Delhi District Court
State vs Lal Singh on 15 September, 2025
IN THE COURT OF RISHABH KAPOOR, JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS -05 SOUTH-WEST DISTRICT,
DWARKA COURTS: DELHI
State Vs. : Lal Singh Digitally
signed by
RISHABH
RISHABH KAPOOR
FIR No : 242/2022 KAPOOR Date:
2025.09.15
17:00:14
+0530
U/s : 279/338 IPC
P.S. : Vikas Puri
JUDGMENT
1. Criminal Case No. : 10505/22 2. Date of commission of offence : 10.03.2022 3. Date of institution of the case : 23.08.2022 4. Name of the complainant : State
5. Name and parentage of accused : Lal Singh s/o Sh Mahipal Singh
6. Offense complained or n proved : U/s 279/338 IPC
7. Plea of the accused : Pleaded not guilty
8. Date on which order was reserved : 02.09.2025
9. Final order : Acquitted
10. Date of final order : 15.09.2025
1. The accused Lal Singh is facing trial for offences u/s 279/338 IPC. The genesis of the prosecution story is that on 10.03.2022 at around 5:00 PM at J-Block Bus Stand, Vikas Puri, Delhi when complainant Ms. Neetu Khurana was crossing the road for going towards her car, the vehicle i.e Gramin Sewa bearing no. DL-2W-4741 which was being driven by the accused in a high speed and rash or negligent manner struck against the complainant, due to which she sustained severe State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 1 injuries. The accused alleged fled away from the spot after the incident and the complainant was taken to hospital by some public persons. The matter was informed to the police on the basis of statement made by complainant, the criminal law was set into motion vide registration of FIR and investigation into the case began. During the course of investigation, efforts were made by police for tracing out the offender and the local inquiry at the spot revealed that the incident was caused by one Gramin Sewa bearing DL-2W-4741. Thereafter, notice u/s 133 MV Act was served upon the registered owner of the said Gramin Sewa i.e. Mukesh Hudda and from his reply, the complicity of accused was found in the alleged offence. The accused was made to join the investigation and he made the disclosure statement allegedly admitting that the incident was caused due to rash or negligent act on his part. Thereafter, the mechanical inspection of the alleged offending vehicle was also conducted and during the investigation, the statements of alleged eye witnesses namely, Golu and Jai Parkash were also recorded. The application for judicial TIP of accused was also filed by the IO. The accused allegedly refused to participate in the TIP proceedings, due to which the said application came to be dismissed on 06.05.2022. The final opinion regarding the injuries suffered by complainant was also obtained, as per which the injuries were found to be grievous in nature, thus section 338 IPC was added in the FIR. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet for offences u/s 279/338 IPC was submitted for trial of accused.
2. Thereafter, the cognizance of the offences was taken by the Ld. Predecessor Court and on the basis of material available on record, notice of accusation for offences u/s State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 2 279/338 IPC was framed and served upon accused Lal Singh. Accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
3. In order to establish guilt of the accused, prosecution has examined nine witnesses in all.
4. Thereafter, the statement of accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded wherein all the incriminating circumstances were put to accused. The accused did not lead evidence in his defense.
5. Ld. APP for State has contended that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts with the help of coherent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and therefore, the accused deserves to be convicted for the alleged offences.
6. Per contra, Ld. Defense Counsel has contended that the accused has been falsely implicated in the present case at the instance of the police. It has also been argued that the prosecution has failed to establish that the alleged incident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle by the accused. It has been contended that the complainant has made considerable improvements in her version before the court and that there exist serious doubts in the prosecution story and hence, accused is liable to be acquitted for the alleged offences.
7. I have heard the rival contentions advanced by the prose- cution and defense and have also gone through the case record carefully.
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 3
8. Prior to delving into the merits of the contentions ad- vanced on behalf of parties, let us briefly discuss the testi- monies of the material prosecution witnesses.
(i) PW-1 Neetu Khurana is the complainant in the present case. She deposed that on 10.03.2022 at about 5:00 PM while she was trying to cross the road to reach out to her car which was parked across the road, one Gramin Sewa of white colour came from the right side in a high speed and same was being driven in careless manner. She deposed that said Gramin Sewa hit on her right side due to which she fell down and saw a glimpse of the driver. She identified accused as the driver of the said Gramin Sewa and stated that he fled away from the spot after the incident. She further deposed that someone from public helped her and called her husband and thereafter, she called police. She further deposed that her husband along with his brother came to the spot and took her to U. K Nursing Home from where she was taken to Action Balaji Hospital for treatment. She further deposed that police came to hospital and recorded her statement Ex. PW 1/A and thereafter, she got discharged from the hospital. She identified the offending Gramin Sewa in photographs Ex. P1 to Ex. P5. During her cross-examination, she stated that there was no red light or zebra crossing on the road from where she was crossing. She could not state about the exact distance between her and the offending vehicle when same was coming towards her. She stated that the vehicle remained at the spot for 2-3 minutes after hitting her and in the said period, she had seen the driver of the vehicle but she could not note down the number of the vehicle. She denied of having not seen the driver of the vehicle at the spot. She was also confronted with her statement Ex.
PW 1/A upon which she stated that she had not mentioned that State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 4 she was not in a position to identify the driver of the offending vehicle. She denied that IO had shown her photographs of the accused due to which she has identified him in the Court. She stated that IO had not taken her to the spot after her discharge from hospital. She stated that there were many public persons present at the spot. She denied that she has falsely implicated the accused in the present case.
(ii). PW-2 Golu is one of the alleged eye witness to the incident. He stated that he was not present at the spot at the time of incident as he had gone to play Dhol at KG-I Vikas Puri at that time. He stated that when he returned back to his shop which is near the spot, he was told by the adjacent shopkeeper that the accident had taken place. Thereafter, this witness was encountered with the questions in the nature of cross examination by Ld. APP for the State and during such examination, he denied that he had seen the incident taking place or that the incident was caused by accused while he was driving Gramin Sewa bearing no. DL-2W-4741 in rash or negligent manner.
(iii) PW-3 Jai Parkash is the other alleged eye witness to the incident. He also stated that he was not present at the spot at the time of incident as he had gone to attend some meeting. He stated that when he returned back to his shop which is near the spot, he heard that the accident had taken place. Thereafter, this witness was encountered with the questions in the nature of cross examination by Ld. APP for State and during such examination, he denied that he had seen the incident taking place or that the incident was caused by accused while he was driving Gramin Sewa bearing no. DL-2W-4741 in rash or State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 5 negligent manner.
(iv). PW 4 HC Baljeet Singh deposed that on 10.03.2022, he went to the spot along with HC Shakti Malik and there it was told by some public persons that the injured was already taken to Balaji Action Hospital. He further deposed that HC Shakti asked him to remain present at the spot and thereafter, he left to Action Balaji Hospital and returned to the spot along with the statement of complainant. He further deposed that HC Shakti had prepared rukka, which was taken by him to Police Station and the FIR was registered. He further deposed that he and HC Shakti looked for CCTV Cameras at the spot but no CCTV Camera was found neither any eye witnesses were found at the spot. During his cross-examination, he stated that there were shops and residences adjacent to the spot and also that there was light traffic near the spot. He stated that IO HC Shakti had not inquired from any shopkeeper or nearby residents regarding the incident.
(v). PW-5 HC Sunil Kumar deposed that on 10.04.2022, he joined investigation with HC Shakti Malik and on that day, IO HC Shakti Malik arrested the accused in his presence vide memo Ex. PW 5/A, seized the original RC of the offending vehicle vide memo Ex. PW 5/B, seized the driving license of accused vide memo Ex. PW 5/C and recorded disclosure statement of accused vide Ex. PW 5/D.
(vi). PW-6 Mukesh Hooda is the registered owner of the vehicle no. DL-2W-4741 and deposed that upon receipt of notice u/s 133 MV Act from the IO vide Ex. PW 6/A, he gave reply stating that at the time of incident, the accused Lal Singh was driving the aforesaid vehicle. He further deposed that he had given the State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 6 key along with the vehicle and its documents i.e. RC and insurance to the IO and upon application Ex. PW 6/B filed by him, the vehicle was released to him on superdari on 26.03.2022. During his cross examination, he stated that the alleged incident had not taken place from vehicle no. DL-2W- 4741. Thereafter he was re-examined by Ld. APP for the State and during such examination, he stated that reply to notice u/s 133 MV Act was signed by him only after reading its contents.
(vii). PW-7 Chander Parkash is the Mechanical Expert who deposed that upon request of IO/HC Shakti Malik, he had conducted the mechanical inspection of vehicle no. DL-2W- 4741 on 21.03.2022 and issued the report Ex. PW 7/A. During his cross-examination, he stated that the vehicle was inspected by him after ten days of the incident and the scratches found on the same were old in nature.
(viii). PW-8 HC Prahlad is the MHC(M) and he deposed that as per the entry no. 2812 dated 11.03.2022 in Register no. 19, the case property seized by the IO weas deposited in Malkhana on 11.03.2022 and the copy of said entry is Ex. PW 8/A.
(ix). PW-9 HC Shakti Malik was the IO in the present case. He deposed about the proceedings of investigation conducted by him and his testimony is similar as that of PW-4 and PW-5, and hence, same is not being reproduced in its entirety to avoid the repetition. Through him rukka was exhibited as Ex. PW 9/A, seizure memo of the vehicle no. DL-2W-4741 as Ex. PW 9/B and site plan as Ex. PW 9/C. He also identified the accused in Court stating that he was driving the aforesaid Gramin Sewa at the time of incident. During his cross-examination, he stated State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 7 that initially the complainant narrated in her statement Ex. PW 1/A that she was not in a position to identify the driver of the offending vehicle and also that the complainant could not describe the identity of the offending vehicle. He stated that he visited the spot on the next day and conducted the investigation from the persons who were present there and from the same he got to know the details of offending vehicle and accused. He stated that he met persons namely Jai Parkash and Golu on 11.03.2022 at the spot. He stated to have not recorded the statement of the persons whom he met at the spot on the same day i.e. on 11.03.2022. He denied that prior to 12.04.2022, he was not having information or knowledge regarding the complicity of accused in the alleged offence or that he has falsely implicated the accused in the present case. He stated that delay occurred in filing TIP application of accused as he was having burden of several case files. He could not state about the date of discharge of complainant from the hospital. He denied that he had shown the photos of accused to the complainant and due to such reason, accused refused to participate in the TIP.
9. The accused has not disputed the factum of registration of FIR, endorsement on rukka, certificate u/s 65 B of Indian Evidence Act, GD no.124A dated 10.04.2022, DD no.105A dated 10.04.2022 vide his statement u/s 294 Cr. PC. The accused further not disputed the factum of medical examination of Neetu Khurana, issuance of MLC of Ms. Neetu Khurana and the record of TIP proceedings dated 06.05.2022 vide such statement and pursuant thereto, the formal witness with respect to the above-mentioned documents were dropped from the list of witnesses.
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 8
10. Having discussed the evidences on record, now let us advert ourselves to the merits of the present case. The accused has been indicted for offences u/s 279/338 IPC. The allegations against accused are to the extent that on 10.03.2022 at around 5:00 PM at J-Block Bus Stand, Vikas Puri, Delhi accused was driving Gramin Sewa bearing no. DL-2W-4741 in a high speed and rash or negligent manner and while driving the aforesaid vehicle, he struck the same against pedestrian namely, Neetu Khurana, who sustained grievous injuries due to the incident.
11. The position of law with respect to offence u/s 279 IPC is being discussed hereinafter;
It is a settled law that Section 279 IPC punishes the act of a person driving or riding a vehicle on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. In the case of Abdul Subhan Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 133(2006) DLT 562, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while discussing about the ingredients of section 279 has observed:-
"In Badri Prasad (supra) the essential ingredients of Section 279 IPC are that there must be rash and negligent driving or riding on a public way and the act must be such so as to endanger human life or be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person. As observed in Badri Prasad (supra), to establish the offence either under Section 279 or Section 304A, the commission of a rash and negligent act has to be proved".
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 9
12. Further, what would constitute rash and negligent act has been described by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Aynuddin @ Miyan Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh de- cided on 28.07.2000, in the following words:-
"A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with reckless- ness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution."
10. Besides this, it has also been upheld in various decisions that evidence of high speed simpliciter, is not ipso facto proof of rashness or negligence.
In the case of Rajiv Netra Panigrahi Vs. State of Orrisa decided on 20.07.1990, Hon'ble Orrisa High Court observed the following:-
"It is no doubt true, as contended on behalf of the peti- tioner and as supported by authorities, that high speed in driv- ing of a vehicle does not by itself amount to rash and negligent driving. If the accused driver was driving the vehicle on the highway and had negotiated the distance safely, it could not have been said that he was driving rashly or negligently be- cause of the high speed."
In the case of Kishore Chand Joshi Vs. State decided on 12.11.2018 Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has observed:-
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 10 "17. A witness can depose as to the manner of driving or speed at which the vehicle was being driven but not render an opinion on "rash and negligence". High speed by itself may not in each case be sufficient to hold that a driver is rash or negli-
gent. Speed alone is not the criterion for deciding the rashness or negligence on the part of the driver."
The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Abdul Subhan (Supra), also observed that: "The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court make it more than clear that a mere allegation of high speed would not tantamount to rashness or negligence. In the present case also, I find that apart from the allegation that the truck was being driven at a very high speed there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which could be re- garded as rash or negligent."
13. Further in Abdul Subhan (Supra), the decision of State of Karnataka Vs. Satish 1998 SCC (CRI) 1508 was also dis- cussed in which Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:-
"3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the re- spondent guilty for offences under Section 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to hold the respondent guilty.
4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness"
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 11 by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what is meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything es- sential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitor".
14. Besides, the ingredients mentioned above, the identity of the accused as driver of the vehicle must also be established separately by the prosecution in order to establish the guilt of the accused.
15. Whereas in order to hold a person liable for offence u/s 338 IPC, the prosecution is also duty bound to establish that the rash or negligent act done by the accused has led to grievous, injuries. In other words, in order to hold a person liable for of- fence u/s 338 IPC, it is necessary to establish that the injuries sustained by the victim are grievous in nature and same were a resultant consequence of the acts of rash or negligence of ac- cused.
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 12
16. In the present case, it is note-worthy to point out the fact that in order to establish the guilt of accused for alleged of- fences, prosecution is primarily relying upon the testimony of PW-1 Neetu Khurana who is also the complainant / victim in the present case. The careful perusal of the initial statement of complainant i.e. Ex. PW1/A would reflect that the complainant has made narration to the extent that the alleged offending ve- hicle after incident fled away from the spot and that she was not in a position to identify the person who was driving the said ve- hicle. The careful perusal of the charge sheet would reflect that search for CCTV cameras were made by the IO during the course of investigation but no such cameras were found there and from the local inquiry conducted by him at the spot, it tran- spired to him that the incident was caused by the Gramin Sewa bearing no. DL-2W-4741 and thereafter, he found the complicity of accused in the alleged offence after serving the notice u/s 133 MV act on the registered owner of the Gramin Sewa namely, Mukesh Hooda. The charge sheet is completely silent regarding the source of information of IO on the basis of which he acquired knowledge that the incident was caused by vehicle no. DL 2 W 4741.
17. Pertinently, the said source of the knowledge on the part of the IO regarding the aforesaid fact was necessary to be shown by the prosecution as the complainant/PW-1 during her deposi- tion in Court has made considerable improvement. More specif- ically, PW-1 during her course of deposition in Court has stated that she had seen the driver of the offending Gramin Sewa at the spot as the said vehicle halted for a time span of 2-3 min- utes after causing the accident and such version of the com-
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 13 plainant/PW-1 is completely contradictory to the narration made by her in her initial statement Ex. PW 1/A. During the course of deposition of PW 9 i.e. IO HC Shakti Malik, it has surfaced that on the next day of incident i.e. on 11.03.2022, he went to the spot and upon local inquiry conducted there, he met the alleged eye witnesses namely, Jai Parkash and Golu, who disclosed about the number of the alleged offending Gramin Sewa and also about the complicity of accused in the alleged offence. However, quite surprisingly, the statements of above-named al- leged eye witnesses were not recorded by the IO on the very same day i.e. on 11.03.2022 and rather such statements were recorded by him after more than one month i.e. on 12.04.2022. The reasons for not promptly recording of statements of the above named two crucial witnesses by the IO have remained unexplained by him. The reasonable explanation on the afore- said aspect was necessary to be given by the IO as both the aforesaid two witnesses i.e. PW-2 Golu and PW-3 Jai Parkash have turned hostile before the court by inter-alia stating that the alleged incident had not taken place in their presence nor they had seen the accused driving the alleged offending vehicle.
18. Besides, the culpability has been imputed upon the accused also on the premise that he had refused to participate in the ju- dicial TIP proceedings. In this regard, one must appreciate that as per the reply to notice u/s 133 MV Act given by registered owner/PW-6 Mukesh Hooda, he had allegedly disclosed to the IO on 15.03.2022 that the alleged offending vehicle was being driven by accused at the time of incident. However, IO despite acquiring the knowledge in that regard has failed to take imme- diate steps for associating the accused in the investigation of State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 14 the case and waited only until 10.04.2022 i.e. for a period of one month to arrest the accused (as reflected in arrest memo Ex. PW 5/A). Again, IO/PW-9 has failed to render any reason- able justification for such crucial lapse on his part. Further, as per record the application for judicial TIP of accused was filed by the IO on 06.05.2022 i.e. after lapse of further 25 days pe- riod from the date of arrest of accused and no such reasonable explanation has come from the IO as to what prevented him to produce the accused before the court for his judicial TIP. Even though, IO has stated that he could not file the application for judicial TIP of accused earlier as he was having burden of sev- eral case files but such justification given by the IO also does not inspire confidence. The prompt action on the part of the IO for producing the accused before the Court for his judicial TIP was necessary so as to rule out any chances of concoction of facts or fading of memory of witnesses who had seen the ac- cused at the time of incident but such action was not taken by the IO for the reasons best known to him. The fact that PW-1 has contradicted herself by stating that she had seen the ac- cused at the time of incident and PW-2 and PW-3 i.e both al- leged eye witnesses have failed to support the case of prosecu- tion by stating about complicity of accused in the alleged of- fence, the only evidence left with prosecution for showing the culpability of accused is the refusal of accused to subject him- self to the judicial TIP proceedings.
19. Pertinently, it is asserted by the prosecution that an ad- verse inference may be drawn against accused qua his com- plicity in the alleged offence as he had refused to participate in the TIP proceedings. In this regard, it is pertinent to state that State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 15 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in matter of Rajesh @ Sarkari & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana Criminal Appeal No.1648 of 2019 decided on 03.11.2020 observed that "the Court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether and adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. The finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo a identifi- cation parade. The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, test the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eye wit- ness to the crime. There is no specific provision either in Cr.P.C. or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades be- long to the stage of investigation of crime and there is no provi- sion which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP. Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of section 162 of Cr.P.C.
A TIP should be ordinarily conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused be- ing shown to the witnesses before it is held. The identification of accused in Court constitutes a substantive evidence. Facts which establish the identity of accused persons are treated to be relevant u/s 9 of the Evidence Act.
A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in Court, if so required. As a rule of prudence, the Court would generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness' State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 16 identification of the accused in Court, in the firm of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to exception when the Court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such other corroboration. Since, a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible. The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the Court in the circumstances of that particular case.
Identification of accused in a TIP or in court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence. The Court may in the context and circumstances of the case determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the Court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused. The identification in the course of the TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused. The finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of accused to undergo an identification parade".
20. In the present case, apart from refusal of accused to undergo TIP proceedings, there is no other reliable evidences showing that the accused was driving the alleged offending vehicle at the time of incident. Though, the prosecution is relying on the alleged disclosure statement given by the accused during the course of investigation yet it is an undisputed fact that the recovery of allegedly offending vehicle or any other incriminating evidence was never affected from or State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 17 at the instance of accused pursuant to alleged disclosure statement made by him in the present case. Therefore, the disclosure statement of accused cannot be said to be admissible in law due to embargo contained in section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act as said facts have not led to recovery of any fact pursuant to the disclosure statements made by the accused. Undisputedly, the refusal of accused to participate in TIP is liable for an adverse inference unless and until a plausible reason is offered. However, in the present case, it is evident from record that IO has not bothered to take any steps for associating accused in the investigation for a period of one month after ascertaining the identity of accused and thereafter, he waited for a further period of more than 25 days for moving the application for judicial TIP of accused. It is vehemently asserted on behalf of accused that he wes never involved in the alleged incident and that the IO had taken his photographs and had shown the same to the complainant suggesting that the alleged offending vehicle was driven by him and due to such reason, the accused refused to participate in the TIP Proceedings. The fact that complainant had initially stated that she did not see the driver of the alleged offending vehicle at the time of incident and thereafter changed her stands while giving deposition as PW-1 that the accused was seen by her at the spot itself coupled with the facts that the alleged eye witnesses i.e. PW-2 and PW-3 have failed to identify the accused as the person who was driving the alleged offending vehicle, the possibility that the photographs of accused were taken by the IO and same were shown to the complainant with the suggestion that accused was the offender who had caused the accident in question, cannot be completely ruled out. Thus the refusal of accused to participate in the TIP proceedings appears State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 18 to be plausible and justified and no adverse inference can be drawn against accused for such refusal.
21. In nutshell, the prosecution is unsuccessful in establishing the identity of the accused as the driver of the alleged offending vehicle and due to such reasons, the accused cannot be held liable for the alleged offences u/s 279/338 IPC. Even if for the sake of arguments, if it is presumed that the accused was driving the alleged offending vehicle at the time of incident, still the prosecution is unsuccessful in establishing the fact that the vehicle was driven by the accused in rash or negligent manner. Precisely, the testimony of PW-1 is completely silent about the manner in which the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of incident so as to constitute rash or negligent act of driving of the vehicle. PW-1 has simply stated that the offending vehicle was driven in a careless manner and at a high speed. It is a settled position in law that mere high speed driving of vehicle is not sufficient to attract provisions of section 279 IPC as the said offence pre supposes the requirement of establishing the fact that the offender was driving the vehicle in an over hasty way either by taking due precautions to avert the incident or with in difference towards the consequences of his such hasty act. However, in the present case no such facts have been established by the prosecution and merely on the basis of bald statement of PW-1 that the vehicle was allegedly driven by accused at a high speed and in careless manner without the detailed description of the same, the existence of any rash or negligent act on the part of the driver of the alleged offending vehicle cannot be presumed. Therefore, the charges levelled against accused appears to be completely unfounded and the accused deserves to be acquitted in the present case.
State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 19
22. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubts that on the given date, time and place, the accused was driving the vehicle no. DL-2W-4741 in a rash or negligent manner so as to endanger human life or public safety or others, therefore, accused de- serves to be acquitted for offence u/s 279 IPC. The prosecution has also failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubts that on the given, date, time and place, the accused struck his vehi- cle with pedestrian Neetu Khurana, who suffered grievous in- juries due to the incident in question, therefore, the accused also deserves to be acquitted for offence u/s 338 IPC. Thus, the accused Lal Singh is hereby acquitted for offences with which he has been charged.
Announced in the open Court on 15.09.2025.
(Rishabh Kapoor) Judicial Magistrate First Class-05 (South-West)/Dwarka State Vs.: Lal Singh FIR No: 242/2022 U/s: 279/338 IPC P.S.: Vikas Puri 20