Karnataka High Court
Smt. Geetha Chavan vs Karnataka Power Corporation Limited on 12 December, 2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
R
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2024
BEFORE
HON'BLE JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
W.P.NO.202497 OF 2024 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
SMT. GEETHA CHAVAN
W/O PRASHANT SHIMPI,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
WORKING AS JUNIOR TRAINING OFFICER,
GOVERNMENT I.T.I COLLEGE, DHULKHED,
BIJAPUR-586207, RESIDING AT WARD
NO.2, KULKARNI OONI, CHADCHAN,
BIJAPUR-586205.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI RAVI B. PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. KARNATAKA POWER CORPORATION LIMITED
A GOVERNMENT OF INDIA UNDERTAKING,
REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
NO.82, SHKTI BHAVAN, RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. THE DIRECTOR (HR)
KARNATAKA POWER CORPORATION LIMITED
NO.82, SHAKTI BHAVAN, RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2
3. THE GENERAL MANAGER (HRD)
KARNATAKA POWER CORPORATION LIMITED,
NO.82, SHAKTI BHAVAN, RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
4. KARNATAKA EXAMINATION AUTHORITY
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
SAMPIGE ROAD, 18TH CROSS, MALLESHWARAM,
BANGALORE-560 003.
....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VENKATESH C. MALLABADI, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI BASAVARAJ R. MATH, ADVOCATE FOR R4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO, CALL FOR THE RECORDS
FROM THE RESPONDENTS II) ISSUE A WRIT OR ORDER QUASHING
THE IMPUGNED ENDORSEMENTS ISSUED ON THE DOCUMENT
VERIFICATION FORMS OF THE PETITIONER FOR THE POST OF
ASSISTANT ENGINEER (MECHANICAL) AND JUNIOR ENGINEER
(MECHANICAL) BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT (ANNEXURE-Q AND Q1
RESPECTIVELY) AND CONSEQUENTLY DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS
TO CONSIDER THE CANDIDATURE OF THE PETITIONER FOR
RECRUITMENT TO THE POST OF ASSISTANT ENGINEER
(MECHANICAL) AND JUNIOR ENGINEER (MECHANICAL) PURSUANT
TO THE NOTIFICATION DATED 03-08-2017 (ANNEXURE-B)
NOTWITHSTANDING HER RESULT IN THE KANNADA LANGUAGE
TEST CONDUCTED BY THE KARNATAKA EXAMINATIONS
AUTHORITY, IF SHE IS OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE, TO MEET THE ENDS
OF JUSTICE ETC.,
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THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDER ON 04.12.2024, THIS DAY ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED
THEREIN, AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
C.A.V. ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
In the captioned petition, petitioner presently
working as a Junior Training Officer at Government ITI
College, Dhulkhed, Vijayapur District is aggrieved by the
endorsement issued by respondent No.3 in rejecting
petitioner's candidature to the post of Junior Engineer
(Mechanical) and Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) under
both HK quota and non-HK quota.
2. Facts leading to the case are as under:
Respondent No.1 - Corporation issued a notification
calling for applications for recruitment of various posts.
In response to the recruitment notification, petitioner
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submitted her application to the post of Junior Engineer
(Mechanical) as well as Assistant Engineer (Mechanical)
under HK quota and non-HK quota. Pursuant to the
scrutiny made by respondent No.2, petitioner was found
eligible to take up written examination and participate in
recruitment process. Petitioner was issued with
admission ticket for written examination, which was
scheduled on 21.01.2018. Petitioner appeared in the
examination.
3. The petitioner was required to take a Kannada
language test as part of the selection process, and she
duly appeared for the same on January 28, 2018. In this
test, the petitioner secured an impressive score of 71
marks. However, respondent No.2 later issued a
corrigendum on June 23, 2018, notifying all candidates
that the written test conducted on January 21, 2018, was
cancelled. During the intervening period, the petitioner
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secured an appointment as a Junior Training Officer in an
ITI college. After a lapse of nearly five years, respondent
No.2 wrote a letter to respondent No.4, instructing them
to take responsibility for conducting a re-examination of
all technical papers as well as the Kannada language test.
In compliance with these directions, respondent No.4
issued a fresh notification for re-examinations.
4. Subsequently, the petitioner appeared for the
re-examinations held on February 18 and February 19,
2024. In the Kannada language test conducted as part of
the re-examination process, the petitioner scored 36
marks out of 150. This marked a significant deviation
from her earlier performance in the Kannada test.
5. Though a final score list was eventually
published, it did not explicitly indicate whether the
petitioner had passed or failed the Kannada language
test. Respondent No.2 issued a notification for document
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verification, publishing a checklist along with an
additional list of candidates eligible to appear for
document verification, which was scheduled for August
21, 2024. The petitioner's name appeared in the
additional list at Serial No.280, leading her to believe she
was eligible for further consideration.
6. On the scheduled date, the petitioner appeared
for document verification. However, respondent No.3,
during the verification process, endorsed that the
petitioner had failed the Kannada language test and, as a
result, her candidature could not be processed further.
This determination came despite the fact that the cut-off
marks for the written examination for each category of
post were only published on August 21, 2024, the same
day as the document verification process.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned
endorsement issued during the document verification, the
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petitioner has filed the present petition, challenging the
rejection of her candidature. The petitioner contends
that the process and basis for disqualifying her on the
ground of failing the Kannada language test were
arbitrary and lacking transparency, particularly given the
delay in publishing the cut-off marks.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, while reiterating the grounds raised in the
petition, has vehemently argued and contended that
neither the cadre or recruitment rules, as evidenced in
Annexure-B, nor the recruitment notification issued by
respondent No.1, prescribe any minimum qualifying
marks to be obtained in the Kannada language test. He
asserts that the petitioner's performance in the Kannada
language test should not be subjected to an unnotified
benchmark, as the introduction of such a requirement
after the examination has concluded amounts to a
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fundamental alteration of the selection process. This, he
argues, is akin to "changing the rules of the game after
the game has been played," a principle consistently
disapproved by the Courts.
9. The learned counsel further submits that the
alleged prescription of 50 marks as the minimum
qualifying criterion for the Kannada language test was
neither notified to the candidates nor placed on record
before this Hon'ble Court. The absence of prior
notification regarding such a qualifying threshold renders
the subsequent application of this criterion arbitrary and
unjust. He contends that this ad hoc fixation of cut-off
marks for the Kannada language test directly contravenes
the principles established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of K.Manjusree vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh and Another1.
1
(2008) 3 SCC 512
9
10. Drawing attention to the judgment rendered by
the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan
High Court and Others2, the learned counsel argues
that the fixation of eligibility criteria for the Kannada
language test after the examination process has
commenced or concluded is impermissible and contrary
to law. He emphasizes that the Hon'ble Apex Court
in K.Manjusree (supra) has unequivocally held that
introducing new qualifying criteria mid-process violates
the principles of transparency and fairness. The
Constitutional Bench, while deliberating on the principles
laid down in K.Manjusree (supra), affirmed its validity as
a binding precedent and clarified its applicability in
subsequent cases.
11. Additionally, the learned counsel refers to the
judgment in The State of Haryana vs. Subash
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2024 INSC 847
10
Chander Marwaha and Others3, arguing that the
principles established in K. Manjusree (supra) remain
distinguishable and have not been overruled. Instead,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the principle that
recruitment processes must adhere to pre-notified rules,
and any deviation post facto undermines the integrity of
the selection process. On this basis, the learned counsel
submits that the prescription of minimum qualifying
marks for the Kannada language test, introduced without
prior notification or transparency, is legally unsustainable
and warrants judicial intervention to protect the
petitioner's rights.
12. Placing reliance on paragraph No.5 of the
Constitutional Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak and
Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others (supra), the
learned counsel for the petitioner has forcefully argued
and contended that the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly
3
(1974) 3 SCC 220
11
delineated two broad categories of power exercisable by
recruitment authorities in the context of fixing eligibility
criteria among candidates.
13. The learned counsel emphasized these two
categories and pointed out that the Hon'ble Apex Court,
while examining the recruitment authority's power, has
consistently upheld that any deviation or alteration of the
eligibility criteria or selection procedure must be
transparent, pre-notified, and within the bounds of
fairness.
14. Referring to these two categories, the learned
counsel contended that the impugned endorsement
rejecting the petitioner's candidature falls under the first
category, which relates to the essential qualifications for
employment. He argued that, in the present case,
passing the Kannada language test is a fundamental
eligibility criterion for selection. According to the learned
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counsel, any candidate who has not studied Kannada at
the SSLC level and fails to pass the Kannada language
test conducted as part of the recruitment process is
automatically disqualified and cannot be included in the
selection list. Thus, the petitioner's failure to meet this
essential qualification, as claimed by the respondents,
has been improperly categorized as a procedural
shortlisting measure.
15. The learned counsel further distinguished this
from the second category mentioned in the judgment,
which pertains to the procedural aspects of selection,
such as the shortlisting of eligible candidates. To
illustrate this distinction, he referred to the judgment
in State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha
(supra), where the recruitment authority followed a
shortlisting procedure. In that case, the recruitment
notification stipulated that candidates who secured a
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minimum of 45 marks would be eligible for consideration
and placed in the selection list. However, the recruitment
authority subsequently applied a higher benchmark of
55% marks as a criterion to further shortlist candidates.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld this procedure,
recognizing it as falling within the second category
defined in Tej Prakash (supra), as it pertained to the
manner of selection rather than the fundamental
eligibility criteria.
16. The learned counsel argued that the procedure
followed in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) aligns with
the latter part of paragraph No.5 of Tej Prakash
(supra) judgment, which relates to procedural shortlisting
and does not equate to altering fundamental eligibility
criteria. In the present case, however, the respondents
have erroneously applied the Kannada language
qualification an essential eligibility criterion as though it
14
were a procedural shortlisting measure, thereby violating
the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
17. Learned counsel concluded by emphasizing that
the petitioner's disqualification on the ground of failing
the Kannada language test, without proper prior
notification of the required qualifying marks or adherence
to the prescribed eligibility rules, is contrary to the
principles of fairness and transparency as laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court.
18. However, he would point out that the
impugned endorsement, which is the subject matter of
captioned petition squarely falls within the former part
where authority having conducted exams, cannot fix a
eligibility criteria. Therefore, citing K.Manjusree (supra)
judgment, he would contend that eligibility criteria was
altered thereby fixing minimum qualifying marks as 50,
15
which was never notified before recruitment process
commenced.
19. In distinguishing the principles laid down in K.
Manjusree (supra) and Subash Chander Marwaha
(supra), the learned counsel for the petitioner has further
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Arunachal Pradesh Public Service
Commission and Another vs. Tage Habung and
Others4. In this case, the Court dealt with a situation
where a minimum cut-off mark of 40 was initially fixed as
the qualifying mark for the English language test in the
Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission's
examination on June 13, 2007. However, by an official
memorandum dated January 7, 2008, this threshold was
reduced to 33% in each subject of the written
examination, with an overall aggregate of 45% marks
being required to be eligible for the viva voce.
4
AIR 2013 SC 1601
16
20. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while referring to
Rules 11 and 12 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service
Combined Competitive Examination Rules, 2001,
observed that the Commission had reserved the right to
determine the minimum marks required for candidates to
qualify in the written examination at any stage. The Court
acknowledged that this right was specifically vested in
the Commission under the relevant rules, and thus, the
modification in the cut-off marks, although made post-
examination, was within the authority of the Commission
due to the rules granting them such discretion.
21. Drawing a parallel to the present case, the
learned counsel pointed out that the respondents in the
current matter have not reserved such a right, nor have
they included any such provision in the recruitment rules
or the notification issued for the examination. Unlike the
Arunachal Pradesh case, where the Commission explicitly
17
retained the power to set and alter the minimum
qualifying marks, the respondents in this case have not
demonstrated such authority, and therefore, respondent
No.4 could not have unilaterally declared the petitioner
ineligible based on a post hoc prescription of minimum
qualifying marks for the Kannada language test.
22. In light of this distinction, the learned counsel
argues that the endorsement issued by respondent No.4,
declaring the petitioner ineligible due to a 50-mark
threshold in the Kannada language test, is fundamentally
flawed. The fixation of this threshold was not pre-notified,
nor was it backed by any specific eligibility criteria set
forth in the recruitment rules or the notification. Thus,
the endorsement is inconsistent with the principles laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.Manjusree
(supra), where it was emphasized that any change in
eligibility criteria after the examination process has begun
18
or concluded would violate the principles of fairness and
transparency.
23. Furthermore, the learned counsel reiterates
that the impugned endorsement, which imposes a 50-
mark minimum qualifying criterion for the Kannada
language test, falls under the formal part of the first
category as discussed in Tej Prakash (supra), which
pertains to essential eligibility criteria, rather than the
procedural aspect of shortlisting candidates. Given that
such a formal eligibility requirement was not notified or
pre-determined, the endorsement is legally
unsustainable. The learned counsel, therefore, concludes
that the endorsement should be quashed as it
contravenes the established principles of law and
fairness, as articulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
both K. Manjusree (supra) and Tej Prakash (supra).
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24. On the other hand, the learned counsel
appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 has justified the
respondents' action in prescribing 150 marks as the
maximum marks for the Kannada language test, despite
the provisions of the Karnataka Power Corporation
Limited Service (Cadre, Recruitment, Probation,
Promotion and Seniority) Rules, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as "C & R Rules of KPCL"). The learned
counsel contends that the C & R Rules of KPCL, while
governing the service conditions and recruitment
processes of KPCL employees, do not have the force of
statutory law. Rather, they are of a contractual nature,
essentially forming an agreement between KPCL and its
employees. As such, the learned counsel argues that the
C & R Rules must be understood as a set of internal
guidelines designed to govern employment relations, and
their interpretation should not be subject to the same
rigidity as that of statutory provisions.
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25. Specifically, the learned counsel emphasizes
that Rule 4.5 of the C & R Rules, which may traditionally
set out certain criteria for recruitment, should not be
viewed as a provision that limits or rigidly governs the
discretion of KPCL. Instead, it is argued that KPCL has
the authority to modify or adapt its own internal
recruitment process as long as such modifications serve
the larger goal of administrative efficiency. The counsel
contends that the decision to prescribe 150 marks as the
maximum marks for the Kannada language test falls well
within the discretion of KPCL, and such a change was
permissible under the broader powers granted to the
corporation.
26. Furthermore, the learned counsel points out
that the petitioner was clearly notified in advance that
the Kannada language test would be conducted for a total
of 150 marks. Given that the petitioner participated in
21
the examination with full awareness of this prescribed
maximum, it is argued that the petitioner cannot now be
allowed to raise any grievance regarding the number of
marks allocated for the Kannada language test. The
learned counsel submits that since the marks were clearly
communicated in the official notification and the
petitioner chose to appear for the examination without
objection, the action of prescribing 150 marks for the
Kannada language test cannot be considered arbitrary or
unreasonable.
27. In light of these arguments, the learned
counsel asserts that the action of the respondents in
setting the maximum marks at 150 is consistent with the
flexibility afforded by the C & R Rules of KPCL, and there
is no basis for the petitioner's complaint in this regard.
The respondent further contends that the petitioner,
having participated in the examination under the
22
prescribed conditions, must be deemed to have accepted
the framework established by the respondents for the
recruitment process. Therefore, the challenge to the
prescription of 150 marks is without merit and should not
be entertained by the Court.
28. The second and substantial issue raised in the
captioned petition pertains to the prescription of
minimum qualifying marks. The respondent has argued
forcefully and contended that the rejection of the
petitioner's candidature by respondent No.4, on the
ground that the petitioner failed to secure the minimum
qualifying marks of 50, falls squarely within the latter
category as delineated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Tej Prakash (supra). Therefore, the
respondent urges that an inference must be drawn to
uphold the discretion exercised by the recruitment
authority in prescribing 50 marks as the threshold for
23
qualification and in rejecting the petitioner's candidature
accordingly.
29. The respondent asserts that the decision to
prescribe 50 marks as the minimum qualifying criteria
does not contravene any established legal principle or
statutory provision. It is argued that this decision is well
within the domain of discretion granted to the
recruitment authority, which is empowered to determine
the method, manner, and criteria for selecting candidates
from among those who meet the eligibility requirements.
By applying 50 marks as the qualifying benchmark, the
authority has merely exercised its prerogative to ensure a
fair and competitive selection process, and such a
determination cannot be construed as arbitrary or
capricious.
30. Furthermore, the respondent would emphasize
that the issue raised by the petitioner aligns with the
24
second category referenced in Tej Prakash (supra),
wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has recognized the
authority's discretion to set qualifying standards in
recruitment processes. The respondent maintains that
such discretion is an integral aspect of the authority's role
and is subject only to the condition that it does not
violate the principles of natural justice or established
legal norms. In the present case, there is no evidence to
suggest any deviation from these principles.
31. Accordingly, the respondent argues that the
rejection of the petitioner's candidature is fully justified
and does not warrant any interference by this Hon'ble
Court. The prescribed qualifying marks of 50 are a
legitimate exercise of the authority's discretion, and the
issue raised in the captioned petition does not disclose
any illegality or irregularity that would necessitate judicial
intervention.
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32. While addressing the petitioner's reliance on
the judgment in K.Manjusree (supra), the respondent
would argue that the basis of the judgment in K.
Manjusree (supra) is entirely distinct and, therefore,
inapplicable to the present case. He would contend that
the facts and circumstances in K.Manjusree
(supra) pertained to a situation where the recruitment
authority fundamentally altered the selection criteria mid-
process, thereby rendering the case incomparable to the
one at hand.
33. Specifically, in K.Manjusree (supra), the High
Court, through an administrative circular, initially fixed a
weightage of 75 marks for the written examination and
25 marks for the viva voce for the recruitment of District
and Sessions Judges (Grade-II). However, subsequently,
a resolution was passed modifying the scheme, whereby
the written examination was allocated 100 marks, and
26
the viva voce was assigned 25 marks, effectively altering
the assessment structure after the process had been
initiated. The Supreme Court, in that case, found that
such a post hoc modification of the criteria violated the
principles of fairness and transparency in the recruitment
process.
34. In contrast, he would submit that the factual
matrix of the present case does not involve any such post
facto alteration of the recruitment criteria. The process
followed here has adhered to the pre-established rules
and guidelines, and no deviation has occurred that would
warrant a comparison to the circumstances in K.
Manjusree (supra). Therefore, he would emphasize that
the reliance placed by the petitioner on the said judgment
is misplaced and does not provide any substantial basis
for their argument in the current context.
27
35. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.
1 to 3 has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subash Chander
Marwaha (supra). He contended that the fixing of
minimum eligibility criteria for recruitment is essentially a
matter of administrative policy. The purpose behind
setting such criteria is to ensure that candidates meet a
certain level of competence and maintain high standards
in the recruitment process. According to the learned
counsel, this is consistent with the general principle that
administrative authorities have the discretion to establish
and modify eligibility criteria in the interest of ensuring
the recruitment of suitably qualified candidates. The
learned counsel further submitted that, in line with this
principle, the action of fixing a score as the minimum
eligibility threshold is within the permissible bounds of
administrative discretion.
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36. Additionally, the learned counsel referred to a
judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in K.H.
Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala and Others5. In this
case, the Kerala High Court emphasized that recruitment
rules provide the competent authority with the latitude to
devise its procedure for selection. The Court held that
such discretion is necessary for the authority to tailor the
selection process to ensure the highest standards of
competence. In light of this judgment, the learned
counsel argued that the absence of a specific prohibition
in the C & R Rules of KPCL regarding the setting of
minimum passing marks after the examination gives the
recruitment authority the discretion to prescribe such
marks, if deemed necessary, to maintain the appropriate
standards for the selection process. Thus, the learned
counsel contended that the notification issued by
respondent No.4, which prescribes a minimum score of
5
(2006) 6 SCC 395
29
50 marks, is a valid exercise of this discretion, intended
to supplement the C & R Rules and ensure a fair and
rigorous recruitment process.
37. Moreover, the learned counsel cited the
judgment in Tage Habung (supra), where the Hon'ble
Apex Court reaffirmed the principle that the actions of
recruitment authorities, including the fixation of eligibility
criteria and procedural norms, must be in line with the
authority's discretion and administrative efficiency. In this
case, the Supreme Court observed that such actions must
not be arbitrary or prejudicial to candidates, and should
align with the overall fairness of the recruitment process.
Referring to this judgment, the learned counsel for
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 argued that the actions taken by
the respondents, including the setting of the minimum
qualifying marks, were neither arbitrary nor prejudicial to
the candidates. Rather, these actions were in furtherance
30
of the administrative objectives of ensuring the
recruitment of competent candidates, and thus, they did
not violate any principles of fairness or transparency.
38. Both counsels have exhaustively argued their
respective contentions, addressing the issues raised in
the petition and responding to the arguments presented
by the other side. In addition to the oral arguments, both
parties have submitted detailed written synopses for the
Court's consideration. This Court has carefully reviewed
the petition, the annexures, the rejoinder filed by the
petitioner, and the statement of objection filed by
respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The Court has also considered
the arguments presented by the learned counsel for
respondent No. 4, who has supported the actions of
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the same manner.
39. In light of the comprehensive submissions
made by both sides, this Court has given anxious
31
consideration to the legal principles cited, the facts of the
case, and the relevant precedents. The Court will now
proceed to deliberate on the merits of the case based on
the arguments, legal authorities, and factual matrix
presented by the parties.
40. Rule 4.5 of C & R Rules of KPCL is extracted,
which reads as under:
"4.5 No person who is eligible for appointment to any of
the posts in the cadre of Assistant Engineers. Equivalent and
below shall be appointed to the post on the ground of his
selection unless-
a) he has passed such Kannada Language test as may be
prescribed by the Corporation, or
b) he has studied Kannada Language as one of the
subject for SSLC or equivalent examination, or
c) he has passed the said SSLC or equivalent
Examination through the medium of Kannada language, or
d) he has passed the Kannada language certificate
examination held by the Universities established by Law in the
State of Karnataka.
NOTE: The Language test shall be for 100 marks and its
standard will be at the level of third language in SSLC."
32
41. Rule 4.5 of C & R Rules of KPCL contemplates
maximum marks of 100 while conducting Kannada test. In
the light of these two regulations, this Court deems it fit to
examine the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Tej Prakash (supra). In relevant paragraph No.5,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has broadly categorized two
categories and the same is extracted, which reads as under:
"5. In various judicial pronouncements, the law
governing recruitment to public services has been colloquially
termed as 'the rules of the game'. The 'game' is the process of
selection and appointment. Courts have consistently frowned
upon tinkering with the rules of the game once the recruitment
process commences. This has crystallised into an oft-quoted
legal phrase that "the rules of the game must not be changed
mid-way, or after the game has been played". Broadly-speaking
these rules fall in two categories. One which prescribes the
eligibility criteria (i.e., essential qualifications) of the
candidates seeking employment; and the other which stipulates
the method and manner of making the selection from amongst
the eligible candidates."
42. In the case at hand, learned counsel for the
petitioner has strongly relied on the Constitutional Bench
33
judgment rendered in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs.
Rajasthan High Court and Others (supra), which clearly
delineates two broad categories of power exercisable by
recruitment authorities when fixing eligibility criteria among
candidates. The Hon'ble Apex Court made a clear distinction
between these two categories.
43. These categories, as articulated by the
Constitutional Bench, are as follows:
1. Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking
Employment: This refers to the fundamental
qualifications or requirements a candidate must meet to
be considered eligible for the recruitment process.
Examples include educational qualifications, age limits,
language proficiency, and other basic criteria essential
for eligibility.
2. Method or Manner of Selection of Suitable
Candidates: This pertains to the procedural aspects of
the recruitment process, such as prescribing minimum
34
cut-off marks to be secured by candidates in the written
examination or viva voce, as was observed in the cases
of K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and
Another and the present case, or requiring candidates to
undergo specific tests relevant to the nature of the
employment being offered.
44. Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking
Employment: This category pertains to the fundamental
qualifications or essential criteria that candidates must fulfill
to be eligible for the recruitment process. These criteria
include educational qualifications, age limits, language
proficiency, and other basic requirements that are necessary
for a candidate to be considered for the recruitment process.
In this context, the passing of the Kannada language test is
one such fundamental eligibility criterion that must be met by
candidates applying for the post of Junior Engineer or
Assistant Engineer, which are technical positions that also
require a proficiency in the Kannada language. In the present
case, the rejection of the petitioner's candidature on the
35
ground of securing only 36 marks in the Kannada language
test, without a pre-established and clear minimum qualifying
mark for the Kannada test, raises concerns about the fairness
and transparency of the process. The petitioner was not made
aware of the minimum qualifying criteria for the Kannada test
before taking the exam, which resulted in her disqualification
after the fact. The action of the respondents, therefore,
appears to have contravened the established principles
regarding the determination of eligibility criteria, as set out in
the first category.
45. Method or Manner of Selection of Suitable
Candidates: The former category involves the procedural
aspects of the recruitment process, such as the fixation of
minimum cut-off marks for written examinations or viva voce,
and the method of selecting candidates for further stages.
This category encompasses actions like setting passing scores
or requiring candidates to undergo specific tests relevant to
the job at hand. In cases like K. Manjusree vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh (supra), and the present case, the fixation of
36
minimum cut-off marks after the completion of the
examinations cannot be termed as procedural discretion,
often used by recruitment authorities to filter out candidates
for further consideration.
46. In the present case, the petitioner's disqualification
due to her failure to secure the minimum qualifying marks in
the Kannada test, which was fixed unilaterally after the
completion of the examination, clearly falls under the first
category--Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking
Employment--and not the second category, as argued by
the respondents. The passing of the Kannada language test is
an essential qualification to be considered for selection, and
any modification of this qualification or prescribing higher
qualifying marks after the examination has commenced
effectively changes the eligibility requirements that
candidates were expected to meet. This action of introducing
a minimum qualifying marks of 50 after the examination is
akin to altering the eligibility criteria post facto, which clearly
violates the principles of legitimate expectations. The
37
candidates, including the petitioner, had no prior notice of
such a requirement, and were thus prejudiced by the
introduction of this additional eligibility criterion after they
had already participated in the recruitment process.
47. Further, while the recruitment notification clearly
prescribed a maximum of 150 marks for the Kannada
language test, the subsequent unilateral fixation of a
minimum of 50 marks as qualifying marks after the
examination had already been conducted cannot be
considered a fair or transparent action. It falls squarely within
the first category--Eligibility Criteria for Candidates
Seeking Employment--and not the second category, which
pertains to the method or manner of selecting suitable
candidates. By introducing this qualifying criterion after the
fact, the respondents have effectively changed the rules of
the game, which is contrary to the expectations set forth in
the recruitment notification.
38
48. The action of the respondents in unilaterally setting
the minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada test after its
completion, without prior notice or disclosure to the
candidates, is not only arbitrary but also prejudicial to the
petitioner's prospects of being selected. The failure to
communicate the qualifying marks before the examination
violates the principles of transparency and fairness in the
recruitment process, which are foundational to the
constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
49. The law laid down by the Apex Court in K.
Manjusree (supra), although not prescribing minimum marks
for written tests or interviews as eligibility criteria, regulates
the stage at which eligibility criteria may be introduced.
The timing of when the eligibility criteria are set plays a
crucial role in ensuring that candidates are not caught
unaware or prejudiced by changes made after they have
already participated in the process.
39
50. In the present case, the respondents have clearly
introduced eligibility criteria post-examination, which is in
contravention of the principles set out by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Tej Prakash (supra). This action falls under the first
category, which deals with the fundamental eligibility
criteria that must be met by candidates. The rejection of the
petitioner's candidature based on the unilaterally introduced
minimum qualifying marks clearly alters the criteria for
selection after the commencement of the recruitment process.
Therefore, the action of the respondents cannot be justified as
a procedural change and is liable to be quashed.
51. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 have placed reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subash Chander
Marwaha (supra) to justify the action of setting minimum
qualifying marks for the Kannada language test. Respondents
contention that fixing of eligibility criteria for recruitment is
primarily a matter of administrative policy, aimed at ensuring
that candidates meet a certain level of competence and that
high standards are maintained throughout the recruitment
40
process and this principle aligns with the general discretion
granted to administrative authorities is misconceived.
Respondents clearly erred in adapting eligibility criteria,
Setting a score(50 marks) as the minimum eligibility
threshold and therefore is not a valid exercise of this
discretion, falling within the permissible bounds of
administrative authority.
52. Additionally, the judgment of the Kerala High Court
in K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala (supra), in which the
Court emphasized that recruitment rules provide the
competent authority with the flexibility to devise and modify
its procedure for selection, depending on the needs and
objectives of the recruitment process. The judgment
confirmed that such discretion is necessary for the authority
to tailor the selection process to ensure the recruitment of
competent candidates, thereby maintaining high standards of
quality in the recruitment process. In this regard, the
absence of a specific Regulation in the C & R Rules of KPCL
regarding the setting of minimum passing marks after the
41
examination does not give the recruitment authority the
discretion to prescribe such marks if deemed necessary.
53. Furthermore, the judgment in Tage
Habung (supra), where the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed the
principle that the actions of recruitment authorities, including
the fixation of eligibility criteria and procedural norms, must
align with the authority's administrative discretion and
efficiency. The Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that such
actions must not be arbitrary or prejudicial to candidates, and
they should be consistent with the overall fairness of the
recruitment process.
54. However, the application of these judgments to the
present case is problematic. Unlike the Arunachal
Pradesh case, where the Commission explicitly retained the
power to set and modify the minimum qualifying marks, the
respondents in this case have not demonstrated any such
reserved discretion or power in the recruitment notification.
In Arunachal Pradesh, the Commission was explicitly
42
authorized to revise the minimum marks for the written
examination at any stage, and this authority was part of the
recruitment rules. In contrast, the C & R Rules of KPCL and
the recruitment notification in this case do not contain any
such provision reserving the right to unilaterally set or modify
the minimum qualifying marks after the examination process
had already begun.
55. Therefore, the respondents' action of prescribing
minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada language test
after the examination has concluded is not supported by any
explicit provision in the recruitment notification or the C & R
Rules of KPCL. This failure to establish clear criteria in
advance and the imposition of new qualifying marks post-
examination creates a situation where the eligibility
requirements were introduced in an arbitrary manner, which
is contrary to the principles of fairness and transparency. The
petitioner, having taken the Kannada language test without
prior knowledge of the minimum qualifying marks, was
unfairly prejudiced by the subsequent imposition of these
43
marks. The judgments cited by the respondents in Subash
Chander Marwaha (supra) and Tage Habung (supra) do not
apply to the present case because the respondents in this
case did not retain the discretionary power to set such marks
after the examination process had commenced.
56. In light of the above, the respondents' action of
prescribing minimum qualifying marks after the Kannada
language test, without prior notification or a clear provision in
the recruitment rules, is unjustified. The principle of
legitimate expectations, as upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court,
requires that candidates are made aware of the eligibility
criteria before they participate in the recruitment process. The
failure to do so in this case undermines the fairness of the
selection process, and the respondents' reliance on the
aforementioned judgments is misplaced. The action of the
respondents must, therefore, be deemed arbitrary and in
violation of the principles of transparency and fairness in
recruitment.
44
57. The recruitment authority is obligated to set the
minimum qualifying marks in advance, providing clear and
transparent criteria for all candidates to follow. The fixing of
150 marks as the maximum score, which is contrary to the
regulations under the KPTCL (Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited) Service Rules, has further complicated
the selection process. It is unreasonable to expect aspiring
candidates to speculate about the minimum qualifying marks
based solely on the maximum score of 150. If the
respondents had properly notified the minimum qualifying
marks in the recruitment notification, it is only natural that
candidates would have tailored their preparation accordingly,
aiming to secure the prescribed 50 marks. Furthermore, it is
crucial to recognize that the position in question is a technical
one, and passing the Kannada language examination should
not override the technical qualifications required for the post.
The primary focus should be on the technical competencies of
the candidates, and the imposition of an arbitrary language
proficiency requirement without prior notice undermines the
45
fairness of the process. This failure to communicate the
qualifying criteria in advance prejudices the candidates'
chances of success and creates an imbalance in the selection
process.
58. Conclusion:
a) Drawing from the Constitutional Bench judgment
in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court
and Others, this Court underscores the two categories of
power exercisable by recruitment authorities:
i.Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking
Employment: This category pertains to the
fundamental qualifications that candidates must satisfy
to even be considered for the recruitment process, such
as educational qualifications, language proficiency, or
other mandatory prerequisites.
ii.Method or Manner of Selection of Suitable
Candidates: This relates to the procedural framework
governing the selection process, including the setting of
cut-off marks or shortlisting criteria after determining
the pool of eligible candidates.
46
b) In the instant case, the action of KPCL in prescribing
minimum qualifying marks of 50 for the Kannada language
test falls under the "former category", that is eligibility
criteria. The Kannada language test was positioned as an
essential qualifying condition, and candidates who failed to
achieve the prescribed marks were disqualified outright,
irrespective of their technical qualifications. This represents a
fundamental eligibility criterion rather than a procedural
aspect of selection.
c) The respondents' assertion that this prescription is
procedural and falls under the "latter category" is misplaced.
Procedural criteria are intended to refine the selection process
among already eligible candidates. However, KPCL's action
altered the basic eligibility requirements post facto,
introducing a new threshold without prior notification. This
contravenes the principle of fairness and legitimate
expectations, as aspiring candidates could not have
reasonably anticipated or prepared for such a post-
examination threshold.
47
d) Moreover, the Kannada test, although important,
cannot be allowed to supersede the technical qualifications
required for the post. The fixation of 150 marks contrary to
the C & R Rules further compounds the issue, creating
unnecessary ambiguity for candidates. Had the minimum
qualifying marks been notified in advance, candidates would
have had clarity and the opportunity to prepare accordingly.
e) Thus, the KPCL's unilateral action to prescribe
minimum qualifying marks after conducting the test
constitutes a substantive alteration of eligibility criteria. This
change falls squarely within the first category defined in Tej
Prakash Pathak, rendering it impermissible and arbitrary. The
respondents' actions are therefore unsustainable under the
law.
f) The Hon'ble Apex Court, while adjudicating in Tej
Prakash Pathak, has clarified that the judgments rendered
in K.Manjusree and Subash Chander Marwaha address distinct
legal issues and are not in conflict with one another.
48
Specifically, Subash Chander Marwaha pertains to the right of
candidates to be appointed from the select list, whereas K.
Manjusree addresses the right to be included in the selection
list. Given these entirely different subject matters, the
principles laid down in Subash Chander Marwaha are
distinguishable and inapplicable to the case at hand.
g) In Subash Chander Marwaha case, all candidates
who secured 45% marks, as stipulated in the recruitment
notification, were considered eligible and were included in the
selection list. The subsequent adoption of a 55% performance
criterion for shortlisting candidates was aimed at identifying
those who met higher performance standards. This exercise
was conducted within the bounds of the recruitment process
and did not alter the eligibility criteria initially prescribed.
h) The decision in Arunachal Pradesh Public Service
Commission & Anr. v. Tage Habung & Ors. (2013) 7 SCC 737
is based on a materially different set of facts and principles.
In that case, the eligibility criteria were altered after the
49
selection process had commenced. The Division bench noted
that while there was an official memorandum prescribing
minimum marks, it could not be retrospectively applied once
the recruitment process was underway. However, the Apex
Court observed that the relevant rules (Rules 11 and 12)
empowered the selection authority to fix minimum marks at
any stage. Consequently, the Court upheld the authority's
discretion to establish minimum performance standards under
the extant rules.
i) The judgments cited by the respondents in Subash
Chander Marwaha (supra) and Tage Habung (supra) are
inapplicable to the present case, as the respondents here did
not retain any discretionary authority to prescribe or modify
qualifying marks after the examination process had
commenced. Unlike in Tage Habung, where the relevant rules
explicitly empowered the selection authority to fix minimum
qualifying marks at any stage, there is no such provision in
the recruitment notification or the C & R Rules governing the
recruitment process of KPCL. The respondents' act of
50
introducing minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada
language test after the examination was concluded is
unsupported by any explicit rule or provision and is,
therefore, procedurally improper. This failure to establish
clear and transparent criteria in advance, coupled with the
post-facto imposition of new qualifying standards, constitutes
an arbitrary and unfair alteration of the eligibility
requirements. Such actions undermine the principles of
fairness and transparency that are fundamental to any
recruitment process, rendering the respondents' actions
untenable in law.
59. For the reasons stated above, this Court proceeds
to pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed;
(ii) The impugned endorsements vide Annexures-Q and Q1 issued by respondent No.3 are hereby quashed;
51(iii) The respondents are directed to re- conduct the Kannada language test, ensuring compliance with Rule 4.5 of the C & R Rules of KPCL by prescribing a maximum of 100 marks for the test;
(iv) The respondents are further directed to issue a clear notification specifying both the maximum marks and the minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada test. Such notification shall be issued well in advance, providing adequate clarity to the candidates who have already undertaken the technical test and are required to appear for the Kannada test;
(v) After giving sufficient time to the candidates and following proper notification procedures, the respondents shall conduct the Kannada test and proceed with further steps in the recruitment process, subject to the outcome of the re-conducted test.
SD/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE Srt CT-SW