Delhi District Court
Jai Singh Yadav vs Rakesh Chopra And Anr on 21 February, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN, ARC-01,
CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
RC ARC No. 177/2024
Jai Singh Yadav ..........Petitioner
S/o Late Sh. Maharaj Singh Yadav
H.No. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali,
Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar
Delhi-110006.
Also at:
312, HMM Apartment
Plot no.6, Sector-10, Dwarka
Delhi.
Versus
1. Rakesh Chopra
S/o Late Sh. Mulakh Raj
H.No. 4083, Ground Floor, Gali Mandir Wali,
Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar
Delhi-110006.
2. Rajeev Chopra
S/o Late Sh. Mulakh Raj
H.No. 4083, Ground Floor, Gali Mandir Wali,
Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar
Delhi-110006. .........Respondents
Date of Institution of the case 20.03.2024
Under Section Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section
25B, Delhi Rent Control Act.
Date of reserving of Order 27.01.2025
Digitally
signed by
RUPINDER Date of order 21.02.2025
RUPINDER SINGH
SINGH DHIMAN
DHIMAN Date:
2025.02.21
Decision Leave to defend application is
16:20:17
+0530 allowed.
RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 1 of 15
Argued by:
Sh. Jai Singh Yadav, Counsel for petitioner
Sh. Pankaj Singhal and Sh. Rohit Pal, Counsels for respondents.
ORDER
1. This order shall dispose off an application for leave to defend filed by the respondents/tenants in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter the "Act" or "DRC Act") in respect of two rooms at ground floor in H.No. 4082, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as the "tenanted premises") as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the petition.
PETITION
2. Briefly stated, it is the case of the petitioner that he is the joint owner of the property H.No. 4082, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as subject premises). It is stated that the subject premises were owned by the father of the petitioner and after the demise of his father, the other legal heir/brother of the petitioner has executed SPA in favour of the petitioner. It is stated that originally father of the respondent was a tenant in the tenanted portion of the subject premises and after his death, the respondents being his legal heirs succeeded the tenancy and starting paying rent. It is, however, stated that the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for residence of himself and his family members. It is RUPINDER stated that the petitioner wishes to rebuild the subject premises for residence SINGH DHIMAN of all the family members as the property is old and not in a habitable Digitally signed by RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN condition. Hence, it is prayed that an eviction order may be passed with Date: 2025.02.21 16:20:31 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 2 of 15 respect to the tenanted premises in question. Along with the petition, petitioner has filed site plan, rent receipts, statement of bank account, Aadhar card of the petitioner and SPA executed in favour of the petitioner.
LEAVE TO DEFEND
3. After being duly served, the respondents has filed an application seeking leave to defend on 23.04.2024. It is stated by the respondents therein that the present petition is not maintainable and various objections have been raised seeking leave to defend. Firstly, it is contented that the petitioner is not the owner of the property but merely a rent collector / landlord. It is stated that originally Maharaj Singh Yadav (father of petitioner) was the landlord and after his death, petitioner and Jaswant Singh Yadav started collecting rent from the respondents. It is, however, stated that Jaswant Singh Yadav has expired and his LRs have not been impleaded as a party as co-landlord. Secondly, it is contented that the site plan is incomplete as the property consists of ground floor, first floor and second floor with terrace. It is stated that the entire first floor and second floor is residential and the said accommodation is available with the petitioner. Thirdly, it is contented that the petitioner is residing in a super HIG Flat, Dwarka, Delhi and therefore, has alternative accommodation. Fourthly, it is also stated that the tenanted premises lie in old Delhi area having narrow streets and therefore, the petitioner would not shift to the said area. Further, it is contented that the RUPINDER SINGH tenanted rooms are of 8X8 feet only and therefore, not fit for residence. DHIMAN Digitally signed by Fifthly, it is contented that there are about eight rooms on the ground floor RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 apart from the tenanted premises and further two shops on the front side at the 16:20:38 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 3 of 15 ground floor are also in the possession of the petitioner. Additionally, it is stated that the petitioner is in possession of ten rooms at first floor and five rooms at second floor. It is stated that the petitioner has let out the same for his residential purposes. Sixthly, it is contended that just six months prior to the filing of the present petition, petitioner had obtained possession of two shops from tenants Om Tailors and Birju and converted the said shops into one unit along with adjoining shop which was already in possession of the petitioner. Seventhly, it is contented that respondents are using the tenanted premises for commercial purposes and therefore, the said rooms are not suitable for residence. It is further stated that the purpose of the petitioner is to demolish the subject premises and thereafter, sell the entire premises. Lastly, it is contented that the petitioner is also owner of property no. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-06 and the said fact is reflected from the memo of parties, affidavit and Aadhar card of the petitioner. Along with the leave to defend application, respondent has also filed GST certificate of their firm run from tenanted premises, copy of invoices, copy of rent receipts and site plan.
REPLY TO LEAVE TO DEFEND
4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a reply to the leave to defend application where the petitioner has denied the averments of leave to defend application and reiterated the averments of his petition. Additionally, it is RUPINDER SINGH stated that the flat of Dwarka is taken on rent by the petitioner and is not DHIMAN Digitally signed by owned by the petitioner. It is further stated that property no. 4083, Gali RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-06 does not pertain to the 16:20:45 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 4 of 15 petitioner as it fell in the share of the uncle of the petitioner at the time of partition of ancestral property. Along with the reply, petitioner has filed copy of partition deed dated 14.12.2007, rent agreement with respect to flat at Dwarka and medical documents of the petitioner.
REJOINDER
5. Thereafter, in rejoinder to the reply of the petitioner, respondents denied the averments made in the reply and reiterated their grounds of leave to defend.
FINDINGS
6. Arguments were then advanced by ld. counsels for the petitioner and respondents on the leave to defend application. At the outset, it is stated that there is no doubt regarding the case laws relied upon behalf of both the parties where the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has laid down the principles with respect to provisions of the DRC Act, 1958 in different factual scenarios. However, each case has its own distinguishing facts and circumstances. In a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in order to get an eviction order the petitioner/landlord is required to establish the following :
(i) That he/she is the owner/landlord of the property;
(ii) That he/she requires the premises bonafide and Digitally (iii) That he/she does not have any other alternative suitable signed by RUPINDER RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN accommodation for this purpose.
SINGH DHIMAN Date:
2025.02.21 16:20:50 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 5 of 15 LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
7. As far as the question of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties is concerned, it is observed that there is no categorical denial on behalf of the respondents. Rather there is an admission on the part of the respondents that they are tenants in the premises and copy of rent receipt has also been filed as per which late father of petitioner was the landlord. Therefore, the objections that the petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises does not amount to any triable issue. Moreover, in a petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act, the petitioner is not supposed to prove absolute ownership and is only required to show a title better than that of the tenant/respondent. It is to noted that in the judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Leela Wati reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held the following:
".....It is settled law that for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than a tenant".
8. Further, perusal of definition of landlord under Section 2(e) of DRC also shows that it also includes a person entitled to recover rent whether on own account or on behalf of or for the benefit of some other person. Therefore, even as per the version of the respondents, petitioner would fall RUPINDER under the definition of landlord. Besides, in an eviction petition under the SINGH DHIMAN DRC Act, the question of title is not to be decided. Petitioner is only required Digitally signed by RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 to show that he has a better title than that of the tenant. The principle is very 16:20:56 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 6 of 15 clear that once a tenant always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his successor-in-interest. The law in this regard has been elaborately dealt with in the case of in Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held:
".......... The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly.........".
9. Hence, the said contention is devoid of merits.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 had held that:
".....13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise to extreme Digitally signed by confusion in the matter of relationship of the RUPINDER RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of SINGH DHIMAN Date:
2025.02.21 estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in 16:21:01 +0530 the said section.
RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 7 of 15
10. Thus a tenant is estopped from challenging the ownership or denying the title of the landlord. Further, it is also contended on behalf of the respondents that the petition is bad for non joinder of necessary party since the legal heirs of the other co-owner have not been impleaded as a party. However, it is a well settled law that petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act can be filed even by one of the co-owners without impleading the other co-owners. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in M/s India Umbrella Manufacturing Company Vs. Bhaja Bandei Aggarwalla, 2004 (3) SCC 178 whereby it was held that even a co- owner can file an eviction petition against the tenant and all the co-owners are not required to be joined as a party. Similarly, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as Dhannalal Vs. Kalawati Bai & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16 that even one of the co-owner can file a petition under Section 14 (1)
(e) of DRC Act on the ground of bonafide necessity, against the tenants without impleading the other co-owners. Hence, the said contention is devoid of merits.
11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that petitioner has been able to show a better title for the purpose of Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act, than that of the tenant. Thus, with respect to the tenanted premises, the landlord- tenant relationship between the parties stands established in the instant case.
Digitally signed by RUPINDERRUPINDER SINGH SINGH DHIMAN BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND NON AVAILABILITY OF Date:
DHIMAN 2025.02.21 16:21:08 ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION +0530
12. As far as the bonafide requirement and non availability of accommodation is concerned, the said issues being inter connected are taken RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 8 of 15 up together. It is pertinent to note here the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, Civil Appeal No. 9444 of 2016 where it was stated by the Hon'ble court that requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Further, such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant.
13. It is contended that the petitioner requires the tenanted premises as he wishes to rebuild the same for residence of himself and that of dependent family members. Per contra, it is contended that the requirement of the petitioner is not bonafide. It is stated that the tenanted premises are small room and therefore, not suitable for residence. Further, it is stated that the tenanted premises lie in narrow street of old Delhi area and therefore, the petitioner would not shift to the same. However, the Hon'ble Supreme court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine and bonfide. Additionally, the burden to refute the said presumption squarely lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the part of tenant is insufficient. Therefore, the said contention by itself does not amount to any triable issue. Furthermore, it is trite to state RUPINDER SINGH that it is prerogative of the landlord to choose the premises for his DHIMAN Digitally signed by RUPINDER SINGH requirement. Besides in Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Prem Machinery & DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 16:21:15 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 9 of 15 Company (2000) 1 SCC 679, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Also, in this regard, the provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession or having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person within three years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the said contention is also devoid of merits.
14. As far as contention of respondents is concerned that the petition is not maintainable, since they are using the premises for commercial need, the said contention is no longer valid, in view of Apex Court's decision in Satyawati Sharma Vs UOI AIR 2008 SC 3148. Therefore, landlord cannot be precluded from filing eviction petition on the ground of bonafide need regarding premises let out for commercial purpose. Hence, the said contention does not amount to any triable issue.
15. Further, it is contended that the petitioner already has HIG flat at Dwarka. However, petitioner has clarified that the said flat is on rent. Further, petitioner has also filed a copy of rent agreement in this regard. It is also RUPINDER pertinent to note that no documents have been filed on behalf of the SINGH DHIMAN respondent to show that the said property is under the ownership of the Digitally signed by petitioner. It is trite to state that the tenant cannot dictate to the landlord to RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 16:21:21 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 10 of 15 adjust in some other property or to live on rent. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the observation of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Saroj Khemka Vs. Indu Sharma, 79 (1999) DLT 120 whereby it was observed that no court can compel a person to stay in a house of his relative or in a hotel. Furthermore, reference is made to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del 13026, wherein it was held as under :-
"18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement having alternate premises, having not used the same and instead having commercially exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be proved."
16. Next, it is contended that the requirement of the petitioner is not bona fide as just six months prior to filing of present eviction petition, petitioner had obtained possession of two shops from tenants. Perusal of record shows RUPINDER that the petitioner has denied the said fact as false and frivolous grounds. SINGH DHIMAN However, the respondent has also filed a counter site plan. Further, it is also Digitally signed by RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN averred on behalf of the respondent that there are various other rooms on the Date: 2025.02.21 16:21:26 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 11 of 15 ground floor of the subject premises. Respondent has also shown the said rooms in the counter site plan. However, there is no categorical denial of the petitioner and further, no clarification regarding the number of rooms and under whose occupation the said rooms are. Furthermore, respondent has also alleged that alternative accommodation is available with the petitioner on the first floor and second floor of the subject premises. Again , in the reply there is no categorical denial of the petitioner in this regard. It has been simply averred that the present petition has been filed considering his own bonafide requirement and that of family members dependent upon him. Here, it is also pertinent to note that in the entire petition, the petitioner has not clarified who are those family members who are dependent upon him and how many rooms are required for their bona fide requirement. Furthermore, it is also relevant to note that rebuilding of a premises is also a separate ground under Section 14(1)(g) of DRC Act. However, for the said ground summary procedure under Section 25B of the DRC Act has not been provided. It is trite to state that while deciding an application for leave to defend, the court is required to only see if the facts alleged in the tenant's affidavit are such that, if proved at the trial if leave is granted, the landlord would be disentitled to relief claimed, then the Controller must grant leave and proceed to hold a regular trial. Thus, the test is that if the defence raises triable issues, leave should be granted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh" (2001) 1 SCC 706" held that Digitally signed by "As is evident from Section 25 B (4) & (5) of the Act, burden placed on a tenant is light and RUPINDER RUPINDER SINGH SINGH DHIMAN DHIMAN Date:
2025.02.21 limited in that if the affidavit filed by him 16:21:32 +0530 discloses such facts as would disentitle the RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 12 of 15 landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act, with which we are concerned in this case, are good enough to grant leave to defend".
17. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent has also raised contention that the petitioner has alternative accommodation in the form of property bearing H.No. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006. Though the petitioner has stated that the said property fell in the share of his uncle at the time of partition and has also filed a copy of deed of partition in this regard, however, perusal of the memo of parties shows that the petitioner has mentioned his address as H.No. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006. Further, the Aadhar card of the petitioner also has his address as H.No. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006. Since, the deed of partition is 14.12.2007 and admittedly, the Aadhar was introduced in the year 2009 only, therefore, even after the said purported partition, prima facie the address of the petitioner continues to be H.No. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006 in the records. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Precision & Engineering Works Vs. Prema Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal", (1982) 3 SCC RUPINDER 270, whereby it is held that the controller is not to record a finding on SINGH DHIMAN disputed questions of facts on the basis of his preference for one set of Digitally signed by RUPINDER affidavit against other set of affidavits. Thus, in the present case, it is only SINGH DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 16:21:38 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 13 of 15 deemed appropriate that petitioner's projected need be tested at the touch- stone of evidence/cross-examination.
18. In the present case, thus, there is a triable issue qua availability alternative accommodations. Finding qua the aspect of suitability and availability of accommodation in the ground floor of subject premises as well as first and second floor of subject premises and qua property bearing H.No. 4083, Gali Mandir Wali, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006 as alternative accommodation cannot be given on the basis of rival affidavits. Reference in this regard is made to Rampat v. Ganga Devi RC (Rev.) No.271/14 whereby it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that where a tenant has pleaded that a shop is lying vacant, a triable issue of alternative suitable accommodation is made out . Further, there is also a triable issue on the aspect of bonafide requirement since the petitioner has concealed the number of dependent members for whose residence, he is seeking possession of tenanted premises. Neither their names and particulars have been given nor their requirements disclosed. A proceeding under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B DRCA, being summary in nature, it is imperative that ample caution is exercised before a tenant is evicted from the premises. The legislation is enacted for the benefit of those class of landlords who genuinely require the premises for their needs and do not have any other accommodation. The requirement must be sincere and honest and RUPINDER not a pretense to evict the tenant.
SINGH DHIMAN Digitally signed by RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN Date: 2025.02.21 16:21:44 +0530 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 14 of 15 RELIEF
19. In the petition in hand, as discussed herein-above, since triable issues have been raised by the respondents. In case titled as "Manoj Kumar Vs. Bihari Lal (Dead) by LRs", (2001) 4 SCC 655, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if a tenant has made out a prima facie case, raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge then that would be sufficient to grant leave. Therefore, leave to defend application of the respondent is hereby allowed. However, it is clarified that nothing stated herein shall tantamount to final opinion or expression on the merits of the case.
20. Let written statement be filed within 30 days from today with advance copy to the opposite party. Thereafter, replication, if any, be also filed with advance copy to the opposite party. To come up for PE on 01.07.2025. Advance copy of evidence by way of affidavit be supplied to the opposite Digitally signed by RUPINDER side at least 15 days prior to the NDOH. RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN SINGH Date:
DHIMAN 2025.02.21 16:21:51 +0530 (Rupinder Singh Dhiman) ARC-01, Central District,THC.
21.02.2025 RC ARC No.177/2024 Jai Singh Yadav v. Rakesh Chopra and Anr. Page no. 15 of 15