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[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Pramod Goel vs Stuti Sharma on 28 April, 2026

            IN THE COURT OF MS. CHARU AGGARWAL:
            ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-02; E COURT:
           SHAHDARA: KARKARDOOMA COURT: DELHI.


      Crl. (R) No. 85/2026
      Pramod Goel
      s/o Late Sh. Naresh Goel
      r/o 2758, Onkar Nagar,
      Tri Nagar, Delhi-110035.
                                  VERSUS
      Stuti Sharma
      d/o Sh. Sunil Sharma
      r/o D-71, Ground Floor,
      Suraj Mal Vihar, Delhi-110092.


             Date of filing       :      04.04.2026
             Date of arguments :         28.04.2026
             Date of order        :      28.04.2026


                                 ORDER

1. The present revision petition under Section 438 BNSS alongwith an application under section 5 of limitation Act, has been preferred by the revisionist/accused assailing the order dated 19.11.2025 passed by the Ld. JMFC-NI Act (Shahdara), whereby his application seeking stay of further proceedings was dismissed, in a complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI Act").

Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.1/10 Digitally signed by
                                            CHARU      CHARU AGGARWAL
                                            AGGARWAL   Date: 2026.04.28
                                                       16:41:48 +0530

2. First, I will take up the application u/s 5 of Limitation Act; there is delay of 50 days in filing the instant revision. It is stated in the application that the present revision could not be filed within stipulated period since revisionist was in JC for more than 6 years and 5 months and was released on regular bail on 24.12.2025, thereafter, he scrutinized the entire record of the present case and further also that the impugned order was uploaded on the website with slight delay.

2.1 It is settled that there cannot be any hard and fast rule for deciding an application for condonation of delay. The expression sufficient cause in Section 5 of limitation Act is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a purposeful manner to meet the ends of justice. The courts always held that a liberal approach should be adopted while considering the application for condoning the delay so that substantive rights of the party are not defeated merely because of the delay. The court should be pragmatic in their approach while dealing with application for condonation of delay, unless the delay is unduly long and vexatious or frivolous. 2.2 This court is of the view that revisionist has given sufficient reason for belatedly filing the present revision and it would be in the best interest of the justice, if the delay of 50 days is condoned, hence in the interest of justice, the delay in filing the present revision is hereby condoned, consequently, the application u/s 5 of Limitation Act is hereby allowed.

Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.2/10 Digitally signed by
                                            CHARU      CHARU AGGARWAL
                                            AGGARWAL   Date: 2026.04.28
                                                       16:42:00 +0530

3. The necessary facts to decide the present revision petition are that the respondent herein had filed the above referred complaint under Section 138 N.I. Act against the Company namely 'M/s Indrapuram Habitat Centre Pvt. Ltd.' and revisionist as accused no.2 being its Director.

4. As observed in para no.8 of the impugned order, the cheques in question were returned dishonoured on 29.03.2019 and legal demand notice was dispatched on 22.04.2019 which was delivered on the very next day on 23.04.2019. Thereafter, the complaint was filed by the respondent herein on 30.05.2019 and vide order dated 13.09.2019 accused was summoned by the Ld. Trial court. The moratorium was invoked vide order dated 22.08.2019 of Ld. NCLT. These facts are not disputed by the revisionist.

5. The revisionist filed the application before Ld. Trial Court, seeking to adjourn the proceedings sine die against him and the Company, in view of invocation of moratorium under Section 14 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC).

6. Ld. Trial Court, vide impugned order dated 19.11.2025, stayed the proceedings qua accused no.1 company 'M/s Indrapuram Habitat Centre Pvt. Ltd.' but declined the request of revisionist to stay the proceedings against him.

7. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present revision petition has been filed by the revisionist on the ground that the Ld. Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in M/s Digitally signed by CHARU CHARU AGGARWAL AGGARWAL Date: 2026.04.28 16:42:13 +0530 Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.3/10 Catmoss Retail Pvt. Ltd. v. Company Petition No. 36/2013 , decided on 07.02.2024. In the said judgment, it was categorically held that if cognizance is taken subsequent to the invocation of moratorium, the prosecution against the corporate debtor, its directors cannot be permitted to continue.

It is stated that in this case, the cognizance was taken by the Ld. Trial Court post invocation of moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC).

8. I have heard Ld. Counsel for complainant and perused the record.

9. Ld. Counsel for revisionist has advanced submissions on the same lines, contending that in the judgment referred to above, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has unequivocally held that proceedings against the company as well as its Directors cannot be permitted to continue if cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is taken after the invocation of moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).

9.1 It is argued that the legislative intent behind Section 14 IBC is to provide a complete shield to the corporate debtor and its management from any coercive proceedings once the moratorium is in force, so as to ensure that the resolution process is not derailed. The continuation of criminal proceedings under Section 138 NI Act, post invocation of moratorium, would directly frustrate this Digitally signed by CHARU CHARU AGGARWAL AGGARWAL Date: 2026.04.28 16:42:27 +0530 Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.4/10 objective by exposing the directors to prosecution despite the statutory suspension of all proceedings. 9.2 Counsel further submits that the Hon'ble High Court has clarified that the bar under Section 14 IBC is not confined merely to civil proceedings but extends to criminal complaints under Section 138 NI Act as well, since such proceedings are in the nature of debt recovery actions. Therefore, once the moratorium is in place, the Trial Court is divested of jurisdiction to take cognizance or to proceed further against the company or its directors. 9.3 It is argued that in the present case, cognizance was taken by the Ld. Trial Court on 13.09.2019, i.e., after the moratorium had been invoked on 22.08.2019. Therefore, in light of the binding precedent of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the proceedings against the revisionist are liable to be stayed.

10. I have considered the arguments advanced by Ld. counsel.

11. As already mentioned, vide impugned order, Ld. Trial Court has stayed the proceeding against the accused company but rejected the request of revisionist (Director of the accused company) to stay proceedings qua him.

12. The issue whether proceedings against natural person/directors under Section 138 NI Act are hit by moratorium under Section 14 IBC has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258 wherein Court held as under:- Digitally signed by CHARU CHARU AGGARWAL AGGARWAL Date: 2026.04.28 16:42:37 +0530 Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.5/10 "Proceedings under Section 138 NI Act are in the nature of "proceedings" within the meaning of Section 14 IBC. Therefore, such proceedings cannot continue against the corporate debtor during the moratorium. However, the moratorium does not extend to directors, guarantors, or other natural persons. Complaints under Section 138 NI Act can proceed against them notwithstanding the moratorium."

12.1 Similarly, in Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 660, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that natural persons cannot take shelter under Section 14 IBC to avoid criminal liability under Section 138 NI Act.

12.2 In Vishnu Mittal Vs. M/s Shakti Trading Company 2025 SCC Online SC 558, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9 has categorically observed that the cause of action to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI Act") arises only upon service of the statutory demand notice and the failure of the drawer to make payment within the stipulated period of fifteen days thereafter.

12.3 The Court further clarified that the bar under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC") operates depending on the timing of the cause of action. If the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arises after the moratorium has been invoked, initiation or continuation of such proceedings would be barred. However, if the cause of action had already accrued prior to the commencement of moratorium, the proceedings are not hit by Section 14 IBC and may validly continue. Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court has drawn a clear distinction between complaints where the statutory cause of action crystallizes before the Digitally signed by CHARU CHARU AGGARWAL AGGARWAL Date: 2026.04.28 16:42:48 +0530 Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.6/10 moratorium and those where it arises thereafter. In the former category, the proceedings are legally sustainable, whereas in the latter, they are barred by virtue of Section 14 IBC. 12.4 Recently, in Abhay Kumar Anand Kumar Bhambore & Ors. v. Ortho Relief Hospital and Research Center & Ors., SLP (Crl.) No. 19823 of 2025, decided on 16.04.2026, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the order of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court dealing with the same issue. The High Court had categorically held that the liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI Act") continues to subsist against natural persons, such as directors or signatories of the cheque, despite the initiation of insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC").

12.5 The Bombay High Court discussed in detail the following judgments on the subject:

1. P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. , (2021) 6 SCC 258
2. Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545
3. Narinder Garg & Ors. v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. , (2022) 19 SCC 623
4. Shashankbhai Jayantibhai Shah v. HDFC Bank Ltd., Criminal Appeal No. 5606 of 2024, decided on 23.04.2025
5. Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 6 SCC 781 Digitally signed by CHARU CHARU AGGARWAL AGGARWAL Date:
2026.04.28 16:43:00 +0530 Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.7/10 12.6 After considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments, the High Court, in paragraph 20 of its order, held that the scope of Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC") must be understood in light of the distinction consistently drawn by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. While the moratorium under Section 14 IBC bars proceedings against the corporate debtor once insolvency proceedings are initiated, it does not automatically extend to natural persons such as directors or signatories of cheques, who remain personally liable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI Act").

Relevant para 20 is re-produced as under

20. From the bare perusal of the above observations, it is crystal clear that the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a recovery proceeding. Once it is held by the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court (Three Judges), that the IB Code proceeding and Section 138 NI Act proceedings are altogether different, it is not open for this Court to take a different view. Some of the key features which can be culled out from those judgments are as under :
(i) Section 138 NI Act proceedings are not recovery proceedings.
(ii) The Directors of the Company remain liable under Section 138 of the NI Act, even if Company's debt is resolved under the IB Code.
(iii) A resolution plan approved under the IB Code does not automati-

cally extinguish the criminal liability of Directors under Section 138 of the NI Act.

(iv) Section 138 of the NI Act proceedings are penal in nature, aimed at maintaining the integrity of commercial transactions and not just com- pensating.

(v) The approval of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the IB Code does not automatically discharge the signatory/ Directors from the lia- bility under Section 138 of the NI Act.(vi) Section 32A protects the corporate debtor, but, not individuals responsible for Company's con- duct. Rgd.

(vii) The IB Code and the NI Act serve different purposes and do not conflict with each other.

Digitally signed by CHARU
                                                    CHARU       AGGARWAL
                                                    AGGARWAL    Date: 2026.04.28
                                                                16:43:11 +0530




Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma             Page No.8/10
       12.7         The further relevant portion of the judgment of

Hon'ble Bombay High Court, contained in paragraph 21, is reproduced as under

21. From the above discussion it is clear that it makes no difference whether the proceedings are initiated prior to initiation of IB Code pro-

ceeding or thereafter. The Supreme Court has in unequivocal terms held that natural persons cannot escape from their personal liability un- der Section 138 of the NI Act. It is further held that Section 138 pro- ceedings in relation to the signatories who are liable or covered by the two proviso to Section 32A[1], will continue in accordance with law. I am further fortified in my view by the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of Rakesh Juneja and another .vrs. M/s. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and another - 2025 NCPHHC 101360, wherein a similar view is taken while dealing with the identical factual matrix, as in the present case. The Court after taking into consideration the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishnoo Mittal [supra], has stated that the reliance on the same is misplaced in view of legal position as settled by the Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court. Eventually, the fact remains that in Ajay Kumar Goenka [supra], the Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has in unequivocal term held that the scope of nature of proceedings under the two Acts are quite differen. Further it is clarified that the nature of proceedings which have to be kept in abeyance under Section 14 of the IB Code, would not include criminal proceedings, which is the nature of proceedings under Sec- tion 138 of the NI Act.

13. In view of the judgment in Abhay Kumar Anand Kumar Bhambore (supra), it is immaterial when the cause of action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI Act") arose or when the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC") was invoked. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that natural persons, such as directors or signatories of the cheque, cannot escape their personal liability under Section 138 NI Act merely by virtue of the moratorium applicable to the corporate debtor. Hence, irrespective of date of invocation of moratorium, the proceedings u/s 138 NI Act cannot be stayed against revisionist. CHARU Digitally signed by CHARU AGGARWAL AGGARWAL Date: 2026.04.28 16:43:22 +0530 Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma Page No.9/10

14. Moreover, as per the other precedents discussed in paragraph 12 to 12.2 of this order, the proceedings against the revisionist cannot be stayed in the present case. The factual sequence demonstrates that the cheques in question were dishonoured on 29.03.2019. Pursuant thereto, a statutory demand notice dated 22.04.2019 was dispatched and duly delivered on 23.04.2019. Upon failure of payment within the stipulated period, the complaint was filed on 30.05.2019. The moratorium under Section 14 IBC was invoked only later, on 22.08.2019.

14.1 Thus, the cause of action to file the complaint under Section 138 NI Act had already crystallized much prior to the invocation of moratorium. In light of the settled legal position, the protection of moratorium does not extend to the revisionist, who remains personally liable. Accordingly, the Trial Court rightly dismissed his application seeking stay of proceedings qua him.

15. In view of above discussion, this Court finds no illegality or perversity in the order dated 19.11.2025 passed by the Ld. MM. The revision petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Copy of this order be sent to Ld. Trial Court. Revision file be consigned to record room.

                                                     Digitally signed
                                                 by CHARU
                                        CHARU    AGGARWAL
                                        AGGARWAL Date: 2026.04.28
                                                     16:43:32 +0530



      Announced in the open              (Charu Aggarwal)
      Court on 28.04.2026                ASJ-02/E-Court/Shahdara
                                         KKD Court, Delhi.


Cr. Rev. No. 85/2026 Pramod Goel Vs. Stuti Sharma            Page No.10/10