Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Ibrahim Salu Koli on 23 September, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1994)1GLR279
JUDGMENT K.J. Vaidya, J.
1. This appeal, by the State of Gujarat, is directed against the impugned judgment and order, dated 16-6-1992, rendered in Criminal Case No. 1884 of 1991, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kachchh at Bhuj, wherein the respondent-Ibrahim Salu Koli, who came to be tried for the alleged offence punishable under Section 25 (1)(b)(1-A) of the Arms Act, 1959, was at the end of trial ordered to be acquitted.
2. According to the prosecution, Mr. R.B. Odedra [P.W. 3, Exh. 10] when he was serving as P.S.I in Bhuj Taluka Police Station in February, 1991, he received an information that the respondent was in possession of firearm in his 'Bhunga' (Hut) without licence. He accordingly on 26-2-1991 obtained a search warrant (Exh. 7) from the District Magistrate, Kachchh, and on the basis of the same on 28-2-1991 in the presence of two panchas, viz., Arjan Jiva (P.W. 1, Exh. 6) and Lakhman Radha (P.W. 2, Exh. 9), after explaining them the contents of the said warrant and obtaining their signatures thereunder, raided the 'Bhunga' (Hut) of the respondent who was present in the house at village - Mokhana. This search warrant was shown to the respondent, under which his left hand thumb impression was taken in presence of the Panchas. Thereafter, on taking out search of 'Bhunga', one single muzzle loaded country-gun was recovered from the barrel' for which the respondent had neither licence nor any other explanation to offer. On the basis of this, the said country-gun was seized and the respondent came to be arrested under Panchnama Exh. 8, below which all the three, viz., two Panchas and the P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra placed their respective signatures. On the basis of these allegations, after obtaining necessary sanction (Exh. 14), a complaint was filed wherein after the investigation was over, the respondent came to be charge-sheeted for the aforesaid alleged offences to stand trial before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kachchh, at Bhuj.
3. At trial, the respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried on the alleged ground that he had been falsely implicated and that no weapon as such was recovered from him.
3.1 The trial Court after duly appreciating the prosecution evidence brought on the record, acquitted the accused mainly on the ground that the evidence of the P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra was not corroborated by two Panchas who have turned round and not supported the prosecution. It is under these circumstances that the aggrieved State of Gujarat has preferred the present acquittal appeal. It may incidentally be stated that on the basis of very same allegation, five accused in other criminal cases were tried for the very same offence and they too, on the very same stock-ground of Panchas not supporting the prosecution were acquitted, disposing of their cases by separate judgments.
4. Mr. D.K. Trivedi, the learned P.P. appearing for the appellant-State, while challenging the impugned order of acquittal has taken this Court through the relevant evidence brought on the record as well as the reasons for acquittal given by the trial Court. Mr. Trivedi submitted that there is no law which requires that before the evidence of any Police Officer is accepted, the same should necessarily be supported by some independent, witness. Mr. Trivedi further submitted that merely because in the present case the Panchas have not supported, that by itself cannot be said to be a sufficient ground to discard the evidence of P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra, which otherwise appears to be quite reliable enough to base the order of conviction and sentence. The learned P.P. further submitted that taking into consideration the cross-examination, there is not even a whisper of allegation against the Police Officer to file a false complaint against the respondent herein. In support of this contention, Mr. Trivedi has invited attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Parasram v. State of Haryana , wherein in para 12 it has been observed as under:
12. It was submitted that the evidence against the appellant did not establish that he was guilty of an offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act, namely, of having in his possession an unlicensed firearm. We have examined the evidence and found no reason to question the conclusion of the Designated Court that the appellant was so guilty. That the evidence relied upon was of two Police officials does not ipso facto give rise to doubt about its credibility. There is nothing on the record to show that these Police officials were hostile to the appellant and their evidence was not shaken in cross-examination That the private party who was called as a witness by the prosecution did not support it does not, in the circumstances, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was innocent.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Trivedi finally urged that the trial Court has committed a patent, error in mechanically discarding the evidence of P.S.I.-Odedra solely on the ground that the two Panchas have not supported the prosecution. Mr. Trivedi further submitted that the alleged offence has taken place in the Kachchh District which is adjoining to Pakistan, and if the accused allegedly involved in such serious offences arc acquitted in such a light-hearted fashion, then the heavy trafficking in arms and ammunitions through the border area would seriously undermine the national security. In this view of the matter, according to Mr. Trivedi, this is a matter wherein the acquittal appeal deseives to be allowed and the respondent be convicted and sentenced accordingly.
5. As against the above, Mr. C.H. Vora, the learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that this is not a matter wherein any interference is called for. Making good this broad contention, Mr. Vora has made following three submissions, viz,, (i) that if on the bare interested testimony of the Police Officer, the fate of the citizen is to be sealed and he is to be sent to Jail, then there would indeed be no safety for any citizen. Any one, at any point of time would be picked up at the whims and caprice of the Police for any offence, which could ultimately lead to Police Raj! (ii) That so far as conscious and intelligent possession of muddamal fire-aim as well as 'bhunga' in question are concerned, from where the same was recovered, the prosecution has not led any independent evidence on the basis of which the accused can be safely connected with the offence alleged against him, and (iii) That apart above, if the trial Court has thought it fit not to convict the accused in absence of Panchas, not supporting the prosecution case, it cannot be said that the said findings are in any way perverse, calling for any interference in an acquittal appeal, at this stage. In support of this contention, Mr. Vora has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of State of Punjab v. Gurnam Singh . Mr. Vora on the basis of the aforesaid submissions finally urged that since it cannot be said that the impugned judgment and order is in any way perverse, more particularly, when there is no independent definite evidence to connect the accused with the offence alleged, this is not a case wherein in acquittal appeal, any exception can be taken and the respondent be convicted for the alleged offence and sentenced to Jail and that too after two years!
6. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties, at the very outset, it may be stated that the trial Court has indeed taken a very narrow, superfluous, mechanical, unconcerned and totally unrealistic view of the matter while appreciating the prosecution evidence brought on the record! To say the least, the appreciation of evidence lacks total judicial pragmatism! In a given case there cannot be any dispute with the broad general proposition that before the evidence of Police Officer is accepted and relied upon, it should ordinarily be corroborated by some independent evidence but then the basic question in such cases is as to whether in each and every case, the evidence of Police Officer needs to be corroborated and that in absence of the same, the Court should feel handicapped in acting upon the same, to record the conviction? And further, if indeed some corroboration is needed to accept the evidence of Police Officer, then in that case to what extent? This is always a matter which requires little application of mind on the part of the learned Magistrate to find out from the record itself. Firstly, it is certainly not the law that in each and every case, irrespective of the facts and attending circumstances, the evidence of Police Officer needs corroboration before it is accepted to be acted upon, and secondly, the corroboration does not necessarily mean that the witness should be corroborated by other witness only! No doubt, corroboration by other witness is one of the most important mode, but there is yet another not less important mode of corroboration which is by way of some intrinsic circumstantial evidence available on the record. In fact, in a given case there may not be any other direct evidence of a witness to corroborate the evidence of the Police Officer, but at the same time, if there is nothing to reach at the conclusion that the Police Officer was malicious and interested in falsely framing up the accused and there were certain inbuilt and unimpeachable circumstantial evidence on the record to support the evidence of the Police Officer, then in such cases without examining that part of it, to mechanically discard his evidence by simply saying that the evidence is not corroborated, is a very idle and mechanical way of deciding the case. The principle of benefit of doubt to be given to the accused can certainly be not disputed, but at the same time, before the said doubt is resolved in favour of the accused, the circumstances creating doubt is a subject-matter of judicial mental process. Every learned Magistrate is required to make some honest efforts to go deep into the matter and find out the intrinsic circumstantial worth of the witness. The appreciation of evidence is not a matter of some blind jacket formula, for example, whenever Panchas do not support the Police Officer, his evidence is straightway required to be discarded giving benefit of doubt to the accused! Every criminal case has its own peculiar backgrounds and settings, by way of some direct and/or indirect circumstantial evidences, which a judicial mind should be capable enough to clearly discern and distinguish in the light of the common sense. Once judicial pragmatism is put in shelves and the Court starts mechanically to decide the cases on some blind and general dictums, it is bound to wander away and as a result, suffer with the non-application of mind as such an idle approach is nothing but the fore-runner of injustice! This is what unfortunately appears to have happened in the instant case!
7. It is indeed strange to find that the learned Magistrate has refused to accept the evidence of P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra on the alleged ground that he was an "interested" witness, and that his evidence was not corroborated by the independent Panch-witnesses. Now this ground standing by itself is too general and it is indeed as falicious as it could be, for the simple reason as to what is indeed wrong if the Police is "genuinely interested" in discharge of its duties! In fact, it is our experience, day in and day out, what hdppens when the Police ceases to take interest in discharging its duty!! The illustrations are not that far to seek, and to cite few such alleged illustrations (i) the illegal encroachments on foot-paths of the public road around the traffic point, which though is made for pedestrains is challengingly occupied by illegal encroachers, and we see that despite the provision in the Bombay Police Act, 1951, nothing is done! Similarly, the allegations of open boot-legging activities carried out in broad day-light on a public road, gambling den, etc., the complaints are not recorded for hours and number of other complaints which we often hear Police turning deaf ears to! Some of these complaints may be general and false but at the same time, the judicial wisdom warrants that each and everyone of the same cannot be discounted summarily as false. These are merely illustrations of Police not taking interest, as alleged. Thus, taking up the interest by the Police in the investigation and/or in any other discharge of duty is must and if it does not take the desired interest that prima facie amounts to nothing less than dereliction of duty. In this background, when we find that there are indeed some honest, efficient, good Police Officers who taking genuine interest, show sincerity towards their duties and investigate the case and maintain the law and order then what is wrong in it ? How their evidence could be blamed and condemned on account of alleged interestedness they can be condemned for discharging their duty rightfully by booking the offenders? This Court is of the view that Police must be honest in discharging its duty, and there is nothing wrong if it takes positive interest in it. No doubt, the evidence of that Police Officer must be discarded from consideration, who with some ulterior motive was out to falsely implicate the innocent citizen! But then, this should be made clear either from the cross-examination of that witness or from the attending circumstances of the case, or where the Court in overall totality of the facts and circumstances of the case feels it quite unsafe to act upon the evidence of such Police witness. In short, merely by affixing a label of "interested witness" to throw away evidence of the Police witness would not only be simply condemning an honest witness and doing the greatest injustice to him at his back, but the same in a way was bound to demoralize and dishearten him from discharging his duties. It is as good as--as saying goes 'give dog a bad name and hang it'! This is too harsh and unjust to any witness! Every Court must carefully avoid such general way of doing justice. The Court has to examine each and every case in the background and the strength merits of the facts of that particular case! The ex-cathedra condemnation of the Police witnesses, irrespective of the consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, would be simply unjudicial approach, which the Court doing justice should avoid. Such stock allegations against the Police as 'interested witness' cannot be mechanically accepted to discard his evidence. In this view of the matter, the learned Magistrate has committed an obvious error in discarding the evidence of P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra, against whom there is not even a whisper of allegation in the cross-examination. Neither, there is anything in attending circumstances from which it could be said that he has falsely implicated the accused with some ulterior motive! When such is the sterling worth of the evidence of P.S.I not to accept his evidence would be totally perverse.
7.1 Apart this, if at all the learned Magistrate still wanted to have some independent corroboration to the evidence of P.S.I it was not necessary for him to look far away for a support from some independent witness, as the intrinsic circumstances brought on the record clearly vouchsafe and corroborates his say. For example, (i) the offence came to be registered on the basis of some previous information that the accused was having firearm (counliy-gun) in his house, (ii) on the basis of this information P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra approached the District Magistrate and obtained a Search Warrant (Exh. 7) to carry out the raid, (iii) for this purpose, P.S.I also called upon services of Panchas and in their presence raided the "Bhunga" (Hut) of the respondent-accused, (iv) on calling the respondent-accused by name, the respondeiit himself came out, (v) and thereafser, on canying out search of the entire house, a country-gun was recovered at the instance of the accused only from the barrel, (vi) below the search warrant, signatures of the accused was obtained alongwith that Panch-witnesses, (vii) At the time of seizure also, the Panchnama (Exh. 8) was drawn, below which Panchas have placed their signatures. Under the circumstances, there appears to be no reason for the Police Officer to falsely implicate the accused in such a serious charge under the Arms Act. Mr. Odedra, P.S.I was also himself a party to take the search warrant and actual recovery of a country-gun from the Bhunga of the respondent-accused. The aforesaid material clearly projects the picture of a true case. If the aforesaid circumstances cannot be doubted which has a support of contemporaneous record by way of search warrant, taking help of Panchas and the seizure and Panchnama drawn at a particular date, time and place, merely because the Pancbas did not support P.S.I.-Mr. Odedra that by itself cannot be permitted to deflat his otherwise totally dependable evidence. Thus, in case the trial Court wanted some intrinsic corroboration, though circumstantial, the same was very much available on record, the only thing which was required was the judicial effort and eye to find out the same!
8. That takes us now to the second contention of Mr. Vora regarding factum of 'hut' in question belonging to the accused and the muddamal recovered therefrom can be said to be recovered from conscious and intelligent possession when the Panchas had clearly given a go-bye to the prosecution case. It is true that the Panchas have not supported the prosecution but merely because the Panchas do not support the case, it cannot be said that whatever has been stated in the Panchnama [Exh. 8] falls flat on the ground and gets obliterated from the record! Mr. Odedra, P.S.I who was very much a party to the Panchnama and who has also seen and heard the incident at the time of search and recovery of the country-gun and drew the Panchnama and placed his signature! Thus, he alike any other Panch was equally competent to refer to Panchnama (Exh. 8) and get it exhibited in support of what he had seen and heard earlier. One should not forget that the necessity of Panchas and Panchnama are after all a sort of a device by way of additional evidence which in a given case, whenever Court feels little doubtful about the evidence of Police Officer in some material parts, then it can be referred to and resorted to, for the purpose of necessary corroboration to satisfy the judicial conscience. In fact, in a given case, some such corroboration may be necessary when something is alleged against the Police Officer and the Court on closely scrutinising the evidence of such Police Officer feels that cloud of suspicions created by the allegation requires to be cleared before his evidence is accepted, some independent corroboration is necessary. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that once the Court finds, as this Court has found in the present case that the P.S.I - Mr. Odedra to be quite dependable, in that case, merely because Panchas do not support the prosecution that by itself cannot be permitted to obliterate the evidence of a Police Officer, giving benefit of doubt to the accused.
8.1 Further, every Court will have to bear in mind the facts and circumstances as to why Panchas sometime turn round and not support prosecution. Accordingly, taking into consideration the present day situation prevailing in the society, they cannot be wholly blamed for the same. The Panch-witness is an average and ordinary human being! He has a family to be maintained apart discharging and shouldering his own liabilities, alike others. Moreover, like any other human being, he is also quite exposed and vulnerable to the human feelings of yielding, brow-beating, threats, inducements, etc. Further, in these extreme days of ever escalating terrorism and day-by-day deteriorating law and order situation where indeed there is no safety and security to the ordinary citizen, what could happen if a witness figures as a Panch-witness and gives honest and truthful version before the Court against the accused who in a given case may be a dreaded criminal! He is always afraid of the dangers not only to his personal life, limb and property but also to his family members as well depending upon the dreaded character of the accused! Under such circumstances, to figure as a Panch-witness at the stage of Police investigation is one thing, and thereafter to give evidence before the Court is entirely a different thing. In fact, Panch-witness generally thinks twice before entering into the witness-box and if at all he enters the same, one would not be surprised if he does not support the prosecution because of the apprehended danger in case of the dreaded criminal taking revenge upon him. To give evidence against the accused who are involved in some serious offences is not a joke, as to give evidence against such anti-socials is to invite all sort of troubles; including physical assaults and other sort of harassment, if not death. If such things happen, we all know that for giving truthful evidence what protection these persons would get! Quite obviously, even the Police would be unaware if such person are suddenly attacked! If under such circumstances, the Panchas do not support and merely on that count alone, the evidence of police official is to be thrown away, the resultant effect would be that the Court would be acquitting such accused at the grave risk to the law and order situation, and the public interest involved in the matter. Under such circumstances, the judicial pragmatism warrants that if the Police Officer is otherwise found to be quite dependable, then merely because the Panchas do not support, that should not be mechanically made a ground to discard his evidence. Merely because a witness happens to be a police official, that by itself is not sufficient to stamp him out as an 'interested witness' in success of the investigation. It is only when the investigation is mala fide, with an obvious and ulterior motive to frame up an innocent citizen, then and then only, such an investigation deserves to be condemned and not relied upon. In fact, there is no such 'rule of law' nor indeed there can be any, that the evidence of Police Officer cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated by Panch-witness (es) and the Panchnama duly brought on the record. This distinguishing feature between an ordinary 'rule of prudence' and the rule of law' is clearly required to be understood by every Court.
9. Once again reverting back to the facts and the present case and bearing in mind the overall sense of judicial accountability, the learned Magistrate ought not to have been further oblivious to the fact that he was administering the criminal justice in the allegedly one of the most sensitive zone of the country, viz., Kachchh, which is not only adjoining to the hostile Pakistan, but by this time, it is an open secret that it has become the hub of smuggling, espionage and a passage for trafficking of all sorts of narcotic drugs, arms and ammunitions; including the sophisticated one, which are supplied to the terrorists for carrying on their disruptive activities disturbing not only the law and order and public order, but even the safety and security of the nation as a whole. These are the hard facts which everyone knows and the learned Magistrate who is also a member of the society cannot stand aloof and passive on top of the ivory tower, cut off from the currents that are flowing around him! This indeed is not to suggest that in all such cases which take place in the sensitive zones like Kachchh, the accused person should always be convicted mechanically without carefully scrutinizing the prosecution evidence. Remotely even, that can never be a suggestion of this Court. In fact, what this Court means and ultimately want to say is that the learned Magistrate should be alive to the grave situation of the present day and should not mechanically acquit the accused merely because apparently the Panch-witnesses do not support the prosecution. The reason why the Panchas do not support the prosecution as well as whether irrespective of hostile Panch-witnesses, there is any dependable evidence of the Police Officer or not, are the factors that should be clear before the mental eyes of the Court, before the persons accused of serious offences are acquitted! It is only when this aliveness is demonstrated, then and then only, it can be said that the real judicial approach is made to the facts of the case to reach the just decision in the matter. At the cost of repetition, it may once again be stated that the learned Magistrate is required to make sincere and honest efforts of going deep into the roots of the matter of this type to find out where lies the real truth, and it is finding of this truth only that the ultimate order should be passed; be it that of conviction or acquittal. What is important is the honest and sincere efforts and display of judicial activism and pragmatism of the concerned Magistrate to arrive at the truth. In short, what this Court feels and is most worried about is the apprehension that even the slightest black-out of any of the aforesaid judicial qualities in the learned Magistrate would indeed not only be the fore-runner of doomsday for justice, but rather inadvertently may help out the anti-national terrorists in carrying out their nefarious activities in disrupting and disturbing the National integrity and security. This should never be allowed to happen. In the matter of such duty, the learned Magistrate is by no means less responsible than the Police Officer and the soldier maintaining the law and order on the one hand and defending the border of the country on the other hand, respectively.
10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court on being satisfied that the evidence of P.S.T.-Mr. Odedra is dependable enough to be accepted, connecting the respondent with the offence with which he came to be charged beyond doubt, much less than reasonable doubt, mere failure of the Panch-witness to support him do not weaken the prosecution case slightest even Thus, the impugned order of acquittal being patently unreasonable, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside, and accordingly, the respondent shall have to be convicted and sentenced for the offence with which he was charged.
11. That takes us now to the next important question as to what should be the proper order of sentence! Now, the sentence provided for the alleged offence under Section 25(1)(b)(1-A) of the Arms Act, 1958, is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine, provided that the Court may also for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment impose sentence of a term less than one year. On asking about the sentence, Mr. C.H. Vora, the learned Advocate for-the respondent submitted that as the accused was not present before the Court, he would like to obtain fresh instructions to file a short affidavit and prayed for an adjournment. The request being reasonable, the same is granted, and accordingly, the matter is adjourned to 14-10-1993.
12. Mr. D.K. Trivedi, the learned P.P. has requested this Court to adjourn this matter for sometime as he is awaiting report from D.S.P.-Kachchh in the matter of sentence Accordingly, S.O. to 1-11-1993.
12.1 Today, Mr. Vora, the learned Advocate is present with the respondent-accused Ibrahim Salu Koli, and has submitted a short affidavit stating to the effect that: (i) the respondent was a poor labourer and the sole bread-winner for his family which consists of six members including the children, his old parents and ailing wife; (ii) that in his absence, there is no other family member to take care of his family; (iii) that he earns around Rs. 20/- by way of daily wages; (iv) that this was his first offence, i. e., neither in the past nor thereafter till today any criminal case has been registered against him, and if he is sent to Jail, his entire family will be rendered destitute and miserable; and (v) Mr. Vora orally also submitted that what was recovered from the house of the respondent was merely a country-gun and not a sophisticated weapon, and therefore, this Court should not take a serious view of the matter.
12.2 Mr. D.K. Trivedi, the learned P.P. though given an opportunity, has not controverted the above facts stated in the affidavit filed by the respondent. Instead, the learned P.P. was satisfied by producing before this Court a report received by him from the office of the District Superintendent of Police, Kachchh, wherein it has been stated that the respondent was not found to have been involved in any offence either prior to the date on which the alleged offence took place or thereafter till the hearing of this appeal. Thus, the facts stated by the respondent in his affidavit have not been disputed by the State.
13. Now, it is true that none of the above circumstances have been disputed by the State, but that does not mean that only the conviction is required to be recorded against the accused, and thereafter, he should be given an easy pass-off so far as the sentence is concerned. While imposing the sentence, depending upon the facts and circumstances of that particular case, though the Court is required to be little merciful but at the same time, such a mercy cannot be extended in the manner which ultimately blunts out the impact of conviction and the deterrent object of the penology, and at the cost of overall public interest! The circumstances highlighted above are the circumstances which to some extent can be taken into consideration, but at the same time, all of them are such which first of all the accused himself was required to bear in mind and take care of and consider before committing the crime! A person deliberately playing with fire by putting his finger in cannot be permitted to scream and cry for mercy, as he was supposed to think twice about the indiscreet act and the result thereof! Anyway, at this stage, this Court is inclined to take into consideration the aforesaid circumstances to avoid the minimum sentence prescribed under the Arms Act. The argument of Mr. Vora that what was recovered from the respondent was merely a country-gun and not the sophisticated weapon, and therefore, the same be taken into consideration for awarding token sentence, has no substance worth the name! In fact, this is hardly a ground to take a lenient view of the matter because it is not unknown that the country-gun can as well be used for the commission of serious offences like murder, dacoity, extortion, rape, etc., etc. Therefore, the mere fact that the muddamal weapon is a country-gun, that by itself does not lessen and mitigate the gravity and seriousness of the offence. However, taking into consideration the fact that except the present offence the respondent was neither previously nor subsequently involved in any such or similar offences, and that after acquittal also, two years have already elapsed and no crime is reported against the accused. This is a case where at the stage of allowing acquittal appeal, less than minimum sentence prescribed can be awarded. It may be clarified that these are the cases wherein sitting as the trial Court, this Court, perhaps, would have taken quite stricter view but at this stage, after the lapse of two years to exercise discretion of imposing minimum sentence of imprisonment appears to be little unjust and harsh. In this view of the matter, it appears that ends of justice would be fully met, if the respondent is sentenced to undergo R.I. for three months. In the matter of awarding fine, this Court feels that though the respondent is liable to be visited with quite heavy fine, but taking into consideration the undisputed poverty of the accused, it would indeed not be just and proper to order heavy fine; as the very imposition of the same may father impel the respondent either to borrow the amount or to commit some such crime, viz., robbery, theft, etc., to pay off the same. Accordingly, by chance even this Court would not like to be a party to trigger off one more offence!
14. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kachchh at Bhuj, is hereby ordered to be quashed and set aside. The respondent is accordingly convicted for the offence under Section 25(1)(b)(1-A) of the Arms Act, 1958, and is ordered to undergo sentence of R.I. for three months and pay a fine of Rs. 500/- (five hundred rupees) and in default, to undergo further R.I. for one month. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the respondent prayed for not implementing this order for ten weeks on the ground that Diwali festival is round the corner. The learned P.P. has no objection if this request is granted. Hence, the request is granted.