Madras High Court
Management Of Devon Estate vs Nabeesa And Anr. on 4 May, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991ACJ489
JUDGMENT T. Somasundaram, J.
1. This is an appeal preferred by the management of Devon Estate, Devarshola Post, Nilgiris District against the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, dated 29.7.1982 in W.C. Case No. 9 of 1982 awarding compensation of a sum of Rs. 18,000/- in favour of the first respondent herein. W.C. Case No. 9 of 1982 is an application filed by the first respondent herein claiming a compensation of Rs. 18,000/-for the death of her husband Mohamed while he was working under the appellant herein on 9.6.1981.
2. The case of the first respondent in W.C. Case No. 9 of 1982 is as follows: The husband of the first respondent, Mohamed, a workman employed by the appellant herein on 9.6.1981 received personal injuries in an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment resulting in his death on 9.6.1981. The cause of the injury was that on 9.6.1981 the late Mohamed, during the course of his employment while working, suffered acute chest pain as a result of which he died instantaneously in the hospital at 8.45 a.m. The respondent is the dependant of the deceased worker being his wife and that she is entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 18,000/- as compensation.
3. The appellant herein resisted the claim for compensation contending as follows: The late Mohamed did not die on 9.6.1981 as a result of an injury caused out of and in the course of employment under the appellant. On the other hand, the deceased workman even before he commenced work for the day complained of chest pain due to heart attack and died at the hospital at about 8.10 a.m. There was no accident and the death of Mohamed was due to natural causes and it was not due to injury and it did not occur in the work spot and in the course of his employment and, therefore, the appellant is not liable to pay any compensation. During the enquiry before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore two witnesses were examined on behalf of the first respondent herein. The specific evidence of one Putturangan, who was examined as AW 2 in this case, is that on the date of accident at about 7.30 a.m., when the deceased Mohamed was cutting the grass he collapsed. Thereafter, he was taken to the hospital where he died. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellant herein. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore accepted the evidence of AW 2 and disbelieved the evidence of RWs 1 to 3 and held that the deceased was a workman under the appellant and that the accident arose in the course of and out of employment and, therefore, the appellant is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 18,000/- as compensation to the first respondent
4. Aggrieved by the said order of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, the present civil miscellaneous appeal is filed.
5. There is no dispute in this case that the deceased Mohamed was a workman under the appellant. Mr. T.S. Gopalan, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the workman Mohamed died of heart attack and that the first respondent failed to establish that the workman Mohamed died in the course of and out of employment and that the first respondent failed to establish the causal connection between the work and the injury and, therefore, the appellant is not liable to pay compensation. In support of his contention learned counsel relied on the decisions in Laxmibai v. Port Thist, Bombay (1954) 1 LLJ 614; Kamla Bai v. Divisional Superintendent Central Railway 1971 ACJ 170 (Bombay) and Sarat Chatterjee & Co. v. Khairunnessa 1967 ACJ 290 (Calcutta). The contention of the learned counsel is without substance. The oral evidence let in on behalf of the first respondent herein discloses that on 9.6.1981 the deceased Mohamed during the course of his employment in the working hours, while he was going to the field from the muster, suffered from acute chest pain and as a result of which he died instantaneously at the hospital at 8.45 a.m. Under these circumstances in view of the evidence of AWs it has to be held that the deceased workman died in the course of his employment.
6. The next question is, whether the accident arose out of the employment, i.e., whether the first respondent established the nexus between the work and the injury or the causal connection between the work and the injury. The specific case of the appellant is that the workman Mohamed died of chest pain and not out of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation. The expression 'out of and in the course of his employment' has been the subject of interpretation in numerous cases. There is also the expression 'accident' in the Section. The basic and indispensable ingredient of accident is unexpectedness. A second ingredient, however, has been added in most judicial decisions. The injury must be traceable within reasonable limits to a definite time, place and occasion or cause. Larson in his Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, while dealing with heart diseases, observes at page 548 as follows:
In the heart cases, the issue almost from the start has centred about the question whether there was anything unusual about the exertion producing the attack or the circumstances surrounding it.
Tracing the course of the decisions, Larson cited the decision in Massee v. James H. Robinson Company 301 NY 34, where the following statement has been made:
A heart injury such as coronary occlusion or thrombosis when brought on by over-exertion or strain in the course of daily work is compensable, though a pre-existing pathology may have been a contributing factor.
7. Larson concluded thus again quoting from a judgment:
However, whether an event is to be found as industrial accident is not to be determined by legal definition but by common sense viewpoint of the average man. Hence the issue almost invariably falls within the realm of fact and if the facts and circumstances sustain, upon any reasonable hypothesis, the conclusion that an average man would view the event as accident, then the determination of the board is final. Applications of this principle, though often not expressed, are inherent in many decisions.
Venkatadri, J. in the decision in Madras State Electricity Board v. Ambazhathingal Ithachutti Umma (1966) 2 LLJ 12, after extracting the above passages from Larson, has held as follows:
The principle in heart cases seems to be that, if death or disability is due to heart attack which resulted from the exertion of the employee in the performance of the duties of his employment, compensation should be awarded. If death of an employee is brought about by an injury due to some mishap, or accident, happening during the course of his employment, the fact that deceased had a chronic ailment which rendered him more susceptible to such injury than an ordinary person would be, will not defeat the right to compensation. The fact that the injury and the pre-existing disease combined to produce the disability does not prevent the injury being compensable in nature and it is not necessary to prove that the injury accelerated or aggravated the disease or that the accident complained of was a contributory cause to the injury. If the accidental injury suffered in the course of his employment is the proximate cause of the employee's death, the previous physical condition is unimportant.
Venkatadri, J., in the above decision further held:
Acceleration or aggravation of an employee's heart condition, thereby causing death or disability, may constitute a compensable injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The sudden manifestation of the heart condition from the effect of strain or over-exertion at work constitutes an accidental injury within the meaning of the Act.
8. On a review of the entire case law on the subject, Venkatadri, J., in the above-mentioned decision, has further held that it is desirable and in accordance with the general rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be broadly and liberally construed, in order to effectuate their evident intent and purpose, in the application of the provisions which govern the nature and determination of the injuries for which compensation may be had. Courts should favour adoption of liberal construction of the words "by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment".
9. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the decision in B.M. Sodha v. Hindustan Tiles (1977) 2 LLJ 95, dealing with heart cases had laid down the following principle:
The sudden collapse of the worker after he suffered this injury resulting in his chest pain was clearly the result of his work connected with the work he was doing. In fact, this was a clear case where the old age got coupled with the employment and, therefore, the employment was a contributory cause and the causal connection being established, the conclusion was inescapable that the accident arose out of and during the course of the employment.
Unless there were circumstances to the contrary, it would be justifiable to presume that the workman was discharging and had discharged the work that was usually assigned to him at the particular time and it would also be natural to presume that if such work involved some strain, this disease, infirmity or old age, that was existing was likely to contribute to or accelerate the death. In such cases, the pre-existing disease, infirmity or old age is the pre-disposing factor which will supply the necessary causal link to make this a work-connected injury, if death takes place while the workman is engaged in his normal work.
(Emphasis added)
10. On the evidence available on record in this case in the light of the proposition laid down in the decisions referred to above, it has to be held that if the workman Mohamed died of heart attack, there was a pre-existing heart condition which was aggravated by the strain of the work of the deceased which resulted in his death. In the instant case, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has rightly held that the workman died of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The decisions relied on by learned counsel for the appellant can be distinguished on facts and they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is unassailable, the quantum of compensation is just and reasonable, in the circumstances of the case. The civil miscellaneous appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.