Patna High Court - Orders
Saryu Singh vs The Union Of India & Ors on 17 December, 2014
Author: Samarendra Pratap Singh
Bench: Samarendra Pratap Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Letters Patent Appeal No.1225 of 2014
In
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 22327 of 2013
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1. Saryu Singh son of Late Rajnarayan Singh, resident of At. Vishnupur
(Nayatola), P.O. Mahnar Road (R.S.), P.S.- Mahnar, Distt.- Vaishali,
Bihar, Pin Code- 844507
.... .... Appellant
Versus
1. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Govt. of
India, Shastri Nagar, New Delhi
2. The Northern Coalfield Ltd. through the Chairman and Managing
Director, P.S. and P.O. Singrauli, Dist. Singrauli
3. The Central Coalfield Ltd. through the Chairman and Managing
Director P.S. And P.O. Ranchi, Dist. Ranchi, Ranchi, Jharkhand
4. The Coal India Ltd. through the Chairman, Coal Bhawan, 10, Netaji
Subhas Road, Kolkata (W.B.)
.... .... Respondents
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Shankar Ganguli, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Sanjay Kumar (ASG)
Mr. V.M.K. Sinha, Advocate.
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE I. A. ANSARI
AND
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SAMARENDRA PRATAP
SINGH
CAV ORDER
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE I. A. ANSARI)
7 -12-2014 This is an appeal against order, dated
02.07.2014, passed, in CWJC No. 22327 of 2013, by a learned single Judge of this Court, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that (i) no assistance was rendered, in the writ proceedings, on behalf of the writ petitioner-appellant herein and (ii) the writ petition lacks territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action had arisen within the Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 2/46 territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court.
2. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his writ petition, this appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioner.
3. The material facts, giving rise to the writ petition, may, in brief, be set out as under:
(i) The State Collieries, spread over several States of India, was earlier run directly by the Ministry of Production, Government of India, and Kargali Collieries, in the district of Hazaribagh (Jharkhand), was one of the units of the State Collieries of the Government of India within the territorial limits of the erstwhile State of Bihar.
(ii) The writ petitioner was appointed, at Kargali (Hazaribagh), as Assistant Law Officer by the then Ministry of Production, Government of India, with effect from 01.01.1954, in the Central Pay Commission Scale approved by the Government of India and guided by the Central Civil Rules.
(iii) During the service tenure of the writ petitioner, he was transferred to the National Coal Development Corporation Limited, which announced that the scale of pay, recommended by the 3rd Central Pay Commission, would be applied, with effect from 01.01.1973, by the National Coal Development Corporation Limited, as approved by the Government of Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 3/46 India, vide letter No. NCDC/3rdCPC office/75, dated 27.05.1975, and the name of the writ petitioner figured at serial No. 56 in the list of employees issued in this regard.
(iv) Thereafter, the Central Coalfields Limited, which was formerly known as National Coal Development Corporation Limited, announced, on 11.05.1987, implementation of revised 4th Central Pay Commission pay scale, as approved by the Government of India, with effect from 01.01.1986, by letter No. 2 PM (A)/EE/Excentince/DA/VDA/87/10919-104.
(v) The writ petitioner was promoted to the post of Deputy Chief Legal Manager, in the revised 4th Central Pay Commission pay scale of Rs. 4100-5300 vide Officer Order No. C-5A (iii)/51791/(PT)/1082, dated 27.10.1987, issued by the Coal India Limited, Kolkata, and the writ petitioner was posted at Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli (Madhya Pradesh), a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, Kolkata, by order passed, in this regard, on 26.12.1987. The writ petitioner, accordingly, joined the Head Office of Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli (Madhya Pradesh) on 28.12.1987.
(vi) Later on, the writ petitioner discovered that in the Officer Order No. C-5A (iii)/51791/(PT)/1082, dated 27.10.1987, issued by the Coal India Limited, Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 4/46 Kolkata, in place of Central Pay Commission scale of pay, replacement/BP scale of pay was, inadvertently, mentioned, whereupon the writ petitioner filed a representation to the Personnel Department of Northern Coalfield Limited requesting them to approach Coal India Limited, Kolkata, for necessary amendment in the said Office Order. Thereafter, the said Officer Order was amended vide letter No. C-5A (iii)/5199(/(PT)/867, dated 21.07.1988, and the scale of pay of the writ petitioner was fixed at Rs. 4100-125-4850-150-5300/-.
(vii) The writ petitioner superannuated, on 30.04.1990, from the post of Deputy Chief Legal Manager, in Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli, and the pension of the writ petitioner was fixed at Rs. 2,332/- in terms of the 4th Central Pay Commission scale of pay of Rs. 4100-5300/-. The writ petitioner, accordingly, started submitting his pension bills and the pension bills, so submitted, were also honoured by the Northern Coalfield Limited.
(viii) The writ petitioner had to submit his pension bill each month. The writ petitioner requested Northern Coalfield Limited to provide him the copies of the relevant notifications, issued by the Government of India, on the subject of pension, so as to enable him in to raise, within time, correct pension bills. Though the Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 5/46 copies of the notifications, on being received by the Coal India Limited, Kolkata, were circulated among all its subsidiaries for implementation thereof, no copy of the said notifications was ever supplied to the writ petitioner.
(ix) The writ petitioner, on hearing the announcement of the 4th Central Pay Commission Report, as approved by the Government of India with effect from 01.01.1996, requested, a number of times, the Personnel Department and Accounts Department of the Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli, to provide a copy of the relevant notification of the Government of India; but no attention was paid to the requests of the writ petitioner. At last, the writ petitioner approached the Personnel Department of the Central Coalfield Limited, Ranchi, and obtained therefrom a copy of the Government Notification No. 45/86/91 P & PW(A) P.t II, dated 27.10.1997, implementing the 5th Central Pay Commission Report, with effect from 01.01.1996, with an Office memorandum No. CIL/C-5A (VI)/50708/5th CPC/76, dated 19.05.1998, whereunder the notification, dated 27.10.1997, was circulated among all the subsidiaries of the Coal India Limited, including Northern Coalfield Limited, for implementation of the recommendation of the 5th Central Pay Commission.
(x) The writ petitioner represented himself Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 6/46 before the Accounts Department of the Northern Coalfield Limited for implementation of the 5th Central Pay Commission‟s recommendations with regard to the fixation of pension of the writ petitioner.
(xi) As the writ petitioner stood
superannuated, the Northern Coalfield Limited was
required to issue pension bills. The writ petitioner, therefore, started preparing pension bills as per the direction contained in the Notification No. 45/86/91 P & PW(A) P.t II, dated 27.10.1997. Based on the chart attached to the said Notification, the pension of the writ petitioner was fixed at Rs. 6139/- in place of Rs. 2332/-, as per the 5th Central Pay Commission‟s recommendations, with effect from 01.01.1996.
(xii) Subsequent to the writ petitioner‟s raising of pension bills on the basis of the Notification No. 45/86/91 P & PW(A) P.t II, dated 27.10.1997, applying the 5th Central Pay Commission‟s recommendations with effect from 01.01.1996, the writ petitioner came to know about the Notification No. 45/10/98-P&PW(A), dated 17.12.1998, whereby it was clarified that pension of all pensioners, irrespective of their dates of retirement, shall not be less than 50 per cent of the minimum pay in the revised scale of pay introduced with effect from 01.01.1996. By the said notification, the Government of Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 7/46 India amended the provisions of the 5th Central Pay Commission as implemented vide notification No. 45/86/91 P & PW(A) P.t II, dated 27.10.1997.
(xiii) In the mean-time, the Central Government approved the report of the 6th Central Pay Commission, vide notification No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A), dated 01.09.2006, with effect from 01.01.2006.Subsequent to the publication of the notification, dated 01.09.2006, aforementioned, the pay scale of the writ petitioner was fixed at Rs. 13,876/- in place of Rs. 6139/- (as per the 5th Central Pay Commission‟s report). The writ petitioner, having no knowledge of the notification No. 45/10/98-P&PW(A), dated 17.12.1998, prepared his pension bills according to the chart attached to the 6th Central Pay Commission‟s report. It was also discovered by the writ petitioner that the entire dearness allowance, paid to the writ petitioner between 01.01.2006 and 01.01.2008, had been adjusted, which was contrary to the notification No. 42/2/2008-P & PW(G), dated 12.09.2008, inasmuch as the notification, dated 12.09.2008, aforementioned envisaged that the payment of dearness allowance, covered by the said Notification, shall be made after adjusting the instalments of enhanced dearness allowance already paid to the pensioners between 01.01.2006 and 01.01.2008. Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 8/46
(xiv) Thereafter, the writ petitioner made a representation to the Finance Manager, Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli, stating therein, inter alia, that the entire dearness allowance, paid to him, had wrongly been adjusted, vide Office Order No. NCL/EE/P- File/09/2481, dated 05.02.2009, issued by Managing Director, Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli.
(xv) With regard to the above, when the writ petitioner raised his grievances before the officials of the Central Government, he came to know that long ago, a decision had already been taken by the Central Government, in respect of the 5th Central Pay Commission‟s report, that the pensioners would receive their pension as per the notional pay, i.e., 50 per cent of minimum of the revised scale of pay corresponding to the scale of pay on which the pensioners had retired.
(xvi) Thereafter, the writ petitioner, on 01.04.2009, wrote a letter to the Managing Director, Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli, demanding payment of pension based on the notional pay and to furnish to the writ petitioner a copy of the relevant decision of the Government of India. The Managing Director, Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli, did not, however, pay any heed to the letter of the writ petitioner.
(xvii) The writ petitioner, thereafter, obtained Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 9/46 a copy of the notification No. 38/37/08-P & PW(A) pt.1, dated 14.10.2008, whereby the Central Government had clarified the manner of fixation of pension in respect of pre-1996 and post-2006 scales of pay and in terms of this notification, the correct pension of the writ petitioner would be Rs. 7,150/- as per the report of the 5th Central Pay Commission and Rs. 23,050/- as per the 6th Central Pay Commission‟s report.
(xviii) The writ petitioner, therefore, requested, on several occasions, the Managing Director, Northern Coalfield Limited, Singrauli, enclosing, therewith, a copy of the notification No. 38/37/08-P & PW(A) pt.1, dated 14.10.2008, to pay his pension based on the notional pay. The writ petitioner also mentioned his correct pension in the requests made by him to the respondents-authorities, but the respondents-authorities did not take any action on the requests, so made, by the writ petitioner.
(xix) The writ petitioner, then, made several applications, under the Right to Information Act, 2005, regarding non-fixation of his correct pension with effect from 01.01.1996 to 01.01.2006; but in the replies to the writ petitioner‟s applications, the respondents-authorities asserted that the writ petitioner had been receiving regular pension.
Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-201410/46
(xx) However, according to the writ petitioner, the core issue, regarding correct fixation of the writ petitioner‟s pension, with effect from 01.01.1996 to 01.01.2006, was never dealt with, though it was stated by the respondents-authorities, in their communications made to the writ petitioner, that the notional pay scale of the writ petitioner, as per the report of the 5th Central Pay Commission, was Rs. 14,300-400-18,300/- and, as per the report of the 6th Central Pay Commission, the writ petitioner‟s notional pay scale was Rs. 37,400-67,000 with grade pay of Rs. 8,700/-.
(xxi) The writ petitioner, on experiencing that no action was being taken either by the authorities of the Ministry of Coal, Government of India, or by the authorities of the Coal India Limited, made a representation, on 24.05.2010, addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of Coal, New Delhi, and also forwarded a copy of the said representation to the Chairman, Coal India Limited, Kolkata, urging upon them to take necessary action; but all the efforts of the writ petitioner went in vain.
4. Being aggrieved by the continued inaction of the respondents-authorities, the writ petitioner made an application, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which gave rise to CWJC No. 22327 of 2013, Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 11/46 seeking following reliefs:
"(i) That the respondent No. 2, i.e., Northern Coalfield Ltd., may be directed to pay pension to the petitioner based on notional pay scale, i.e., Rs. 7,150/- Basic Pension plus Dearness Relief as announced by the Central Government based on amended 5th Central Pay Commission w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and Rs. 23,050/- Basic Pension plus Dearness Relief based on 6th Central Pay Commission as announced by the Central Government w.e.f. 01.01.2006.
(ii) That the respondent No. 2 may be directed to pay additional quantum of pension to the petitioner on attaining 80 years of age w.e.f. 01.04.2012.
(iii) That the respondent No. 2 may be directed to provide the petitioner calculation of arrear till date in respect of pension as per the provision of 5th Central Pay Commission and 6th Central Pay Commission and also the calculation of arrears till date in respect of the additional quantum of pension payable to the petitioner on reaching 80 years of age.
(iv) That the respondents may be directed to pay arrears in respect of pensionary benefits as per the amended revised scale of 5th Central Pay Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 12/46 Commission and revised pay scale of 6th Central Pay Commission issued by the Government of India with interest at 18 per cent either severally or wholly/jointly.
(v) That the respondent No. 2 may be directed to pay dearness relief as per the order of notification no. 42/2/2008- P & PW (G), dated 12.09.2008, and adjust only enhanced old dearness relief paid from 01.01.2006 to 01.01.2008 with new dearness relief.
(vi) for granting any other relief(s) to which the petitioner is otherwise found entitled to."
5. On 02.07.2014, a learned single Judge of this Court has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that apart from the fact that there was lack of assistance rendered on behalf of the writ petitioner, this Court lacked territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Patna High Court.
6. Aggrieved by the order, dated 02.07.2014, aforementioned dismissing his writ petition, the writ petitioner has preferred this appeal.
7. We have heard Mr. Ravi Shankar Ganguli, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Mr. V.M. K. Sinha, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. We have also heard Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 13/46 learned A.S.G., appearing for the Union of India.
8. What needs to be borne in mind, while dealing with this appeal, is that the question as to whether the writ petitioner‟s grievances, raised in the writ petition, as regards non-payment of correct amount of pension, has not been dealt with, and decided, by the learned single Judge, in the order, dated 02.07.2014, aforementioned on the ground that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues raised in the writ petition.
9. We are, therefore, not called upon to decide the correctness or otherwise of the grievances of the writ petitioner as regards non-payment of correct amount of pension; rather, what we are required to decide is:
Whether the learned single Judge was correct in holding to the effect that this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the issues raised in the writ petition.
10. Before, however, we turn to the correctness or otherwise of the order, dated 02.07.2014, which stands impugned in the present appeal, it needs to be pointed out that on 13.03.2014, which was the first date of admission hearing of the writ petitioner, the respondents raised objection by contending that the writ Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 14/46 petition was not maintainable inasmuch as this Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
11. Upon hearing the parties concerned, on the question, as to whether this Court had territorial jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition, a learned single Judge of this Court observed, in the order, dated 13.03.2014, that the writ petition was maintainable. The order, dated 13.03.2014, is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow:
"This case has been placed before me, out of turn, on the basis of mentioning slip on the ground that petitioner is an old man, aged about 85 years and suffering from several chronic disease.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for Union of India as well as learned counsel appearing for respondents no. 2 to 4.
At the very outset,
learned counsel appearing for
respondents no. 2 to 4 raised
objection regarding jurisdiction of
this Court to entertain this petition submitting that petitioner retired from Singrouli, Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, this petition is not maintainable before this Court. In support of his above stated contention, he placed order dated 02.12.2005 passed by Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 15/46 a Bench of this Court in CWJC No. 10954 of 2003.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Government of India issued Notification No. F. No. 45/10/98-P&PW(A) dated 17th December, 1998, contained in Annexure-5 to the petition, granting benefit of 5th Pay Revision and, similarly, later on, granted benefit of 6th Pay Revision by Notification No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A).pt.1 dated 14th October, 2008, contained in Annexure-11 to the petition, to the employees of Northern Coalfield India Ltd., but the aforesaid benefit has not been given to the petitioner. It is further submitted by him that both the above stated notifications cover entire India and, therefore, if the aforesaid notifications are violated, the writ petition may be entertained by any court in whole India.
I am in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and, in my view also, this writ petition is maintainable before this Court.
Learned counsel appearing for respondents no. 2 to 4 seeks six weeks time to file counter affidavit.
Let this matter be listed after six weeks for filing counter affidavit but in the meantime, if the claim of the petitioner is admitted by the respondents Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 16/46 no. 2 to 4 in the light of Annexure-5 and Annexure-11, the same must be paid to the petitioner till the next date of hearing.
(Emphasis is added)
12. Thus, by the order, dated 13.03.2014, a learned single Judge of this Court had already held that this Court had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Pursuant thereto, the respondents, on 25.04.2014, sought for some time to calculate and clear the admitted dues of the writ petitioner. The learned single Judge, therefore, in the order, dated 25.04.2014, observed and directed as follows:
"Learned counsel appearing for the Coal field submits that petitioner superannuated from service 18 years ago and it is very old matter, so the respondents need some more time to calculate and clear the admitted dues of the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the Union of India is present but no one appears on behalf of the petitioner.
Let this matter be listed after eight weeks retaining its original position.
However, in the meantime, respondents should file counter affidavit."
(Emphasis is added)
13. From a combined reading of the orders, dated 13.03.2014 and 25.04.2014, which were Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 17/46 reproduced above, it becomes transparent that a learned single Judge of this Court, while dealing with the writ petitioner, took the view that the writ petition was maintainable and the respondents sought for, as reflected by the order, dated 25.04.2014, some time to calculate and clear the admitted dues of the writ petitioner.
14. In the backdrop of what have been mentioned above, it needs to be noted that the appellant submits that the counter affidavit was served on him as late as on 17.06.2014 and, on 01.07.2014, the writ petition was listed before another Bench of this Court and, on that day, learned Counsel for the appellant was, out of station, for his medical treatment and, hence, could not appear before the Court to pursue the matter and the Court directed that the matter should be fixed for the next date (i.e., on 02.07.2014). The order, dated 01.07.2014, reads as under:
"On call, there is none for the petitioner.
The objection raised by the counsel for the Northern Coalfield Ltd. and the Union of India will be looked into tomorrow despite the previous order of the Court in this regard.
Put up tomorrow."
15. According to the appellant, since the learned Counsel, representing the appellant, was out of Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 18/46 station for his medical treatment, he could not, again, appear on behalf of the writ petitioner, on 02.07.2014, in the writ petition and another learned single Judge of this Court heard the matter ex parte and dismissed the appeal not only on the ground that there was no assistance provided to the Court on behalf of the writ petitioner- appellant herein, but also on the ground that the writ petition lacks territorial jurisdiction as, according to the learned single Judge, no cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court.
16. Placed thus, it is contended, on behalf of the appellant, that the order, dated 02.07.2014, whereby this Court has held that it lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition runs contrary to the conclusion reached, and the order made, on 13.03.2014, by another learned single Judge of this Court that the writ petition was maintainable and the statement, made on behalf of the respondents, on 25.04.2014, shows that they submitted before the learned single Judge that they (respondents) needed some more time to calculate and clear the admitted dues of the petitioner.
17. The order, dated 02.07.2014, being under challenge, is reproduced hereinbelow:
"This matter was called out yesterday. There was none for the Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 19/46 petitioner. However, counsel for the Coal Company, respondents No. 2 and 3, as well as Union of India are present. Same is the position today.
Writ application is dismissed not only on the ground of lack of assistance on behalf of the petitioner but also on the ground that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of Patna High Court.
Dismissal of the writ application will not come in the way moving before appropriate forum in this regard.
The objection of the respondents in this regard is a valid objection.
(Emphasis is supplied)
18. It is, now, submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that it was to the great misfortune of the appellant that the learned single Judge, while passing the order, dated 02.07.2014, overlooked the earlier order made on 13.03.2014, whereby another learned single Judge of this Court had already held, in effect, that this Court did not lack territorial jurisdiction.
19. Coupled with the above, it is also submitted by the appellant that the learned Counsel, representing the appellant, could not appear before the Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 20/46 Court on the date fixed, i.e., 02.07.2014, as he was under
medical treatment at Banaras Hindu University, Banaras.
20. With regard to the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition, in question, it is contended by the appellant that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition since cause of action had arisen in the State of Bihar.
21. In short, thus, as the writ petition has been dismissed primarily on the ground that Patna High Court, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, lacks territorial jurisdiction, because no cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petitioner has preferred this appeal putting to challenge the conclusion of the learned single Judge that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction.
22. It is the contention of Mr. Ganguli, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant, that in the face of the facts pleaded, in the writ petition, by the appellant, as writ petitioner, cause of action or, at least, part of the cause of action, has arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court and, hence, the writ petition could not have been dismissed on the ground that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction, more so, when a learned single Judge had already held, in effect, Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 21/46 on 13.03.2014, that this Court had territorial jurisdiction and the writ petition was maintainable.
23. While respondent No.1, namely, the Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Government of India, Shashtri Bhawan, New Delhi, has not contended before us that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction, Mr. V.M.K. Sinha, learned Counsel appearing respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, namely, Northern Coalfield Ltd. and its functionaries, has strenuously argued before us that this Court, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, lacks territorial jurisdiction and, hence, the order, dated 02.07.2014, does not call for any interference.
24. In view of the fact that the challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition is posed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it is imperative that this Court determines the layout of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
25. Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as it stands today, reads as follows:
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 22/46 relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
26. While considering the question of territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226, it is necessary to bear in mind that Clause (2) of Article 226 did not, originally, exist.
27. In the absence of Clause (2) of Article 226, when the question arose as to whether a High Court could invoke its jurisdiction, under Article 226, to issue writs based on the ground that the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 23/46 Court, a Constitution Bench, while interpreting Article 226 (as it stood then), observed, in Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao MANU/SC/ 0060/1953 : AIR 1953 SC 210, as follows:
".... The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226, which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises, but insists on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction."
28. Thus, in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), the Supreme Court had expressed the view, in no uncertain words, that in the absence of a specific provision in Article 226 on the lines of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction.
29. In other words, what the Supreme Court, in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), had held was that in the absence of a specific provision in Article 226 suggesting that the cause of action would attract jurisdiction to enable a High Court to issue, under Article 226, writs, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction, under Article 226, on the plea that the whole Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 24/46 or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction.
30. According to what Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) laid down was that a High Court can exercise jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, only if the person or authority to whom the writ is sought to be issued is located within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court.
31. Extended logically, the decision, in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), conveyed that even if cause of action or part thereof had arisen within the territorial limits of a High Court, the High Court could not have issued writs unless the person or authority to whom the writ was sought to be issued stood located within the territorial limits of the High Court. This view was followed in some subsequent cases.
32. When the question was, once again, raised as to what are the limitations on the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and if, on the ground of cause of action having arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, a High Court will be constitutionally competent to issue writ, the Supreme Court, in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India and Anr. MANU/SC/0039/1960 :
AIR 1961 SC 532, following its earlier decisions in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) and K.S. Rashid and Son Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 25/46 v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission MANU/SC/0123/1954 : 1954 S.C.R. 738, observed thus:
".... Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao MANU/SC/0060 /1953 : [1953] S.C.R. 1144 and K.S. Rashid and Sons v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission MANU/SC/0123/1954 : [1954] S.C. R. 738. that there is twofold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Article 226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories"
which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one."
33. The Supreme Court further observed and held, in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), as follows:
"Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 26/46 action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories?. It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the express provision in Article 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it."
34. From a close reading of what had been laid down in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), it becomes clear that the Supreme Court held two-fold limitations on the powers of Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 27/46 the High Courts to issue writs under Article 226, namely,
(i) that the seat of the person or authority to whom the writ is issued must be within the territorial limits of the High Court meaning thereby that the writs could not have been issued by a High Court to run beyond its territorial jurisdiction and (ii) that cause of action could not be a ground for the High Courts to assume jurisdiction unless the person or authority to whom the writ is sought to be issued stands located within the territorial limits of the High Court.
35. The consequence of the views, expressed in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), was that it was only the High Court of Punjab, which could, under Article 226 of the Constitution, exercise jurisdiction against the Union of India and other instrumentalities of the Union Government located in Delhi. To remedy this situation, Clause (1-A) came to be inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963, conferring thereby on the High Courts jurisdiction to entertain a petition, under Article 226, against the Union of India or any other body or authority, if the cause of action arose, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction.
36. Clause (1-A) was, later on, renumbered as Clause (2) of Article 226. Hence, by virtue of Clause (2) of Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 28/46 Article 226, the power, conferred by Clause (1) of Article 226, on the High Courts to issue writs can, now, be exercised by a High Court if the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within its territorial limits.
37. In other words, in the context of territorial jurisdiction, the maintainability or otherwise of a writ petition, in a High Court, now, depends on the answer to the question as to whether the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, whose interference is sought for or not. If the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the High Court will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and not otherwise.
38. The fall-out of the above discussion is that with the insertion of Clause (2) of Article 226, a High Court can, now, exercise its writ jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court even if the seat of the Government or the authority concerned, to whom the direction, order or writs, sought to be issued, is not located within the territorial limits of the High Court. Conversely put, what Clause (2) of Article 226 conveys is that if the cause of action has not arisen, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 29/46 High Court, the High Court will not have the power to issue writ or writs even if the seat of the Government or of the authority concerned is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
39. After an in-depth study of the subject of territorial jurisdiction of a High Court as postulated under Article 226, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kr. Basu, reported in MANU/SC/0759/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 711, laid down as follows:
"7. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause ─ notwithstanding anything in Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, 'within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 30/46 territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. This is, at best, case in the writ petition."
40. From the decision in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), what becomes abundantly clear, as already noted above, is that if cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court, the High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition even if the seat of the Government or the authority concerned or the residence of the person concerned is not within the territorial limits Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 31/46 of the High Court, whose writ jurisdiction, under Article 226, is invoked.
41. In other words, a High Court can, now, issue a writ even to the person or the authority located outside its territorial jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or partially, arises within the Court's territorial jurisdiction.
42. It may be pointed out that in Naveenchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0549/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 640, which arose out of an application made, under Article 226, in the Bombay High Court, for quashing of an FIR lodged in the State of Meghalaya, the Supreme Court, while relying, amongst others, on its decision in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), has observed, "From the provisions in Clause (2) of Article 226, it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court". (See also Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr.
MANU/SC/3240/2006 : (2006) 6 SCC 207 and Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors., MANU/SC/2105/2009 : (2010) 1 SCC 457).
Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-201432/46
43. Thus, the language, used in Clause (2) of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the authorities cited above, leave no room for doubt that a High Court can, now, invoke its powers under Article 226 only if the cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court and not otherwise irrespective of the fact as to whether the person or authority to whom the writ, sought to be issued, is located within or outside the territorial limits of the High Court.
44. We may, at this stage, pause and refer to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, while laying down the place of suing, reads as follows:
"20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.─: Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction ─
(a) The defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain;
Or
(b) Any of the Defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 33/46 actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry of business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution;
Or
(c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises."
(Emphasis is supplied)
45. From a careful reading of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes clear that Section 20 Code of Civil Procedure envisages 3 (three) different conditions in which a suit will lie within the territorial jurisdiction of a court. While Clause (a) and (b) of Section 20 Code of Civil Procedure refer, inter alia, to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain, Clause (c) refers to a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
46. What follows from a minute analysis of Section 20 is that a suit can be instituted under Clauses
(a) and (b) of Section 20 Code of Civil Procedure, where the defendant or defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain; but Clause (c) determines the Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 34/46 place of suing on the basis of cause of action.
47. From a minute reading of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which makes cause of action the basis for the High Court to assume territorial jurisdiction, vis-à-vis Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it clearly follows that while considering the question as to whether a High Court will issue writ or not, it is not material, unlike Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to whether the person or authority, against whom the writ sought to be issued, is located within the territorial limits of the High Court or not. Like Clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, what would be material, in order to attract the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is whether the cause of action, either wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, which invokes its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
48. In Kusum Ignots and Alloys Limited v. Union of India, reported in MANU/SC/0430/2004:
(2004) 6 SCC 254, it has been held, in no uncertain words, that even if a small part of the cause of action accrues within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, such a High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution.Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 35/46
49. What logically follows from the question, posed above, is that unless this Court finds that the cause of action, in part or as a whole, has arisen, in the present case, within the territorial limits of the State of Bihar, this High Court cannot be held to have jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition merely on the ground that the writ petitioner resides within the territorial limits of the State of Bihar, for, residence of a petitioner or of a respondent is immaterial and irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether a High Court has, or does not have, jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
50. Before we answer the question as to whether cause of action, either in whole or in part, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, we need to determine as to what cause of action means and conveys. It may be pointed out that cause of action implies a right to sue. Cause of action has not been defined in any statute; not even in the Code of Civil Procedure. It has, however, been judicially interpreted to mean, inter alia, every fact, which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
51. Cause of action, for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, must be assigned, for Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 36/46 all intent and purposes, the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Cause of action is bundle of facts, which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed.(See Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, reported in MANU/SC/0672/2014 : 2014 (9) SCALE 244).
52. Thus, the material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute cause of action. Negatively put, it would mean that everything, which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would form part of cause of action, [See Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra)].
53. The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence, which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff seeks the court to arrive at its conclusion in his favour. [See Chand Kour v. Pratap Singh, reported in (1887-
88) 15 JA 1566].
54. In Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), the Supreme Court has made it clear that the answer to the question as to whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be arrived at Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 37/46 on the basis of averments made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. The relevant observations, appearing, in this regard, in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), read as under:
"... therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial.
To put differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court."
(Emphasis is supplied) Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 38/46
55. What becomes transparent from the above discussion is that the expression „cause of action' means a bundle of facts, which, if traversed, a plaintiff must prove to entitle him to receive a judgment in his favour. The cause of action bears no relation to the defence, which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief(s) sought for. The cause of action is nothing, but the media upon which the plaintiff or the petitioner seeks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
56. For determining, therefore, the question as to whether a Court has territorial jurisdiction or not, the Court must take into account all the facts, pleaded in support of the cause of action, without, however, embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the facts pleaded.
57. To put it a little differently, the question as to whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. (See Naveenchandra N. Majithia (supra)).
58. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Limited, reported in MANU/SC/0696/2001 : (2002) 1 SCC 567, the Supreme Court has held that in order to Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 39/46 confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts, pleaded in support of cause of action, that the facts pleaded constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute, which has, at least, in part, arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. Facts, which have no bearing on the lis or the dispute involved in a case, do not give rise to a cause of action and cannot confer territorial jurisdiction on a High Court enabling it to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
59. In the light of what is indicated by the Supreme Court in Adani Exports Limited (supra) and Naveenchandra N. Majithia (supra), it is more than clear that any controversy, in a writ petition, with regard to territorial jurisdiction, has to be settled by the High Court on the basis of the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action without, of course, embarking upon an enquiry as to whether the facts pleaded are or are not correct.
60. There is yet another dimension of the expression 'cause of action', which needs to be, now pointed out and this aspect of the expression „cause of action' can be best explained by referring to case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and Another, reported in MANU/SC/ 0304/1985 : Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 40/46
(1985) 3 SCC 217.
61. In M/s. Swaika Properties (supra), the facts, in brief, were thus:
The respondent-Company, which had its registered office in Calcutta, but owned certain land, on the outskirts of Jaipur city, was served with notice for acquisition of land under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the Company, at its registered office, at Calcutta. The Company, reached the Calcutta High Court by means of a writ petition challenging the notification of acquisition. The matter, ultimately, came before the Supreme Court to answer a question as to whether the service of notice, under Section 52(2) of the Act, at the registered office of the respondent, at Calcutta, was an integral part of cause of action and was it sufficient to vest, in Calcutta High Court, the jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification. Answering the question, the Supreme Court held, "7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action, neither wholly nor in part, arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution or to Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 41/46 make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under Sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act, the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession Under Sub-section (6) thereof."
xxx xxx xxxx xxxx xxx xxx The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents, at their registered office, at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta, i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 42/46 rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur, under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order Under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose."
(Emphasis is added)
62. From the observations, which appear in Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 43/46 M/s. Swaika Properties (supra), what becomes clearer than before is that mere service of notice or communication of a decision, at the residence of a person, will not give rise to a „cause of action' at the residence of the person concerned unless service of notice or communication of decision forms an integral part of the cause of action. In short, whether service of the notice or order or communication of a decision constitutes cause of action or not would depend upon the nature of the impugned order, which gives rise to the cause of action.
63. Recently pointed out the Supreme Court, in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, reported in MANU/SC/ 0672/2014: 2014 (9) SCALE 244, that the question, whether or not cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court, shall have to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction.
64. In the backdrop of the position of law, as discussed above, it needs to be noted that the writ petitioner was, admittedly, an employee of Coal India Limited and as per the terms and conditions of his Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 44/46 employment, the writ petitioner, as an employee, is, admittedly, required to be paid his pension and pensionery benefits by his employer at Patna.
65. When the employer has the liability to pay pension and pensionery benefits to his employee (i.e., writ petitioner) at Patna, it logically follows that pension and pensionery benefits offered to be paid, or paid, must be a sum of money, which is due and payable to the writ petitioner. Neither the writ petitioner can be paid more than what he is legally entitled to receive nor can he be made to suffer non-payment of the whole or part of the sum of money, which the writ petitioner is lawfully entitled to receive as pension or pensionery benefits. The place of delivery of pension and pensionery benefits by the employer, and receipt of the pension and pensionery benefits by the employee, at Patna, is an integral part of the contract of the employment of the writ petitioner.
66. If, therefore, the writ petitioner is not paid the sum of money, which is due and payable to him as pension and pensionery benefits, at Patna, it becomes obvious that his right to receive due and payable pension and pensionery benefits, at Patna, is being denied; consequently the infringement of his right or his sufferance of injury is at Patna.
67. Necessarily, therefore, in the face of the Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 45/46 facts pleaded in the writ petition, Patna High Court cannot be held to have no jurisdiction.
68. The payment of the pension and pensionery benefits, at Patna, to the writ petitioner as an employee of the respondents is not a courtesy extended to the writ petitioner as the respondents‟ retired employee; rather, making available to the petitioner lawfully due sum of money is bounden duty of the respondents as employer. Receipt of the pension and pensionery benefits by the writ petitioner is not mere receipt of communication of the decision taken by the respondents as an employer. Far from this, non-payment of the dues, at Patna, or less payment of the dues, at Patna, is a denial of the writ petitioner‟s rights at Patna and would, therefore, constitute cause of action enabling the writ petitioner to seek issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus in exercise of this Court‟s extraordinary jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if the writ petitioner can prove that he is entitled to receive what he has claimed and that his lawful claim is being denied.
69. Shortly put, therefore, the cause of action has arisen, if not wholly, substantially within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court. The dismissal, therefore, of the writ petition by the impugned order, dated 02.07.2014, cannot be allowed to stand good on record. Patna High Court LPA No.1225 of 2014 (7) dt.17-12-2014 46/46
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the impugned order, dated 02.07.2014, suffers from serious infirmity and cannot be allowed to survive.
70. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal succeeds and the impugned order, dated 02.07.2014, is hereby set aside by holding that the Patna High Court has territorial jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition. Whether the writ petitioner would be, eventually, found entitled to the reliefs, which he has claimed, is immaterial in this regard.
71 With the above observations and directions, the writ petition, CWJC No. 22327 of 2013 is hereby restored to its original file and remanded for disposal in accordance with law.
(I. A. Ansari, J.)
S. P. Singh, J.: I agree.
(Samarendra Pratap Singh, J.)
Anand/Mkr./
A.F.R.
U √