Kerala High Court
Shri C.N. Presannan, Judl. Second Class ... vs Shri K.A. Mohammed Ali, Adv. on 14 March, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ2194
JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J.
1. This is an action on the Contempt of Courts Act. The respondent is a Member of the Bar. The proceedings were initiated on a reference made by the Judicial Magistrate of the II Class, Cochin.
2. At every stage of the proceedings, there were obstructions posed by objections of the respondent. It is unnecessary to allude to these antecedent events. The Bench before which the matter had come up (Paripoornan and Jagannadha Raju, JJ.), directed that the matter may be placed before another Bench. It was so done after elaborate orders have been passed on some among the contentions raised by the respondent. We too had to deal with a spate of petitions, raising a variety of contentions intended to halt and to end the proceedings. Those petitions have been dealt with from time to time. (See orders in C.M.P. Nos. 16654, 16655, 16656 and 19370 of 1990).
3. The charge was, framed on 4-10-1990. The gravamen of the charge is that the respondent organised and caused the staging of a demonstration before the residence of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Kerala to protest against Judicial acts of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Cochin, and that he caused to publish posters in and near the Court premises containing contemptuous remarks against the judiciary and threats against the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Cochin.
4. The respondent denied the charge. This necessitated a trial. In the course of such trial, many petitions were filed by the respondent seeking various reliefs. They have been dealt with by orders dated 5-11-1990, 3-12-1990 etc.
5. The evidence collected at the trial consisted of 24 exhibits produced in substantiation of the charge and the oral evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 and R. Ws. 1 to 4. The respondent caused to be marked on his side 14 exhibits. Four witnesses were examined on his side.
6. Certain facts are beyond controversy. A collection of such facts will facilitate closer analysis of the evidence adduced in the case.
7. The respondent, as noted earlier, is and Advocate. He has a long standing at the Bar, of about three decades. His practice is mostly confined to the criminal side and to the courts in Cochin. He claims that he has got a substantial portion of the criminal works in the Courts at Cochin.
8. The Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class was holding that post in a temporary capacity. He was formerly working in the office of the Advocate-General, and for a fairly long period of about 11 years, before he was posted as a temporary Magistrate for the first time in September, 1983. He later successfully competed for selection as a Munsiff and is now functioning as Rent Controller at Thrissur.
9. On the judicial side, the Magistrate had met with many problems. That is but natural. But some problems were much more complex and complicated than are noticed in other stations.
10. We must now steer clear of a controversy projected by the respondent about the correctness of some orders passed by the Magistrate. There are more reasons than one for us to avoid the mire of details of that controversy. Assuming that any order of the judicial officer is erroneous, a remedy is prescribed under our judicial system for obtaining the necessary relief. The hierarchy of Courts strives to attain perfection in the administration of justice. That has been noted even by non-legal thinkers, Edward de Bono for example. While dealing with the concept of perfection, he observed:
"It is easy to be blocked by the concept of 'perfection'. Often the expense of moving from ninety per cent, perfection to one hundred per cent, perfection is huge. If we look at the administration of justice we find a system which is striving for perfection. The result is an elaborate system with numerous avenues of appeal so that the chance of injustice is removed. The effect is to clog the whole system and slow down justice to the point where the delay itself becomes a considerable injustice."
(See PO : Beyond Yes and No by Edward de Bono, Page 68). If even at the risk of generating a buckle of arrears, a system has been evolved to achieve mere perfection in the area of administration of justice which takes in as an integral part of administration of criminal justice. The Courts would not ordinarily tolerate matters pending before the Courts to be tackled by agitations otherwise than the process of law and the immediate of Courts. Possibly general issues which concern principles of directions of a policy may stand on a different footing. In the present case, some of the very issues raised by the respondent impinging upon the correctness of the decision of the Magistrate are pending before another Court for active consideration. We shall not express any opinion which shall in any way tend to influence a decision in that case.
11. Organising a demonstration before the residence of the Chief Justice with a view to influence the decision in a pending matter before a Court in our view, would clearly amount to contempt of Court as defined in the Act. It has definitely lowered or tended to lower the authority of the Court, by creating an impression in the minds of the participants in the organisation that a decision taken by the Court could be got varied or upset by methods other than the normal and ordinary recourse to the remedies provided by law. It has also the effect of interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. If judicial officers have to anticipate a demonstration or other form of protest, while passing any order or deliver any judgment, the administration of justice will come to a crying halt. The time old logic of giving absolute immunity to a judge in relation to proceedings in the Court, is founded on this wholesome principle, of leaving the judicial mind free and fearless. In that sense, the organisation of a demonstration interferes and tended to interfere with the administration of justice even otherwise. It has also obstructed and tended to obstruct the administration of justice.
12. The further question then is about the factual finding on the involvement and role of the respondent.
13. The charge of organising a demonstration, is not amenable to easy proof. A person aware of the consequences of such a culpable act would naturally take every step necessary to conceal his involvement and to cover up his identity in the various activities connected with the organisation of the demonstration. Circumstances could justifiably enable an inference of the respondent's active part in the organisation of the demonstration.
14. The presence of the respondent in the very demonstration, will go a long way in establishing the charge. Of course, an accidental presence among the demonstrators, or an inquisitive post at about the premises, may not be inconsistent with his innocence in the matter. That calls for a critical examination of his activities antecedent to the actual staging of the demonstration, and the part he played in the pose of the demonstration itself.
15. The respondent admits that he had travelled from Cochin to Ernakulam on that day by boat in the evening. He, however, disputed his participation in the demonstration. His denial of the role in the organisation of demonstration has been critically evaluated as he is an interested party in the proceedings.
16. There is positive evidence in the case on the matter, as furnished by P.W. 1, P. Venugopal, Chief Reporter of the Cochin Edition of the Indian Express. The following passage extracted in the words of the witness himself, so as to avoid a possible contention of the correctness of the compressed summary of the statements, would establish matters beyond doubt :
"I was personally present before the residence of the Chief Justice at the time of the demonstration, I met Mr. Mohammed Ali the respondent herein a little away from the residence of the Chief Justice when the demonstration was going on. It was roughly at a distance of 15 metres from the venue of the demonstration."
The incident was reported by him in the Indian Express with the caption "Demonstration before Chief Justice's house." A photograph of the demonstration was also published in the paper. Ext. P1 is the report.
17. P.W. 1, is an independent witness, whose presence in the place is not disputed by the respondent. That P.W. 1 had talked to him in the evening, querying whether the respondent was Mr. Mohammed Ali, and seeking the details of the background in which the demonstration was staged, is admitted by R.W. 4. While in the box giving evidence as R.W. 4, the respondent was specifically asked :
"Did P.W. 1 explain to you how he had come to the place of demonstration along with the photographer? Ans : No. I did not ask them either about it."
He admitted that P.W. 1 had a talk with R.W. 3 Advocate Mr. Mohammed Moop-pan, whose office is close by, and whose evidence is relied on by the respondent to contradict the version of P.W. 1. R.W. 4 was specifically questioned about the evidence of P.W. 1 on this aspect, as is evident from the following passage in his deposition :
"Did P.W. 1 tell you that he had come to the place on the direction of resident editor who had a telephone from a person styling himself as Mohammed Ali? Ans : He did not tell me anything like that. Can you remember the exact words you talked to P.W. 1. Ans,: I cannot. I put it to you that P.W. 1 gathered his impression from the conversation he had with you, when he deposed before the Court that "the main spokesman of the demonstrators was Mr. Mohammed Ali?" "
The answer is significant and it is as follows :
"Perhaps P.W. 1 might have felt that he could get all details about the events of the Court from me."
18. P. W. 1 was searchingly cross-examined on behalf of the respondent. He has given all relevant details connected with the incident. For example, he states:
"The Chief Justice was not present in the residence at the time of demonstration. The memorandum was submitted to the office in the residential compound of the Chief Justice."
His evidence contains a clear and crucial statement:
"The main spokesman of the demonstrators was Mr. Mohammed Ali."
P.W. 1 has not made any confusion regarding the identity of the person. His further evidence is:
"Mr. Mohammed Ali is the respondent before this Court. I met the respondent at the junction............ Que: Did you meet the respondent near the office of the Advocates? I do not know the existence of office of any advocate in that locality."
The size of the demonstration is also spoken to by the witness. There were about 25 persons. They have moved towards the Chief Justice's residence at about 5.30 p.m.
19. P.W. 1 had a discussion with the Magistrate. There are indications about the explanations given by the Magistrate in Ext. P1 report. They would clearly imply the collection of details by P.W. 1 from someone intimately connected with the case. The respondent who was counsel appearing for the accused in the case pending before the Magistrate, could in the circumstances be the only person who would have furnished the details of the case. That is the positive evidence of P.W. 1. The evidence of P.W. 1 and R.W. 1 Magistrate would clearly establish and corroborate the talk P.W. 1 had with the respondent regarding the details of the case near the site where the demonstration was staged.
20. The respondent attempted to explain his presence at about the place with a view to deny his presence itself at the demonstration site or in the company of the demonstrators. The evidence of R.W. 3 is the substantial support which he could muster. If the evidence of P.W. 1 could be believed, presence and participation of the respondent in the demonstration would stand clearly established. It was not without reason that the respondent was felt to be the main spokesman of the demonstrators by P.W. 1, a person who had with his professional skill as a journalist, could form an impression about those connected with an incident. There is absolutely nothing to suggest any bias or interest on the part of P.W. 1, which would make his evidence suspect.
21. R.W. 3 met the respondent in the same evening near the premises where the demonstrations were staged. The respondent has a theory that soon after embarking at Ernakulam in the boat at about 5.30 p.m., he had walked up the distance from the boat jetty to the Court complex, with a view to find out the availability or whereabouts of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, missing him in the office, proceeded to further north, when he met P.W. 1 and talked to him. The attempt was to make out a case that the respondent had no occasion whatever to proceed further to the premises in front of the residence of the Chief Justice, where the demonstration was staged. We are clearly of the view that the evidence of R.W. 3 is not inconsistent with the positive and clear evidence given by P.W. 1. Sitting in his office, and with a view towards the road available only in one place, it would be possible for R.W. 3 to notice continuously all the movements of the respondent after he reached the Court complex. The presence of the respondent in the demonstration and his conversation with P.W. 1 as spoken to by that independent witness, in the circumstance, had preceded the meeting between P.W. 1, R.W. 4 and R.W. 3. The attempt at disowning his earlier presence and among the demonstrators, in front of the residence of the Chief Justice, has been unsuccessful in the light of the positive evidence of P.W. 1.
22. There are clinching circumstances which would show that his presence among the demonstrators before the residence of the Chief Justice had integral connection with reasons personal to the respondent. An elucidation of that aspect will require an examination of the evidence connected with the professional conduct of the respondent before the Magistrate.
23. The Magistrate has given evidence before us as P.W. 2. The demonstration was on 16-12-1988. The respondent had moved a bail application on 15-12-1988. In accordance with a practice available in that Court the bail application along with the vakalath was handed over to the Magistrate in the Court itself. The bail application and vakalath were disposed of by him on 16-12-1988. The bail application was dismissed.
24. It is on that very date that the demonstration was organised at Cochin. This furnishes a background of the demonstration which undoubtedly was organised with a preconcerted plan and line of action.
25. The incidence in the Court on 17-12-1988 would also point out to the persons who are behind the organisation. They are integrally connected with the same incident, originating from the rejection of the bail by P.W. 2.
26. The Magistrate, P.W. 2, noticed on 17-12-1988, posters on the compound wall, on the date of the Court. He arranged to have the photographs taken of these posters. They have been marked as Exts. P2, P2(a) and P2 (b). (The negatives are Exts. P4, P4(a) and P4(b)). They have been proved by the photographer examined in the case as P.W. 3. The photographs were sent in covers Exts. P5 and P5(a). (There is nothing to discredit his version of having taken the photographs of the posters and about the location in which the photographs of posters were seen). The posters purport to be displayed by the organisation for 'protection of citizens' rights'. The gist of it reads:
"Suspend Magistrate Presannan.
Give compensation to those unlawfully detained in Jail.
The bourgeois Court is an instrument of oppression.
Jail is the place for those who violate the law.
Kerala requires people's Judges."
The contents of Ext. P2(b) make longer reading; through projected under the same auspices. They read:
"Initiate proceedings against the Magistrate Pressannan.
Let the Court which illegally detain the workers perish.
Let Judges of the rich and the pot-bellies get lost.
Conduct open enquiry against Judges who fear enquiry.
Let Judges who destroy rule of law resign.
Let people organise themselves against such Judges.
Let the people resist and defeat the High Court's reign of terror.
The workers detained in the jail are thirsting for vengeance."
Ext. P. 2(b) purports to be a notice of invitation for a meeting proposed to be held at 5 p.m. on 19-12-1988 at the residence of Advocate Mohammed Ali. It reads:
"A meeting is proposed to be held at 5 p.m. at the residence of Advocate Mohammed ali to consider about obtaining compensation for those illegally detained in jail by Magistrate Pressannan and for adopting the direct action steps before the High Court which refuses to take action against him (Magistrate). All good people participate and make (the endeavour) a success."
27. The respondent, no doubt, disowned responsibility for the posters. He pleaded that there was other advocates also in the Court by name Mohammed Ali. The respondent admitted having seen the three posters on 17-12-1988. On 20-12-1988, the District Judge, Ernakulam, Shri Hariharan Nair, had proceeded to enquire into the complaint received from Magistrate Pressannan about the contemptuous behaviour of the respondent. The District Judge enquired him about the incident in the course of the enquiry conducted in the Chambers of the First Class Magistrate. The respondent sought some time to file a statement. Time was granted till 22-12-1988. The respondent was directed to file the statement at 9 a.m. on 22-12-1988. As to what happened at that time, is stated by the witness in these words:
"The District Judge asked me about the posters. I told him that somebody had done so to malign me. I also mentioned that I could have taken action or complained to the police if the initials of Mohammed Ali also had been given in the posters, or the particulars of the place at which the meeting was scheduled."
He was cross-examined on the point. He stated there:
"I saw the posters Ext. P2 series. The appearance of the posters was on 17-12-1988. Did any meeting take place as mentioned in Ext. P2(b) poster? Ans. I do not know. Did you take any steps to, clarify that you had no connection with the proposal to hold the meeting as contained in Ext. P2(b) poster. Ans. I did not. I did not mention to the Magistrate that I had nothing to do with the posters indicating the convening of a meeting in my house, because it did not contain the initials of Mohammed Ali or the particulars of the residence. On the first available opportunity, I informed the matter to the District Judge on 20-12-1988 itself."
It is somewhat interesting to note that the production of the statement of the respondent before the District Judge dt. 20-12-1988 was opposed by the respondent. The opposition was, however, overruled and it had been marked as Ext. P6. This unusual conduct on the part of the respondent is explained by even the contents of Ext. P6. Ext. P6 contains a crucial statement that the respondent is a leading criminal lawyer in the Criminal Courts at Cochin. That was in the context of a motive suggested on the part of other advocates for blacking his reputation, according to his version. In Ext. P6, he has stated:
"As an advocate with the largest practice in the Cochin Magistrates' Courts, I am an eyesore to other advocates....."
He refers to a proposal for boycotting the work by the Members of the Bar Association on 15-6-1988. His reaction was different from many others of the Bar. He indicated that he was not prepared to join the agitation without knowing the demands of the Members of the Bar at Chavakkad, (in sympathy with whom the Bar Association had planned the strike). He further stated:
"I further informed them that as a Communist, I was bound by pledge to support the left democratic front's Government of Kerala, by paying any price and that if the agitation was against the Government, I would face it to the best of my ability.....".
He referred to the fact that he was counsel for the Electricity Board and Cochin Corporation. Later he stated:
"Great majority of accused in Criminal Courts are the starving and semi-starving unemployed persons and the workers, who struggle for their demands and who get involved in cases after getting drunk, to get over their physical and mental tiredness after heavy burden of their physical and mental tiredness after heavy burden of their work. Very few from the affluent classes (vernacular matter omitted.) are arrayed as accused....."
Though, in this evidence, he stated that there were other advocates by the same name, he could not recollect the initials. Although, he stated initially that there were two or three, later he reduced the number to two and still later it came only to one, Sri. P. M. Mohammed Ali, whom he had seen for six or seven years. It is unimaginable that such a junior member, who did not have any occasion to have any grouse against the Magistrate, would have organised the writing and display of the posters. Having regard to the sequence of events and the probabilities, we are of the view that it was the respondent who had a motive for preparing and putting up the posters in the manner done in the Court premises. No other counsel had any grievance in relation to the alleged incident of refusal of bail on 16-12-1988 as he was the person who appeared for the accused in that case. It was the wife of his client and her associates who had made the demonstration before the residence of the Chief Justice. The respondent did identify the wife (Pathai) of the accused in the photos published along with the report Ext. P.1.
28. There is a conclusive connection between the respondent and the photographs by intrinsic and internal evidence. The language of the posters is indicative of a grouse against the judiciary as an instrument of oppression. In Ext. P.6, there are clear statements which show the entertainment of a philosophy by the respondent that judiciary essentially serves the interests of the moneyed classes. It is the same thing that is projected prominently in the posters Exts. P.2, P2(a) and P2(b). The respondent was specifically asked about the statement contained in Ext. P.6 where reference is made to the moneyed class and the difficulty for the poorer sections in obtaining justice from the Court. His answer was:
"I have stated in Ext. P.6 that accused rarely come from (vernacular matter omitted) (moneyed classes) as this has been my experience in the lower Court, in criminal cases."
The very phraseology contained in Ext. P.2(a) where reference is made to (vernacular matter omitted) (moneyed classes) in the sentence which reads: "Let Judges of the rich and the pot-bellies get lost" brings out the connection between the respondent and the posters. It was a consensus on his part about the occurrence of a phraseology of (vernacular matter omitted) in Ext. P.6 that prompted him to object to marking of his own statement given on the earlier occasion before a Judge conducting the enquiry.
29. There is, no doubt, no direct evidence as to who wrote the posters or as to who caused the writing of those posters and the pasting of the same on the walls in the Court premises. The circumstances, however, leave no room for doubt that they have been done only at the instance of the respondent.
30. On the question of organisation of the demonstration before the residence of the Chief Justice, there is other acceptable evidence about the positive part played by the respondent. P.W. 1 refers to the conversation he had with the editor of the Indian Express Shri. Anantharaman. The conversation which P.W. 1 had with his editor, was soon followed by his action in accordance with the directive given by Shri. Anantharaman. (Shri. Anantharaman has since retired from Indian Express and is now settled down in Bombay). Anantharaman told him about a telephone call who described himself as Advocate Mohammed AH. The person who te(SIC)honed had mentioned to Shri. Ananthara(SIC)about the demonstration being organised before the residence of the Chief Justice and suggested that it would be good if the demonstration was covered in the paper Indian Express. There is no cross-examination about the version regarding the conversation between the editor and P.W. 1. The respondent has, no doubt, disowned the telephone conversation. He, however, admitted that he was a subscriber to Indian Express for the last 30 years and that he knew that it was published from Fort Cochin very close to the Cochin courts. The presence of the respondent among the demonstrators before the residence of the Chief Justice, the unambiguous impression of P.W. 1 about the respondent being the spokesman of the demonstrators would justify an inference that the respondent himself was the person who telephoned Shri. Anantharaman. In a sense it is part of res gestae. The only inference possible from the available evidence is that the respondent himself had telephoned Anantharaman, the editor of Indian Express. That evidence is entitled to be accepted and acted upon being res gestae. We therefore hold that in relation to the entire activities of securing maximum publicity for this ugly demonstration, the respondent had taken a very effective and important step in the organisation of the demonstration, namely publicity in the media of such a demonstration. Thus, it is the respondent who had close contact with the wife and allies of the accused who was not released on bail by the Magistrate. It was he who had the grievance against the Magistrate. Those who participated in the demonstration were the wife and allies of the accused who was denied bail by the Magistrate. No satisfactory explanation for the presence of the respondent at the time of the demonstration and as one amongst the demonstrators is forthcoming. He had a case that he wanted to inform the C.J.M. about some of these developments and that the C.J.M. was known to him. If that were so innocent, there would not be any justification for his presence among the demonstrators. He would have returned without traversing a fairly long way to the Chief Justice's residence from the office of the R.W. 3, if by the time he had reached the C.J.M's. office, he realised that the C.J.M. had left the office. There was no particular or satisfactory reason for him to have endevoured to call on C.J.M. It was the Registrar of the High Court who could be easily contacted, if the idea of the respondent was only to alert the administration wing of the High Court against possible attempts at demonstration before the Chief Justice's residence. He did not resort to such a step. That is not without significance. The theory about meeting the C.J.M. for such a laudable purpose as to bring to the notice of the Head of the Criminal Judiciary the developments in his Court, cannot therefore be accepted. We have in this connection to observe that there is formal evidence about an extraordinary intense friendship between the C.J.M. and the respondent. There are indications about such strong bond between the two. The manner in which the C.J.M. (now retired) had given evidence with an eagerness to distort facts in favour of the respondent, enables us to accept the plea of the C.J.M. and the respondent being on more than ordinary terms of friendship.
31. The respondent has a version that as a person owning buildings, (one of which had been let out to Shri. M. K. Damodaran, Advocate, who himself had filed a vakalath in the present case, does not carry conviction. The situation of that property is entirely different. One cannot assume the presence of the respondent at the demonstration spot, if he had only some talk on the property let out to Shri. M. K. Damodaran.
32. It is to be noted that P.W. 1 gave evidence about the involvement of the respondent in the demonstration and his being a spokeman of the demonstrators on the basis of enquiries which he made with the leaders of the demonstration. He was explicit later:
"Two or three other persons explained the causes of the demonstration."
The exact spot at which P.W. 1 met the respondent was spoken to by him. At the time when he talked to the respondent he did not see anyone with a cap and a beard (the identification with reference to the cap and beard being P.W. 3 Advocate Mohammed Moopan) clearly posits a meeting and a conversation with the respondent not at a time when R.W. 3 was also present. In cross-examination it was elicited:
"When I reached the place I mainly spoke to the spokesman. I went to the place as informed by Mohammed Ali and spoke mainly to the respondent."
As to now he ascertained the person shown as Mohammed Ali was also answered by him. The answers are significant:
"I asked some of the demonstrators and they pointed out Mr. Mohammed Ali. After obtaining information from demonstrators about the identity of respondent Mohammed Ali, I met Mr. Mohammed Ali and asked him the reason for demonstration."
In the light of the above evidence, there can hardly be any doubt that it was the respondent who had a grouse against the Magistrate in relation to a matter in which he was personally involved, that it was he who organised the wife and friends of the detained accused for a demonstration, that it was he who took the extra interest of being present in the midst of the demonstrators and at the time of the demonstration, and that it was he who caused the posters to be made degrading the courts and the Rule of Law and caused them to be displayed in the premises of the Court.
33. The specific plea of the respondent as contained in paragraph 4 of the reply affidavit is adverted to in this context. It reads:
"I was not present at or near the place of demonstration. The allegation that I was standing near the place where the demonstration was staged is absolutely untrue and is denied."
In the light of the evidence of an independent witness like P.W. 1, who gave his evidence in a natural and impressive manner, we have no hesitation to reject this plea of the respondent and to hold that he was present at the demonstration and was the main spokeman of the demonstrators.
34. We shall now advert to the evidence attempted on his side. R.W. 1 a former Chief Judicial Magistrate has been examined with a view to give an appearance of innocence to this organisation of the demonstration. He telephoned the C.J.M. about the proposed demonstration sometime in the afternoon. (That witness, however, was not clear in mind and said erroneously that the telephone conversation was on the day prior to the date on which the demonstration was actually held. That had to be corrected in the cross-examination). The fact that the respondent telephoned the C.J.M. about the demonstration which was to take place in the evening, if at all, only indicates his active contact with the demonstrators themselves. It will only support the charge against him and not serve to explain his conduct. R.W. 2 Devasikhamani, Advocate and a former Secretary of the Bar Association, was examined to show that the Magistrate had some grouse against the respondent. That refers to an incident in 1988-89, and when he sought to intervene in connection with the action of the Magistrate in issuing notice for the production of sureties. This casual conversation cannot have any effect on the evidence of P.W. 2 or the principal acts on which the charge has been levelled against him. R.W. 3 in a way supports the evidence regarding the preparations made for the demonstration. Some of them had been to his office at about 5 p.m. They got from him "the directions for proceeding to the residence of the Hon'ble Chief Justice." R.W. 3 met the respondent only at about 6 p.m. As noted earlier, that was at a time when he was coming from the west. Obviously, that is at a time and place other than those at which P.W. 1 met the respondent and talked to him. R.W. 3 and the respondent had only a short way common to them. One was having strong religious faith and proceeded to the mosque. The other took to another route. We have already discarded the evidence of R.W. 4 unreliable when he denied his presence among the demonstrators and his conversion with P.W. 1.
35. There was an attempt at showing that the Magistrate was acting arbitrarily and unjustly in denying bail to an accused. As we observed earlier, we decline to consider the correctness or propriety of the orders passed by the Magistrate in these proceedings. The party aggrieved should have recourse to the remedies provided under law. At the same time we have to indicate generally the extensive abuse of the process of Court prima facie disclosed in the proceedings before the Magistrate Court at Cochin. The Magistrate was only trying to curb and contend such malpractices and abuses of process of Court. Impersonation of parties, and the same person taking on four or five names for him and in relation to different proceedings, have all been brought out by the evidence in the case and in particular by the evidence of and the proceedings passed by the Magistrate P.W. 2, A judicial officer trying to cleanse the Court process from such abuses on the part of the anti-social elements, has only to be protected in the discharge of his very onerous duty in such a situation. They will not constitute grounds for either disbelieving P.W. 2 or for finding fault with his bona fide actions. Page 13 of the deposition of R.W. 4 would indicate that he had instructed the demonstrators to proceed to Ernakulam of course he would add that the complaint is to the Court. The demonstrators cannot go to the Court with complaints. That is a duty and responsibility of counsel. The gloves attempted to put over his statement by R.W. 4, does not therefore stick. It is somewhat strange that the respondent could not remember the exact words he talked to P.W. 1, the correspondent of Indian Express.
36. In the light of the above discussion we hold that the charges as against the respondent has been fully established.
37. We shall in brief advert to some of his legal contentions hereafter.
38. The respondent has taken a contention about non-application of the mind of the Division Bench before the contempt proceedings are initiated against him. He also purports to nurse a grievance on the ground that he had not been offered adequate opportunity to meet the charges. The detailed proceedings, and the prolonged enquiry, the examination of the witnesses, the production of the documents, and the advertence to every request made by him from time to time, would establish the hollowness of his contentions. Apart from the unrefined language employed, which is quite consistent with a crude conduct on his part throughout the proceedings, there is absolutely no substance whatever in those contentions urged with high sounding words. The respondent has not suffered any prejudice whatever in the course of the proceedings. The Court has been over-indulgent towards him, giving 'him every accommodation and every adjustment, and according him all that is due to a member of the learned profession. Sad to say, the conduct of the respondent was not graceful or disciplined, even in the course of the proceedings before the Court. The respondent was not asserting a constitutional right or projecting the public grievance, by organising the demonstration in a manner not befitting a member of the profession and not in tune with the tradition of the Bar. It may also be pointed out that after having denied the charge of participation in the demonstration, it was unnecessary for him to blow the trumpet of one who wages a war against opporession or injustice. His attack was against the Rule of Law and that we shall not permit.
39. Having found the respondent guilty of the charge framed against him, we have now to consider the punishment that should be imposed on him.
40. There cannot be any doubt that organising a demonstration before the residence of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, and with a view to sway the courts in the proceedings pending before a subordinate Court, is a very grave threat to the Rule of Law and to the administration of justice. Consistent with the gravity of the offence, the maximum punishment permitted under the enactment would be perfectly justified. Some guidelines are available about the punishment imposed on contemners, by the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered recently and the Calcutta High Court. (See R.K. Garg v. State of H.P., AIR 1981 SC 1382: (1981 Cri LJ 1029) and In re Provash Chandra, AIR 1961 Cal 495 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 334). The Supreme Court awarded imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in AIR 1981 SC 1382 (supra). If at all, the charge against the respondent is more serious, more grave and direct. A higher punishment would be justified in such circumstances.
41. Contempt jurisdiction date backs to the 12th century. Its manifestations are indeed many and varied. There have been discussions even about the phrase 'contempt of Court'. Lord President Clyde rightly emphasised in Johnson v. Grant, AIR 1923 SC 789 (sic).
"It is not the dignity of the Court which is offended ........ it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged".
Expressed in another way as has been done by Browne-Wilinson, "one of the foundations of a free society is that there should be Courts to which all can have access, in which the justice dispensed is impartial and whose orders are obeyed. The law of contempt is the means by which these vital requirements are preserved". The developments in legislation, including the recommendations of the Phillimore Committee and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1981 in England, would be of great help in resolving any particular controversy arising in that jurisdiction. The proteus of legal world presents an almost infinite variety of forms of contempt. One such form has arisen in the present case. It is some consolation that much freedom is given to the Court trying the contempt action, even when competing considerations are at play. It has been rightly said :
"The law of contempt is but one example of the Court's ability to regulate its own procedures so as to ensure that justice prevails."
A manifestation of a novel problem is presented in a recent case, A. G. v. Newspaper Publishing plc., (1987) 3 All ER 276. Balcombe Lord Justice mentioned in that case :
"The books are full of cases about such acts. Some, such as assaulting an officer of the Court, interference with witnesses or jurors, or disrupting Court proceedings......."
The difficulty of the Court was perhaps demonstrated by the fact that after the arguments were over, and the Court had adjourned the case for consideration of judgments, a point which was so fundamental that the Court thought it right to invite further argument, is referred to in the aforesaid case. It was observed that concepts which may not ordinarily present any difficulty, can themselves pose difficult problems. Thus it was said:
"Mens rea in the law of contempt is something of a minefield."
Ultimately it was held that an intent need not be expressly avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances, including the foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct. (See page 304 of (1987) 3 All ER 276 (supra))
42. The duty of counsel to uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court, even while maintaining that a particular order is not correct and seeking a review, has been emphasised by the Supreme Court in Lalit Mohan Das v. Advocate General, AIR 1957 SC 250. That and other cases including the Privy Council in Govt. Pleader v. Judges of High Court of Madras, AIR 1930 PC 144 : (31 Cri LJ 489), had been surveyed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in In re Provash Chandra Mallick, AIR 1961 Cal 495 : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 334. Addressing the Magistrate spiteful and admonishing him for being disobliging to lawyers and warning the Magistrate that the matter would be given publicity constituted contempt, according to the Court.
43. In Advocate-General v. K. Ramakumar, ILR 1986 (1) Kerala 464, this Court imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for an article published in a legal journal with limited circulation, having regard to the serious threat the article would have on the administration of justice. Organising a demonstration before the residence of the Chief Justice by itself, is far more serious, in as much as it would immediately attract the attention of larger sections of ordinary people. The gravity of his misconduct is enhanced when he had made arrangements by telephoning the editor of a prominent English daily having very large circulation in this area, to cover the news of such a demonstration. A report and the photograph thus published under Ext. P1 did seriously disturb the administration of justice and the working of the Courts and the morale of the judicial officers. With all these aggravating factors we have desisted from awarding him the punishment of imprisonment. We have been extremely indulgent towards him, having regard to the long standing he had at the Bar. In a sense, the long standing he had at the Bar should have made him more circumspect, and sober. Looked that way, a higher punishment is justifiable and may be imposed on him in such circumstances. We remind ourselves about the highest restraint needed in that circumstance and we have practiced that high restraint in these proceedings. Following the guideline afforded by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 1382 : (1981 Cri LJ 1029) (supra) we direct him to pay a sum of Rs. 10000 to the Kerala Legal Aid Board. The amount shall be recovered as fine, if it is not paid within an outer period of one month, for the payment of the entire amount, and with a further stipulation that Rs. 5000/- thereof shall be paid within 15 days. In default of the payment, the respondent shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months.
44. We have also to ensure that such serious threats to administration of justice and rule of law are effectively avoided in future by the respondent and by persons having similar trends and tendencies. The conduct of the respondent would be observed by the judicial officers before whom he appears. In the event of there being any serious threat from his conduct at the Bar in the Court or otherwise which in any way constitutes a contempt as defined in the Act, the judicial officer concerned shall promptly report the matter to the High Court which will then duly consider the matter and initiate further action as found necessary.
The petition is, disposed of in the above manner.