State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Indusind Inppon Life Insurance Company ... vs Hem Narayan Pachori S/O. Umashankar ... on 25 March, 2026
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
REVISION PETITION NO. NC/RP/285/2026
(Against the Order dated 6th November 2025 in Appeal No. SC/22/FA/460/2025 of the State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Chhattisgarh)
WITH
NC/IA/3175/2026 (EXEMPTION FROM DIM DOCUMENTS)
NC/IA/3174/2026 (CHANGE OF NAME)
NC/IA/3173/2026 (STAY)
INDUSIND INPPON LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD FORMERLY KNOWN AS RELIANCE
LIFE INSURANCE CO. LTD.
PRESENT ADDRESS - 2ND FLOOR 29 COMMERCIAL COMPLEX NEAR VIJAYA BANKNEHRU
NAGAR BHILAI TEHSIL AND DISTRICT , DURG,CHHATTISGARH.
BUSINESS ADDRESS - UNIT NO - 410 B, 402, 403, AND 404, 4RTH FLOOR, , BANDRA KURLA
COMPLEX, BANDRA EAST, , INSPIRE-BKC, BLOCK-G, BKC MAIN ROAD, ,
MUMBAI,MAHARASHTRA.
.......Petitioner(s)
Versus
HEM NARAYAN PACHORI S/o. UMASHANKAR PACHORI
PRESENT ADDRESS - Q NO 31 B AVENUE SECTOR 2 , DURG , TEHSIL AND DISTRICT
DURG , DURG,CHHATTISGARH.
.......Respondent(s)
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. P. SAHI , PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. BHARATKUMAR PANDYA , MEMBER
FOR THE PETITIONER:
MR. ROHIT RATTU AND MR. ANURAG JAIN, ADVOCATES
DATED: 25/03/2026
ORDER
1. The respondent/ complainant filed CC/328/2019 before the DCDRC, Durg, Chhattisgarh. The complaint was regarding non-payment of the matured amount against certain deposits made with the Reliance Life Insurance Corporation which the complainant alleged was payable on maturity.
2. The claim was also with regard to the benefits of Super Money Back Plan Policy and after examination of the facts in question, the District Commission came to the conclusion that the lump sum amount as claimed was payable and that there was a deficiency in service. The claim was allowed and the Insurance Company was directed to make a payment of Rs.1,95,704/- with interest @ 6% p.a. with effect from 28.08.2014 plus Rs.20,000/- as compensation and Rs.5,000/- as litigation costs. The order was delivered on 03.12.2024.
3. The Insurance Company filed an inordinately delayed appeal with a delay of 234 days. The explanation given for the delay was a departmental and administrative delays plus also a mistake that occurred with regard to the pre- deposit that was to be made to the extent of 50% for which the demand draft had been prepared in a wrong name.
4. The issue of delay has been dealt with by the Apex Court in a recent decision in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 10 SCC 531 and it has been held that while explaining the delay a distinction has to be drawn between the excuse and an explanation. Paragraphs 30 to 32 of the said decision are extracted herein under:
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."
5. The State Commission found that the counsel for the Insurance Company was present on the date of the pronouncement of the order i.e. 03.12.2024 and the certificate copy was received on 16.12.2024. The appeal was filed on 08.09.2025 and there is no valid explanation given much less a cogent explanation for the said delay. The State Commission has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court that have been extracted in the impugned order to hold that in view of the ratio of the said decisions and in the absence of any cogent explanation showing sufficient cause. The delay has not been explained and the delay was dismissed.
6. We have gone through the order passed by the State Commission as well as the grounds taken in this revision petition. We do not find any explanation given before us as well with regard to the said delay on the basis whereof the appeal was dismissed. Rather the contentions raised in the grounds are more on the merits of the policy rather than explaining the delay to enable us to interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction under Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The law on the scope of the revisional jurisdiction has been well settled by the Apex Court in the in the case of Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Company, (2011) 11 SCC 269, in paragraph 23 as follows:
"23. Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two fora."
7. This was followed by another decisions in the case of Sunil Kumar Maity v. SBI, (2022) 20 SCC 543, wherein the following observations have been made in paragraph 12:
"12. It is needless to say that the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the said Act is extremely limited. It should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the said provision, namely, when it appears to the National Commission that the State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity."
8. This has been further explained by the Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Shukla vs. Gold Rush Sales and Services Ltd. and Ors., (2022) 9 SCC 31, wherein it is observed as under in paragraphs 12 to 14:
"12. At this stage, it is required to be noted that on appreciation of evidence on record the District Forum as well as the State Commission concurrently found that the car delivered was used car. Such findings of facts recorded by the District Forum and the State Commission were not required to be interfered with by the National Commission in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. It is required to be noted that while passing the impugned judgment and order [Goldrush Sales and Services Ltd. v. Rajiv Shukla, 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 702] the National Commission was exercising the revisional jurisdiction vested under Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
13. As per Section 21(b) the National Commission shall have jurisdiction to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Thus, the powers of the National Commission are very limited. Only in a case where it is found that the State Commission has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested illegally or with material irregularity, the National Commission would be justified in exercising the revisional jurisdiction.
14. In exercising of revisional jurisdiction the National Commission has no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the District Forum and the State Commission which are on appreciation of evidence on record. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order [Goldrush Sales and Services Ltd. v. Rajiv Shukla, 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 702] the National Commission has acted beyond the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction
9. We hardly find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned order so as to invoke our revisional jurisdiction for interfering with the impugned order. There is no good ground made out for the same. The revision petition lacks merits and is accordingly rejected.
..................J A. P. SAHI PRESIDENT ..................
BHARATKUMAR PANDYA MEMBER BRAHM PAL/Court-1/28