Allahabad High Court
Smt. Binda Bau And Ors. vs Board Of Revenue And Ors. on 25 August, 2006
Equivalent citations: AIR2007ALL10, 2007(1)AWC816, AIR 2007 ALLAHABAD 10, 2006 (6) ALL LJ DOC 273, 2006 (6) ALL LJ 273, 2007 A I H C 21, (2006) 63 ALL LR 126, (2006) 108 FACLR 533, (2006) 101 REVDEC 618, (2007) 1 ALL WC 816
Author: Ashok Bhushan
Bench: Ashok Bhushan
ORDER Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri B.N. Agrawal learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri S.K. Misra and Sri D.N. Gupta learned Counsel appearing for the respondents.
2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders dated 24.8.1984 passed by the Board of Revenue in Second Appeal No. 18(z) of 1976-77 and the order dated 29.7.1976 passed by the Additional Commissioner and the order dated 4.3.1976 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. A mandamus has also been sought directing the Board of Revenue to hear the appeal after giving opportunity to the counsel for the petitioner.
3. Brief facts necessary for deciding the writ petition are:
A suit under Section 220-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 was filed by the respondent No. 6-Deep Chandra praying for declaration with regard to Plot No. 304 area 4.60 acres on basis of adverse possession. The suit was decreed by the trial Court by its judgment dated 4.3.1976. A first appeal was filed before the Additional Commissioner by the defendant which appeal was dismissed by the first appellate Court on 29.7.1976. A second appeal was filed against the order of the Additional Commissioner by Chittu. The second appeal has been dismissed by the judgment dated 24.8.1984 on merits by the Board of Revenue against which order the present writ petition has been filed.
4. The case of the petitioner in the writ petition is that the appeal came for hearing before the Board of Revenue on 24.8.1984 on which date the counsel for the appellant-Chittu moved an application for adjournment on which a date was given which was noted by his counsel, thereafter the Presiding Officer rejected the adjournment application after hearing the counsel for the respondents. This Court on the first date of hearing of the writ petition on 24.9.1984 granted time to learned Counsel for the petitioner to furnish certified copy of the order sheet indicating that the case was adjourned to 24.9.1984. However, no copy of the order sheet has been filed by the petitioner. The respondents' case in the counter-affidavit is that the appeal was listed for hearing on 21.3.1984 and thereafter adjourned to several dates. The appeal was taken up on 22.8.1984 before the Board of Revenue for hearing on which date the counsel for the appellant sought adjournment which was opposed. However, on the prayer of the counsel for the appellant the case was adjourned for 24.8.1984 for heating on which date an application on false ground for adjournment that Raja Ram has died, was given by appellant's counsel praying for time to take steps. The objection was filed by the respondents to the said application that Raja Ram is not dead and the application has been made on false ground. The Board of Revenue rejected the application of adjournment and decided the appeal on merits. The above averments have been made in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit which has remained uncontroverted since the writ petitioner chose not to file rejoinder-affidavit despite time granted by the Court twice. It is stated in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit that the appellant appeared before the member of the Board of Revenue and the member of the Board of Revenue had given time to bring his counsel but in spite of giving opportunity he did not turn up for pressing arguments on merits. It has been further submitted in paragraph 10 that the appellant-petitioner was throughout present when the arguments were heard in the appeal.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition submitted that the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to proceed to decide the appeal on merits on 24.8.1984 after rejecting the adjournment application of the counsel for the appellant. He submitted that the Board of Revenue could at best have dismissed the appeal in default of the appellant and could not have proceeded to decide it on merits. Reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioner on provisions of Order XLI, Rule 7(1) and a judgment of the Apex Court Abdur Rahman v. Athifa Begum.
6. Learned Counsel for the respondents refuting the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Board of Revenue had rightly proceeded to decide the appeal on merits after rejecting the adjournment application of the appellant-petitioner which was filed on false ground. Reliance has been placed by counsel for the respondents on Full Bench judgment of this Court M.S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal.
7. I have considered the submissions and perused the record.
8. The submission of the petitioner's-counsel to be considered is as to whether the Board of Revenue committed error in deciding the appeal on merits after rejecting the application for adjournment filed by appellant-petitioner. Before proceeding to consider the submission it is relevant, to note the relevant facts pertaining to the filing of the application by the appellant-petitioner's-counsel and the rejection of the same by the Board of Revenue. In paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit it has specifically been pleaded by the respondents that the appeal was fixed for hearing on several dates and on 22.8.1984 the adjournment prayed by the counsel for the appellant-petitioner was resisted by the counsel for the respondents and the Court fixed 24.8.1984 for hearing with the stipulation that the appeal will be heard on that date. The application which was filed by the appellant-petitioner on the said date has been brought on record as Annexure C.A. II. The appellant's-counsel in the said application has stated that Pairokar of the appellant-petitioner informed that Raja Ram and Raghubir Singh had died and their date of death with heirs have to be ascertained for filing substitution application hence a month's time be granted for taking steps. The application was immediately objected by the respondents' counsel by filing written objection. In the said objection it has been specifically stated that on 26.8.1984 the appeal was adjourned with detailed instructions to both the parties that the appeal be heard on 24.801984. It was further stated that Raja Ram had not died and the application has been moved on false ground to seek adjournment of the case. The Board of Revenue rejected the application of the appellant-petitioner and proceeded to decide the appeal on merits. Order XLI, Rule 17 which has been relied by the appellant-petitioner's counsel is as follows:
ORDER XLI Rule 17 Dismissal of appeal for appellant's default. 1) Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed.
(Explanation : Nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on the merits.) (2) Hearing appeal ex parte. Where the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear, the appeal shall be heard ex parte.
9. Much emphasis has been given on the Explanation to Rule 17(1) that nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on merits. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 is to the effect that where on the date fixed the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court could not dismiss the appeal. The explanation makes ft clear that in absence of the appellant the appeal cannot be dismissed on merits. The Apex Court judgment relied by the counsel for the petitioner also lays down the same proposition that in absence of the counsel for the appellant the appeal cannot be dismissed on merits, but the facts of the present case are otherwise and do not call for applicability of the Order XLI, Rule 17. In the present case from the materials on record it is clear that the appellant's-counsel moved an application for adjournment and the appellant was also present in person when the case was called. 24th August, 1984 was adjourned date with instructions to both the parties to get the appeal argued on merits on 24.8.1984. The Court did not commit any error in rejecting the application and proceeding to decide the appeal on merits. Full Bench judgment of this Court in M.S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal 1976 All LJ 379 (supra) had an occasion to examine the question that when the counsel moved an application for adjournment whether the appellant can be said to be present and Court can proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. to decide the case on merits. The Full Bench has answered the question holding that the Court can decide the case on merits. The explanation added to Order 17, Rule 2, C.P.C. (By High Court amendment) has been noted by the Full Bench. Following was held in paragraphs 70, 72 and 75.
70. In Civil Revision No. 356 of 1970 the question of law referred to the Full Bench is "Whether an application moved for adjournment of a case is an application contemplated by and within the meaning of the Explanation added by this Court to Order XVII, Rule 2, C.P.C."
72. As far as I have been able to see there has never been, since the Explanation came, any controversy that an application for adjournment is within its ambit. In Gopal Singh v. Kailash Gir AIR 1933 All 652 a Division Bench held-
Various rulings have been shown to us : Ram Charan Lal v. Raghubir Singh AIR 1923 All 551; Baldeo Singh v. Chhaju Singh AIR 1931 All 703 (2) and Man Mohan Das v. Krishan Kant Singh AIR 1933 All 41 in each of these cases there was an appearance by a pleader on behalf of the party and the making of an application for adjournment by that pleader. Under the Explanation which has been added by this Court to Rule 2, Order 17, that appearance for a limited purpose is appearance on behalf of the party and, therefore, under that rule the party is represented in Court by that pleaded not only for the limited purpose but for the purpose of the case and, therefore, the party cannot claim to have been absent on that date.
This view was affirmed in Mst. Jaggo v. Kanhaiya Lal (supra)
75. The consistent opinion in this Court is that anapplication for adjournment is within the purview of the Explanation to Rule 2 of Order 17. The question of law referred in : Civil Revision No. 356 of 1970 is accordingly answered in the affirmative.
10. The judgment of the Apex Court in , State of J. & K. v. Enquiry Officer also fully supports the submission of counsel for the respondents. In the case before the Apex Court the request for adjournment by the appellant's-counsel was refused by the High Court and the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Apex Court held that after rejecting the adjournment application it was necessary for the High Court to hear the appeal and to come to the conclusion on its merits. Following was held in paragraphs 3 and 5 by the Apex Court.
3. The order under appeal was passed in an appeal (CIA No. 40 of 1995) by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. The order states some facts, records the submission on behalf of the second respondent that the appeal was not maintainable, and proceeds thus:
The records of this appeal state that appellant's-counsel has been taking adjournments and according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, only to delay the grant of relief to respondent 2.
Considering the overall circumstances and that respondent 2 had been struggling for compensation for the last more than five years of his property which was admittedly taken over by the security forces and the tactics adopted by the appellant, a request for adjournment sought by the Government Advocate, Mr. Geelani, is rejected and this appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution.
5. The appeal was dismissed for this reason: "...a request for adjournment sought by the Government Advocate, Mr. Geelani, is rejected and this appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution." That the High Court was right in declining the adjournment is not in dispute, but it was then necessary for it to hear the appeal and come to a conclusion on its merits. If for any reason the appellant's-advocate declined to argue the appeal, that is what the High Court should have recorded and should then have dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-prosecution. There was no justification for dismissing the appeal only on the ground that the appellant's application for adjournment had been rejected.
11. From the materials brought on record it is held that the appeal was fixed for hearing with the instruction to counsel for both the parties to argue the matter on merits. The hearing of the appeal was adjourned from several dates earlier. The counsel appeared and moved an application for adjournment which was rejected by a separate order passed on the order sheet, as has been mentioned in paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Board of Revenue. In the facts of the present case it cannot be said that the appellant was not present when the appeal was called for hearing. Order XLI, Rule 17, C.P.C. is not attracted in the facts of the present case. The order rejecting the adjournment application of the appellant has neither been brought on the record by the writ petitioner nor it has been shown that the Board of Revenue erred in rejecting the adjournment application.
12. In view of the foregoing discussions it is found that the Board of Revenue did not commit any error in proceeding to decide the appeal on merit after rejecting the adjournment application filed by the appellant.
13. Apart from the only submission as noted above, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner did not address any argument on the merits of the case.
14. There is no merit in the writ petition which is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.