Delhi High Court
Syed Mushir Ahmed vs Deputy Commissioner Of Police (South ... on 27 February, 1987
Equivalent citations: 32(1987)DLT29
JUDGMENT Malik Sharief-ud-Din, J.
(1) The petitioner was given a show cause notice under Section 50 of the Delhi Police Act to show cause as to why action against him shall not be taken under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act. The notice is based on three cases; F.I.R. No. 889 of 1974 under Sections 304/506 I.P.C Police Station Kalkaji, Delhi, F.I.R. 95/1976 under Sections 506 and 457 Indian Penal Code , Police station Kalkaji and F.I.R. No. 401/78 under Sections 147, 148 149,452 and 506 Indian Penal Code . Police Station Hauz Khas New Delhi. The notice was given on 1-6-1979 by respondent No. 1.
(2) The aggrieved petitioner has challenged it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has prayed that the impugned notice be quashed. The case of the petitioner is that he is a Trade Union Leader and in that connection he is fighting for the redress of grievances of the labourers and for that reason he has been leading many demonstrations. He has further said that in this connection some police cases were registered against him but he has been acquitted. The petitioner further states that after 1978, no case has been registered against him.
(3) I have heard Sodhi Teja Singh, counsel for the respondents, in the absence of the petitioner and his counsel who failed to appear. Sodhi Teja Singh has very fairly argued the matter before me. It would be worthwhile to notice the contentions of respondent No. 1 raised in his counter affidavit The respondent has stated that the petitioner is involved in four cases registered in 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1978 respectively. It is also stated that in the first case the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to payment to fine of Rs 300.00 In the second case he is stated to have been acquitted. The remaining two cases are said to be still pending. This affidavit was filed on 18th of February 1983. No material has been filed to indicate as to what happened to the last two cases. In the counter-affidavit the respondent, however has not specifically denied the fact that the petitioner is a labour leader Instead it is suggested that the petitioner poses himself to be a labour leader and resorts to frequent demonstrations at the houses of respectable House builders. It appears from the counter-affidavit that these cases filed against the petitioner are also the outcome of such demonstration. Obviously the petitioner has faced these trials in pursuance of espousing the cause of labourers. Indeed it is not permissible for the petitioner to take the law into his own hands but he cannot be denied the right to demonstrate peacefully for vindicating the grievances of his Union. Strangely in the counter affidavit it is stated that the petitioner is harassing the House builders by putting up false claims against them instead of approaching the labour court for appropriate relief. This makes the position clear enough. Apparently there are some powerful interest groups working against the petitioner.
(4) In any case the notice says that the movements and the activities of the petitioner are causing danger and alarm to the person and property of the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of the police station Hauz Khas. It further states that the petitioner is a habitual offender involved in the commission of offences causing danger and hazard. It also conveys to the petitioner that he is a man of desperate criminal nature. Witnesses are not willing to come forward to give the evidence in public against him for reasons of their own safety.
(5) The main question that arises is whether the material on the basis of which the conclusions are drawn, could be said to be sufficient for arriving at a reasonable satisfaction that the petitioner is a habitual offender. To me, the answer appears to be in the negative. Reasonable belief must always be based on some material and it must be based on sound reason not being the outcome of the imagination. It must be the satisfaction of a normal and ordinary prudent man. Considering the background in which the cases have been registered it will be most unreasonable to say that the petitioner is a habitual offender, much less to characterize him as a desperate criminal. The notice is vague in so far as the allegations that the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against him is concerned. It is not indicated as to which of the witnesses have due to some apprehensions at the hands of the petitioner declined to tender evidence. It has not been suggested anywhere that in the four cases which were registered against the petitioner the witnesses have refused to tender evidence. This appears to have been reproduced in the notice to fulfilll the requirements of Section 47 of the Delhi police Act.
(6) Apart from what has been stated above, the notice in itself is invalid in law. Section 47 read with Sections 49 and 50 envisages a notice to be given indicating the proposed action, if externment from Delhi it has to specify the period for which it is proposed to be taken. This is otherwise necessary also as the petitioner is entitled to know as to what action is proposed to be taken. The notice simply says to show cause why he should not be externed from the Union Territory of Delhi. This is a notice which is virtually meant to throw him out of Delhi for all times to come. Under Section 49, Delhi Police Act, the externment period can in no case exceed two years from the date it is made. The notice therefore, should have specifically made mention as to the period for which the action is proposed to be taken. The notice does not specify it. In any case, apart from this ground, the most important ground on which this petition is not be allowed is that there is no demonstrable material to lead to the reasonable belief that the petitioner is a habitual offender or a desperate criminal as stated earlier. The last case was registered against him in April 1978 and we are now in 198". Ever since 1978, no case seems to has been registered against the petitioner. The material on which the satisfaction is based is now too remote in time for taking an action under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act. In that view of the matter the petitioner is allowed and the impugned notice dated 1.6.1979 is quashed. Consequently the proceedings under Sections 47/50 of Delhi Police Act pending against the petitioner are also quashed. The proceedings under Sections 47 and 50, Delhi Police Act shall stand dismissed.