Bombay High Court
Sunder Ganpat Bekal vs Bhagirathi Sunder Bekal on 14 December, 1992
Equivalent citations: II(1993)DMC322
JUDGMENT S.W. Puranik, J.
1. The Appellant is the husband of the Respondent. The Respondent had filed an application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the month of May 1973. She had at that time claimed the maintenance for herself and her two daughters Rooprani and Vanita. In the said proceedings maintenance at the rate of Rs. 75/- p.m. was granted to the wife and maintenance at the rate of Rs. 40/- for each of the two daughters.
2. In the month of April 1986, under an application for enhancement, the Trial Court was pleased to enhance the said amount of maintenance to a sum of Rs. 250/- p.m. for the wife and Rs. 75/-p.m. to each of the two daughters.
3. On 20th November 1987, the Respondent-wife applied for further enhancement. On 2nd February 1988, the Appellant- husband also filed an application for cancellation of the maintenance awarded to the two daughters. However, his application came to be rejected on 15th March, 1988 on preliminary objection. The Appellant-husband therefore, filed another application on 22nd March 1988 for cancellation of the amount of maintenance awarded to the two daughters on the ground that they have attained majority. Soon thereafter on 30th June 1988, the Respondent-wife filed application for recovery of arrears of maintenance for the duration May 1973 till the date of the application after adjustment of payments made by the husband through Court.
4. Thus, the application dated 20th November 1987 for enhancement of the maintenance filed by wife, the application filed by the husband on 22nd March 1988 for cancellation of the maintenance awarded to the two daughters and the application dated 30th June 1988 filed by the wife for recovery of the arrears of maintenance were decided by Shri J.A. Patil, Judge of the Family Court No. 4, Bombay on 2nd May 1991. By the said common order (i) the wife's application for enhancement was granted and the enhancement awarded was raised to Rs. 500/- with effect from 2nd May 1991; (ii) the application filed by the husband for cancellation of the maintenance amount to the two daughters was also allowed and the cancellation was ordered with effect from 22nd March 1988; and (iii) the learned Judge issued distress warrant against the husband to recover the maintenance amount of Rs. 4,350/- being the maintenance amount for a period of 12 months prior to the filling of the application and he further directed the husband to clear all the dues of maintenance of Rs. 9,660/- within a period of one month failing which the husband was sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a term of six months or until payment if sooner made.
5. The husband feeling aggrieved by the said Judgment has preferred this appeal. Mrs. Pushpa Menon appears for the Appellant. She submits that she has no grievance about the maintenance being enhanced to Rs. 500/-per month nor has she any grievance about the recovery of arrears of maintenance. Her grievance centres around the issue of distress warrant against the husband for recovery of due amount of Rs. 4,350/- and for an order of sentencing the husband to suffer simple imprisonment for a term of six months in the event he does not clear ail the dues of maintenance of Rs. 9,660/- within a period of one month.
6. The Appeal was admitted on 24th June 1991 and the hearing was expedited. However, there was no stay of the impugned order. It is stated before us that all the arrears as directed by the Trial Court had been deposited by the Appellant without prejudice to the rights of the respective parties.
7. Notice of this appeal has been duly served upon the Respondent. Respondent and her Counsel are not present.
8. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the Appellant we have gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Judge of the Family Court. Paragraphs 18 to 21 of the Judgment of the Family Court deal with the impugned part of the order. In paragraph 18, the learned Judge seems to have taken into consideration the allegation of the Respondent-wife that arrears are due from May 1973 upto date except for the payments deposited by the husband in Court from time to time and to ascertain the same, he has calculated the actual payments deposited by the husband in Court and recorded the said adjustment. By the said calculation the arrears came to about Rs. 10,110/- deducting the amount paid in respect of the daughters maintenance he has arrived at the figure of Rs. 9,660/-. However, in respect of the recovery of the said amount of Rs. 9,660/- the learned Judge of the Family Court has made a serious error. He has relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Karson Ramjit v. The State of Bombay, . But in doing so he has completely lost sight of the fact that the Full Bench was dealing with the powers of Magistrate under then existing provisions of Section 488(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to Section 125(3) of the New Code of Criminal Procedure and has observed that the said provision confers upon the Magistrate two independent powers, one to issue a warrant which has to be executed in the manner laid down in the Sub-section and the other to sentence the person also in the manner laid down in the sub-section. Thus the Full Bench while holding that the two independent powers of the Magistrate one to issue warrant and one to sentence the person are both to be executed or passed respectively in the manner laid down in this Sub-section. A reading of the provisions of Section 125(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that for every breach of the order, the Court may issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Therefore, the power to sentence arises only if after the execution of the warrant, whole or any part of the each monthly allowance has remained unpaid. But the proviso to Section 125(3) of the Code further makes it clear that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this Section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due. Therefore, a warrant can be issued for recovery of the amount only for a period of 12 months from the date of which it became due and it is only if after this warrant is executed, full or part of the maintenance amount asked remains unpaid, can the Magistrate sentence the defaulter.
9. Thus, the warrant for levying of the amount due itself has to be for a period not more than 12 months immediately preceding the date of the application and only if such warrant for recovery of maximum defaulted amount of 12 months prior to the date of application, the Court may sentence a person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant.
10. In the conclusion therefore, the learned Judge of the Family Court has totally erred and passed an order directing the Appellant to deposit the entire arrears of Rs. 9,660/- for the period 1973 upto date within a period of one month failing with he has ordered the Appellant to sentence simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months. This order is thus patently erroneous and is liable to be set aside.
11. Insofar as the order of issue of distress warrant against the Appellant is concerned, even though it pertains to one year prior to the filing of the recovery application the documents pertaining to the payment of arrears such as the extract of the Ledger (Maintenance Register) maintained by the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mulund as well as the original receipts of the deposits during the pendency of the proceedings were not taken into consideration. It would be seen that during the one year prior to the date of application i.e. 12 months prior to 30th June 1988 i.e. for the period 1st July 1987 to 30th June 1988 the arrears for 8 months except for 4 months payments had been effected under Receipts and therefore, the distress warrant should not have been issued in the sum of Rs. 4,350/- as done by the learned Magistrate, Moreover, we have on record Receipt No. 1840 dated 5th July 1991 whereby the Appellant has deposited Rs. 9,660/- being the alleged defaulted arrears from 1973 upto date which would cover the said period. In the circumstances of this case therefore, there is no necessity for issuance of any distress warrant against the Appellant.
12. In the result, therefore, the Appeal succeeds the impugned Judgment of the learned Judge of the Family Court is quashed and set aside. It is however, observed that in respect of the amount deposited by the Appellant from time to time, the same will be taken into consideration and adjusted in respect of the arrears for the period in the pending recovery proceedings. There shall be no order as to costs.