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[Cites 32, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Smt. Susheela Devi vs Sh. Ram Charan Yadav on 13 November, 2019

     IN THE COURT OF SH. M. P. SINGH, ADJ­03 (EAST DISTRICT),
                KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
RCA No. 13/2018
Smt. Susheela Devi
W/o Sh. Ram Karan Yadav
R/o E­492, Gali No. 9,
West Vinod Nagar, Delhi ­ 92                                     ................Appellant
                                          Versus
1.    Sh. Ram Charan Yadav
S/o Sh. Gajraj Yadav
R/o E­492, Gali No. 9,
West Vinod Nagar, Delhi ­ 92
2.    Sh. Anil Yadav
S/o Sh. Ram Charan Yadav
R/o E­492, Gali No. 9,
West Vinod Nagar, Delhi ­ 92
3.    Smt. Jyoti Yadav,
W/o Sh. Anil Yadav
R/o E­492, Gali No. 9,
West Vinod Nagar, Delhi ­ 92
4.    Sh. Ram Lal Yadav
S/o Sh. Gajraj Yadav
R/o E­492, Gali No. 9,
West Vinod Nagar, Delhi ­ 92                               ................Respondents
                            Appeal filed on ­ 05.02.2018
                        Judgment pronounced on - 13.11.2019
                                      JUDGMENT

1. This appeal by the plaintiff arises out of a suit for possession, permanent and mandatory injunctions and damages at the rate of Rs 15,000/­ per month. Plaintiff claims to be owner of house no. E­492, Gali No. 9, West Vinod Nagar, Delhi ­ 92 measuring 50 sq. yards in khasra no. 1357/829 of village Mandawali, Fazalpur, Shahdara (for short the 'suit property'). Her averment is that she had purchased the same from Manoj Kumar Yadav vide RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 1 of 16 agreement to sell, affidavit, registered GPA, registered Will, receipt and possession letter dt. 17.02.2000 for a consideration of Rs. 55,000/­. Manoj Kumar Yadav happens to be none other than plaintiff's own son. Documents on record show that Manoj Kumar Yadav had in turn purchased the suit property from one Ratan Singh on 08.02.2000 vide agreement to sell, affidavit, registered GPA, registered Will and Receipt for sale consideration of Rs. 50,000/­. Plaintiff Susheela Devi asserts that in 2005, at her husband's instructions, she had permitted the defendants (her husband's near relatives) to stay as licensees in a room and a kitchen on the first floor and two rooms and a kitchen on the second floor of the suit property. Defendants, however, started to misbehave and harass her. They refused to vacate. Plaintiff's police complaints dt. 22.05.2009 and 05.06.2009 and her legal notice dt. 25.06.2009 to the defendants asking them to vacate were of no avail. On these averments she filed the suit.

2. Defendants in their written statement state that plaintiff's husband, defendants no.1 to 4 and Gajraj Yadav are joint owners and in possession of the suit property. The aver that the suit is not maintainable for the reason that another suit for partition, injunction and declaration that suit property is joint owned by the brothers (Ram Charan Yadav, Ram Lal Yadav and Ram Karan Yadav) and father (Gajraj Yadav) is already sub judice before Ld. Additional District Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi. They state that plaintiff has no right, title and interest in the suit property. According to them, Manoj Kumar Yadav son of Ram Karan Yadav had purchased the suit property out of joint family funds sans the consent and permission of Ram Karan Yadav and defendants no.1 to 4.

3. Defendants' version, as to how the suit property is jointly owned, is as follows. Defendant no.1 Ram Charan Yadav had purchased a house RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 2 of 16 bearing no. S­660, Nehru Enclave, Delhi measuring 35 sq. yards for Rs. 1.00 lac in his own name from one Ms. Basumati Singha on 05.02.1991. Defendant no.1 had paid Rs. 70,000/­ from his own pocket and Ram Karan Yadav (plaintiff's husband) and Gajraj Yadav paid the balance Rs. 30,000/­. Thus, this house no. S­660 was purchased out of joint funds. In 1995­96 defendant no.1 Ram Charan Yadav sold the said house no. S­660 for Rs. 1,90,000/­. Thereafter, defendant no.1 purchased another house bearing no. S­151/A, School Block, Shakarpur, Delhi in his own name from one Ms. Sushila on 08.09.1994 for Rs. 3.20 lacs partly out of the sale proceeds of the previous house no. S­660 and partly out of money given by Gajraj Yadav and defendants no.1 and 4. House no. S­151/A too was sold in December 1999 for Rs. 8.20 lacs. In fact, both the houses were in the name of defendant no.1, but they related to joint family. Thereafter, a two room flat was taken on rent. In the meantime, mother of defendants no. 1 & 4 and plaintiff's husband fell ill and she came to Delhi and was admitted in Walia Nursing Home. As such, all were busy in looking after the mother and the said amount of Rs. 8.20 lacs was kept in the flat taken on rent. Prior to the mother falling ill and her arrival in Delhi for treatment, defendants no.1 and 4 were busy searching for another plot as also a house. Three ­ four plots were seen, including the suit property, for the purpose of making the purchase in order to reside. Defendants no.1 and 4 and their family members and plaintiff's husband were busy looking after their mother. This gave an opportunity to the plaintiff and her husband. While other family members were busy in Walia Nursing Home, the plaintiff, without taking her husband into confidence, approached a property dealer for purchase of the suit property in the name of her son Manoj with the money kept in the rented flat. After mother's discharge from the nursing home, it was discussed in her presence that the house should be purchased as they were living in rented accommodation. Manoj then disclosed that his mother had already purchased RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 3 of 16 the house i.e. the suit property and that the money that was lying in the house was paid towards the consideration. Thereupon, defendants no.1, 4, their father and mother raised objections. It was then settled that the house i.e. the suit property would be got transferred in the name of plaintiff's husband and the same was accordingly transferred in his name 8 days later. The decision was taken after discussion amongst the family members and it was decided, by mutual understanding of all the family members, that the house i.e. suit property ought to remain in the name of one of the brothers or in the name of their parents. It is thus that defendants no.1 and 4 and plaintiff's husband are joint owners of the suit property.

4. Defendants in their written statement go on to state that subsequently a rough and notional partition of the suit property, which consists of three storeyes, was arrived at between the parties. And whereunder the ground floor came under the ownership and possession of plaintiff's husband who is residing there with his family. The first floor came to the ownership and possession of defendant no.1 Ram Charan Yadav who is residing there with his family. Defendants no.1 and 4, plaintiff's husband and their father Gajraj Yadav are joint owners of the suit property and they are living therein as co­ owners.

5. Defendants further state that on 18.07.2009 plaintiff, her son and two unknown persons told them that she (plaintiff) had already entered into a Sale Agreement with some unknown persons. Plaintiff disclosed that she was going to execute the sale deed very soon. Defendants raised an objection and told her that suit property was a joint property as it had been purchased out of joint funds of defendant no.1, defendant no.4, Ram Karan Yadav (plaintiff's husband) and their father Gajraj Yadav. They further informed the plaintiff that she had no right, title or interest to sell, transfer, alienate or create third party RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 4 of 16 interest therein. Plaintiff's colleagues threatened to take possession before the execution of the sale deed. Defendants no. 1 and 4 then approached the plaintiff's husband. Plaintiff became furious and she asked her husband not to interfere. Finding no other alternative, defendants approached the concerned police station, but the police refused to lodge any report on the plea that it was a civil dispute. The defendants then filed the suit for partition, declaration and injunction. Defendants deny that plaintiff raised construction of the 2 nd floor. They state that they had duly replied to plaintiff's legal notice. Denying other averments, defendants sought dismissal of the suit.

6. Plaintiff in her replication reaffirmed and reiterated her averments as set out in her plaint and refuted those of the defendants as stated in the written statement. It is stated that Manoj Kumar Yadav had purchased the suit property out of his own funds on 08.02.2000.

7. On the following issues, framed on 04.03.2010 by Ld. Trial Court, the trial was conducted: ­

(i) Whether the present suit is not maintainable? OPD

(ii) Whether the suit is barred for mis­joinder of necessary parties? OPD

(iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of possession as prayed for? OPP

(iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for? OPP

(v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mandatory injunction as prayed for? OPP

(vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of damages/mesne profit, if yes, at what rate and for what period? OPP

(vii) Relief.

8. Before the Trial Court, in plaintiff's evidence, the following four witnesses were examined, (a) PW1 Susheela Devi (plaintiff herself), (b) PW2 RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 5 of 16 Manoj Kumar Yadav (plaintiff's son), (c) PW3 Ram Karan Yadav (plaintiff's husband), and (d) PW4 Smt. Janki (an official from Sub­Registrar - IV, Nand Nagri, Delhi). She appeared with the registered GPA and the Will both dt. 17.02.2000 in plaintiff's favour.

9. Before the Ld. Trial Court, in defendants' evidence, the following witnesses were examined, (a) DW1 Ram Charan Yadav (defendant no. 1), and

(b) DW2 Chhagur Yadav, brother­in­law of defendant no. 1.

10. Ld. Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that in the absence of registered instrument of sale, the plaintiff cannot succeed. Ld. Trial Court observed that any other evidence of transfer of the suit property, other than the sale deed, cannot be accepted. Ld. Trial Court was further of the view that deficiently stamped Agreement to Sell cannot be read in evidence. It is also observed that no party to the suit had title except the factum of possession.

11. Arguments heard. Record perused.

12. It is on the basis of title that the plaintiff bases the present suit for possession, permanent and mandatory injunctions and damages/mesne profits. She asserts that the defendants are her licensee having been so inducted in 2005 on the instructions of her husband. Defendants are none other than the brothers, nephew and niece of plaintiff's husband. Plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit property vide GPA sale documents from her own son Manoj Kumar Yadav on 17.02.2000. Manoj Kumar Yadav in turn claims to have purchased the suit property from one Ratan Singh on 08.02.2000. However, the assertion of the plaintiff that her son Manoj Kumar Yadav had purchased the suit property out of his own separate funds appears to be highly doubtful. PW1 Susheela Devi in her cross­examination conducted on 09.09.2010 stated that in year 2000 her son Manoj had been working as an electrician in his village and at that time he RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 6 of 16 was also a student; that the age of Manoj as in the year 2010 was 30 years; that a criminal case under sections 379/356/411, IPC had been registered against her son Manoj and he was released on bail after 6­7 days of his arrest on the surety bond of his father Ram Karan Yadav. On the Trial Court Record, there is copy of a ration card (Ex.PW3/D1 colly) showing the age of Manoj to be 13 years as on 30.10.1996. This copy of the ration card is the own document of the plaintiff and which had been furnished along with the bail bond in the criminal case (FIR no. 643/01, PS Preet Vihar) under sections 379/356/411/34, IPC registered against her son Manoj. PW1, PW2 and PW3 in their cross­ examination admit the registration of the aforesaid criminal case. PW2 admits that his father Ram Karan Yadav had stood as surety for him. PW3 admits that he had stood as surety for his son Manoj and had furnished the bail bond which is Ex. PW3/D1 (colly) together with other documents including the ration card. This ration card would show that Manoj Kumar Yadav was born in the year 1983 and consequently in the year 2000 he would have been less than 18 years of age. In the face of this documentary evidence, the self serving ipse dixit of the plaintiff (PW1) that her son Manoj was well above 18 years of age as on the date of purchase of the suit property (year 2000) cannot be accepted. That apart, plaintiff (PW1) deposes that her son had been working as an electrician in the village and at the same time he was a student. PW2 Manoj however contradicts PW1 Susheela by stating that in 2000 he used to do part time work, besides studying, at a shop in Shakarpur, Delhi and not in the village. PW2 Manoj adds that at that time he used to earn Rs. 4,000/­ ­ Rs. 6,000/­ per month and that he never used to pay a single penny to his parents. But then PW2 furnishes no documents to show that he used to earn Rs. 4,000/­ ­ Rs. 6,000/­ per month way back in 2000. PW2 does not disclose the name of his employer. He does not state the name of the shop or its address. PW3 in his cross­ examination states that he did not know as to who had financed Manoj Yadav RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 7 of 16 for purchasing the suit property and that he came to know about its purchase by Manoj about 15 days later. PW3 further deposed that he does not know as to how much Manoj used to earn in 2000 and he also did not know as to whether plaintiff had financially assisted him in purchasing the suit property. He further deposed that Manoj was learning electrical work in 2000 and also doing part time electrical work. Given the evidence on record, it is highly doubtful that Manoj Kumar Yadav (PW2) had purchased the suit property on 08.02.2000 out of his own self earned money as claimed.

13. Further, given the circumstances on record, it is also doubtful that plaintiff paid consideration in cash to Manoj Kumar Yadav to purchase the suit property on 17.02.2000. Plaintiff and Manoj Kumar Yadav are mother and son duo. As already stated hereinabove, in year 2000 Manoj Kumar Yadav, on the basis of document(s) on record, was less than 18 years of age. That apart, the source of funds of plaintiff Susheela Yadav is not proved on record. Given the circumstances, it appears to be highly doubtful that money exchanged hands in the purported transfer from Manoj Kumar Yadav to plaintiff on 17.02.2000.

14. In Pushkar Singh Bisht Vs. Bhim Singh Bisht, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10667, it has been held that agreement to sell, power of attorney, affidavit and receipt cannot be documents of title. Pushkar Singh Bisht (supra) was a case where the plaintiff had sued his own brother for possession of an immovable property situated in West Sagarpur, Delhi on the basis of agreement to sell, power of attorney, affidavit and receipt. It was observed, "13. The next argument of the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff is that the appellant/plaintiff had proved the Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney, Affidavit and Receipt by secondary evidence and the Courts below have wrongly held that they have not been so proved.

14. In view of the reasoning given by both the Courts below, the RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 8 of 16 aforesaid is irrelevant. I have thus asked the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, as to how the Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney, Affidavit and Receipt constitute valid documents of title.

15. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff states that the said documents constituted documents of title, prior to the dicta of the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited supra. Reliance is placed on paras 25 to 27 of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited supra as reported in SCC, where it has been clarified that the judgment was not intended to, in any way, affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions and would not affect the cases, where the said documents had been accepted by the DDA or other Developmental or Revenue Authorities to effect mutation.

16. The aforesaid observation does not mean that such documents constituted documents of title, prior to the said judgment. Though this Court in Asha M. Jain Vs. Canara Bank 94 (2001) DLT 841 has held that owing to a large scale of transfer of the properties through the medium of Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney and Will, the documents may be construed as documents of title but the said judgment was specially over ruled in Suraj Lamp & Industries Private Limited supra.

17. It cannot thus by any stretch of imagination be said that Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney, Affidavit and Receipt executed on a date prior to the judgment in Suraj Lamp And Industries Private Limited supra, were documents of title. All that the observations of the Supreme Court, to which attention is drawn, says is that the said documents will not stand invalidated as to their legal effect. However, at the same time it was declared that the legal effect of the said documents is not to confer title. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff is misconstruing the said observations to confer status of title on the said documents and which has been declared otherwise by the Supreme Court.

18. Once, even if the documents are to be read, the appellant/plaintiff is not found to have title, the need to go into the question of, whether the documents have been proved by secondary evidence or not, is not felt.

19. I have recently in Chander Dutt Sharma v. Prem Chand 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9903 held as under with respect to a suit for possession:­ "20.....

(A) A suit for recovery of possession of immovable property can be filed either under Section 5 or under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 9 of 16

(B) A suit under Section 5, can be filed, either (i) on the basis of prior possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed, under Article 64 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, within twelve years from the date of dispossession; or, (ii) based on title, under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, within twelve year from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

(C) A suit under Section 6, can be filed if any person is dispossessed from immovable property without his consent, otherwise than in due process of law, but within six months of the date of dispossession.

.....

(E) A mere possession of immovable property, even if accompanied with GPA, Agreement to Sell, Affidavit etc., does not constitute title to the immovable property. Reference, if any required in this regard can be made to the dicta of the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana (2009) 7 SCC 363 and (2012) 1 SCC 656 setting aside the dicta of the Division Bench of this Court in Asha M Jain Vs. Canara Bank (2001) 94 DLT 841.

(F) The appellant/plaintiff, claiming only GPA, Agreement to Sell, Affidavit etc. from respondents No.4&5 in his favour, thus had / has no title to the property.

(G) An agreement purchaser, has no right, title, interest in immovable property and has only a right to seek specific performance of such agreement. Reference if any required can be made to (i) Jiwan Dass Rawal Vs. Narain Dass AIR 1981 Del 291; (ii) Deewan Arora Vs. Tara Devi Sen (2009) 163 DLT 520; (iii) Sunil Kapoor Vs. Himmat Singh (2010) 167 DLT 806; and, (iv) Samarjeet Chakravarty Vs. Tej Properties Private Limited 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3809.

.....

(I) Though the appellant/plaintiff, under Section 5, had a choice to sue either on the basis of prior possession or on the basis of title but the appellant/plaintiff, inspite of having no title to the property, filed the suit by drafting the plaint not on the basis of prior possession but on the basis of title. The RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 10 of 16 appellant/plaintiff, throughout the plaint has described himself as purchaser of the property from respondents No.4&5. Owing thereto only, issue also framed in the suit was qua ownership of appellant/plaintiff and not qua possession of the appellant/plaintiff. Rather, the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff today also, upon it being put to him as to why the appellant/plaintiff did not sue for specific performance of the Agreement to Sell, states that there was/is no need to sue for specific performance since the appellant/plaintiff was already owner in possession of the immovable property.

(J) Owing to the appellant/plaintiff having sued on the basis of title which the appellant/plaintiff did not possess, and not on the basis of prior possession, Issue No.1 got framed in the suit, was decided against the appellant/plaintiff.

(K) Though issues are to be framed by the Court but with the assistance of the counsels. If the appellant/plaintiff had sued for possession on the basis of prior possession and the Court had wrongly framed the issue treating the suit as on the basis of title, it was incumbent upon the appellant/plaintiff to apply for amendment of issues and which was not done by appellant/plaintiff.

(L) However, even if the appellant/plaintiff is treated as having sued for possession on the basis of prior possession and even if non seeking of an issue qua prior possession is ignored, the recovery of possession was sought not from respondents No.4&5 but from respondents No.1 to 3 and their mother Bhagwati and it was against respondents no.1 to 3 and their mother that the appellant/plaintiff was required to prove prior possession. For proving such prior possession against respondents No.1 to 3, admission of the respondents no.4&5, in their written statement or in the Agreement to Sell or in their evidence, could not be relied by the appellant/plaintiff. The respondents No.4&5 were not contesting the claim of appellant/plaintiff and rather filed a written statement admitting the material pleas in the plaint. A plaintiff, to prove case against defendant, cannot rely upon admission of another defendant who is not in contest with the plaintiff.

(M) The appellant/plaintiff was thus required to prove prior possession by some independent evidence.

RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 11 of 16

(N) The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, on enquiry, admits that save for the recital in the Agreement to Sell of being delivered possession, there is no other evidence led by the appellant/plaintiff of being in possession of the property, to be able to sue for recovery of possession thereof on the basis of prior possession."

15. Appellant's counsel however relied on the judgments of Ramesh Chand Vs. Suresh Chand, 188 (2012) DLT 538 and Hardeep Kaur Vs. Kailash, 193 (2012) DLT 168 to contend that GPA sale documents coupled with consideration do create rights to the extent provided under section 202 of Contract Act, section 53A of Transfer of Property Act and ownership on account of devolution in terms of the Will after testator's demise, although stricto sensu the same do not confer complete ownership. This argument is of no avail. In the case of Pushkar Singh Bisht (supra) and Chander Dutt Sharma (supra) it has been held that GPA sale documents do not constitute valid documents of title. That apart, in the case at hand, the claim that Manoj Kumar Yadav had purchased the suit property from his own funds is highly doubtful. There is no proof that plaintiff had purchased the suit property just about a week later from her own son Manoj in cash from her own funds.

16. It has come in the evidence that on 16.02.2000, Manoj Kumar Yadav had executed GPA sale documents in favour of Ram Karan Yadav (plaintiff's husband). This was just a day prior to the execution of GPA sale documents in favour of the plaintiff by Manoj Kumar Yadav. Both the GPA sale documents dt. 16.02.2000 and 17.02.2000 relate to the very same suit property. PW2 Manoj Kumar Yadav in his cross­examination admits that General Power of Attorney had been prepared in the name of his father Ram Karan Yadav, but he adds that the same was not a final document. He goes on to state that he as well as his father and the witnesses had signed on the GPA but the same was not attested by Notary Public. PW3 Ram Karan Yadav in his RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 12 of 16 cross­examination admits that Manoj Yadav had prepared property papers in his name on 16.02.2000, however, he adds that only a rough draft was prepared. There is on record photocopy of GPA dt. 16.02.2000 and an agreement deed dt. 16.02.2000 executed by Manoj Kumar Yadav in favour of his father Ram Karan Yadav. These documents are Ex. PW3/D1 (colly). These documents have been signed by he vendor, vendee and the witness(es). This agreement deed dt. 16.02.2000 reflects that a consideration of Rs. 52,000/­ had passed from the vendee Ram Karan Yadav to the vendor Manoj Kumar Yadav. Sh. Ram Karan Yadav had used these documents as proof of his solvency while furnishing the surety bond for his son Manoj Kumar Yadav in FIR no. 643/2001, PS Preet Vihar. It is difficult to comprehend as to how these documents were not final documents. Further, stamp of Notary Public is not necessary or mandatory to complete the transfer of property under GPA sale documents. There are no judgment to hold that transfer of an immovable property under GPA sale documents is complete only when such documents are notarised. One of the documents (agreement deed) dt. 16.02.2000 is in fact notarised. The point therefore is that if such GPA sale documents do create rights in an immovable property, as contended by appellant's counsel, in terms of judgments of Ramesh Chand (supra) and Hardeep Kaur (supra), then the suit property had already been transferred to Ram Karan Yadav on 16.02.2000 and if this be so, the question to be asked is what was then left for Manoj Kumar Yadav to transfer to his mother/plaintiff. Further, it does appear that on the basis of GPA sale documents dt. 16.02.2000 in favour of plaintiff's husband, the electricity and water connections in the suit property had been obtained. PW1 in this context deposes, "It is correct that the electricity and water connection are in the name of Sh. Ram Karan Yadav in the house."

17. Plaintiff asserts that she has raised construction in the suit property and spent about Rs. 2­2.5 lacs before the defendants had shifted in as RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 13 of 16 licensee. However, except for the self serving ipse dixit of PW1, PW2 and PW3, there is nothing on record to substantiate this. On the contrary, the defendants have led in evidence certain documents of construction which are Ex. DW1/6 to Ex. DW1/10. These documents, in the name of defendant no. 1 Ram Charan Yadav, are of July, 2000.

18. Plaintiff contends that the defendants had been inducted as licensees, on her husband's instructions, in the suit property in year 2005. However, this claim of the plaintiff appears to be doubtful. PW3 Ram Karan Yadav, inter alia, deposed in his cross­examination, "Since the year 2000 Sh. Ram Charan Yadav with his family residing in the said premises. Again said, family is not residing there."

19. Appellant's counsel relied on the judgment of Sunil Kapoor Vs. Himmat Singh, 167 (2010) DLT 806 in support of his arguments. This judgment was rendered in a different context. This judgment holds that doctrine of part performance can be of no avail in the absence of a registered agreement to sell and that an agreement purchaser­tenant cannot avoid his ejectment by a landlord on the plea of a mere agreement to sell and his status would continue to remain to be that of a tenant. This judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.

20. The next judgment relied upon by the appellant is that of Maya Devi Vs. Rajender Kumar, 188 (2012) DLT 549. This judgment again has no application to the facts of the present case. In Maya Devi (supra) in a petition for ejectment under Delhi Rent Control Act, the tenant denied landlord­tenant. However, this denial was held to be an afterthought inasmuch before filing of the eviction petition in his reply to the legal notice the tenant had admitted such a relationship. In the case at hand, there is no admission anywhere of any RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 14 of 16 relationship of licensor­licensee between parties to the present suit.

21. The next judgment relied upon by the appellant is that of Aspire Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Nexgen Edusolutions Pvt. Ltd., 220 (2015) DLT

316. This was again a dispute between landlord and the tenant and that tenant continued in possession even after termination of notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act. It was held that the arbitrator erred in holding that the grant of interim relief on the basis of admissions as prayed for by the petitioner would amount to granting the final relief. This judgment has no application to the facts of this case. In this case, there is no admission anywhere of any relationship of licensor­licensee between parties to the present suit.

22. The next judgment relied upon by the appellant is that of Poonam Khurana Vs. Ved Prakash Khurana, 2015, SCC OnLine Del 111

86. This was a case where in a suit for possession, it was the appellant who had executed the GPA sale documents in favour of the respondent­plaintiff. Such is not the case here.

23. The fact that the defendants may not have been able to substantiate their case would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree in her favour. Plaintiff cannot succeed on the basis of failure on the part of defendants to prove their case. Plaintiff must stand on her own legs. In this context, the following decisions can be referred to:­ Sankar Kumar & Anr. vs. Mohanlal Sharma, AIR 1998 Orissa 117; Shiv Nandan Sachdeva (Sh.) vs. Smt. Ruby, 2009 V (Delhi) 55; Umesh Bondre vs. Wilfred Fernandes, AIR 2007 Bombay 29; M. P. Narayan vs. Sm. Sudhadevi & Ors., AIR 1986 Cal. 256; State of West Bengal vs. Subimal Kumar Mondal & Anr., AIR 1982 Cal. 251 and Sayed Muhammed Mashur Kunhi Koya Thangal Vs. Badagara Jumayath, JT 2004 (6) SC 556.

RCA No. 13/2018 Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors. Page 15 of 16

24. To conclude, this Court finds no merit in this appeal. This appeal stands dismissed. Trial Court record be sent back with a copy this judgment. Appeal file be consigned to record room.

Digitally signed by
                                              MURARI        MURARI PRASAD
                                                            SINGH

                                              PRASAD        Location: Court No.7,

Announced in the open Court
                                                            Karkardooma Courts,
                                                            Delhi
                                              SINGH         Date: 2019.11.13
                                                            16:03:17 +0530
on 13.11.2019
                                                (M. P. SINGH)
                                          Addl. District Judge­03 (East)
                                           Karkardooma Courts, Delhi




RCA No. 13/2018             Susheela Devi Vs. Ram Charan Yadav & Ors.               Page 16 of 16