State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Make My Trip India Private Limited ... vs Anand Gupta S/O. Prafulla Gupta on 16 January, 2026
&
IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
SECOND APPEAL NO. 873 OF 2025
(Against the Order dated 14.10.2025 in Appeal No.847 of 2024 of the M .P. State
Commission, Bhopal)
With
IA/15540-15542/2025 (For grant of stay, exemption from dim documents, c/d)
MAKE MY TRIP (INDIA) PVT. LTD.
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE
MR. PUNEET CHAWLA 191H FLOOR, TOWER AZB/C,
EPITOME BUILDING NO.5, DLF PHASE III, DLF CYBER
CITY, GURGAON, HARYANA-122002.
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE . ... Appellant (s)
Versus
1. SH . ANAND-GUPTA,
S/O PRAFULLA GUPTA, R/O 7, CYAN PARK COLONY,
TELEPHONE NAGAR INDORE, MADHYA PRADESH - 452016.
2. JET AIRWAYS INDIA LIMITED,
SIROYA CENTRE, SAHAR AIRPORT ROAD, MUMBAI,
MAHARASHTRA - 400099. Respondent(s)
BEFORE:
■i HON'BLE OR. INDER JIT SINGH, PRESIDING MEMBER
For the Appellant(s) Mr. Harsh Vardhan, Advocate (V.C)
Dated : 16.01.2026
ORDER
1. Heard counsel for the appellant.
2. The SA has been filed with a delay of 20 days, as per the calculations made by the Registry. The delay in filing the SA is condoned after considering the reasons stated in the condonation of delay application and the matter is taken up on merits.
3. The challenge is to the order of the State Commission dated 14.10.2025, vide which first appeal filed by the appellant herein was dismissed on account of limitation, having been filed with a delay of one month and 24 days.
SA/873/2025 Page .1 of 8
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4. Section 51(2) envisages a second appeal before this Commission if it involves a substantial question of law. Section 51(3) states that such substantial / question of law should be listed in the memorandum of appeal. In the present case, the appellant has listed the following substantial questions of law in the memorandum of appeal:
4'1. Whether the Consumer Forums have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate refund claims arising out of cancellation of flights by an Airline after the commencement of insolvency proceedings and subsequent liquidation of the concerned Airline, in view of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?
2. Whether the Ld. District Commission erred in law by adjudicating refund claims arising out of cancelled flights when the concerned Airline was already under Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and a statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was in force?
3 Whether the Consumer Forums have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon refund claims which have already been raised and submitted by the Appellant before the Interim Resolution Professional of the concerned Airline pursuant to the initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?
4. Whether the Ld. District Commission failed to appreciate that in view of the moratorium declared by the Hon'ble NCLT, all claims relating to refunds against Jet Airways could only be pursued before the Interim Resolution Professional in accordance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?
5. Whether the Ld. District Commission erred in law by fastening the entire refund liability upon the Appellant, despite the cancellation of flights arose due to insolvency and grounding of operations of Jet Airways?
6. Whether the Ld. District Commission wrongly directed the Appellant to refund the flight booking amounts which were never received by the Appellant from the concerned Aidines?
7. Whether the Ld. District Commission has wrongly interpreted the Force Majeore clause duly agreed and consented to by the Respondent No. 1, wherein it is explicitly mentioned that in the event of force majeure circumstances such as the insolvency, the Appellant cannot be held liable for cancellation of bookings by the airlines?SA/873/2O25 Page 2 of 8
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8. Whether the Ld. District Commission erred in proceeding ex parte against the Appellant and passing the Impugned Order dated 03.01.2024 without ensuring valid service of summons at the registered office of the Appellant?
9. Whether the Hon'ble State Commission erred in law in dismissing the First Appeal filed by the Appellant as barred by limitation by computing the period of limitation from the date of alleged dispatch of the free certified copy of the Impugned Order passed by the Ld. District Commission, instead from the date of actual receipt of the certified copy of the said order by the Appellant?
10. Whether the Hon'ble State Commission failed to apply the settled law that limitation under the Consumer Protection Act commences from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order by the aggrieved party and not from the date of its dispatch to an incorrect address?
11-Whether the rejection of the Appellant's application for condonation of delay without granting any opportunity of being heard and without considering the bona fide circumstances of the Appellant amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice?
12. Whether the Ld. District Commission failed to consider the Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) issued by DGCA, which places the onus of refund in cases of flight cancellation upon the Airline and not the travel agent or facilitator?
13. Whether the Ld. District Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by rewriting the contractual terms between the parties and imposing liability upon the Appellant contrary to the User Agreement, Cancellation Policy and Force Majeure clause of the Appellant?
14. Whether the SCDRC and DCDRC could have at all ignored the user agreement between the parties, which has neither been challenged, nor set aside, which specifically states that failure of the Airline to perform its obligations, would be the liability of the Airline and not the Appellant?
15. Whether "remote or indirect loss or damage" can at all be awarded to a Complainant in light of the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act?
16. Whether an "intermediary" as defined Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 read with Section 79 (1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 can at all be affixed with liability in SA/873/2025 Page 3 of 8 /' / terms of Rule 5 of the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020?
17. Whether the grant of excessive and unreasoned compensation by the Ld. District Commission, in the absence of any established deficiency in service is contrary to law and liable to be set aside?
5. The appellant has challenged the orders of the State Commission on following grounds:
(i) Both the fora below, while passing the impugned orders, have wrongly fastened the entire liability on the Appellant, completely ignoring the crucial aspect that, the onset of the present legal quagmire happened because of Respondent No. 1 and 2.
(ii) The State Commission has wrongly dismissed the Appeal filed by the Appellant without affording any opportunity of being heard on merits and has erroneously concluded that the Appeal was barred by the law of limitation, thereby upholding the impugned order dated 03.01.2024.
(iii) The State Commission has failed to consider that the Appellant has filed the First Appeal within the statutory period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the impugned order i.e. on 12.04.2024 and therefore, there was no delay in filing the Appeal before the State Commission.
(iv) The State Commission also failed to consider that the certified copy of the impugned order was sent to an incorrect/old address of the Appellant which was malafidely mentioned by Respondent No.2 in the original Complaint. Therefore, the Appellant did not receive the free certified copy of the impugned order resulting in unawareness of the proceedings before the District-Commission .
(v) The State Commission has failed to appreciate that the Appellant applied for the certified copy of the impugned order on 06.02.2024 and received the same only on 28.02.2024. The Appeal was filed by the Appellant on 12.04.2024 i.e. on the 44th day from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the impugned order and therefore, the said Appeal was well within the statutory period of 45 days.
SA/873/2025 Page 4 of 8(vi) The State Commission has completely overlooked the well-settled principle of law, that the period of limitation for filing an Appeal commences from the date on which the certified copy of the impugned order is received by the party.
(vii) Because the impugned order dated 03.01.2024 passed by the District Commission is a non-speaking order.
(viii) Because the District Commission has wrongly proceeded ex-parte against the Appellant based on an incorrect presumption that the non- appearance of the Appellant before the District Commission was deliberate and intentional.
(ix) The District Commission has failed to consider that the Appellant solely acts as a facilitator, enabling a booking interface between the user and the end service provider, in this case, between Respondent No.I'-and the concerned airline i.e. Respondent No.2. As agreed under the user agreement, the obligation of the Appellant was confined to ensuring a confirmed ticket booking, which was duly and undisputedly fulfilled.
(x) The District Commission has failed to consider that it was agreed between the parties that Respondent No.1 is governed by the cancellation and refund policy of the concerned airlines and that the actual contract for the provision of flight services exists solely between the Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2.
(xi) The District Commission has completely ignored the fact that the Respondent No.2 had temporarily ceased its operations and grounded all its flights and the same was official announced on 17.04.2019. The sudden suspension resulted in the cancellation of all bookings made with Respondent No.2, including the onward and return sector flights of Respondent No.1, without any prior intimation to the Appellant. Further, the Appellant, having acted merely as a booking facilitator/intermediary, was not in a position to anticipate or foresee the suspension of operations by Respondent No.2.
(xii) The District Commission has also failed to appreciate the fact that the Respondent No.1, at the time of booking and while accepting the SA/873/2025 Page 5 of 8 / terms of User Agreement, also agreed to the 'force majeure' clause of the Appellant.
(xiii) The Appellant has also relied on the following judgments passed by the National Commission, Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the Hon'ble High Court of India:
Rita Kesh v. Biswanath Singha, 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 120; Housing Board v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Assn., (1^95) 5 SCC 672; Gauhati University v. Niharlal Bhattacharjee, (1995) 6 SCC 731; Jindal Power Limited v Dushyant C. Dave Liquidator of Shirpur Power Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.; Sunil Kumar Singh v. Virender Kumar; Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; Sushil Kumar Sabharwal v. Gurpreet Singh, (2002) 5 SCC 377; Harendra Nath Ghosal v. Suprefoam Pvt.
Ltd. C.O. Appeal No.315 of 1990; Deepak Machineries Pvt. Ltd. v. Ispat Industries Limited, (2005) 2 Bom CR 94; Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE <2015) 8 SCC; O.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259; Bharathi Knitting Co. v. DHL Worldwide Express Courier (1996) 4 SCC 7041; State Bank of India & Ors. v. The Consortium of Mr. Murari Lal Jalan and Mr. Florian Fritsch & Anr.; Shreya Singhal v. UOI (2015) 5 SCC 1, Flipkart Internet Private Limited v. State of U.P. 2022 Livelaw (AB) 467; Sri Kunal Baht v. State of Karnataka; Nivedita Singh v. Dr. Asha Bharti & Ors., Civil Appeal No<s) 103 of 2012; Surendra Kumar Tyagi v. Jagat Nursing Home and Hospital & Anr., IV (2010) CPJ 199 (N.C.) and Punjab Small Industries & Export Corporation Ltd. v. GurjeetSingh & Ors., (2015) SCC OnLine NCDRC 1644.
6. The main question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismiss it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and contentions of the Petitioner herein in the light of observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases.
7. In $heo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Respresentative and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the SA/873/2025 ' Page 6 of 8 / r / cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the lengths of delay being immaterial, each case for condonation of delay based on the existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts and that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below. In Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when a case is filed beyond the limitation period, the applicant must demonstrate "sufficient cause," meaning an adequate and enough reason for not approaching the court within the prescribed time. If the party is found to be negligent, lacking bona tides, or not acting diligently, there is no justified ground for condoning the delay. Courts are not justified in condoning such delays by imposing any conditions and must adhere to the established parameters for condonation of delay. Condoning delay without sufficient cause and proper justification would violate statutory provisions and show disregard for legislative intent. In Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed concern over the growing tendency to perceive delay as a trivial matter and to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude towards it, which needs to be addressed within the confines of legal parameters. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v^Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765, the Supreme • Court affirmed the principle that the law of limitation must be applied rigorously as prescribed by statute, even if it causes hardship to a particular party. The court cannot extend the limitation period on equitable grounds. In H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 680 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, and therefore, applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed in the absence of genuine reasons. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 observed that the law of limitation is rooted in the public policy of concluding litigation by forfeiting the remedy rather than the right itself, emphasizing that rights or remedies not exercised within a specified time should cease to exist. In State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, the Supreme Court observed that the notion that merit in a case justifies disregarding a period of delay is preposterous. Regardless of a case's merit, the limitation period can bar its consideration, potentially excluding even strong cases. However, this does not negate the court's jurisdiction to condone delay in appropriate circumstances. In Bappanand Narshimman Annu Vs. Hirmanidevi G.S. Gupta & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 2605, the National Commission observed that in accordance with the broad principles established by numerous decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the term 'sufficient cause' cannot be interpreted liberally when negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides are attributable to the party seeking such discretion. Emphasizing the importance of applying the statutory period of limitation rigorously, the Commission observed that unlimited leniency in time limits fosters uncertainty.
8. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Manjunath Anandappa (Supra), stated that appellate courts generally should not intervene with the discretion exercised by SA/873/2O25 Page 7 of 8 tower courts. This principle is affirmed in LLP. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros (AIR 1967 SC 249), where it is emphasized that appellate courts should be •hesitant to interfere with the exercise of discretion-by trial courts. The appellate court should not replace its own discretion for that of the trial judge unless the trial court has acted unreasonably, capriciously, or ignored relevant facts. Additionally, in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980) 2 SCC 593, it is highlighted that appellate courts should intervene only when the lower court's order is clearly wrong, not just when it is not right.
9. We have carefully considered the order of the State Commission, other relevant records, and the substantial questions of law listed in the memorandum of appeal, and are of the considered view that the case involves no substantial question of law. The State Commission is well within its jurisdiction and powers to dismiss the first appeal on limitation, if it does not find the cause sufficient. Pence, the order of the State Commission is upheld. Accordingly, SA/873/2025 is dismissed.
10. Registry of NCDRC is directed to send a copy of this order (free certified copy) to both sides, in particular the Respondents), on the address given in the Memo of Parties, within a maximum period of one week from the date of this order.
11. Pending lAs, if any, also stand disposed off. .
..A---- '--A-'-
Sd/-
(DR. INDER JIT SINGH-)- ®
PRESIDING MEMBER ® I
Sabita/Court-3/ AB 723
SA/873/2025 Page 8 of8