyac gqvk ¼Nk;kizfr layXu½A Qly chek 'kk[kk esa dk;ksZa dh vf/kdrk dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, vfrfjDr dq'ky ekuo lalk/ku fu;qDr djus gsrq 'kklu dks lapkyuky;hu i= dzekad 1568 fnukad 12-06- 2019 i= dzekad 3032 fnukad 29-07-20`19 ,oa i= dzekad 3513 fnukad 23-08-2019 }kjk vuqjks/k Hkh fd;k x;k gSA ftldh Lohd`fr visf{kr gSA le; lhek esa ;kstuk dk lqpk: :i ls vkidks Kkr gS fd jch fdz;kUo;u gsrq Hkjld iz;kl fd;k x;k gS] ekSle ekg vDVwcj ls bl gsrq jkT; Lrjh; Qly chek leUo; izkjaHk gks tkrk gSA ;kstuk lfefr dh cSBd fnukad 13-11-2019 esa ds lwpk: fdz;kUo;u gsrq vuqeksnu mijkar chek daiuh ds p;u gsrq ekxZnf'kZdk esa fdz;kUo;u fufonk vkea=.k dh lwpuk fnukad 14-11-2019 ls lacaf/kr xfrfof/k;ksa gsrq dks izdkf'kr dh x;hA ekSleokj le;&lhek iwoZ es jch 2016 esa 20-12-2016 dks] jch 2017 fu/kkZfjr gSA ekSle izkjaHk esa 30-11-2017 dks] jch 2018 esa 06-12-2019 gksus ds iwoZ gh Qly dks m|kfudh Qlyks ds chek gsrq vf/klwpuk chek fdz;kfUor djus ds fd;k x;k Fkk orZeku o"kZ jch 2019 esa 07-12- fy, leqfpr dk;Zokgh 2019 dks vf/klwpuk tkjh dh xbZ gS tks mDr fd;k tkuk pkfg;s Fkk] frfFk;ksa ds yxHkx leku gSA ijarq vkids chek gsrq Hkkjr ljdkj ls lwphc) lHkh 19 ykijokghiwoZd foyac ls chek daiuh;ksa dks bZesy ,oa LihM iksLV ds izLrko izLrqr djus ds ek/;e ls fufonk lacaf/kr nLrkost iszf"kr fd;s dkj.k vYi le; dh x;s rFkk nwjHkk"k ij Hkh fufonk vkea=.k dh fufonk lwpuk ¼chek lwpuk iznku dh x;hA fufonk izdk'ku dh daiuh izLrko½ vkeaf=r lwpuk dks ,d jk"Vªh; Lrj ds lekpkj i= djus ds lkFk lkFk ¼esy VwMs fnukad 15-12-2019½ ,oa nks LFkkuh; Hk.Mkj dz; fu;e esa NwV lekpkj i= ¼uoHkkjr fnukad 15-12-2019 ,oa izkIr djus dh vko';drk gfjHkwfe fnukad 15-12-19½ esa izdkf'kr dh iM+hA foyac ls fufonk x;hA lapkyuky;hu i= dzekad 5730 fnukad vkeaf=r djus ds dkj.k 21-11-2019 ,oa i= dzekad 6046 fnukad dsoy ,d daiuh }kjk 30-11-2019 ds ek/;e ls la;qDr lfpo ,oa fufonk eas Hkkx fy;k x;k lhbZvks] iz/kkuea=h Qly chek ;kstuk Hkkjr RkFkk izhfe;e nj xro"kZ ljdkj ubZ fnYyh dks Hkh lwphc) leLr chek dh rqyuk eas yxHkx 64- daifu;ksa dks fufonk esa Hkkx ysus gsrq funZsf'kr -7- 75 izfr'kr o`f} gqbZ gS] djsu dkl vuqjks/k Hkh fd;k x;k RkFkk fnukad ftlds QyLo:i 'kklu 21-11-2019 dks vk;ksftr lkIrkfgd fofM;ks dks vfrfjDRk foRrh; Hkkj dkaQzflax esa Hkh fufonk vkea=.k dh lwpuk ogu djuk iM+ ldrk lHkh chek daifu;ksa ds izLrko dks iznku dh gSA x;hA bl izdkj vYi le; dh fufonk lwpuk esa vf/kd ls vf/kd daifu;ksa ds izLrko lfEefyr gks lds bl gsrq ;Fkksfpr iz;kl fd;s x;sA chek daiuh }kjk vf/kd Hkkfjr izhfe;e nj vafdr djus ds fuEu dkj.k laHkkfor gS& foxr o"kksZ a esa vf/kd chek nkok jkf'k dk Hkq x rku& jch o"kZ 2016 esa dqy izhfe;e dk 27-45 izfr'kr] [kjhQ 2017&18 esa 39-04 izfr'kr] jch 2017&18 43-57 izfr'kr] [kjhQ 2018&19 esa 33-97 izfr'kr] jch 2019&19 esa 65-99 izfr'kr jkf'k] chek nkok ds :i esa chek dEiuh }kjk d`"kdksa dks Hkqxrku fd;k x;k gSA chek nkok jkf'k ds x.kuk gsr q mi;ksx fd;s tkus okys VeZ ' khV esa ifjorZ u & orZeku esa chek gsrq tkjh dh xbZ fufonk esa cSaXku] QwyxksHkh] iRrkxksHkh ,oa vkyw Qly esa vksyko`f"V ls gksus okyh laHkkfor {kfr dh jkf'k dks iwoZ o"kksZa dh rqyuk esa o`f) dh xbZ gSA o"kZ 2016 jch ekSle esa bl ;kstuk ds izkjaHk ds le; Hkh m|kfudh Qlyksa ds fy, chek daiuh }kjk izLrkfor izhfe;e nj 24-92 izfr'kr FkhA orZeku jch 2019 esa izkIr fufonk nj 23-0021] tks fd jch 2016 esa izkIr nj ls de gSA
13. From the plain reading of the aforesaid explanation provided by the petitioner it would evidently clear that the petitioner had infact made categorical denial and in addition to the categorical denial there was also specific explanation provided, coupled with the fact that the petitioner had also made a categorical statement that it was not infact the petitioner who was responsible to discharge the duties in respect of the allegations made and that it was infact otherwise entrusted to the Additional Director in the Department and a committee constituted in that regard. -8-
14. Now if we look into the impugned order of punishment Annexure P/2, there is no discussion whatsoever so far as the reply that the petitioner has made and in respect of the specific contention raised by the petitioner in his explanation and the authorities have simply repeated the allegations made against the petitioner and have imposed the order of punishment.
15. The Supreme Court in case of O.K. Bhardwaj Vs. Union of India, 2001(9) SCC 180 in paragraph 3 has held as under :
"3. While we agree with the first proposition of the High Court having regard to the rule position which expressly says that "withholding increments of pay with or without cumulative effect" is a minor penalty, we find it not possible to agree with the second proposition. Even in the case of a minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the charges against him. Moreover, if the charges are factual and if they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for. This is the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot be dispensed with."
16. Reiterating the same principle, the Suprme Court again in case of State of Bihar Vs. Laxmishankar Prasad, 2002(10)SCC 351 in paragraph 3 has held as under:
"3. ...After the initiation of the fresh proceeding, though an explanation was called for from the delinquent, but the impugned order of punishment indicates that the disciplinary authority has not recorded a finding about the guilt of the delinquent of different charges which were levelled against him as well as the consideration of the explanation given by the delinquent to the charges levelled against. In such circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the order of punishment on a conclusion that the disciplinary authority did not record a finding about the guilt of the delinquent nor has it recorded any reasoning for arriving at such conclusion."
17. These two judgments of the Supreme Court was further relied upon by the MP High Court in case of Raj Kapoor Singh Parihar Vs. State of MP, 2014 Lawsuit 196, decided on 06.03.2014 in WP No.2760 of 2013 wherein again examining the need to conduct an enquiry in respect of allegations which are based on factual matrix, the MP High Court in paragraph 8 to 10 has held as under:
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"8. At the cost of repetition, in the opinion of this Court, whether it is an enquiry under Rule 14 or under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to issue a specific charge sheet against the petitioner. The delinquent employee must know about the nature of accusation against him. This enables him to put forth his defence in a reasonable, adequate and effective manner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice and denied the charges in toto. On merits also, he submitted his detailed reply. Admittedly, no enquiry was conducted. The prosecution witnesses were not examined in presence of the petitioner nor he was permitted to lead his evidence. The alleged enquiry reports, Annexures P/16 and P/17, are the reports based on some material collected behind the back of the petitioner. In the opinion of this Court, the said enquiry reports are no reports in the eye of law, worth the name. This is trite law that even in minor penalty proceedings if the charges are denied. It is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to conduct a full- fledged enquiry.
This view is taken by the Supreme Court in (O.K. Bhardwaj vs. Union of India and others, 2001 9 SCC 180). In the present case, without conducting any enquiry as per rules and after taking into account the ex parte enquiry reports, Annexure P/16 and P/17, the disciplinary authority intended to punish the petitioner. The petitioner submitted detailed reply. The disciplinary authority in his punishment order although reproduced the stand of the petitioner taken in his reply, did not assign a single reason as to why the said defence or reasons not suit him. AS per Rules 15(3), 16(1)(d) and 16(2)(viii) of CCA Rules, the disciplinary authority is under a statutory obligation to assign reasons for his conclusion. Thus, this is not only the requirement of principle of natural justice, it is the mandate of the governing Statute, i.e., CCA Rules.
9. By the impugned punishment order, recovery of a huge amount is directed against the petitioner, which entails civil consequences. It was obligatory on the part of the respondents to assign reasons for the same. The reasons are held to be heartbeat of 'conclusion' by the Supreme Court. It is emphasized that in judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative orders, the authorities must assign reasons. This view is taken by Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited V. Masood Ahmed Kha, 2010 9 SCC 496.
10. The appellate order suffers from same illegality and infirmity. As per Rule 27 of CCA Rules, the appellate authority is obliged to examine the procedural part of the enquiry, perversity of finding and also the proportionality in imposing punishment. The petitioner preferred a detailed appeal running in 15 pages. The said appeal is rejected by a single stoke of pain by holding that the petitioner has not made effort to stop illegal mining. The grounds taken by the petitioner in his appeal memo are not dealt with by the appellate authority. This runs contrary to the judgment of Supreme Court in (Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, 1986 3 SCC 103), followed by this Court in (Mohemmad Idris vs. Registrar General of MP High Court, Jabalpur and others, 2005 2MPLJ 51). Recently, the Apex Court followed this view in (Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. A/Masilamani, 2013 6 SCC 530). Thus, the appellate order is also illegal and cannot be permitted to stand. In the opinion of this Court, even if the petitioner has committed any error or misconduct, the respondents are bound to establish it by conducting enquiry in -10- accordance with law. Without conducting proper enquiry, no punishment order can be permitted to stand."
18. The aforesaid judicial pronouncements specifically reveal that the mandate laid down by these judicial pronouncements are that even if the authorities concerned intend to impose a minor punishment, there has to be a proper appreciation of the reply which the delinquent employee submits. That each of the contents raised in the reply to the specific allegations have to be dealt with and the reasons have to be recorded as a finding, before imposing the punishment and for which some sort of an enquiry becomes necessary. The delinquent also would have the advantage of getting an opportunity to establish his contention and explanations to the disciplinary authority before the punishment order is imposed. The impugned order Annexure P/2 in the instant case also lacks this requirement which are otherwise expected from the disciplinary authority. The impugned order Annexure P/2 to that extent also is not sustainable. This view has further been resorted to by this court in WPS No.2119 of 2011 in case of Rudranarayan Singh Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others decided on 18.08.2018.
19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders deserve to be and are set aside. However, the right of respondent No.1 stands reserved, if they intend to still proceed further against the petitioner, they may do so after meeting the requirement as has been laid down in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment.
20. The writ petition accordingly stands allowed and disposed of.
Sd/-
(P. Sam Koshy) Judge inder