Mr. Arun Kumar G V vs The State Of Karnataka on 23 October, 2025

[Cites 18, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Mr. Arun Kumar G V vs The State Of Karnataka on 23 October, 2025

Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 33842 OF 2024 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:

MR. ARUN KUMAR G V,
S/O. G. VEERAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
POLICE INSPECTOR
BANGALORE METROPOLITAN TASK FORCE,
BANGALORE CITY.
RESIDING AT NO.012.
SANSID GALAXY APARTMENT,
RAILWAY PARALLEL ROAD,
RACHENAHALLI, BENGALURU 560 077.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. UNNIKRISHNAN M, ADVOCATE)
AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH THE POLICE INSPECTOR-27,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BENGALURU CITY DIVISION 560 001.
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Digitally signed
by CHANDANA 2. SRI.PARAMESH V
BM SON OF LATE VENKATESH,
Location: High AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
Court of RESIDING AT NO.561,
Karnataka NEAR OM SHAKTHI TEMPLE
BELLATHUR COLONY, KADUGODI POST
BENGALURU - 560 067.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-1, R-2 SERVED)

THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO-QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED AS
LOKAYUKTHA CRIME NO. 41/2024 IN PURSUANCE TO THE COMPLAINT, DTD
14.11.2024 FILED BY THE R-2 I.E ANNX-A AND B AND CONSEQUENTLY ALL
PROCEEDINGS IN LOKAYUKTHA CRIME NO. 41/2024 PENDING BEFORE THE
RD
HONBLE 23 ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE CUM SPECIAL COURT
(PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT), BANGALORE AS AGAINST THIS
PETITIONER.
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THIS PETITION IS BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 25.07.2025
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE
THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

CAV ORDER

In this petition, petitioner - accused seeks quashing of the

impugned FIR in Crime No.41/2024 registered on 14.11.2024 by

the 1st respondent - Lokayuktha police, pursuant to a complaint

dated 14.11.2024 filed by the 2nd respondent - complainant against

the petitioner for offences punishable under Section 7(a) of the

Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the P.C.Act') and

for other reliefs.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

counsel for the 1st respondent and perused the material on record.

3. Though the notice of this petition has been served on the

2nd respondent, he has chosen to remain absent and

unrepresented and not contested the petition.

4. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the

petitioner is working as an Inspector in the Bangalore Metropolitan

Task Force (BMTF) as an employee of the BBMP. The 2nd
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respondent filed a complaint dated 14.11.2024 with the 1st

respondent - Lokayuktha interalia stating that he was the husband

of Smt.Sridevi, who was the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.56 of

Kumbena Agrahara Village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Bangalore East

Taluk, Bangalore and had entered into a JDA with M/s.S.S

Developers, who had constructed a residential apartment complex.

The complainant alleged that on 11.11.2024, he received a phone

call from one Thimmaraju working in BMTF, who informed the

complainant that a complaint had been filed against the said

Smt.Sridevi regarding illegal encroachment and that the

complainant had to meet the petitioner in this regard. It is further

alleged that when the complainant met the petitioner, he demanded

Rs.15 lakhs for closing the case / complaint against Smt.Sridevi

and after negotiations, the said amount was reduced and fixed at

Rs.12.5 lakhs by the petitioner typing the said amount on his

mobile phone.

5. The 2nd respondent-complainant claimed that he had

recorded the said conversation in a spy camera and transferred it

to a laptop and being unwilling to pay the said amount to the

petitioner, 2nd respondent filed a complaint before the 1st
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respondent - Lokayuktha, who conducted a pre-trap proceedings

and thereafter, accompanied the complainant to a designated place

where a sum of Rs.2 lakhs was handed over by the complainant to

one Nandish, who was apprehended and a trap panchanama was

prepared, statements of persons were recorded and proceedings

were initiated against the petitioner.

6. A perusal of the material on record comprising of the

complaint, FIR, trap panchanama, pre-trap panchanama,

statements of witnesses will indicate that except the allegation

made in the complaint to the effect that the petitioner had allegedly

demanded a sum of Rs.12.5 lakhs from the 2nd respondent, there is

absolutely no material to incriminate the petitioner for the alleged

offences. It cannot be gainsaid that it has been repeatedly held and

reiterated by the Apex Court and this Court that proof of both

demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is sine qua non for

attracting the provisions contained in Section 7(a) of the P.C.Act.

7. In this context, it is pertinent to note that the amount was

not recovered from the petitioner but only from one Nandish and

the trap panchanama and the entrustment mahazar do not indicate

the presence of the petitioner at the scene of occurrence and the
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incident is said to have occurred in the car of the said Nandish;

these documents also do not speak about the handing over of any

illegal gratification to the petitioner, much less, any demand or

acceptance by the petitioner; so also the alleged voice recording on

11.11.2024 is of such poor quality that it cannot be deciphered that

the voice was that of the petitioner as per the panchanama; at any

rate, the said voice recording does not establish acceptance of

illegal gratification by the petitioner; as stated supra, the alleged

illegal gratification was never handed over to the petitioner who

was not found at the scene of occurrence nor was he apprehended

by the 1st respondent at that time; further, the material on record

also does not indicate that any video recording is mentioned or

referred to in the panchanama, mahazar etc., Under these

circumstances, in the absence of any material to establish that the

petitioner is guilty of the alleged offence punishable under Section

7(a) of the P.C.Act, I am of the considered opinion of the impugned

proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law

warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.

8. In its recent judgment in the case of Shivaram M.J. vs.

State by Lokayuktha - Crl.P.No.7568/2024 Dated 02.06.2025,
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the co-ordinate Bench of this Court considered the provisions of

Section 7 of the P.C.Act (Pre-amendment and Post amendment)

referred to various earlier judgments of the Apex Court, this Court

and other High Courts and held as under:-

" The petitioner/accused No.1 is at the doors of this
Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime
No.22 of 2024 against the petitioner and others for offences
punishable under Section 7(a) and 12 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short).
2. Facts, in brief, as borne out from the pleadings
are as follows:-

The 2nd respondent is the complainant. A complaint
comes to be registered on 18-05-2024 against the
petitioner and others alleging that the complainant owned
sites in Site Nos. 3 and 10 in Sy.No.38/1A of
Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk and ward
No.40 of the Bruhat Bengaluru Manahagara Palike and a
dispute emerged between the neighbours with regard to
ownership of sites. The complainant files a suit for
injunction and it appears, that the concerned Court grants
temporary injunction. A case and counter case comes to
registered between the complainant and the neighbouring
property owner. The petitioner was working as a Police
Sub-Inspector in Byadarahalli Police Station. When the
case and counter-case was registered before the Officer in-
charge of the Police Station/the petitioner, it is alleged that
the petitioner had demanded money for grant of station
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bail. Based upon the said allegation, a crime comes to be
registered in Crime No.22 of 2024 for offences punishable
under Sections 7(a) and 12 of the Act. Registration of crime
has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

3. Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta, learned senior
counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.B.Patil,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1.

4. The learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that rival claimants
were on loggerheads. Both have registered crimes against
each other - a case and a counter case in Crime No.232 of
2024 and Crime No.236 of 2024. Pursuant to registration
of a case and counter-case, the SHO who was not the
petitioner instructed the petitioner to go ahead with the
procedure and grant station bail. It is alleged that the
petitioner has demanded ₹50,000/- for himself and
₹5,000/- to be paid to the writer and accordingly, ₹5,000/-
was paid to the writer. The demand was allegedly
recorded in a voice recorder and based upon this
information a crime in Crime No.22 of 2024 is registered.
The learned senior counsel would further contend that
there is no proof of demand and acceptance. There was
nothing pending before the petitioner to constitute an
offence. This, at best, is a failed trap, as neither the voice
recording nor the complaint directly pins the petitioner. It is
registered only to wreak vengeance on grant of bail to one
of the warring parties. The panchanama also indicates that
the voice recorder was turned off at the time of
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conversation in the police station and the alleged demand
of bribe was not by the petitioner nor it was accepted by the
petitioner. It was accused No.2 who was caught accepting
bribe of ₹5,000/-.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri B.B.Patil
appearing for the 1st respondent/Lokayukta would submit
that the petitioner was the person who was to grant station
bail, as the Station House Officer has instructed the
petitioner to register the case and the counter-case. The
warring parties were before the civil Court and one of them
had secured injunction and the other one was demanding
that the Police issue Section 41A Cr.P.C notice. In the
wake of issuance of the notice, it is the allegation that the
petitioner had demanded ₹50,000/- initially and the matter
was settled for ₹5,000/-. He would admit the amount was
recovered from accused No.2 and not from the hands of
the petitioner. He would contend that all these matters
would be a matter of trial and there cannot be
entertainment of a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C
at the stage of investigation.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and
have perused the material on record.

7. The afore-narrated facts are borne out from the
pleadings, the complaint or the trap mahazar. Therefore,
they would not be necessary to be reiterated again. The
petitioner, at the relevant point in time, was working as
Sub-Inspector in Byadarahalli Police Station. A complaint is
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filed by one Satish L, an electrical contractor, the 2nd
respondent/complainant that the petitioner has demanded
an illegal gratification of ₹1,50,000/- which was later
reduced to ₹50,000/- for accused No.1, the petitioner and
₹5,000/- to the writer one Ningaraje Gowda, accused No.2
for grant of station bail to respondent No.2 against whom a
crime was registered in Crime No.232 of 2024 for offences
punishable under Sections 504, 506, 448, 323, 324 r/w 34
of the IPC. The crime is registered on account of squabble
with the complainant and certain persons involved in the
dispute in respect of Sy.No.38/1A situated at
Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The
complainant then approaches the Lokayukta alleging that
the petitioner has demanded bribe for the purpose of
registration of crime and issuance of Section 41A notice
against the complainant in Crime No. 232 of 2024, as the
complainant also had registered a crime against the
complainant in Crime No.236 of 2024, as it was a case and
counter case.

8. Pursuant to registration of complaint by the 2nd
respondent a crime in Crime No.22 of 2024 comes to be
registered against the petitioner for offences punishable
under Section 7(a) and 12 of the Act. Thereafter,
entrustment mahazar was drawn and a trap was
conducted. The petitioner was not caught in the trap; it was
a failed trap inasmuch as the petitioner was concerned.
Accused No.2, Ningaraje Gowda who was a writer in the
Police Station and who had to draw the station bail was
caught accepting ₹5,000/-. Pursuant to the said act, the
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petitioner along with two others are drawn into the web of
crime. It is then the petitioner is before this Court.

9. Before embarking upon consideration of the case
of the petitioner on its merit, I deem it appropriate to notice
the law as elucidated by the Apex Court both in the pre-
amendment and post-amendment. The provisions of the
Act that are alleged are as follows:

"7. Offence relating to public servant being
bribed.--Any public servant who,--

(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from
any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to
perform or cause performance of public duty
improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause
forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or
by another public servant; or

(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue
advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or
dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to
perform such duty either by himself or another public
servant; or

(c) performs or induces another public servant to
perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to
forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in
consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any
person,

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than three years but which may extend to
seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation 1.--For the purpose of this section, the
obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue
advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the
performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or
has not been improper.
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Illustration.--A public servant, 'S' asks a person, 'P'
to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process
his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an
offence under this section.

Explanation 2.--For the purpose of this section,--

(i) the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts
to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public
servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any
undue advantage for himself or for another person, by
abusing his position as a public servant or by using his
personal influence over another public servant; or by any
other corrupt or illegal means;

(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a
public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the
undue advantage directly or through a third party.]

7-A. Taking undue advantage to influence public
servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of
personal influence.--Whoever accepts or obtains or
attempts to obtain from another person for himself or
for any other person any undue advantage as a motive
or reward to induce a public servant, by corrupt or
illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence
to perform or to cause performance of a public duty
improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to
forbear such public duty by such public servant or by
another public servant, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to seven years and
shall also be liable to fine.

... ... ...

12. Punishment for abetment of offences.--
Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act,
whether or not that offence is committed in
consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less
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than three years, but which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.

13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.--
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,--

(a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or
otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted
to him or any property under his control as a public servant
or allows any other person so to do; or

(b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the
period of his office.

Explanation 1.--A person shall be presumed to have
intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any person on
his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time during the
period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary
resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income which the public servant cannot
satisfactorily account for.

Explanation 2.--The expression "known sources of
income" means income received from any lawful sources.

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal
misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which shall be not less than four years but
which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable
to fine."

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 directs that any public servant who
accepts or attempts to obtain from any person undue
advantage with an intention to perform or cause
performance of public duty or to forbear such performance
either by himself or by another public servant is said to
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have committed the offence of bribe. Therefore the soul of
Section 7(a) is demand and acceptance for the
performance of public duty or forbearance of such
performance. Section 7A deals with taking undue
advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal
means or by exercise of personal influence. The section
mandates that whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to
obtain from another person for himself or for any other
person undue advantage for performance of a public duty
or its forbearance is amenable for punishment. Here again
it should be demand and acceptance by himself or through
some other person. Section 12 deals with abatement of
offence which cannot be applicable to the petitioner.
Section 13(2) deals with punishment for criminal
misconduct. Criminal misconduct is defined in Section
13(1)(a) that whoever dishonestly or fraudulently
misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any
property entrusted to him or enriches himself illicitly during
the period of his office. Since the soul is Section 7 either
under the un-amended Act or under the amended Act, the
interpretation of Section 7(a) or Section 7A by the Apex
Court qua un-amended Act or the amended Act is germane
to be noticed.

INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED
ACT:

10. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH interprets Section 7 of
the Act and holds as follows:
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"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of
illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the
said offence and mere recovery of currency notes
cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the
accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to
be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid
down in several judgments of this Court. By way of
illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M.
Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC
(Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779:
(2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]."

(Emphasis supplied)

In the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v. STATE OF
TAMILNADU the Apex Court holds as follows:

"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery
by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution
against the accused. Reference can be made to the
judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779
: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of
this Court while considering the case under Sections 7,
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence
of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere
possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to
constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held
that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can
be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal
gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial
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presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets
doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.

27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment
in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC
55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp. 58-
59)

"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of
illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the
said offence and mere recovery of currency notes
cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the
accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to
be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid
down in several judgments of this Court. By way of
illustration, reference may be made to the decision
in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. State of
A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M.
Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3
SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] .

8. In the present case, the complainant did not
support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the
accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined
any other witness, present at the time when the money was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant,
to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made
by the accused. When the complainant himself had
disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.
P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove
that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of
PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon
to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes
proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We
are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as
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well as the High Court was not correct in holding the
demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The
only other material available is the recovery of the tainted
currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact
such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere
possession and recovery of the currency notes from the
accused without proof of demand will not bring home the
offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive
insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for
illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or
abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be
established.

9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such
presumption can only be in respect of the offence under
Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification
was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act.
Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if
there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the
present case the primary facts on the basis of which the
legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are
wholly absent."

The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the
case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed
by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined
on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the
demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone
by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal
recorded by the trial court is a "possible view" as such the
judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC
OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside.
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Before recording conviction under the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take
utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is
recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the
society apart from serious consequences on the service
rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that
whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view
or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each
case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to
evidence on record."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court, later, in the case of
K.SHANTHAMMA v. STATE OF TELANGANA has held
as follows:

"10. We have given careful consideration to the
submissions. We have perused the depositions of the
prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the
PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a
demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof.
The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and
its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing
the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152
: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the
well-settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus :
(SCC p. 159)

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demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring
home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a
corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for
illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the
amount from the person accused of the offence under
Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction
thereunder."

(emphasis supplied)

12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had
kept pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said
Society for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a
notice dated 14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the
said Society to produce the record. Accordingly, the
necessary books were produced by the said Society. The
case made out by PW 1 is that when he repeatedly visited
the office of the appellant in February 2020, the demand of
Rs 3000 by way of illegal gratification was made by the
appellant for passing the assessment order. However, PW
1, in his cross-examination, accepted that the notice dated
26-2-2000 issued by the appellant was received by the said
Society on 15-3-2000 in which it was mentioned that after
verification of the books of accounts of the said Society,
exemption from payment of commercial tax as claimed by
the said Society was allowed. PW 1 accepted that it was
stated in the said notice that there was no necessity for the
said Society to pay any commercial tax for Assessment
Year 1996-97.

13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he
visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final
assessment order. According to his case, at that time,
initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000.
But she scaled it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-
2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing
the said Society that an exemption has been granted from
payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore,
the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year
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1996-97. The issue of the final assessment order was only
a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's case
about the demand of bribe made on 23-3-2000 by the
appellant appears to be highly doubtful.

14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the
pre-trap mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8,
Shri R. Hari Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 --
complainant at the time of offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri
P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8 Shri U.V.S. Raju, the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had instructed LW
8 to accompany PW 1 -- complainant inside the chamber
of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating in
the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to
accompany PW 1 and observe what transpires between
the appellant and PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted
that only PW 1 entered the chamber of the appellant and
LW 8 waited outside the chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in
the cross-examination that when PW 1 entered the
appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained outside in the
corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an independent
witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the directions
issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1 inside
the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the
chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no
explanation why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the
chamber of the appellant at the time of the trap.

15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the
alleged demand and acceptance. According to PW 1,
firstly, the demand was made of Rs 3000 by the appellant
on 24-2-2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days, she
reiterated the demand when he visited the appellant's
office. Lastly, the appellant made the demand on 29-2-
2000 and 23-3-2000. On this aspect, he was cross-
examined in detail by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellant. His version about the demand
and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:
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"In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which we
went there was stopped and I was asked to go into the
office of AO and the trap party took vantage positions.
Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I wished AO. At
that time apart from AO some other person was found in
the office room of AO and he was talking to the AO. AO
offered me a chair. After discussion with the AO the said
other person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I
brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and also
asked her to issue the final assessment orders. Then I took
the said tainted currency notes from my shirt pocket and I
was about to give the same to the AO and on which instead
of taking the same amount directly by her with her hands
she took out a diary from her table drawer, opened the
diary and asked me to keep the said amount in the diary.
Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She closed
the said diary and again kept the same in her table drawer
and locked the drawer and kept the keys in her hand bag
which was hanging to her seat. She pressed the calling bell
and a lady attender came into the room of AO, then she
instructed the lady attender to call ACTO concerned to her
along with the society records concerned.

Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After
going through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on
the last page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning
26-2-2000 below her signature in the said register though
she signed on 27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her
attender to affix official rubber stamp below her signature in
the ledger and cash book and accordingly attender affixed
the same. AO also signed on the office note of final
assessment orders at that time. Thereafter, I collected the
general ledger and cash book from the attender after
affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and came out of the
office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal to the trap
party."

(emphasis supplied)
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16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant
reiterated her demand at the time of trap. His version is that
on his own, he told her that he had brought the amount.
What is material is the cross-examination on this aspect. In
the cross-examination, PW 1 accepted that his version
regarding the demand made by the appellant on various
dates was an improvement. The relevant part of the cross-
examination of the appellant reads thus:

"I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161
CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met the
AO and that she demanded the bribe. I did not mention in
Ext. P-3 complaint that continuously for 3 days after 24-2-
2000 I met the AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I did
not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000 I
approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe of Rs
3000 and that unless I pay the said bribe amount she will
not issue final assessment orders. I did not state in my
Section 164 statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-
2000 to 16-3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-
3-2000, I was engaged in recovering the dues of the
society. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO
continuously 3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-
2000 and that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest
that I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and
that AO did not demand any money from me. I did not state
in my Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that
before I left the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a
phone call enquiring about the availability of AO and the
AO was in the office and informed me that she should be
available in the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day so
also in my Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call
from the office of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as to
from which phone number I made phone call on that day. I
cannot describe office telephone number of the AO. It is not
true to suggest that I did not make any such phone call to
AO and that she did not give any such reply to me. I did not
state to ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement
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or to the Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that
I went inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that
time apart from AO some other person was found in the
office room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and
that the AO offered me a chair and that after discussion
with the AO the said person left the room of AO and then I
informed the AO that I brought the bribe amount. I did not
state that said aspects to DSP during the post trap
proceedings also."

(emphasis supplied)

17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-
chief about the demand made by the appellant from time to
time is an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not
enter the appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is
no other evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the
evidence of PW 1 about the demand for bribe by the
appellant is not at all reliable. Hence, we conclude that the
demand made by the appellant has not been conclusively
proved.

18. PW 2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal
knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that
on 15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication
informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the
year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as
Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on
15-3-2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO
served the original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was
mentioned that the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It
is his version that when he met the appellant on the same
day, she enquired whether he had brought the demanded
amount of Rs 3000. However, PW 3 did not state that the
appellant demanded the said amount for granting any
favour to the said society.

19. PW 4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the
relevant time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant
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instructed him to prepare the final assessment order, which
was kept ready in the morning. He stated that he was
called at 6 p.m. to the chamber of the appellant along with
books of the said Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting
there. He stated that the appellant subscribed her signature
on a Register of the said Society and put the date as 26-2-
2000 below it. He was not a witness to the alleged demand.
However, in the cross-examination, he admitted that the
appellant had served a memo dated 21-3-2000 to him
alleging that he was careless in performing his duties."

The afore-quoted judgments were rendered
interpreting Section 7 as it stood prior to amendment. The
Apex Court holds that demand and acceptance are sine
qua non for an offence under Section 7 of the Act.

JUDGMENTS POST AMENDMENT:

11. The Apex Court has further interpreted Section
7(a) post amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v.
STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI and holds as follows:

"8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note
that we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as
they stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of
2018 with effect from 26th July 2018. We are referring to
Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission
of the offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time,
reads thus:

"7. Public servant taking gratification other than
legal remuneration in respect of an official act.--

Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant,
accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain
from any person, for himself or for any other person, any
gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a
motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official
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act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of
his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or
for rendering or attempting to render any service or
disservice to any person, with the Central Government or
any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of
any State or with any local authority, corporation or
Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2,
or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise,
shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not
less than three years but which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanations.-

(a) "Expecting to be a public servant"- If a person not
expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by
deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in
office, and that he will then serve them, he may be
guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence
defined in this section.

(b) "Gratification". The word "gratification" is not
restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to
gratifications estimable in money.

(c) "Legal remuneration"- The words "legal
remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration
which a public servant can lawfully demand, but
include all remuneration which he is permitted by the
Government or the organisation, which he serves, to
accept.

(d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person who
receives a gratification as a motive or reward for
doing what he does not intend or is not in a position
to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.

(e) Where a public servant induces a person
erroneously to believe that his influence with the
Government has obtained a title for that person and
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thus induces that person to give the public servant,
money or any other gratification as a reward for this
service, the public servant has committed an offence
under this section."

9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time,
reads thus:

"13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.--

(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence
of criminal misconduct,-

(a) ....................................

(b) ....................................

(d) if he,-

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains
for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant,
obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or

(e) ........................................"

10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance
thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the PC Act.

11. The Constitution Bench4 was called upon to
decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In
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paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have
been summarised, which read thus:

"74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by
the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish
the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections
7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand
of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance
as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved
either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of
oral evidence or documentary evidence.

(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the
proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public
servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe
giver without there being any demand from the public
servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives
the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per
Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a
prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant
makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand
and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment.
In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal
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gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an
offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer
by the bribe giver and the demand by the public
servant respectively have to be proved by the
prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere
acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without
anything more would not make it an offence under
Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of
the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to
bring home the offence, there must be an offer which
emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the
public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a
prior demand by the public servant when accepted by
the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made
which is received by the public servant, would be an
offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i)
and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way of
an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary
evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of
the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise
a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of
demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of
course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the
accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption
stands.

(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial,
demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in
the evidence of any other witness who can again let in
evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence.
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The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of
acquittal of the accused public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section
20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the
illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or
reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said
presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal
presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said
presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not
apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact
referred to above in point

(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption
while the latter is discretionary in nature."

(emphasis added)

12. The referred question was answered in
paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus:

"76. Accordingly, the question referred for
consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as
under:

In the absence of evidence of the complainant
(direct/primary, oral/ document-tary evidence), it is
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of
culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act
based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution."

(emphasis added)

13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20
of the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution
Bench by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue,
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Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a presumption that
illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward
as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the
amendment of 2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has
approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble
Judges in the cases of B. Jayaraj1 and P. Satyanarayana
Murthy2. There is another decision of a three Judges'
bench in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil
Nadu5, which follows the view taken in the cases of B.
Jayaraj1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy2. In paragraph 9 of
the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj1, this Court has dealt
with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In
paragraph 9, this Court held thus:

"9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such
presumption can only be in respect of the offence
under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on
proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that
presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act
that such gratification was received for doing or
forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of
illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of
demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the
primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption
under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."

(emphasis added)

14. The presumption under Section 20 can be
invoked only when the two basic facts required to be
proved under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic
facts are 'demand' and 'acceptance' of gratification. The
presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary is
proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be presumed
to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7.
It means that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal
gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the
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contrary are proved, the Court will have to presume that the
gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or
reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this
presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the
preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the
presumption.

15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar5, another bench of
three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption
under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to
establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and
clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)
of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus:

"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by
itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against
the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of
this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and
in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the
aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering
the case under Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated
that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of
proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere
possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to
constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held
that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can
be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal
gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled
that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal
jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the
trial court."

(emphasis added)
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16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its
acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26th July 2018, was
different from the present Section 7. The unamended
Section 7 which is applicable in the present case,
specifically refers to "any gratification". The substituted
Section 7 does not use the word "gratification", but it uses a
wider term "undue advantage". When the allegation is of
demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the
accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or
forbearing to do any official act. The fact that the demand
and acceptance of gratification were for motive or reward
as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the
presumption under Section 20 provided the basic
allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. In
this case, we are also concerned with the offence
punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which
is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d)
of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the
statute book prior to the amendment of 26th July 2018, has
been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of clauses (i) and
(ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove
the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d).
In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a
given case, the demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant can be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral or
documentary evidence. While answering the referred
question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability
and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of
direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always
be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial
evidence.
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18. The allegation of demand of gratification and
acceptance made by a public servant has to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the
Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes
by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution
Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by
direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way
of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When
reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the
demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish
each and every circumstance from which the prosecution
wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so
established must be consistent with only one hypothesis
that there was a demand made for gratification by the
accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine
whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we
come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of
demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is
any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand."

Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA'S case, the Apex
Court in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE has held
as follows:

"FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND

9. We have considered the submissions. It is well
settled that for establishing the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand
of gratification and acceptance of the gratification is a sine
qua non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in the case
of Neeraj Dutta3 has reiterated that the presumption under
Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked only on proof of
facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification by the
accused and the acceptance thereof.
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10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not
supported the prosecution. He has not said anything in his
examination-in-chief about the demand made by the
appellant. The public prosecutor cross-examined PW-2.
The witness stated that there was no demand of a bribe
made by the appellant. According to him, he filed a
complaint as the return of the sale deed was delayed.
Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the complaint, in
the cross-examination, he was not confronted with the
material portions of the complaint in which he had narrated
how the alleged demand was made. The public prosecutor
ought to have confronted the witness with his alleged prior
statements in the complaint and proved that part of the
complaint through the concerned police officer who had
reduced the complaint into writing. However, that was not
done.

11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow
witness (PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that
the appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the
amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a
specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To
attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification
has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before
26th July 2018, is 'gratification'. There has to be a demand
for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it
has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of
demand of gratification and acceptance thereof is proved,
then the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked,
and the Court can presume that the demand must be as a
motive or reward for doing any official act. This
presumption can be rebutted by the accused.

12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand
for gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the
offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been established.
Unless both demand and acceptance are established,
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offence of obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means
covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be
proved."

The Apex Court, in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA
supra, was clarifying and interpreting the judgment in the
case of NEERAJ DUTTA which was rendered by a
Constitution Bench and further holds that proof of demand
and acceptance of gratification is sine qua non for any
allegation under Section 7 of the Act, be it pre-amendment
or post-amendment. This is reiterated in the case of
SOUNDARAJAN supra.

12. The Apex Court, in its latest judgment, in the
case of AMAN BHATIA v. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI),
while considering the purport of Section 7 of the Act has
held as follows:

".... .... ....

51. In C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India, (1997)
9 SCC 477, this Court, although interpreting the term
"accept" in the context of the 1947 Act, observed that
"accept" means to take or receive with a consenting mind.
In contrast, "obtain" was understood to imply securing or
gaining something as a result of a request or effort. In both
instances, a demand or request by the receiver is a
prerequisite for establishing an offence under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted
money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges
against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a
conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act
respectively, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money,
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knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently
reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non for
establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj
Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC
731, categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the
demand by the public servant have to be proved by the
prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections
7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of
illegal gratification without proof of offer by bribe-giver and
demand by the public servant would not make an offence
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The
relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

"88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely,
the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in
mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without
there being any demand from the public servant and the
latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of
the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand
by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and
tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received
by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case
of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the
bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant
respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact
in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an
illegal gratification without anything more would not make it
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an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii),
respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the
Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an
offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it an
offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant
when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a
payment made which is received by the public servant,
would be an offence of obtainment under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act."

(Emphasis supplied)

54. It was further explained by this Court in P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC
152, as follows:

"23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus,
is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof,
unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere
acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal
gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of
demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring
home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a
corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for
illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the
amount from the person accused of the offence under
Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction
thereunder."

(Emphasis supplied)

55. From the above exposition of law, it may be
safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of
tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the
absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an
offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act
respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand
for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public
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servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his
position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

56. The present case is not one of an "offer to pay
by the bribe-giver" where, in the absence of any demand
from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal
gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of
the PC Act. The expression "offer" indicates that there is a
conveyance of an intention to give, which must be
communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to
meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For
such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section
7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing
that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted
it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other
words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-
giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad
idem as regards the factum of offer of bribe.

57. By applying the abovementioned principles to
the evidence on record, we are of the considered view that,
having regard to material inconsistencies in the testimony
of the complainant and the testimony of the panch witness,
the allegation of demand by the appellant herein does not
emerge clearly, let alone being proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

58. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a wholly reliable
witness, the court faces no difficulty in reaching a
conclusion, it may convict or acquit solely on the basis of
such testimony, provided it is free from any suspicion of
interestedness, incompetence, or subordination. Similarly,
in the case of a wholly unreliable witness, the court again
faces no ambiguity in discarding the testimony. The real
challenge arises when the witness is neither wholly reliable
nor wholly unreliable. In such situations, the court must
proceed with caution and seek corroboration in material
particulars, whether through direct or circumstantial
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evidence. The court's duty to act on the testimony of a
single witness arises when it is satisfied, upon a careful
perusal of the testimony, that it is free from all taints and
suspicions. [See: VediveluThevar v. State of Madras, 1957
SCC OnLine SC 13; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer
Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390]."

The Apex Court also considers the presumption
under Section 20 of the Act and holds on examination of
evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Apex Court has held as
follows:

".... .... ....

v. Presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act

64. Insofar as the presumption under Section 20 of
the PC Act is concerned, such presumption is drawn
only qua the offence under Sections 7 and 11 respectively
and not qua the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act. The presumption is contingent upon the proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification to the effect that the
gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or
reward as contemplated under Section 7 of the PC Act.
Such proof of acceptance can follow only when the
demand is proved.

65. In that case, the prosecution evidence alone
cannot be considered for the purpose of coming to the
conclusion. The evidence led by the prosecution and, the
suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, are
also required to be considered. It is then to be seen as to
whether the total effect of the entire evidence led before the
court is of a nature by which the only conclusion possible
was that the public servant accepted the amount. If the
answer is in affirmative, then alone it can be held that the
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prosecution established the case beyond reasonable
doubt.

66. Undoubtedly, the presumption under Section 20
arises once it is established that the public servant
accepted the gratification. However, in determining whether
such acceptance occurred, the totality of the evidence led
at the trial must be appreciated. The evidence led by the
prosecution, the suggestions made by the defence
witnesses, if any, the entire record is required to be
considered. Only if the cumulative effect of all the evidence
is such that the sole possible conclusion is that the public
servant accepted the gratification can it be said that the
prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable
doubt.

67. On examination of the entire evidence, we are of
the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish
beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its
acceptance, in a trap laid by the ACB. In such
circumstances, there is no question of a presumption under
Section 20. Consequently, we find ourselves compelled to
conclude that it would be entirely illegal to uphold the
conviction of the appellant under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.

G. CONCLUSION

68. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have
reached the following conclusion:

68.1 The legislature has used a comprehensive
definition of "public servant" to achieve the purpose of
punishing and curbing the growing menace of corruption.
Keeping this intention of the legislature in mind, we are of
the view that the definition of "public servant" as defined
under the PC Act should be given a purposive and wide
interpretation so as to advance the object underlying the
statute.
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68.2 It is the nature of duty being discharged by a
person which assumes paramount importance when
determining whether such a person falls within the ambit of
the definition of public servant as defined under the PC Act.

68.3 Stamp vendors across the country, by virtue of
performing an important public duty and receiving
remuneration from the Government for the discharge of
such duty, are undoubtedly public servants within the ambit
of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.

68.4 In the case at hand, the appellant was eligible
for receiving discount on the purchase of stamp papers
owing to the license that he was holding. Further, the
discount is traceable to and is governed by the 1934 Rules
framed by the State Government. Thus, the appellant,
without a doubt, could be said to be "remunerated by the
government" for the purposes of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC
Act.

68.5 Further, the prosecution has failed in
establishing the allegation of demand for illegal gratification
and acceptance thereof beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offences
under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act cannot be sustained and is, thus, liable to be set
aside."

On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the
Apex Court, as quoted supra, the soul of Section 7 is
demand and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on
the interpretation, in the considered view of the Court would
be, if there is demand but no acceptance it would not make
an offence under Section 7. If there is acceptance but no
demand, it would then also make no offence under Section
7. An act alleged under Section 7 should have the
ingredients of demand and acceptance and it is for the
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performance of a public duty or forbearance from
performance. Therefore, demand and acceptance should
be for the purpose of performance of some duty. For such
performance there should be work pending at the hands of
the public servant against whom Section 7 is alleged.

APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF
THE CASE:

13. In the light of the judgments rendered by the
Apex Court, it becomes necessary to consider whether the
proof of demand and acceptance in the case at hand is
established albeit, prima facie. The backdrop of registration
of the complaint by the 2nd respondent is narrated
hereinabove. The complaint is registered on 18-
05-2024. Since the crime is registered on the complaint, I
deem it appropriate to notice the complaint so registered by
the complainant, the 2nd respondent. It reads as follows:

"ರವ ೆ,
ೕ ಅ ೕ ಕರು,
ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ೋ ಾಯುಕ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ ಾಗ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ
ಇಂದ,

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ನಂ.5, ಲ ೆ45ೆ ಮುಖ0ರ8ೆ,
5ಾ9ೕ: ಾಂ ಸಕ *, ಲ ೆ45ೆ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು-560058.
ªÉÆ.£ÀA.9845065509.
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;ಾನ05ೇ,

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ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ೆJ ೇG ೆ ಇKBರುವ $%ೕ $ವ5ಾಜು.ಎಂ.Qೆ. `.ಎ .ಐ. ಾ0ಡರಹLM
ೕ NಾOೆ ಮತು ಲಂಚದ ಹಣವನು< CೕG ೆಲಸ ;ಾGe ೊಳpMವಂ[ೆ
fೆ%ೕ5ೆ`eರುವ $%ೕ Cಂಗ5ಾQೇ ೌಡರವರುಗಳ ರುದs ಾನೂನು ಕ%ಮ
ಜರು>ಸುವಂ[ೆ ೋರು[ೇ ೆ. ಈ ದೂ ೊಂZ ೆ ರೂ.50.000/- ಹಣವನು< ಮತು
¢:-17/05/2024gÀAzÀÄ rfl¯ï Fಾ...X 5ೆ ಾಡ gïನ A 5ೆ ಾa
;ಾG ೊಂGರುವ ಸಂ ಾಷOೆಯನು< ªÉÆÃgï;ಾ0†X ಕಂಪCಯ ಒಂದು fೆ,vೆ‡:
ವ ಾ leದುs, ಸದ fೆ,vೆ‡: ಅನು< ತಮq ಮುಂ3ೆ YಾಜರುಪGeರು[ೇ ೆ.

ವಂದ ೆಗVೆ ಂZ ೆ,
ತಮq rಾoe,"
¸À»/-
(¸ÀwÃ±ï.J¯ï)."

Pursuant to registration of the complaint a pre-trap
mahazar is drawn. The pre-trap mahazar has some voice
recording. The voice recording relates to registration of
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crime by the complainant in the case at hand before the
Byadarahalli Police Station in which the present petitioner
was the Police Sub-Inspector. After registration of the
crime, the Police Inspector directs the petitioner to take the
issue forward. The allegation in the complaint is that money
was to be paid for grant of station bail. The complainant
was not even arrested; the complainant I mean in Crime
No.232 of 2024. Only a Section 41A notice was issued to
the complainant in relation to the crime. Therefore, the
theory of demand of money for the purpose of grant of
station bail that too at ₹50,000/- by the petitioner is a
canard. The recordings in the entrustment mahazar, which
is appended to the petition, does not record any demand by
the petitioner.

14. Pursuant to the pre-trap mahazar, the sleuths of
the Lokayukta conduct a trap in the Police Station. The
petitioner was not even present in the Police Station.
Therefore, the petitioner demanding and accepting bribe is
a theory that cannot be accepted. Who is caught in the trap
is required to be considered. Accused No.2, Ningaraje
Gowda is caught accepting the bribe. The pre-trap
mahazar indicates that the demand of bribe by the
petitioner. But, accused No.2 is caught accepting the bribe.
As observed hereinabove, the petitioner was not present at
the spot, i.e., the Police Station. No phenolphthalein test
was conducted on the petitioner. The pre-trap mahazar is
indicative of the fact that the voice recorder was turned off
at the time of trap. It is here, in such cases, it becomes
necessary that a pre-verification should be done by the trap
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laying officer. In this regard, it becomes apposite to notice
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MIR
MUSTAFA ALI HASMI v. STATE OF ANDHRA
PRADESH, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... ....

25. The learned counsel further urged that the
appellant (AO-1), having failed to offer a plausible
explanation regarding the tainted currency notes found
from the rexine bag in his possession and so also to the
presence of phenolphthalein on the fingers of his right
hand, was rightly convicted by the trial court and his
conviction was justifiably affirmed by the High Court. He
thus, implored the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm
the impugned judgments.

Discussion and conclusion

26. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at the Bar and have perused the
impugned judgments. With the assistance of the learned
counsel for the parties, we have thoroughly examined the
evidence available on record.

27. Since fervent arguments were raised on behalf
of the parties on the aspect of demand of bribe, it would be
useful to recapitulate the relevant position of law on the use
of circumstantial evidence to prove demand of illegal
gratification.

28. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj
Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 352] , was
called upon to answer a reference on the question as to
whether the circumstantial evidence can be relied upon to
prove the demand of illegal gratification and whether in the
absence of evidence of the complainant direct/primary, oral
or documentary, would it be permissible to draw an
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inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of
the Act based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution. This Constitution Bench traversed the entire
history of the judicial pronouncements on the issue and
held as below : (SCC pp. 776-77, para 88)

"88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:

88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt
of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of
illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a
matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by
direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence
or documentary evidence.

88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof
of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also
be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.

88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely,
the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in
mind:

(i) If there is an offer to pay by the bribe-
giver without there being any demand from the public
servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives
the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per
Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a
prior demand by the public servant.
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(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by
the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant,
respectively, have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact
in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an
illegal gratification without anything more would not make it
an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii),
respectively, of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the
Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an
offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it an
offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant
when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a
payment made which is received by the public servant,
would be an offence of obtainment under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an
inference only when the foundational facts have been
proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not
in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on
record, the court has the discretion to raise a presumption
of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has
been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a
presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused
and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns "hostile",
or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting
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in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in
evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence.
The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of
acquittal of the accused public servant.

88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20
mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as
mentioned in the said section. The said presumption has to
be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a
presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also
subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law
under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of
fact referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the
former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is
discretionary in nature."

(emphasis in original)

29. Thus, in addition to answering the primary issue
raised in the matter, the Constitution Bench in Neeraj
Dutta [Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC
731 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 352] also went on to hold that in
order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has to prove the demand of illegal gratification
and the subsequent acceptance, by either direct or
circumstantial evidence.

... ... ...

31. First and foremost, we may note that the first
allegation of demand as emanating from the prosecution
case is reflected from the complaint (Ext. P-1) submitted by
the complainant (PW 1) to the DSP, ACB Department,
Hyderabad Range on 22-1-2003, alleging inter alia that a
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fine of Rs 50,000 had been imposed on his sawmill by the
Flying Squad led by the appellant (AO-1) in relation to the
recovery of illegal and unlicensed teakwood in the sawmill.
After a week of this event, the appellant (AO-1) and the
Forest Guard (AO-2) again came to the sawmill and
demanded a monthly amount (mamool) of Rs 5000 to
refrain from taking any further action on the sawmill. Thus
the allegation of demand as emanating from the complaint
(Ext. P-1) is common to both the appellant (AO-1) as well
as the co-accused (AO-2) who stands acquitted by the
High Court. The complaint (Ext. P-1) was lodged on 22-1-
2003. The DSP (PW 10) organised the pre-trap
proceedings, on the next day i.e. on 23-1-2003 without
making any attempt to verify the allegation of demand of
bribe levelled against the appellant (AO-1) by the
complainant (PW 1) in the complaint (Ext. P-1).

... ... ...

34. In normal course, before proceeding to the stage
of trap, it was incumbent upon the DSP (PW 10) to get an
independent verification done of the alleged demand which
fact assumes prominence considering the circumstance
that the accompanying shadow witness, Ramesh Naidu
(PW 2) is a close friend of the complainant (PW 1) who
himself bore a grudge against the appellant (AO-1) on
account of the fine of Rs 50,000 imposed on the sawmill.

... ... ...

48. In cross-examination, DSP (PW 10) admitted
that he did not make any enquiry whether the complainant
(PW 1) was having any licence to run sawmill or the timber
depot under the name of Malikarjun Sawmill. He simply
accepted the version of the complainant (PW 1) that he had
taken the sawmill on lease from one E. Ramachary.
However, neither any enquiry was made from E.
Ramachary nor did the DSP (PW 10) visit the sawmill
before registering the case on the ipse dixit of the
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complainant (PW 1). He did not ask the complainant (PW
1) to produce the attendance register of the workers
employed in the sawmill. He also did not make any enquiry
about the rent receipts issued by E. Ramachary. Smt
Manjula, wife of the complainant (PW 1) was alleged to be
the lease-holder of the sawmill. However, DSP (PW 10)
neither enquired about the financial status nor about the
capability of complainant (PW 1) to pay the compounding
fee of Rs 50,000 under the memo (Ext. P-2). PW 10 also
admittedly did not make any effort to verify the allegation
made by the complainant (PW1) in the complaint (Ext.P-
1that the appellant (AO-1) was demanding mamool (bribe)
from him."

The Apex Court notices factual background and the
judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of NEERAJ
DUTTA and at paragraph 28 a primary issue with regard to
demand and acceptance is noticed. At paragraph 34 the
Apex Court holds that it was necessary for the trap laying
officer to ascertain the demand before proceed to trap. At
paragraph 48 it is noticed that there was no justification to
have straight away registered the FIR on the ipse dixit of
the complainant and to have planned the trap proceedings
without the minimum endeavour to verify the background
facts leading to the alleged demand of bribe. The Apex
Court further holds that a prudent and unbiased Police
Officer would be persuaded to make at least a basic
enquiry into the facts rather than following dictate of the
complainant.

15. If the case at hand is considered on the bedrock
of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, the
unmistakable inference would be that, the trap laying officer
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has not verified even to its slightest sense as to whether
there was any substance in the complaint registered by the
complainant. While the substance may be against accused
No.2 who was caught accepting ₹5,000/- bribe, the
petitioner was not even present at the spot. There is no
record of demand or acceptance. The complainant, in the
case at hand, had an axe to grind against the petitioner,
taking cue from this act, it is apparent that the subject
complaint has emerged against the petitioner. In the light of
no nuances of a successful trap being present in the case
at hand qua accused No.1, permitting further proceedings
would become an abuse of the process of law.

16. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL, has held as follows:

".... .... ....

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
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(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
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maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in clauses (1), (5) and (7) clearly
holds that even if the allegations are construed to be true, it
would not make out any case against the accused and if
the crime is registered on mala fide intention such crimes
should not be permitted to be continued.

17. In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court as
quoted hereinabove, the complaint, the pre-trap mahazar
or the trap panchanama nowhere mentions the name of the
petitioner for having demanded or accepted bribe. It is a
story twined by the complainant only insofar as the
petitioner is concerned, while it may be true against others,
as accused No2 is admittedly caught accepting the bribe. It
is for accused no.2 to answer the allegations. Permitting
further proceedings against accused No.1, the petitioner,
would become an abuse of the process of law and result in
miscarriage of justice.
18. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:-

ORDER

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

(ii) Proceedings in Crime No.22 of 2024 pending before the 23rd Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (P.C. Act) stand quashed qua the petitioner.

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(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings against any other accused pending before any other fora."

9. As stated supra, this Court reiterated the well settled principle that existence of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a condition precedent for attracting the provisions contained in Section 7(a) of the P.C.Act and in the absence thereof, the petitioner - accused cannot be held to be guilty of the alleged offences; in the instant case, except the averments made in the complaint by the 2nd respondent - complainant to the effect that the petitioner demanded illegal gratification in a sum of Rs.12.5 lakhs, the other material on record i.e., trap panchanama, pre-trap panchanama, statements of witnesses etc., do not establish the allegation of demand and acceptance by the petitioner who was not even found at the alleged spot / scene of occurrence nor was he trapped by the Lokayuktha police, who are alleged to have trapped one Nandish when he is alleged to have received Rs.2 lakhs from the complainant and consequently, it cannot be said that the petitioner was guilty of the offences alleged against him and as

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10. In the result, I pass the following:-

ORDER

(i) Petition is hereby allowed.

(ii) All further proceedings pursuant to the complaint dated 14.11.2024 registered as an FIR in Crime No.41/2024 by the 1st respondent - Lokayuktha for an offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the P.C.Act, insofar as the petitioner is concerned, are hereby quashed.

Sd/-

(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE Srl.

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