Bombay High Court
Akshay Mahadev Kamble vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others on 9 January, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:1205-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.701 OF 2025
Akshay Mahadeo Kamble
Age : 27 yrs, occ : business
R/o Old Ausa Road, Latur Appellant
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Secretary, Home
Department, Mantralaya,
Mumbai
2. Dy. Inspector General of
Police, Nanded Range,
Nanded
3. Superintendent of Police, Latur.
4. The Sub Divisional Police
Officer, Latur
5. Police Inspector,
Shivaji Nagar Police Station,
Latur Respondents
...
Mr. R.R. Karpe a/w Mr. Saurabh Nikat, Advocates for the
appellant.
Mr. A.V. Lavate, A.P.P. for respondents.
...
CORAM : SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE AND
MEHROZ K. PATHAN, JJ.
Reserved on : 16.10.2025
Pronounced on: 09.01.2026
Judgment (Per Sandipkumar C. More, J.) :
1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has
questioned the legality and validity of the order dated
29.05.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
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and Special Judge, Latur whereby extension of 90 days
sought by the Investigation Officer i.e. Sub-Divisional Police
Officer, Latur, has been granted for completing further
investigation and filing charge-sheet. However, during
pendency of this appeal, by carrying out the amendment, the
appellant also prayed for quashing and setting aside the
impugned order below Exh.1 dated 30.07.2025 passed by the
learned Special Judge, whereby default bail application filed
by the appellant, was rejected.
2. Facts leading to the present appeal, are as under :
The present appellant, who is the original accused
No.3, was arrested on 24.04.2025 alongwith accused Nos.1
and 2 in Crime No.0087/2025 dated 12.03.2025 registered
with Shivaji Nagar Police Station, Latur for the offences
punishable under Sections 109 (1), 308(5), 311, 111 of
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 alongwith Section 4 read with
Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act and Sections 3 (1) (2), 3(2)
and 3(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,
1099 ("MCOC Act" for short), added subsequently. The
present respondent No.5 i.e. the Police Inspector of Shivaji
Nagar Police Station, Latur submitted an application under
Section 23(1) (a) of MCOC Act to respondent No.2 thereby
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seeking prior approval for invoking Sections 3(1)(2), 3(2) and
3(4) of the MCOC Act. Under the order dated 09.04.2025,
sanction was approved for invoking the aforesaid sections of
MCOC Act. Thereafter on 28.05.2025 a communication was
made to the learned Additional Sessions Judge by the
aforesaid Investigating Officer i.e. SDPO, Latur for extension
of 90 days time for completing further investigation as it could
not be completed within earlier period of 90 days, Thereafter
vide impugned order dated 29.05.2025, the learned Special
Judge, Latur without extending any opportunity to the
petitioner, granted such extension.
3. Learned counsel Mr. Karpe for the appellant
submitted that the learned Special Judge has ignored the
provision of MCOC Act while granting further extension of 90
days for completing the investigation under impugned order
dated 29.05.2025. He pointed out that the application for
extension of time was not filed by the Public Prosecutor, but it
was in fact filed by the Investigating Officer and it is only
shown to be filed through APP, without his signature.
According to him, no notice of the said application for
extension was given to the appellant, violating the principle of
natural justice. The proviso appended to Section 21 (2) of
MCOC Act was not at all followed. Even there was no
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application of mind through the Prosecutor for submitting
such application for extension for carrying out the
investigation. He pointed out that since the order of extension
is illegal, the appellant was definitely entitled for default bail
as the charge-sheet could not be filed within the period of 90
days, and therefore the order of rejecting the application for
default bail filed by the appellant, is illegal. In addition to
submissions at bar, learned counsel for the appellant also
relied on the following judgments.
(i) Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 2018 (Sachin Namdeo
Rathod vs The State of Maharashtra) (Bombay High
Court)
(ii) Criminal Writ Petition No. 831 of 2017 (Pahadiya
Tulshiram Champala and others vs State of
Maharashtra) (Bombay High Court)
(iii) Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2023 (Darshan Subhash
Nandagawali vs State of Maharashtra) (Bom.High
Court)
(iv) Criminal Bail Application No. 2472 of 2022 (Sunil
Vitthal Wagh vs State of Maharashtra (Bombay High
(Court)
(v) Criminal Appeal No. 502 of 2020 (Shaikh Moin
Shaikh Mehmood vs State of Maharashtra) (Bom.
High Court)
(vi) Hon'ble Apex Court Judgment in the Case of
Bikramjit Singh vs The State of Punjab in Criminal
Appeal No. 667 of 2020
4. On the contrary learned A.P.P. strongly opposed
the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and also
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filed affidavit in reply to that effect. He pointed out that the
learned Special Judge properly passed the order of extension.
He pointed out that the appellant had filed application for
default bail on 24.07.2025 and the same was rejected on
30.07.2025 and then the charge-sheet was filed on
04.09.2025. According to him, the extension period had in
fact expired on 09.09.2025, and therefore, the appellant was
not entitled for default bail. He pointed out that that the
application for seeking further extension for carrying out
investigation was not directly filed, but the Investigating
Officer had given instructions to the Special Prosecutor and
then it was submitted to the court by the said Special Public
Prosecutor. Learned A.P.P. submits that the appellant is
prime accused and involved in serious crime, and therefore,
hyper technical approach should not be taken in this matter.
According to him, opportunity was there for the appellant to
apply for regular bail, but he could not avail the same. He
also relied on the following judgments.
(i) Sanjay Datt vs The State (1994 AIR SCW 3857)
(ii) Sadhwi Pragyna Singh Thakur vs State of
Maharashtra [AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 755]
5. It is to be noted that the prayers in this appeal are
twofold, one is for quashing order dated 29.05.2025 passed by
the learned Special Judge, Latur by granting further
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extension of 90 days to the investigating agency to complete
the investigation on the ground that the original application
filed by prosecution was against the provision of Section 21 of
MCOC Act and second for quashing the order dated
30.07.2025 whereby learned Special Judge had refused to
grant default bail to the appellant.
6. Admittedly, in the instant case, application for
seeking extension of time beyond 90 days by the prosecution
was filed on 28.05.2025 which was allowed on 29.05.2025.
Further, the application for default bail by the appellant was
filed on 24.07.2025 and the same came to be rejected on
30.07.2025. The charge-sheet in this matter is admittedly
filed on 04.09.2025 i.e. within the extended period for
investigation, which was to be expired on 09.09.2025.
Though the learned Special Judge rejected the default bail
application of the appellant before filing the charge-sheet
during extended period, but according to the appellant,
extension order was in fact illegally obtained contrary to the
provision of MCOC Act, and therefore, on expiration of 90
days the appellant had acquired indefeasible right of default
bail as contemplated in Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure ("Cr.P.C." for short)
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7. To have better idea of the provisions we would like
to reproduce sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 167 of Cr.P.C.
as under :
"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be
completed in twenty-four hours.
(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in
custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be
completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed
by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that
the accusation or information is well-founded, the
officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer
making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of
sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest
Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary
hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at
the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.
(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is
forwarded under this section may, whether he has or
has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time
authorise the detention of the accused in such custody
as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding
fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction
to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers
further detention unnecessary, he may order the
accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such
jurisdiction" .
8. On going through the aforesaid provision, it can be
seen that before introduction of MCOC Act, the period for
completion of investigation of the offence was either 90 days
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or 60 days, as the case may be, and if the investigation could
not be concluded within the aforesaid periods, then the
accused was entitled to release on bail on his readiness to
furnish bail, irrespective of merits of the allegation made
against him.
9. However, on coming into force MCOC Act certain
modifications are suggested in Section 167 of Cr.P.C. as per
Section 21 of the MCOC Act. For quick reference, we would
like to reproduce Section 21 of the MCOC Act, which reads as
under :
"21. Modified application of certain provisions of
the Code.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code or in any other law, every offence punishable
under this Act, shall be deemed to be a cognizable
offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of
the Code and "cognizable case" as defined in that
clause shall be construed accordingly.
(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a
case involving an offence punishable under this Act
subject to the modifications that, in sub-section (2),--
(a) the references to "fifteen days", and "sixty days",
wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to
"thirty days" and "ninety days", respectively;
(b) after the proviso, the following proviso shall be
inserted, namely :--
"Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of ninety days, the
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Special Court shall extend the said period upto one
hundred and eighty days, on the report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation
and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused
beyond the said period of ninety days.".
(3) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in
relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on
an accusation of having committed an offence
punishable under this Act.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no
person accused of an offence punishable under this Act
shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own
bond, unless--
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity
to oppose the application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and
that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the
accused shall not be granted bail if it is noticed by the
Court that he was on bail in an offence under this Act,
or under any other Act, on the date of the offence in
question.
(6) The limitations on granting of bail specified in sub-
section (4) are in addition to the limitations under the
Code or any other law for the time being in force on the
granting of bail.
(7) The police officer seeking the custody of any person
for pre-indictment or pre-trial interrogation from the
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judicial custody shall file a written statement explaining
the reason for seeking such custody and also for the
delay, if any, in seeking the police custody".
Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the MCOC Act is
relevant in this matter. On going through the said sub-
section, it appears that right of default bail as per Section 167
(2) of Cr.P.C. has not taken away by this Act, but certain
modifications are there as mentioned above. As per the
aforesaid modifications, the right of default bail now available
to the accused under this Act, is available after completion of
90 days period from the date of offence, unless the period for
investigation is extended by the Special Court as per the
proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the MCOC Act.
Therefore, considering the prayers in this petition, it clearly
appears that if the extension order is held illegal, then only
the appellant acquires right of default bail, because the
application to that effect filed by the appellant has already
been rejected within the period of such extension. In other
words, if the extension order is held illegal, then only it can be
held that default bail application of the appellant was
maintainable and it can be said that he had acquired
indefeasible right of default bail which was to be granted to
him by the learned Special Judge.
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10. The appellant has challenged the order of
extension as aforesaid, on the following grounds.
(a) The report was not independently submitted by the
Prosecutor, but it was only submitted by the I.P.
through the Prosecutor.
(b) There was no application of mind by the Prosecutor
while acting upon the aforesaid report of I.O.
(c) There was no notice to the appellant of the
application for extension. Even his say was not
called on the same and the learned Special Judge
passed order of extension immediately on next day of
its filing without giving any opportunity to the
appellant of hearing.
11. In support of the aforesaid grounds the learned
counsel for the appellant heavily relied on the judgments of
this Court as well as Hon'ble Apex Court. In Criminal
Appeal No.732 of 2018 (supra), following observation is
made by this Court.
"Both the applications filed under Section 21 of the
MCOC Act, were addressed to the learned Special
Judge, but the applications were prepared and signed
by the investigating officer, Sub-Divisional Police Officer,
SubDivision Osmanabad. On the application dated
18th September, 2018, there is signature of Motichand
Rathod, SDPO and on the left side of this signature,
there is signature of Special Prosecutor appointed by
the State showing that through Special Prosecutor
application was presented before the learned Special
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Judge by SDPO. The contents of the application also
show that the application was drafted, prepared by the
investigating officer. Except the signature of the learned
Special Prosecutor on both the applications, there is
nothing to show that the learned Special Prosecutor
has considered the contentions of the investigating
officer made for getting extension of time and he was
satisfied that there were reasons for extension of time.
Thus, the applications as they are, do not show that
the Special Prosecutor had applied his mind, he was
satisfied about the grounds mentioned for getting
extension of time. On the application dated 19th
September, 2018, in addition to the signature of the
learned Special Prosecutor, two more words are written
like "submitted by".
With this observation this Court had allowed the
appeal setting aside the order of extension of time for
investigation passed by the learned Special Judge in the said
matter.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied
on the judgment in of this court at Nagpur Bench in
Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2023 (supra), wherein following
observation is made.
"We had an opportunity to peruse the applications filed by
the learned Public Prosecutor before the Special Court on
07.11.2022 and second application dated 07.01.2023,
with the copies of applications produced along with the
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Pursis dated 19.04.2023, which were addressed by the
Investigating Officer to the Public Prosecutor attached to
the Special Court, dated 05.11.2022 and 06.01.2023. On
minute observations, we are surprised to know that all the
contents word by word, paragraph by paragraph,
including full stops and commas, in these applications are
identically the same. Thus, the only conclusion which
could be drawn is that application which was forwarded
by the Investigating Officer on 05.11.2022 addressed to
the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, is
copied word by word and paragraph by paragraph in the
application addressed to the Special Court dated
07.11.2022 by the Public Prosecutor. This application
presented before the Special Court is jointly signed by the
Investigating Officer and Public Prosecutor attached to the
Special Court".
In the same judgment this Court has made
reference to the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors.; (1994) 4 SCC 602 as follows :
"The above dictum as laid down by the Apex Court clearly
goes to show that the duty of the Public Prosecutor
attached to the Special Court is something special in
which he has to apply his mind independently and satisfy
himself as to whether there is actually need for extension
of time to file charge-sheet. Only then the Public
Prosecutor, after verifying the case papers and reasons
given by the Investigating Officer, may apply by
submitting his report to the Special Court for such
extension. The Public Prosecutor along with his report may
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attach the request of the Investigating Officer made to him,
but he has to apply his mind and demonstrate by giving
his reasons as to why he is supporting the contentions
raised by the Investigating Officer for extension of time".
On going the above observations, it is clearly
evident that the application/report for extension is supposed
to be filed independently by the Special Public Prosecutor and
it cannot be merely submitted by the Investigating Officer
through learned Special Prosecutor. It has been specifically
observed that the request of Investigating Officer for extension
of time is no substitute for the report of Public Prosecutor as
per the proviso to Section 21 of MCOC Act. Moreover, in the
light of observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Hitendra Thakur (supra), it has been laid down that the
Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court is having
some special duty in which he has to apply his mind
independently and satisfy himself whether there is actual
need for extension of time to file charge-sheet. Only on such
satisfaction of Public Prosecutor after verifying the material
on record, he shall submit report to the Special Court for
such extension. A duty is therefore cast upon the learned
Prosecutor so attached, to apply his mind for seeking
extension and that too after going through material on record.
He cannot merely act as a post office. By observing this, the
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Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in the aforesaid
judgments, have rejected the extension of time to file charge-
sheet, as prayed. The same view is reiterated by this Court in
the case of Shaikh Moin vs State of Maharashtra in
Criminal Appeal No. 502 of 2020 that how should be the
approach of Public Prosecutor by making the following
observation.
"In Aslam Babalal Desai (supra), Hon'ble Justice
Ahmedi, speaking for the majority, referred with
approval to the law laid down in Rajnikant Jivanlal
(supra) wherein it was observed as under:
The public prosecutor is expected to independently
apply his mind to the request of the investigating
agency before submitting a report to the court for
extension of time with a view to enable the
investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is
not merely a post office or a forwarding agency. A
public prosecutor may or may not agree with the
reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking
extension of time and may find that the investigation
had not progressed in the proper manner or that there
has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in
completing the investigation. In that event, he may not
submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek
extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time
under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an
independent application of his mind to the request of
the investigating agency is required to make a report to
the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of
the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping
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the accused in further custody to enable the
investigating agency to complete the investigation. The
public prosecutor may attach the request of the
investigating officer along with his request or
application and report, but his report, as envisaged
under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that
he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the
progress of the investigation and considered grant of
further time to complete the investigation necessary.
The use of the expression "on the report of the public
prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation
and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause
(bb) in Ss. (2) of Section 167 as amended by Section
20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative
intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably
and to grant extension only on the report of the public
prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor,
therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital
report, because the consequence of its acceptance
affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore,
strictly comply with the requirements as contained in
clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for
extension of time is no substitute for the report of the
public prosecutor. Where either no report as is
envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by
the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated
Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause
(bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary
corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to
seek bail and the court shall release him on bail if he
furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court".
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13. In the instant case, if we peruse the copy of
application dated 28.05.2025 filed before the learned Special
Judge, then it is clearly evident that it is not drafted
independently by the Special Public Prosecutor attached to
the court of learned Special Judge, but there is only
endorsement that it is submitted through the learned
Prosecutor. The said application is signed by the concerned
Investigating Officer. Surprising to see that there is no
signature of the Special Public Prosecutor on the said copy
which is produced on record for perusal of this court. Thus, it
is clearly evident that the learned Public Prosecutor in this
case has acted merely as a post office and did not apply his
mind by going through the case papers and forming
independent opinion.
14. Further, it is also extremely important to note that
in the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 831 of
2017, this Court at Nagpur Bench has specifically observed
that there is nothing to establish that before extension of
custody, accused were given notice of the said application or
were heard as the learned Additional Sessions Judge in para
5 of his order has stated that the accused were informed
about extension of judicial custody by further period of 90
days to which they did not say anything. In the instant case,
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it appears from the record that the appellant had not even
given intimation about such application. Therefore, on that
count also the extension order dated 29.05.2025 passed just
on the next day of filing of the application, appears to be bad
and illegal. Therefore, considering all these facts, we are of
the opinion that the learned Prosecutor did not apply his
mind at all before filing the application for extension of time to
file charge-sheet in the instant case. He merely acted as post
office, and therefore, such order passed behind back of the
appellant without giving him any opportunity of hearing is,
thus, bad and illegal and needs to be set aside.
15. So far as rejection of bail application of the
appellant is concerned, it appears that the appellant had in
fact presented application for statutory/default bail under
Section 187 (3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
(BNSS), 2023, similar to Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. He has
also raised these grounds in the said application that the
extension order was bad, and therefore, he had acquired
indefeasible right of default bail since the charge-sheet was
not filed by that time. On going through the order of rejection
of the said bail application dated 30.07.2025, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Latur had even observed that
decision in Hintendra Thakur (supra) was binding upon it,
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but merely because the extension order was already passed
by that time and he was not having power of review regarding
the said order of extension, the bail application was rejected.
16. The learned A.P.P. heavily relied on the judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra),
wherein following observation is made :
"We have no doubt that the common stance before us of
the nature of indefeasible right of the accused to be
released on bail by virtue of Section 20(4) (bb) is based
on a correct reading of the principle indicated in that
decision. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused
in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing
of the challan and it does not survive or remain
enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not
availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question
of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only
with reference to the merits of the case under the
provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the
filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the
challan has been filed is not governed by Section 167
but different provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. If that right had accrued to the accused but it
remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then
there is no question of its enforcement thereafter since it
is extinguished the moment challan is filled because
Section 167 Cr. P.C. ceases to apply. The Division Bench
also indicated that if there be such an application of the
accused for release on bail and also a prayer for
extension of time to complete the investigation according
to the proviso in section 20(4) (bb), both of them should
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be considered together. It is obvious that no bail can be
given of the even in such a case unless the prayer for
extension of the period is rejected. In short, the grant of
bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the
prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If
the accused applies for bail under this provisions on
expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period,
as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail
forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be
arrested and committed to custody according to the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is settled
by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking
the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a
valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to
be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the
custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order".
17. Learned A.P.P. also relied on the judgment in the
case of Sadhwi Pragnya Singh Thakur (supra), wherein the
following observation is made :
"There is yet another aspect of the matter. The right
under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. to be released on bail on
default if charge sheet is not filed within 90 days from
the date of first remand is not an absolute or
indefeasible right. The said right would be lost if charge
sheet is filed and would not survive after the filing of the
charge sheet. In other words, even if an application for
bail is filed on the ground that charge sheet was not
filed within 90 days, but before the consideration of the
same and before being released on bail, if charge sheet
is filed, the said right to be released on bail would be
lost. After the filing of the charge sheet, if the accused is
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to be released on bail, it can be only on merits. This is
quite evident from Constitution Bench decision of this
Court in Sanjay Dutt vs. State (1994) 5 SCC 410 [Paras
48 and 53(2)(b)]. The reasoning is to be found in paras
33 to 49".
18. In the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra), it is
specifically observed that grant of bail in such situation is
subject fo refusal of prayer for extension of time, if such
prayer is made. It is further observed that if the accused
applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of
180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he
has to be released on bail forthwith. Thus, the filing of the
charge-sheet is an important fact in acquiring the right of
default bail. Similarly, in the case of Sadhwi Pragnya Singh
Thakur (supra) it has been observed that right under Section
167 (2) of Cr.P.C. to be released on bail on default if charge-
sheet is not filed within 90 days from the date of first remand
is not an absolute or indefeasible right, and the said right
would be lost if the charge-sheet is filed and would not
survive after the filing of the charge-sheet. Admittedly, such
right lapses on filing of the charge-sheet, but in the instant
case, when the extension order is already held bad and illegal
by us, then till filing of charge-sheet the appellant was having
right to default bail which was refused to him merely because
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extension order was already passed by that time.
19. It is significant to note that bail application was
filed by the appellant during the said extension period which
is declared illegal by this Court. When it was filed and got
rejected, the charge-sheet was not submitted and the same
was filed on 04.09.2025, before the end of extension period
which expired actually on 09.09.2025. Admittedly, in the
light of the observation in the case of Sadhwi Pragnya
Singh Thakur (supra), right for default bail had lapsed on
filing of charge-sheet on 04.09.2025, but prior to that only the
same was available to the appellant, and therefore, in our
considered view, the appellant is entitled for default bail.
20. Considering all the aforesaid aspects, we pass the
following order.
ORDER
(i) The appeal is hereby allowed.
(ii) The impugned order dated 29.05.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Latur granting further extension of 90 days to the investigating agency for filing charge-sheet on completion of investigation resorting to the provision of Section 21 (2) (b) of the MCOC Act, is quashed and set aside.
(23)criappeal-701.2025.odt
(iii) The order dated 30.07.2025 below Exh.1 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-1, Latur rejecting the default bail application of the appellant is also quashed and set aside and the appellant/accused No.3 is released on execution of his P.R. bond of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) alongwith one or more sureties in the like amount.
(iv) The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
(MEHROZ K. PATHAN) (SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE)
JUDGE JUDGE
VD_Dhirde