Supreme Court of India
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd vs Yashwant Gajanan Joshi And Ors on 5 December, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 933, 1990 SCR SUPL. (3) 434, AIR 1991 SUPREME COURT 933, 1991 AIR SCW 208, 1991 (1) UJ (SC) 259, 1991 (2) SCC(SUPP) 592, 1991 UJ(SC) 1 259, 1991 SCC (SUPP) 2 592, (1991) 1 COMLJ 382, (1991) 1 JT 38 (SC)
PETITIONER:
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
YASHWANT GAJANAN JOSHI AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT05/12/1990
BENCH:
RANGNATHAN, S.
BENCH:
RANGNATHAN, S.
KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 933 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 434
1991 SCC Supl. (2) 592 JT 1991 (1) 38
1990 SCALE (2)1208
ACT:
Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of
User In Land) Act, 1962--Sections 2(a), 7 to 10--'Competent
Authority' employee of contesting parties--Whether fit for
appointment--Whether violative of principles of natural
justice.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant corporation took steps under the Petroleum
and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User in land)
Act, 1962 for laying down pipelines for a project called the
Bombay--Pune Pipeline Project. One Mrs. A.R. Gadre, Special
Land Officer in the office of Competent Authority was ap-
pointed as competent authority by the Government of India.
One of the duties of the Competent Authority was to deter-
mine the compensation which would be payable to those whose
proprietary rights were affected by laying down of pipes by
the Corporation.
The respondent who was claiming compensation filed a
petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Consti-
tution challenging the appointment of Mrs. Gadre as compe-
tent authority on the ground that the principles of natural
justice required a feeling in both the parties that justice
would be done as between them. The High Court allowed the
writ petition and directed the Union of India to appoint
another competent authority who shall not be an employee of
the corporation.
Two special leave petitions were flied against the
judgment of the High Court, one by the Corporation and the
other by the Union of India.
Before this Court it was contended that the special
leave petition filed by the Union of India was barred by
limitation, and that the special leave petition flied by the
Corporation was not maintainable,stood dismissed, because
Union of India alone was the interested party.
On merits it was contended that (i) there was no question of
the
435
violation of any principle of natural justice nor there was
any question. of bias in case any employee of the corpora-
tion was appointed as competent authority under the Act;
(ii) that there was no personal interest of the Competent
Authority in the subject matter of the litigation, namely in
the determination of compensation, and as such the principle
that no person could be a judge in his own cause was not
applicable in the present case; (iii) determination of
compensation by the Competent Authority in the first in-
stance was purely an administrative act by which the rights
of the parties were not determined by the competent authori-
ty; and (iv) the provisions in this Act were analogous to
those under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which case the
amount of compensation payable by the Government was, in the
first instance, determined by the Officer of the Government
itself.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that (i)
the determination of compensation by the competent authority
was a quasijudicial act and not an administrative act; (ii)
the persons or authorities appointed under various other
Acts were appointed by virtue of their holding some office
or post and their orders were appealable to the higher
authorities; (iii) where a discretion was given to the
Central Government for appointing the competent authority,
then such discretion should not be exercised by appointing a
person or authority who may be in the employment of the
body or authority for whose benefit the pipelines were laid;
(iv) while determining the question of bias the test was not
whether in fact bias had affected the judgment but the test
always was and must be whether a litigant could reasonably
apprehend that a bias might operate against him in the
decision of the subject matter of the dispute.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: (1) In view of the fact that the High Court had
removed Mrs. Gadre from acting as competent authority on the
ground that she was an employee of the corporation and
further given direction that any suitable person be appoint-
ed as competent authority but not an employee of the corpo-
ration, there was an independent cause of grievance to the
corporation, and therefore the special leave petition could
be filed by the corporation. [438D]
(2) No one shah be a judge in his own cause only means
that he should not have personal interest in the cause he
has to adjudicate. [441F]
(3) There is no provision in the Act prohibiting the Central
436
Government to make an appointment of an employee of the
Corporation as competent authority. [444G]
(4) The scheme of the Act shows that a competent author-
ity has to discharge various and diverse duties under the
Act. Such person becomes a better qualified and experienced
person equipped with a proper background to decide the
amount of compensation also. [444H-445B]
(5) A party is entitled to raise the ground of bias
against the appointment of an individual officer as compe-
tent authority on sufficient material placed on record in
this regard, but not merely because such competent authority
was an employee of the Corporation. [445F]
(6) It would be too broad a proposition to extend the
theory of bias to exclude a person only because such a
person draws salary from the bodies like a public corpora-
tion, State Government or Central Government. It would
altogether be a different matter if it was a case of a
private employer and his employees. [445G-H]
Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon and Ors.,
[1968] 3 All England Reports 304; G. Sarana v. University of
Lucknow & Ors., [1977] 1 SCR 64; International Airports
Authority of India v. K.D. & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 360, distin-
guished.
(7) In this case, compensation was decided by the Addi-
tional District Judge in favour of the respondent. Mrs. A.R.
Gadre in her own name flied a writ petition challenging the
legality of the award passed by the Additional District
Judge.
(8) Taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of
the case, the respondent was right in contending that Mrs.
A.R. Gadre may have bias while determining the amount of
compensation as she herself is a litigating party in this
very matter in the High Court against the respondent. An
apprehension thus in the mind of the respondent is well
rounded and on this ground there is no justification to
interfere with the order of the High Court holding that the
appointment of Mrs. Gadre was not valid. However, it does
not mean an agreement with the general proposition of the
High Court that an officer of the corporation cannot be
appointed as a 'competent authority' because he may be
biased in favour of the corporation by reason of his employ-
ment. [446C, E-G]
JUDGMENT:
