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[Cites 31, Cited by 0]

Gujarat High Court

Commissioner Of Customs, Ahmedabad vs Baroda Rayons Corporation Ltd on 2 January, 2023

Author: Aravind Kumar

Bench: Aravind Kumar, Ashutosh J. Shastri

 C/TAXAP/504/2022                             CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/01/2023




                                                                           ®
     IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

              R/TAX APPEAL NO. 504 of 2022
                          With
       CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2022
                           In
              R/TAX APPEAL NO. 504 of 2022
                          With
      R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14527 of 2022
=============================================
              COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, AHMEDABAD
                             Versus
                BARODA RAYONS CORPORATION LTD.
=============================================
Appearance:
MR PRIYANK P LODHA(7852) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR SAURABH SOPARKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL WITH
MR HAMESH C NAIDU(5335) for the Opponent(s) No. 1
=============================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE
      ARAVIND KUMAR
      and
      HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH J.
      SHASTRI

                          Date : 02/01/2023
                     COMMON CAV JUDGMENT
 (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE
ARAVIND KUMAR)

1.     This appeal is admitted to consider the following

substantial questions of law:

       "(i)    Whether the Hon'ble Tribunal was justified in
               entertaining an appeal against the Chief
               Commissioner's letter under Section 129A of
               the Act which mandates appeal against the
               Order    of  Commissioner    /Commissioner
               (Appeals)?




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       (ii)    Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
               case and law, the Tribunal was justified in
               holding that even though the duty was
               confirmed by adjudication process, the same
               is payable only when goods are cleared for
               home     consumption,      considering    the
               provisions of section 72 of the Customs Act,
               1962?

       (iii)   Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
               case and law, the Tribunal was justified in
               holding that in terms of the board circular
               03/2003-Cus      dated      14/1/2003,    the
               Respondent was entitled to re-export of the
               goods without payment of duty and
               consequently also entitled for extension of
               warehousing period?

       (iv)    Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
               case and law, the Tribunal was justified in
               entertaining and allowing the appeal which is
               against its own Order dated 25.11.2002 that
               had attained finality and thus reviewing their
               own order."


       BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

2.     Respondent is a public limited company engaged in

a commercial production of Viscose Filament yarn i.e.

Rayon Yarn. In the year 1995-96, respondent imported

plant and machineries - equipment under Open General

Licence (OGL) from Japan, Germany and Korea, after

executing 21 bonds amounting to Rs.18,01,31,442/- and

initially it was stored at Bombay and later on shifted to



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the private bonded warehouse at Surat. On expiry of the

warehousing period, respondent sought for extension for

six months on the ground of it being unable to clear the

imported plants and machineries - equipments due to

financial crunch. Later on four extensions were sought for

which came to be granted upto 31.12.1997. When the 6th

extension was sought for from 01.01.1998 upto six

months i.e. 30.06.1998, same was rejected and so also 6th,

7th, 8th, 9th and 10th extensions sought for. It was the stand

of the respondent that there was no reply in respect of

extensions sought for from 6th extension onwards till the

end.


3.     On account of the equipments in the bonded

warehouse not having been cleared after the expiry of the

permitted extension warehousing period, the appellant

was issued show cause notices, initially 16 show cause

notices resulting in 16 Orders in Original (For short

'OIO') came to be passed on 30.03.2001 which became

the    subject-matter   of   appeals        which      came         to      be

adjudicated by the appellate authority and a common


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order dated 15.01.2001 came to be passed and rejected

the same. Further, challenge to the same before the

Tribunal - CESTAT, Mumbai, also ended in its dismissal

on 25.01.2002. Simultaneously, in respect of remaining

goods, five show cause notices came to be issued on

27.11.2001 which resulted in OIO dated 28.04.2013 being

passed and appeal filed against the same was also

dismissed vide order dated 12.12.2003 and appeal filed

before the CESTAT was allowed in part by order dated

26.05.2004 by reducing the pre-deposit and directed the

Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeals on merits

and on account of there being no compliance, the order of

Commissioner became final. Thus, the customs duty of

688.06 Lakhs was outstanding from the appellant as per

the orders of the authorities which had attained finality.


4.     The      request   of   the    appellant    to     transfer           the

equipments namely bonded plant and machinery lying in

private bonded warehouse to inside factory premises at

Surat was also rejected on the ground of show cause

notice       issued   having         already   been         adjudicated.


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Subsequently, the request which was renewed by the

respondent was considered and permission granted and

accordingly the plant and machinery/ equipment came to

be shifted inside the factory during 23-26.10.2007, which

was      duly       acknowledged        by      the      department                on

29.10.2007. However, the plant and machinery imported

in the year 1995-96 is said to have not been installed and

was still lying in bonded warehouse.


5.     The        respondent   is said         to   have      become            Sick

Industrial Unit under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial

Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985, which resulted

in BIFR proceedings being initiated and factory of the

petitioner was closed from June, 1999 to June, 2000 and

from August, 2002 to December, 2003 and from August,

2008       till     date   thereafter.         Respondent            submitted

representations for re-exporting the plant, equipment and

machineries and also sought for consequential extension

of warehouse period. Undisputedly, respondent admits

said representations were not pursued vigorously on

account of BIFR proceedings pending.


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6.     After a period of 16 years, respondent sought for

extension of the warehousing period which came to be

rejected on the ground that show cause notice and the

demand issued earlier had stood confirmed upto the level

of   Tribunal.        Not    being     satisfied         with        the       same,

respondent again approached the department requesting

for reconsideration of their prayer for extending the

warehousing period which culminated in communication

dated      07.03.2019       being     issued      and        intimating             the

respondent          that   consideration        for     extension           of      the

warehousing period is already over and as such show

cause notices were issued and demand raised thereunder

which have been adjudicated and same had attained

finality by obtaining approval of the Chief Commissioner

of Customs. Being aggrieved by the said communication,

an appeal came to be filed under Section 129 of the

Customs Act, 1962 (for short 'the Act') which has been

allowed by the Tribunal by relying upon the circular

dated 14.01.2003 by arriving at a conclusion that when

importer makes a request for re-export of the goods


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under Section 69 of the Act, same should be allowed even

if the bonding period has expired and demand notice has

been issued or even the goods are put under auction. It

has been further held that appellant therein namely

respondent herein stands on a better footing as the goods

warehoused are not put to auction by the department and

concluding that there is no conflict between the Board

circular dated 14.01.2003 and Section 72(1)(d) of the Act,

it has been held by the Tribunal that goods warehoused

by the respondent were neither cleared for home

consumption nor the department had initiated any action

to sell/auction the goods and as such, appellant is entitled

for re-export of the goods without payment of duty and

consequently entitled for extension of the warehousing

period. The Tribunal also held that even though goods are

cleared for home consumption and same is exported,

appellant would be entitled for 98% duty drawback under

Section 74 of the Act and therefore appellant would not

be liable to pay more than 2% of the total duty payable on

the imported goods. Hence, concluding that appellant



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therein had sought to export the goods from the

warehouse itself and as such it would not be required to

pay 2% duty. Hence, appeal came to be allowed and

appellant therein namely the respondent herein was

permitted to re-export the warehoused goods without

payment of duty, fine and penalty, apart from extending

the warehousing period of the imported goods for six

months or further period within which the goods are

re-exported. Hence, this appeal.


7.     We have heard the arguments of Mr. Priyank Lodha,

learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.

Saurabh N. Soparkar, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the respondent.


8.     It is the contention of Mr. Lodha, learned counsel

appearing for the department that appeal itself is not

maintainable before the Tribunal as an appeal under

Section 129(a) would lie to the Tribunal only against the

order       passed   by   the    Principal       Commissioner                  /

Commissioner as an adjudicating authority and orders



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passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). By drawing the

attention of the Court to the communication dated

19.12.2008 and 07.03.2009, he would contend that it is

not an order of the Commissioner of Customs or

Commissioner (Appeals) and as such, appeal before

CESTAT was not maintainable.


9.     He would elaborate his submissions by contending

that Tribunal erred in allowing the appeal as it would

amount to setting aside its own order passed earlier

whereunder appeal filed by the respondent challenging

the order in original had been dismissed whereby the

duty demand had been confirmed and thereby the

original order had attained finality. He would submit that

impugned order would amount to tribunal reviewing its

own order and thereby rendering its earlier order

infructuous.


10. He would contend that Tribunal committed a serious

error in arriving at a conclusion that goods are lying in

the     warehouse   without     being    cleared         for      home



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consumption and therefore no custom duty would be

payable, though Section 72 of the Act mandates full

custom duty with interest and penalty being payable by

the owner of the goods. He would also submit that action

relating to the impugned goods had also attained finality

as the demand raised under the show cause notice had

been adjudicated by the original authority, confirmed by

the appellate authority and affirmed by the Tribunal by

dismissing the appeals on merits and now by virtue of the

impugned order re-export has been permitted and it

would result in nullifying the earlier order and the effect

of payment of custody duty as directed thereunder would

stand negated. Hence, contending that respondent is

attempting to seek the relief indirectly which he could not

get directly.


11. He would further submit that Tribunal erred in

applying Section 69 inasmuch as liability to pay duty by

the owner of the goods under Section 72(1) had already

arisen with interest and penalty and as such, under

Section 69 could not have been pressed into service at all.


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12. He would also contend that circular No.03/2003

dated 14.01.2003 had no application to the facts on hand

and Tribunal erred in relying on paragraph-2 of the said

circular. He would submit that circular cannot be read in

part and said circular itself indicates that it is subject to

provisions of Section 61 and draws the attention of the

Court to Sub-section (2) of Section 61. Hence, he would

contend that Section 61 itself mandates that it is

necessary to make payment of duty with interest without

which the period of warehousing cannot be extended.


13. It is his further contention that circular dated

14.01.2003 does not indicate anything about liability of

the owner to make payment of duty, interest and penalty

and it only indicates about re-export, which has to be

understood          as   it   would    be        applicable       in     case        of

applications made prior to adjudication of the show cause

notice. Hence, he prays for appeal being allowed by

answering the substantial questions of law in favour of

the appellant - revenue.



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14. Per contra, Mr. S.N. Soparkar, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the respondent would support the

order of the Tribunal. He would contend that as the

communications           which     were          impugned         before          the

CESTAT namely communications dated 19.12.2018 and

07.03.2019 would decide the rights of the respondent and

the order passed thereunder is an order passed by the

adjudicating authority namely the authority which is

competent to pass any order or take decision under the

Act as defined under Section 2(1) and under the

impugned            communication,      the      Commissioner              having

decided the rights of the respondent by adjudicating the

lis, an appeal filed assailing the correctness of the same

by invoking Section 129(a) of the Act was fully justified.

He would support the impugned order and to fortify his

contention, he would rely upon the circular dated

14.01.2003 to contend that under Section 151A of the

Act, the instructions issued to the Officers by way of

circulars would be binding on them and as such, the

Tribunal has rightly extended the benefit flowing from the



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circular dated 14.01.2003. He would submit that whether

accepting the demand made by not challenging the order

or such adjudicating authority having passed any order

adjudicating the show cause notice even if it had reached

Tribunal will have no effect and still the circular dated

14.01.2003 would be binding and qualitatively it does not

make any difference. He would draw the attention of the

Court to the words and expression "that till the goods are

auctioned" found in the circular to buttress his arguments

that a right is kept open to the respondent to seek for

re-export and the authorities are bound to consider such

request and pass orders and it is this precise exercise

which was not undertaken by the Commissioner though

prayed for has resulted in the impugned order being

passed by the Tribunal and rightly so. He would further

contend that even if steps are taken to auction but goods

are not auctioned, still the applicant would be entitled to

seek protection under the circular dated 14.01.2003. He

would also support the finding of the Tribunal with regard

to payment of differential duty and contends that



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Tribunal has examined the case from all angles to extend

the relief which finding does not suffer from any infirmity

calling for interference at the hands of this Court and as

such, he prays for answering substantial questions of law

in favour of the respondent. In support of his submissions,

he has relied upon the following judgments :


       (i)     2018 361 ELT, Page 51;

       (ii) 2003 (5) SCC 528;

       (iii) 2014 (3) SCC 154;

       (iv) 2016 (340) ELT 162.

15. Mr. Soparkar, learned Senior Counsel would also

contend that revenue having not raised any ground with

regard to respondent being entitled for 98% duty

drawback under Section 74 of the Customs Act, 1962, in

its appeal memorandum, said issue cannot be agitated by

the revenue or adjudicated by this Court.


16. In rejoinder, Mr. Priyank Lodha, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant would submit that judgment

of   the      Bombay   High    Court          was      rendered           in      the



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background of Section 110A of The Customs Act, which

provides for provisional release which is an inherent right

given to a party and as such, the principles laid down

thereunder would be inapplicable. He would submit that

Commissioner had no right to adjudicate any right of the

petitioner, that too on the basis of a representation and as

such, the impugned communication dated 07.03.2009

would not partake the character of either being classified

as an order or decision. He would also submit that

circular dated 14.01.2003 will have no effect after

adjudication as it is silent on this aspect. He would also

submit that Commissioner has not adjudicated any claim

of the petitioner as such by the impugned communication

and respondent has been intimated that prayer for

re-export was an issue which has already been decided,

adjudicated and answered which has attained finality and

thereby, respondent cannot rely upon said circular. He

would also contend that payment of 2% differential duty

was alternatively available to the respondent, as held by

the Tribunal cannot be accepted as it involves two stages



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namely clearance of the goods and such stage having not

occurred namely the goods having not being cleared,

Tribunal could not have taken upon itself this issue which

was never raised by the respondent before the Tribunal

and on this ground also he seeks for the order of

Tribunal being set aside and substantial questions of law

being answered in favour of the revenue.


17. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for

the parties and proceed to answer the substantial

questions of law, we deem it necessary to sate the factual

background in brief.


       BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

18. Petitioner            is     a   public          limited     company              and

commenced           its        commercial            production        of      Viscose

Filament Yarn i.e. Rayon Yarn in 1962. Petitioner is said

to have diversified its activities by starting Nylon Plant in

1974 and thereafter established its Polyester Plant and

Nylon Tyre Cord Plant in the year 1981.


19. Petitioner had imported plant and machinery /


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equipment in 1995-96 under OGL from Japan, Germany

and Korea after executing 21 bonds amounting to

Rs.18,01,31,442/-. The goods or the imported equipment

were initially stored at Bombay for safety and security of

the goods and same was allowed to be shifted from

Bombay to petitioner's private bonded warehouse at

Surat. After the expiry of initial warehouse period,

petitioner          had     applied    for         its    first      extension             of

warehousing period which came to be granted upto

30.6.1996. However, petitioner was not able to clear the

imported plant and machinery / equipment on account of

alleged financial crunch. Hence, petitioner applied for

second extension upto 31.12.1996. Subsequently, the

extension sought for from time to time had been

considered          and      granted      upto           31.12.1997.             Though

applications for extension were made, same was not

granted and petitioner was not able to clear the imported

plant and machinery / equipment from their bonded

warehouse           after    the   expiry          of    permitted            extended

warehouse.           This    resulted      in       adjudication              and        the



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department had issued 16 orders-in-original, all dated

30.3.2001 and confirmed the total custom duty of

Rs.05,30,36,179/- and imposed penalty of 10% on each

bond.      It       was   also    ordered       to   recover        interest          at

appropriate rate. Being aggrieved by the same, petitioner

filed appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals), Surat,

who      by         common       order-in-appeals          dated       15.1.2001

rejected all the appeals filed by the petitioner. This was

challenged before CESTAT, Mumbai which also ended in

dismissal vide order dated 25.11.2002.


20. Hence, show cause notices were issued by the

department on 27.11.2001 vide order-in-original dated

28.4.2003           whereby       the     department         confirmed              the

customs duty of Rs.01,55,60,368/- and imposed penalty of

Rs.10,000/- on each bond and the interest thereon. The

appeal preferred against the said order came to be

dismissed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Surat by order

dated 12.12.2003 due to non-compliance of pre-deposit of

Rs.1     crore.       Petitioner        assailed     the    said       order         by

preferring an appeal before CESTAT, Mumbai who by


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order dated 26.05.2004 reduced the pre-deposit from

Rs.1 crore to Rs.50 lakh which was to be deposited within

3 months and report was to be submitted to the

Commissioner (Appeals), Surat who was required to

decide the appeal on merits. On account of non-

compliance of the same, the appeal was not taken up for

hearing on merits.


21. Thereafter the petitioner submitted an application

on 26.10.2006 requesting the department for permitting

transfer of the bonded plant and machinery / equipment

lying in the private bonded warehouse outside the factory

premises to inside factory premises at Surat. The

department by reply dated 19.01.2007 informed the

petitioner and since the request for extension of the

warehousing period has been rejected in 1998 and show

cause notices of consignment were already issued,

permission was not granted. Despite there being no

permission          accorded,   petitioner      shifted        plant         and

machinery / equipment inside the factory during 23-

26.10.2007 and sought to justify its action by relying


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upon the representation submitted on 09.02.2007.


22. On 23.06.2008, petitioner requested the department

to accord permission for re-export of consignment by

relying upon the board's circular dated 3/03-COSs dated

14.01.2003. After having kept quite for 5 years, petitioner

renewed its request vide letter dated 22.07.2008 and

06.10.2008 seeking permission for re-export. Again after

period of 10 years, i.e. on 15.11.2018, petitioner renewed

its request by submitting a representation to the Chief

Commissioner of Customs, Gujarat Zone, Ahmedabad for

extending warehousing period on the ground that it

intends to re-export the imported plant and machinery /

equipment which was followed by communication dated

03.12.2018 which came to be rejected by the Chief

Commissioner of vide letter dated 19.12.2018 on the

ground that show cause notices had been issued and

demand has been confirmed upto the level of Tribunal

and     the issue   had   attained         finality.    Yet petitioner

submitted one more letter on 15.02.2019 to the Chief

Commissioner of Customs, Gujarat Zone, Ahmedabad and


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requested to re-consider the prayer for re-export of entire

warehoused plant and machinery / equipment with

consequent extension of warehousing period till the

goods are re-exported. However, the said request was

rejected by the Chief Commissioner of Customs, Gujarat

Zone, Ahmedabad vide communication dated 07.03.2019,

against which petitioner company preferred an appeal

before CESTAT which has been allowed by the Tribunal

vide impugned order dated 31.01.2022.


       RE: SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW No.(i):

23. Right of appeal is a creature of statute and there

cannot be any dispute to this proposition. When the issue

comes       up      before   the      Court        with    regard          to     the

maintainability, it goes to the root of the matter namely

jurisdictional aspect and at any stage this issue can be

considered, as it would have a direct bearing on the core

issue of maintainability. This view gets support from the

authoritative principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Corona Limited vs. M/s.Parvathy

Swaminathan and sons, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 559

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and Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi,

reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307, whereunder it came to be

held that issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time

and there can be no waiver or consent. In other words, it

has been held consent does not confer jurisdiction.


24. In the instant case, the thrust of the arguments of

the learned counsel appearing for the revenue is that

there was no order adjudicating right of the parties which

gave cause of action for the respondent herein to file an

appeal before the CESTAT by invoking Section 129A of

the Act. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the

communication dated 07.03.2019 which was impugned

before        the   Tribunal     whereunder          the        Additional

Commissioner of Customs with the approval of the Chief

Commissioner has referred to the communications dated

14.02.2019 and 15.02.2019 addressed by the respondent

herein requesting for reconsideration of the request for

extension of the warehousing period and held such

consideration would not arise as the matter had already

attained finality. For the purposes of convenience and


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necessity, we deem it proper to extract the contents of

the said letter and it reads thus:

       "Please refer to your letters dated 14.2.2019 and
       15.2.2019 in the subject matter requesting for
       reconsideration of your request for extension of
       warehousing period.

       2.    In this regard, it is to intimate that as far as
       extension of warehousing period is concerned, this
       stage is already over once a show cause notice was
       issued and demand was dated 14.01.2003
       mentioned in your letters, your representation does
       not merit any consideration now since the matter
       has already attained finality as the issue was
       already decided by the Hon'ble Tribunal.
       3.    This issues with the approval of the chief
       Commissioner.

                                     Yours Sincerely
                                  (Sushant Kumar)
                             Additional Commissioner"

25. A plain reading of the above communication would

indicate that the representations made by the petitioner

on 14.02.2019 and 15.02.2019 requesting for extending

the    warehousing      period     was       held   not       warranting

consideration since the matter had already attained

finality. It would be apt and appropriate to note the

Section 129A of the Act. It reads thus :

       "129A. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal.--

       (1) Any person aggrieved by any of the following


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      orders may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal
      against such order--

      (a) a decision or order passed by the 1 [Principal
      Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of
      Customs] as an adjudicating authority;

        (b) an order passed by the 2 [Commissioner
      (Appeals)] under section 128A;

      (c) an order passed by the Board or the Appellate 3
      [Commissioner of Customs] under Section 128, as
      it stood immediately before the appointed day;

      (d) an order passed by the Board or the 1
      [Principal  Commissioner     of    Customs     or
      Commissioner of Customs], either before or after
      the appointed day, under section 130, as it stood
      immediately before that day:

      [Provided that no appeal shall lie to the Appellate
      Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not have
      have jurisdiction to decide any appeal in respect of
      any order referred to in clause (b) if such order
      relates to,--

      (a) any goods imported or exported as baggage;

      (b) any goods loaded in a conveyance for
      importation into India, but which are not unloaded
      at their place of destination in India, or so much of
      the quantity of such goods as has not been
      unloaded at any such destination if goods unloaded
      at such destination are short of the quantity
      required to be unloaded at that destination;

      (c) payment of drawback as provided in Chapter X,
      and the rules made thereunder:

      Provided further that] the Appellate Tribunal may,
      in its discretion, refuse to admit an appeal in
      respect of an order referred to in clause (b) or
      clause (c) or clause (d) where--


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      (i) the value of the goods confiscated without
      option having been given to the owner of the goods
      to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation under section
      125; or

      (ii) in any disputed case, other than a case where
      the determination of any question having a relation
      to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of
      goods for purposes of assessment is in issue or is
      one of the points in issue, the difference in duty
      involved or the duty involved; or

      (iii) the amount of fine or penalty determined by
      such order, does not exceed 5 [two lakh rupees].

      [(1A) Every appeal against any order of the nature
      referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (1),
      which is pending immediately before the
      commencement of section 40 of the Finance Act,
      1984 (21 of 1984), before the Appellate Tribunal
      and any matter arising out of or connected with
      such appeal and which is so pending shall stand
      transferred on such commencement to the Central
      Government and the Central Government shall deal
      with such appeal or matter under section 129DD as
      if such appeal or matter were an application or a
      matter arising out of an application made to it
      under that section.]

      [(1B) (i) The Board may, 8 [by order], constitute
      such Committees as may be necessary for the
      purposes of this Act.

      (ii) Every Committee constituted under clause (i)
      shall consist of two Chief Commissioners of
      Customs or two Commissioners of Customs, as the
      case may be.]

      (2) [The Committee of Commissioners of Customs
      may, if it is] of opinion that an order passed by the
      Appellate 2 [Principal Commissioner of Customs or
      Commissioner of Customs] under section 128, as it


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      stood immediately before the appointed day, or by
      the 3 [Commissioner (Appeals)] under section
      128A, is not legal or proper, direct the proper
      officer to appeal 4 [on its behalf] to the Appellate
      Tribunal against such order:

      [Provided that where the Committee of 2 [Principal
      Commissioners of Customs or Commissioners of
      Customs] differs in its opinion regarding the appeal
      against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), it
      shall state the point or points on which it differs
      and make a reference to the jurisdictional 6
      [Principal Chief Commissioner of Customs or Chief
      Commissioner of Customs] who shall, after
      considering the facts of the order, if is of the
      opinion that the order passed by the Commissioner
      (Appeals) is not legal or proper, direct the proper
      officer to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against
      such order.

      Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section,
      ―jurisdictional Chief Commissioner‖ means the 6
      [Principal Chief Commissioner of Customs or Chief
      Commissioner of Customs] having jurisdiction over
      the adjudicating authority in the matter.]

      (3) Every appeal under this section shall be filed
      within three months from the date on which the
      order sought to be appealed against is
      communicated to the 2 [Principal Commissioner of
      Customs or Commissioner of Customs], or as the
      case may be, the other party preferring the appeal.

      (4) On receipt of notice that an appeal has been
      preferred under this section, the party against
      whom the appeal has been preferred may,
      notwithstanding that he may not have appealed
      against such order or any part thereof, file, within
      forty-five days of the receipt of the notice, a
      memorandum of cross-objections verified in such
      manner as may be specified by rules made in this
      behalf against any part of the order appealed
      against and such memorandum shall be disposed of


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      by the Appellate Tribunal as if it were an appeal
      presented within the time specified in sub-section
      (3).

      (5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or
      permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-
      objections after the expiry of the relevant period
      referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it
      is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
      presenting it within that period.

      [(6) An appeal to the Appellate Tribunal shall be in
      such form and shall be verified in such manner as
      may be specified by rules made in this behalf and
      shall, irrespective of the date of demand of duty
      and interest or of levy of penalty in relation to
      which the appeal is made, be accompanied by a fee
      of,--

      (a) where the amount of duty and interest
      demanded and penalty levied by any officer of
      customs in the case to which the appeal relates is
      five lakh rupees or less, one thousand rupees;

      (b) where the amount of duty and interest
      demanded and penalty levied by any officer of
      customs in the case to which the appeal relates is
      more than five lakh rupees but not exceeding fifty
      lakh rupees, five thousand rupees;

      (c) where the amount of duty and interest
      demanded and penalty levied by any officer of
      customs in the case to which the appeal relates is
      more than fifty lakh rupees, ten thousand rupees:
      Provided that no such fee shall be payable in the
      case of an appeal referred to in sub-section (2) or a
      memorandum of cross-objections referred to in
      sub-section (4).

      (7) Every application made before the Appellate
      Tribunal,--




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       (a) in an appeal 1 *** for rectification of mistake or
       for any other purpose; or

       (b) for restoration of an appeal or an application,
       shall be accompanied by a fee of five hundred
       rupees: Provided that no such fee shall be payable
       in the case of an application filed by or on behalf of
       the 2 [Principal Commissioner of Customs or
       Commissioner of Customs] under this sub-
       section.]"

26. The judgment of the Bombay High Court which has

been heavily relied upon by Mr. Soparkar though at first

blush looks attractive, on deeper examination it will have

to be necessarily held that it would in no manner assist

the respondent. We say so for reasons more than one. In

the said matter which related to release of vessel namely

the respondent therein that is S.S. Offshore Private

Limited filed a bill of entry - BE for the import of a second

hand vessel by declaring the value of the vessel to be of

Rs.13.82 crores by classifying the same under Chapter

89, heading 8901 of Custom Tariff Act, 1975. The bill of

entry was assessed and vessel was allowed to be cleared

for home consumption. Subsequently, the vessel was

allowed to be converted from a foreign run vessel to

coastal run vessel. The officer of Intelligence and


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Investigation Branch of Custom on a reasonable belief

that vessel is liable for confiscation on account of

incorrect classification / declaration seized it. Hence,

respondent met the Commissioner of Customs and sought

for provisional release of the vessel under Section 110A

of the Act, which provision came to be substituted by Act

2 of 2014 and by virtue of the said section having

undergone a change and interim order or decision could

be taken by the adjudicating authority that is the

Commissioner of Customs was the basis on which the

application was made and it is this representation which

resulted in a decision being rendered by the adjudicating

authority on 25.09.2017 which was the subject-matter of

adjudication before the Bombay High Court. In fact, this

decision of the adjudicating authority which refused

permission was carried in appeal before the Tribunal

whereunder          the   Deputy    Commissioner          of      Customs

ordered for release conditionally and being aggrieved by

the conditions imposed, the respondent challenged the

same before the Tribunal. The Tribunal entertained the



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appeal under Section 129A(1) of the Act and impugned

order was set aside and matter was restored to the

Commissioner of Customs for deciding the issue afresh.

Challenging the said decision, an appeal under Section

130A of the Customs Act was filed and it is in this

background, High Court of Bombay has held that Section

110A of the Act is required to be viewed and the decision

in the letter dated 25.09.2017 is in terms of Section 110A.


27. High Court of Bombay has also referred to the Full

Bench judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Gaurav

Pharma wherein it has been held that an order of

provisional release is a stand alone order irrespective of

the final outcome of the investigation or adjudication.

Hence, the owner has to have a remedy which is

statutorily provided under Section 129A. Whereas in the

instant       case,   we   have     noticed      that       under           the

communication dated 07.03.2019, the authority has

neither adjudicated nor examined the claim of the

respondent or the prayer of the respondent in the

capacity of an adjudicating authority and as such, the


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signatory to the said communication cannot be held to fall

within the definition of 'Adjudicating Authority' as defined

under Section 2(1) of the Act so as to bring such

communication within the sweep of the provisions of

either order or decision as indicated in Section 129A.


28. A taxing statute is to be strictly construed. In a

taxing statute, one has to look merely what is clearly said

in the provision. There is no room for any intendment.

There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as

to tax. Nothing has to be read in, nothing is to be implied.

One can look only fairly at the end use. For this

proposition, judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of CIT Madras vs. Kasturi and Sons reported in

AIR 1999 SC 1275 can be looked up and so also

principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

(2014) 11 SCC 672. In that view of the matter, we

are of the considered view that substantial question

of law No.1 will have to be answered in the negative

that is in favour of the appellant revenue and

against the respondent.


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       RE : SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO.(ii):

29. The Tribunal having entertained the appeal against a

communication        dated      07.03.2019      whereunder                 the

Department - Revenue had intimated the respondent

about       representation   submitted        for      extension             of

warehousing period having already been adjudicated and

reconsideration      of   the     request     would         not        merit

consideration on account of the matter having been

already attained finality, received the attention of the

Tribunal and held that on account of goods lying in the

warehouse without being cleared for home consumption

and therefore, no customs duty would be payable. The

grievance of the Revenue has been throughout that the

issue regarding extension of warehousing period having

been rejected and as such it is deemed under Section 72

of the Customs Act that such goods or improperly

removed from warehouse and thereby the customs duty,

penalty and interest are liable to be paid by the owner

and same having been adjudicated and attained finality,



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question of permitting the respondent to re-export the

goods without payment of customs duty and penalty

would not arise. In this background, we deem it proper

to extract Section 72 of the Customs Act, 1962 and it

reads:

       "72.     Goods   improperly     removed      from
       warehouse, etc.--(1) In any of the following cases,
       that is to say,--

       (a) where any warehoused goods are removed from
       a warehouse in contravention of section 71;

       (b) where any warehoused goods have not been
       removed from a warehouse at the expiration of the
       period during which such goods are permitted
       under section 61 to remain in a warehouse;

       (c) where any warehoused goods have been
       taken under section 64 as samples without
       payment of duty;

       (d) where any goods in respect of which a bond has
       been executed under [section 59 *** ] and which
       have not been cleared for home consumption or
       exportation are not duly accounted for to the
       satisfaction of the proper officer,

       the proper officer may demand, and the owner of
       such goods shall forthwith pay, the full amount of
       duty chargeable on account of such goods together
       with all penalties, rent, interest and other charges
       payable in respect of such goods.

       (2) If any owner fails to pay any amount demanded
       under sub-section (1), the proper officer may,
       without prejudice to any other remedy, cause to be
       detained and sold, after notice to the owner (any


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       transfer of the goods notwithstanding) such
       sufficient portion of his goods, if any, in the
       warehouse, as the said officer may select."

30. A plain reading of the above provision would clearly

indicate that when the goods are cleared from the

warehouse after the expiry of the permitted period or its

permitted extension, the goods are deemed to have been

improperly removed. On a plain reading of the Clause (a)

it would indicate that where any goods are removed from

a warehouse in contravention of Section 71 or where any

warehoused goods have not been removed from a

warehouse at the expiration of the period, during which

such goods are permitted under Section 61 to remain in a

warehouse or where any warehoused goods have been

taken under Section 64 as samples without payment of

duty or where any goods in respect of which a bond has

been executed under Section 59 and which have not been

cleared for home consumption or exportation are not duly

accounted to the satisfaction of the proper officer such

goods are deemed to have been improperly removed and

as a consequence thereof, the duty, interest and penalty



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levied if any would become payable. Sub-section (2) of

Section 72 enables the proper officer to sell such goods

after notice to the owner, if any, in the warehouse in the

event of the owner failing to pay any amount demanded

under Sub-section (1) of Section 72. The issue relating to

improper removal of goods has been laid to rest by the

Apex Court in SBEC Sugar Limited and another vs.

Union of India and others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC

668. It has been held:


       "23. The scope and purport of Section 72 was
       examined by this Court in Kesoram Rayon (supra).
       It was held that:

               "13. Goods which are not removed from a
               warehouse within the permissible period
               are treated as goods improperly removed
               from the warehouse. Such improper
               removal takes place when the goods remain
               in the warehouse beyond the permitted
               period or its permitted extension. The
               importer of the goods may be called upon
               to pay customs duty on them and,
               necessarily, it would be payable at the rate
               applicable on the date of their deemed
               removal from the warehouse, that is, the
               date on which the permitted period or its
               permitted extension came to an end.

               14. Section 15(1)(b) applies to the case of
               goods cleared under Section 68 from a
               warehouse upon presentation of a bill of
               entry for home consumption; payment of
               duty, interest, penalty, rent and other



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               charges; and an order for home clearance.
               The provisions of Section 68 and,
               consequently, of Section 15(1)(b) apply only
               when goods have been cleared from the
               warehouse within the permitted period or
               its permitted extension and not when, by
               reason of their remaining in the warehouse
               beyond the permitted period or its
               permitted extension, the goods have been
               deemed to have been improperly removed
               from the warehouse under Section 72."

       24.     xxx   xxx   xxx

       25.     xxx   xxx   xxx

       26.    We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
       decision in Pratibha Processors on which heavy
       reliance is placed by learned counsel for the
       appellants, is clearly distinguishable on facts
       inasmuch as apart from the fact that in that case
       the clearance of goods was under Section 68 of the
       Act, the import of Section 72(1)(b) of the Act was
       not considered. On the contrary, the dictum laid
       down in Kesoram Rayon (supra) is on all fours on
       facts at hand, and therefore, the decision of the
       High Court cannot be faulted with."

31. In the instant case, undisputedly the goods remained

in the warehouse beyond the period of extension granted

and the prayer for further extension was not acceded to

or in other words not granted and as such they did not

qualify to be construed as goods warehoused in due

compliance of Section 72 and in the facts obtained in the

present case it would also emerge from the records that

on account of such goods having continued in the

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warehouse beyond the period permitted it is deemed to

have been removed improperly attracting the penal

provision which resulted in show cause notice being

issued and same being adjudicated which resulted in

orders being passed and assailed by the respondent

before the appellate authority and also before the

Tribunal which had resulted in its dismissal is a clear

mirror to the fact that duty demand had been confirmed

and as such, Tribunal was not justified in arriving at a

conclusion that though duty demand was confirmed by

adjudicating process, same would become payable only

when it is cleared for home consumption. The Tribunal

erred in applying section 69 of the Act to the present

case. Hence, we deem it proper to extract section 69 of

the Customs Act, 1962 and it reads:


       "69.    Clearance   of    warehoused        goods         for
       exportation. -

       (1)   Any warehoused goods may be exported to a
       place outside India without payment of import duty
       if -

       (a) a shipping bill or a bill of export has been
       presented in respect of such goods in the
       prescribed form;


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       (b) the export duty, penalties, rent, interest and
       other charges payable in respect of such goods
       have been paid; and

       (c)   an order for clearance of such goods for
       exportation has been made by the proper officer.

       (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
       section (1), if the Central Government is of opinion
       that warehoused goods of any specified description
       are likely to be smuggled back into India, it may,
       by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that
       such goods shall not be exported to any place
       outside India without payment of duty or may be
       allowed to be so exported subject to such
       restrictions and conditions as may be specified in
       the notification."


32. A perusal of the above provision would clearly

indicate that warehoused goods can be re-exported

without payment of duty. The Tribunal has also held that

as goods are lying in the warehouse without being home

consumption and therefore no customs duty shall be

payable. However, it ignored that as per the mandate of

section 72 full customs duty with interest and penalty

would be payable by the owner. Section 72 (1)(b)

indicates that where any warehoused goods have not

been removed from warehouse at the expiry of the period,

then proper officer may demand and the owner of such



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goods would forthwith be required to pay, the full amount

of duty chargeable on account of such goods whether

with interest, fine and penalty payable in respect of such

goods. Undisputedly, in the instant case, the goods

remained in warehouse beyond permitted period. Thus,

the owner of the goods would be liable to pay full amount

of duty with interest and penalty, as if the goods are to be

cleared from home consumption. In the instant case, the

owner of the goods has not complied with this statutory

mandate. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 72

clearly mandates where warehoused goods have not been

removed from the warehouse at the expiry of the period,

then proper officer would be empowered to demand and

the owner of the goods would be liable to pay full amount

of the duty chargeable on account of such goods together

with interest, fine and penalty. In the instant case, the

action relating to the impugned goods had been initiated

and had reached finality. Thus, when liable to pay duty,

penalty and interest had already arisen on the owner as

per section 72(1)(b), we are of the considered view that



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section 69 would not be applicable. Section 72 provides

for clearance of the goods by the importer within a

stipulated period either for home consumption or for re-

export and in the eventuality of such importer failing,

then it is deemed that such goods are to be cleared for

home consumption and thereby the importer would be

liable to make payment of applicable customs duty with

interest and penalty. In other words, section 69 would be

attracted prior to applicability of section 72 and not

thereafter. In that view of the matter also, we are of the

considered view that the Tribunal was not justified in

holding that even though the duty was conferred by

adjudication process, section 69 would be applicable and

as such finding recorded by the Tribunal requires to be

set aside. Hence, we answer the substantial question

of law No.(ii) in the negative namely in favour of

Revenue and against the respondent.


       RE: SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW Nos.
           (iii) AND (iv):

33. Insofar as question Nos.(iii) and (iv) are concerned,



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from the record, we notice that original order which had

been passed on 30.3.2021 by Assistant Commissioner,

Central Excise Division-I Surat who by virtue of powers

conferred under Section 72 read with Section 47 and

15(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 has ordered to recover

customs duty amounting to Rs.59,43,140/- chargeable

under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 and also

imposed a penalty of Rs.10,000/- under Section 117 of the

Customs Act, 1962 in addition to recovery of interest at

an appropriate rate in view of Section 61(2) of the

Customs Act read with Sections 47 and 72 till date goods

are not actually cleared had attained finality. Similar

orders have been passed with respect to other show

cause notices as can be seen from the record and these

were the orders which came to be challenged in the year

2001 by preferring an appeal before the Appellate

Authority           has   specifically     rejected    the      request          for

extension of warehousing period. Said orders were

passed way back in the year 2001 and carried further

before the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate



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Tribunal also and Appellate Tribunal has also passed a

specific order in November 2002. Said brief order being

relevant, we deem it proper to reproduce hereunder:

       "ORDER No.: C-II/236 to 268 WZB/2002 Dt.
       25/11/02

       Per: Shri Krishma Kumar, Member (Judicial)

             Arguing the case of the appellant Shri V.N.
       Deshpande, learned advocate submits that the
       appellant's financial condition is very bad and as
       such they are not in a position to deposit the
       amounts towards duty, penalty etc. He submitted
       that appellants have imported 16 consignments of
       new machinery for making further improvement in
       their factory. The total duty amount - against the
       said consignments is Rs.6,80.93,056/-.

       2.     Shri. M. K. Gupta, learned It. CDR stated that
       the appellants have been given four extensions and
       still they have failed to pay the duty etc. and
       remove the goods. Section 72 with Section 47 and
       15(1)(b) provide that where warehoused goods
       have not been removed from the warehouse on
       expiration of period during which such goods are
       permitted under Section-61 to remain in the
       warehouse, the proper officer may demand and
       owner of such goods shall forthwith pay the full
       amount of duty chargeable on account of such
       goods together with all penalties. rent, interest and
       other charges payable in respect of such goods
       Thus the legal position is very clear. It is also is
       seen from the Commissioner's order that the
       appellants have not disputed their duty liability, In
       these circumstances we find that there is no merit
       in the appeals as well as the stay petitions filed by
       the applicant. Accordingly, we dismiss the stay
       petitions as well as the appeals at the stay stage
       itself.



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                                (Dictated in Court)

       (C. SATAPATHY)                   (KRISHNA KUMAR)
       Member (Technical)               Member (Judicial)"


34. As can be seen from the aforesaid order of the

Appellate Tribunal passed in 2002, respondent herein,

had projected financial crunch and contended it is not in

a position to deposit the amount towards duty and

penalty, etc. in respect of 16 consignments, as indicated,

and total duty was amounting to Rs.6,80,93,056/-. In the

said order dated 1.11.2022 it has been specifically

noticed that four extensions were already attempted to be

secured, but still the opponent failed to pay duty and

remove the goods as required under the Act. Thus,

keeping         the   overall   legal       position     in      view         and

circumstances         prevailing,       appeal     along        with         stay

application came to be dismissed. Thus, it is clearly

evident that appellant therein namely respondent herein

had not disputed their duty liability at any point of time.


35. When aforesaid being the factual scenario and the

issue regarding duty and penalty having attained finality,



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an attempt came to be made by the respondent herein

after several years, i.e. 16 years to revive the same issue

by seeking permission to re-export the goods that too

without payment of duty and penalty, by submitting

representations          commencing               from    23.06.2018              and

attempting          to   revive    the       dead        cause       of      action

representations were submitted during 2018-19 and

rightly so said request has been rejected by the Chief

Commissioner of Customs on 07.03.2019 on the ground

said issue had been laid to rest by the CESTAT.


36. However, Tribunal entertained an appeal against

such rejection and has held that in terms of the Board's

Circular No.03/2003-CUS dated 14.01.2003, respondent

was entitled to re-export the goods without payment of

duty, penalty and consequently entitled for extension of

the    warehousing         period.      Tribunal         has     relied        upon

paragraph 2 of the aforesaid circular. Hence, it would be

necessary to understand the circular relied upon by the

Tribunal and same is extracted herein below for ready

reference :


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      "Subject: Warehousing - Grant of extension of
      warehousing period of by Chief Commissioners
      under Section 61 of the Customs Act, 1962 -
      regarding -

      I am directed to refer to the instructions contained
      in Board's Circular no. 47/2002-Cus., dated
      29.07.2002, on the above subject and to say that
      some references have been received in the recent
      past seeking Board's clarification whether the
      goods imported and bounded in a warehouse can
      be permitted to be cleared for the purpose of
      export under Section 69 of the Customs Act, 1962
      have been issued by the Customs authority
      demanding duty, interest and other charges upon
      expiry of the initial or extended period of
      warehousing.

      2.    The matter has been examined in the Board.
      It has been decided that in case an importer makes
      a request to permit re-export of the goods under
      Section 69 of the Customs Act, 1962, such a
      request may be allowed even if the permitted
      period for bonding has expired and demand notice
      has been issued, or it has been decided to put the
      goods under auction. Before permitting re-export
      in each such case, however, it will be necessary to
      extend the period of warehousing under Section 61
      of the Customs Act to enable the importer to
      export the goods within the permitted period of
      warehousing.

      3.   Chief    Commissioners       are,    therefore,
      requested to consider/decide such requests from
      the importers keeping in view the aforesaid
      guidelines of the Board and also taking into
      consideration all the relevant rules/regulations for
      export.

      4.   The contents of this Circular may be suitably
      brought to the notice of the field formations and
      the Trade under your jurisdiction.



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       5.    This issues in partial modification of Board's
       earlier circular under reference."

37.     It is a settled proposition of law that circular cannot

have an overriding effect on a statutory provision. This

well settled proposition of law is propounded by the

Hon'ble        Apex Court in the case of Glaxo SmithKline

Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. Union of India and

others reported in AIR 2014 SC 410 and since same is

quite vogue, we may deem it proper to reproduce the

relevant observations contained in paragraph 60 of the

said judgment:

       "60. In our view, it is well settled that if the
       departmental circular provides an interpretation
       which runs contrary to the provisions of law, such
       interpretation cannot bind the Court. 1979 circular
       falls in such category. Moreover, the 1979 circular
       is with reference to the DPCO,1979 whereas we
       are concerned with DPCO, 1987 and DPCO, 1995.
       We are not impressed by the argument of Mr. S.
       Ganesh that in view of the saving clause in DPCO,
       1987, the circular is saved which is further saved
       by the saving clause in DPCO, 1995."

38. The exemption circular has to be read in its entirety

and not in part. It would be necessary to consider the

language of the circular in its entirety and it cannot be

read in isolation. In fact, paragraph 2 of the said circular


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which has been relied upon by the Tribunal would

indicate the following expression being conspicuously

present viz.

       "2. The matter has been examined ... ... ... in
       each such case, however, it will be necessary to
       extend the period of warehousing under
       Section 61 of the Customs Act to enable the
       importer to export the goods within the
       permitted period of warehousing."
                                    (emphasis supplied)

39. A plain reading of the aforesaid words found in the

circular, it would make it clear that warehoused goods,

even after expiry of warehousing permitted period, can

be allowed to be re-exported, subject to provision of

Section 61 and not otherwise. Hence, we deem it proper

to extract Section 61(2) which would be relevant and it

reads:

       "61(2)       Where any warehoused goods --

       (i)     specified in [sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (aa)]
               of sub-section (1), remain in a warehouse
               beyond the period specified in that sub-
               section by reason of extension of the
               aforesaid period or otherwise, interest at
               such rate as is specified in section 47 shall be
               payable, on the amount of duty payable at the
               time of clearance of the goods in accordance
               with the provisions of section 15 on the
               warehoused goods, for the period from the
               expiry of the said warehousing period till the
               date of payment of duty on the warehoused


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               goods;

       (ii)    specified in sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1),
               remain in warehouse beyond a period of
               ninety days, interest shall be payable at such
               rate or rates not exceeding the rate specified
               in section 47, as may be fixed by the Board,
               on the amount of duty payable at the time of
               clearance of the goods in accordance with the
               provisions of section 15 on the warehoused
               goods, for the period from the expiry of the
               said ninety days, till the date of payment of
               duty on the warehoused goods:

            Provided that the Board may, if it considers it
       necessary so to do in the public interest, by order
       and under circumstances of an exceptional nature,
       to be specified in such order, waive the whole or
       part of any interest payable under this section in
       respect of any warehoused goods:

             Provided further that the Board may, if it is
       satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public
       interest, by notification in the Official Gazette,
       specify the class of goods in respect of which no
       interest shall be charged under this section.

       Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section,
       "hundred per cent. export- oriented undertaking"
       has the same meaning as in Explanation 2 to sub-
       section (1) of section 3 of the Central Excises and
       Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)."

40. Thus, it would be mandatory on the part of owner of

goods to            make    payment       of       duty    with     interest as

contemplated under Section 61, without which period for

warehousing cannot be extended. Thus, in effect, the

circular      would        only   indicate         about    re-export          being


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permitted of warehoused goods and it does not specify or

mention about the liability of the owner to make payment

of duty, interest and penalty. However, it indicates before

permitting re-export in each case, it will be necessary to

extend the period of warehousing under Section 61 of the

Customs Act. In other words, Sections 61 would come

into play. Thereby, Section 61(2) would be attracted.

Hence, we are of the considered view that the circular

cannot be read in isolation or it cannot be read against

Section 72 which empowers the Revenue to demand

payment of duty in case warehoused goods are not

cleared within the permitted time.


41. The circular in question which has been dealt with is

also ex facie not possible to be taken for assistance to

order for re-export of goods, especially when liability to

pay     duty,       interest   and    penalty    had      already           been

crystallised and said findings has attained finality. Hence,

the circular which is sought to be pressed into service

cannot be read contrary to the statutory provisions.

Under the garb of the circular, the adjudicating process


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cannot be given a go-by completely by permitting re-

export of warehoused goods (when the warehousing

period has expired and not extended and such extension

sought       for    having   been expressly refused)                without

payment of duty, fine, penalty. Hence, we are of the

considered view that circular has been erroneously

interpreted by the Tribunal and finding of the tribunal in

this regard is misplaced and contrary to the statutory

provisions.


42. A taxing statute is to be strictly construed. The

Courts have stated greater latitude to the legislature is to

be extended in formulating its tax policy either directly or

by delegated legislation. For this proposition, judgments

the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.K. Garg vs. Union

of India and others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 2138

and in case of M/s. Satnam Overseas (Export) vs.

State of Haryana and another, reported in AIR 2003

SC 66 can be looked up.


43. Viscount Simon quoted with approval a passage from



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Rowlatt J.1 expressing said principle in the following

words:

          "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is
          clearly said. There is no room for any intendment.
          There is no equity about a tax. There is no
          presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in,
          nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at
          the language used."

44. In fiscal legislation a transaction cannot be taxed on

any        doctrine       of    'the     substance          of    the     matter'           as

distinguished from its legal signification, for a subject is

not liable to tax on supposed 'spirit of the law' or 'by

inference or by analogy'. In IRC vs. Duke of Westminster,

(1936) AC 1, Lord Tomlin while refuting the doctrine of

'the substance of the matter' observed thus:

          "It is said that in revenue cases there is a doctrine
          that the court may ignore the legal position and
          regard what is called 'the substance of the matter'.
          This supposed doctrine seems to rest for its
          support upon a misunderstanding of language used
          in some       earlier cases. The       sooner this
          misunderstanding is dispelled, and the supposed
          doctrine given its quietus, the better it will be for
          all concerned, for the doctrine seems to involve
          substituting 'the uncertain and crooked cord of
          discretion' for 'the golden and straight metwand of
          the law'."



1
     Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, (1921) 1 KB 64, also referred to in Canadian Eagle Oil
     Co. Ltd. v. R, (1945) 2 ALL ER 499


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45. It was also pointed out in the same case by Lord

Wright that 'the true nature of the legal obligation'

arising out of a genuine transaction 'and nothing else is

the substance'. This principle which is known as Duke of

Westminster principle is subject to new approach of the

courts towards tax evasion schemes consisting of a series

of transactions or a composite transaction.


46. In interpreting a section in a taxing statutes,

according to Lord Simonds, 'the question is not at what

transaction the section is according to some alleged

general purpose aimed, but what transaction its language

according to its natural meaning fairly and squarely hits'.

Lord Simonds calls this 'the one and only proper test'. It

is, therefore, not the function of a court of law to give to

words a strained and unnatural meaning to cover

loopholes through which the evasive taxpayer may find

escape or to tax transactions which, had the Legislature

thought of them, would have been covered by appropriate

words. As stated by Lord Simon:

       It may seem hard that a cunningly advised


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       taxpayer should be able to avoid what appears
       to be his equitable share of the general fiscal
       burden and cast it on the shoulders of his fellow
       citizens. But for the courts to try to stretch the
       law to meet hard cases (whether the hardship
       appears to bear on the individual taxpayer or
       on the general body of taxpayers as
       represented by the Inland Revenue) is not
       merely to make bad law but to run the risk of
       subverting the rule of law itself.

The same rule applies even if the object of the enactment

is to frustrate legitimate tax avoidance devices for moral

precepts are not applicable to the interpretation of

revenue statutes.


47. In the teeth of aforesaid propositions of law, we

notice in the instant case that entire adjudicating process

with regard to liability of respondent to pay duty - penalty

had got crystallised and had attained finality and as such

by taking aid of the circular dated 14.01.2003 and

reading the same disjunctively, no undue benefit could

have been extended to the respondent by impugned

order. Hence, we are of the considered view that Tribunal

committed a gross error in entertaining the prayer of the

respondent in the background of our aforesaid discussion.



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We are also of the view that reliance placed by the

Tribunal on the aforesaid circular was impermissible in

the background of facts obtained in the present case. If

taking recourse to the said circular, that too by reading it

in isolation, it would have the effect of nullifying the

adjudicating process under law which had attained

finality, then such interpretation has to be necessarily

held bad in law. Hence, we are of the clear opinion that

order      passed   by   the      Tribunal     is    erroneous              and

unsustainable in law.


48. In view of this background of facts, judgments which

have been cited and relied upon by the learned senior

counsel for respondent herein are of no assistance and it

is a settled law that if there is no similarity of facts and

even one additional fact would make a world of difference

in applying the ratio precedent would not arise. Hence, in

view of the discussion made herein-before, we hold that

decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for

the respondent herein are of no assistance and we are of

the opinion that appellant has made out a strong case to


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accept the appeal.           Hence, substantial questions of

law (iii) and (iv) are answered in the negative viz. in

favour of the Revenue and against the respondent.


49. Special Civil Application No.14527 of 2022 has been

filed by the respondent in Tax Appeal No.504 of 2022

seeking for a direction to the respondent to grant

permission to the petitioner for re-export of the goods,

equipment / machinery which are lying at Surat and as

permitted by CESTAT vide order dated 31.01.2022

passed in Customs Appeal No.14527 of 2022.


50. In the background of Tax Appeal No.504 of 2022

filed by the Revenue having been allowed by answering

the substantial questions of law in favour of the Revenue

and      consequently        setting        aside        the       order         dated

31.01.2022          passed   by    CESTAT           in    Customs              Appeal

No.10752 of 2019, we are of the considered view that

prayer sought for in Special Civil Application No.14527 of

2022 cannot be entertained and said petition is liable to

be rejected.



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51. For reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the

following

                               ORDER

(i) Tax Appeal No.504 of 2022 is allowed by answering the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellant - Revenue and against the respondent, by setting aside the order passed by CESTAT in Customs Appeal No.10752 of 2019 dated 31.01.2022. Consequently, Customs Appeal No.10752 of 2019 is dismissed;

(ii) Special Civil Application No.14527 of 2022 is dismissed;

(iii) No order as to costs;

(iv) All pending civil applications stand consigned to records.

(ARAVIND KUMAR,CJ) (ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI, J) Bharat Page 56 of 56 Downloaded on : Mon Jan 02 20:53:05 IST 2023