Madras High Court
N.L. Adhinarayanan vs D. Krishnamoorthy on 26 October, 1990
Equivalent citations: (1991)34MLJ1
ORDER Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. The tenant within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act. In this revision petition the petitioner is the tenant and the respondent is the landlord within the meaning of the Act. The landlord sought the eviction of the tenant under Section 10(2)(l) of the Act on the ground that the tenant has not paid the rents at the rate of Rs. 105 per month from April, 1985 till July, 1985. Thus the question arose before the Controller, who heard the petition for eviction, as to whether the tenant committed wilful default in the payment of the rents for the period from April, 1985 to July, 1985. The tenant sent by a money order the rents for the period from April, 1985 to August, 1985, on 23.9.1985 and that was obviously after the filing of the petition and the landlord declined to receive the money order. The tenant would contest by stating that the landlord used to receive once in three months or four months without any demur and that there was a talk of Settlement with regard to the demand for enhanced rent made by the landlord and the rate of rent was settled at Rs. 175 per month and time was taken to reduce the settlement into a document and in the meanwhile the landlord has rushed to the Controller by filing the petition for eviction. The Controller assessed the evidence placed in the case by the parties and came to the conclusion that the tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rents and as a result ordered eviction. The tenant appealed and the Appellate Authority found no warrant to interfere with the order of the Controller and dismissed the appeal. This revision is directed against the order of the Appellate Authority.
2. Mr. S. Subbiah, learned Counsel for the tenant, would submit that both the Controller and the Appellate Authority ought to have accepted the case of the tenant and they Ought to have held that it is not a case of a wilful default committed by the tenant and learned Counsel for the tenant says that this is a case where this Court should legitimately exercise the power of revision under Section 25 of the Act. Here, find a case where both the Controller and the Appellate Authority rendered findings on facts against the tenant on the question of the tenant committing wilful default in the payment of the rents. The revisional powers of this Court are conferred by Section 25 of the Act and it is sufficient if Section 25(1) of the Act is extracted as follows, for the purpose of finding out the scope of the revisional powers of this Court.
25. Revision : (1) The High Court may, on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of sucr proceeding or the correctness, legality of propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration it may pass orders accordingly.
3. Thereare rules framed pursuant to power under Section 34 of the Act and the said rules are silent with reference to the construction of the revisional powers or their amplitude. But the section itself is self-sufficient in its language with reference to the conferment of the powers of revision on this Court. It speaks about the power of this Court to call for and examine the records of the Appellate Authority to satisfy itself (underlining by me for the purpose of supplying emphasis) as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein. Dattanpant v. Vital Rao , Untwalia, J., while dealing with the power of revision of the High Court under Section 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act (22 of 1961), observed as follows:
The findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Court were not found to be such by the High Court as to justify the exercise of its revisional power under Section 50 of the Act. It is true that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 50 is not as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, at the same time it is not wide enough to take the High Court a second court of first appeal.
4. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswami , the scope of the power of this Court under Section 25 of the Act was construed and was settled in the following terms:
Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, enables any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. Section 25 provides that the High Court may on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority call for and examine the record of appellate authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for consideration, it may pass orders accordingly'. The language of Section 25 is indeed very wide. But we must attach some significance' to the circumstance that both the expressions 'appeal' and 'revision' are employed in the statute. Quite obviously, the expression 'revision' is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression appeal. In fact it has to be noticed that under Section 25 of the High Court calls for and examines the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The desinent idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy itself under Section 25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25 of the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of theTamil Nadu Buildings (Leaseand Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untwalia, J., in Dattanpant v. Vital Rao , it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal.
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Merely hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. It must, however, he shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice. A concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bonafide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
In P.R Krishnamachari v. Lalitha Animal , what has been stated in Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswami Chettiar , has been reiterated in the following terms:
The short point raised in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact reached by the High Courts below under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the C.P.C. But this Court had occasion to define the scope and extent of the revisional power of the High Court under the said section in the case of Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar . This Court has held that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is essentially of a supervisory nature, as it may call for the records of the Courts below with a view to determine only the legality and propriety of the orders passed.
5. In Sri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N. Shanugham Chetty , a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground that there was a bona fide requirement of additional accommodation by the landlords was countenanced by the Controller, after finding the relevant factors of bona fide need and comparative hardship in their favour. On appeal by the tenant, the Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Controller and further held that the landlords were not entitled to recover possession. On further revision, this Court set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and restored the order of eviction passed by the Controller, On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was found that the Appellate Authority had applied wrong tests and had also failed to give effect to unchallenged findings of the Controller. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that the order of the Appellate Authority suffered from manifest errors in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the High Court was therefore entitled to interfere in revision. Straightway, I must say, that such is not at all the position in the present case.
6. Here is a case where there was findings on facts rendered by the two forums below on the question of the tenant committing wilful default in the payments of the rents. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswami , the expressions to satisfy itself according in Section 25 of the Act conveys only an idea of conferment on this Court a power of superintendence; and though the language of Section 25 of the Act is very wide, yet it is not wide enough to enable this Court to interfere with the findings of facts, merely because it is possible for this Court not to agree with the findings of facts rendered by the Subordinate Authority. That would be practically converting this Court into "A second Court of first appeal", which was depreciated in Dattanpant v. Vital Rao . In the instant case, the findings of facts are concurrent by the forums below. Equally, so merely because there is a possibility of saying that the question is a mixed question of fact and law it is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional powers. By assessment of the materials exposed in the case do not enable me to conclude that what the two forums did by way of rendering the findings on the question of wilful default alleged against the tenant is tainted with such unreasonableness, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Nor am I persuaded to hold that there is a manifest error committed by the two forums below on this question. It is also not a case of wrong tests being applied by the two forums below to the relevant question. Mr. S. Subbiah, learned Counsel for the tenant, complains that there was an omission to consider the explanation put forth by the tenant that on account of talks of settlement, there was a delay in paying the rents. The Appellate Authority says that this aspect was not argued at all before it. Even otherwise, this has remained totally unsubstantiated and there was no acceptable evidence over it. Under these circumstances this revision is dismissed.
7. At this stage, Mr. S. Subbish, learned Counsel for the tenant, prays that his client may be given sufficient time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlord. Taking note of this request, the tenant will have three month's time from today to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlord.